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Motivation for the research 
Demographic issues and the declining birth rate (see Figure 1) are influencing 
municipalities and regions in Russia. According to the United Nations, the Rus-
sian population will decrease from 143.9 million people in 2017 to 132.7 mil-
lion in 2050 (United Nations 2017: 26). The number of municipalities is conse-
quently decreasing as well. For comparison: in 2010, there were 23,907 munici-
palities and in 2018 this number fell to 21,945 (Федеральная служба госу-
дарственной статистики 2018).  
The debates on how to solve this issue in Russia are mainly directed towards 
territorial reforms: the abolishment of rural and urban settlements, renaming 
them and the amalgamation of rural settlements by merging small rural settle-
ments into bigger ones (Маркварт, Францке 2017). This discussion is moving 
towards centralization in many spheres, including, for example, school educa-
tion, where some experts have introduced the idea to transfer school admi-
nistration to the regional level (Mann, Briller 2005; Andreev 2013). However, 
others insist that municipal enlargement is not necessarily the only or the best 
solution and that the centralization of public service provision can be avoided 
(Маркварт, Францке 2017; Филатова et al. 2014; Маркварт 2010). There-
fore, this thesis suggests an alternative approach to resolve the consequences of 
depopulation in Russia by means of inter-municipal cooperation. One such con-
sequence is a decrease in consumer demand for municipal services – water and 




Figure 1. Birth rate (per 1,000 population) in Russia, 1992–2019 
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The declining birth rate will also result in a reduction in school-age children 
(see Figure 2), which is so far compensated for by the slight birth rate increase 
of previous years. However, the tendency of yearly school abolishment is ob-
vious and is confirmed by the statistics: the number of schools decreased by 
approximately 10,000 from 2010 to 2018 (see Figure 2).   
 
 
Figure 2. Overall number of school educational organisations (primary, basic, secon-
dary) and number of enrolled pupils (thou. persons) (beginning of academic year) 
Source: Compiled by the author based on Суринов et al. 2016, 2017; Малков et al. 
2019; Federal State Statistics Service 2020; Bondarenko et al. 2020.  
 
 
At the same time, the reduction in the number of school-age children makes it 
increasingly difficult to provide a high-quality education (especially in rural 
areas), since school financing is directly related to the number of pupils en-
rolled. Well-financed schools can afford to employ more qualified teaching staff 
and have sufficient material and technical resources. In Russia, despite the over-
all positive dynamics of state financing of education at current prices, state 
expenditures at real prices are decreasing (see Figure 3). In these conditions, 
inter-municipal cooperation would allow Russian municipalities to obtain cost 
reductions related to the operation of schools and achieve economies of scale 
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Figure 3. Consolidated budget expenditures of the Russian Federation (billions of 
roubles) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Суринов et al. 2017; Bondarenko, Gokhberg et 
al. 2017, 2018; Bondarenko, Borodina et al. 2020; Гохберг et al. 2020. 
 
 
Inter-municipal cooperation is mostly regulated by Federal Act No. 131 “On the 
general principles of organisation of local self-governance in the Russian Fede-
ration”. Based on this law and literature, three possible types of legal forms for 
inter-municipal cooperation in Russia can be emphasised (Ирискина 2010; 
Петроградская 2010; Миронова 2014):  
− Associative forms (associations, unions) 
− Contractual forms (short- and long-term contracts) 
− Economic forms (joint stock companies, non-commercial organisations, etc.) 
Associative and contractual forms are developing rapidly, while economic forms 
of cooperation between Russian municipalities are underdeveloped (Бутова, 
Пухова, Щукин 2013; Бутова, Смирнова, Миловидова 2014). One possible 
form for economic long-term cooperation is Functional Overlapping Competing 
Jurisdictions (hereinafter referred to as FOCJs). FOCJs are proposed by the 
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of school administration and a way of preventing a decrease in the quality of 
school education in Russia.  
This thesis stems from the concept of Functional Overlapping Competing 
Jurisdictions (FOCJs) initially introduced by Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichen-
berger (Frey 1999, 2001, 2005, 2009; Frey, Eichenberger 1995, 1996, 1997, 
1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2002; Eichenberger, Frey 2006). These scientists initiated 
the discussion on an alternative form of competitive federalism “that is not 
dictated from above but emerges from below as a response to citizens’ prefe-
rences” not only for developed capitalist countries, but also for countries in 
transition (Eichenberger, Frey 2006). In the thesis, the author defines FOCJs as 
economic units, not as the political establishments initially created by Frey and 
Eichenberger.   
Four types of FOCJs are discussed in the literature (e.g. Eckardt, Friedrich 
2014). These types are classified based on membership criteria (the FOCJ’s 
members). If members are natural people, it is an FOCJ of type I. If members 
are governmental units (e.g. municipalities), then FOCJs of type II appear. 
FOCJs of type III include subjects of public and private law, and type IV 
comprises all of the members mentioned in the other three types. This thesis 
concentrates on FOCJs of type II with municipalities as members, which means 
that the focus is on FOCJs as a form of inter-municipal cooperation.   
The FOCJ concept is related to existing economic theories, for example, the 
Club theory (Buchanan 1965), since the optimal size of both clubs and FOCJs is 
defined according to a comparison of marginal utility, which members get from 
the consumption of public services, and the marginal costs that they must pay. 
Competition for members among FOCJs is rooted in Tiebout’s “Voting with 
feet” concept1 (Tiebout 1956). However, in Tiebout’s “Voting with feet”, citi-
zens choose a combination of taxes and public services suitable to them by 
moving to another municipality, but in FOCJs, citizens do not have to geo-
graphically move in order to receive services that satisfy them, they simply 
leave one FOCJ and become members of another one regardless of its geo-
graphical location.  
Examples of FOCJ-like cooperation exist in Switzerland and the USA with 
citizens as members (FOCJ of type I). In the USA, there are special purpose 
districts. In Germany and other German-speaking countries, there is Zweckver-
band2, which is analogous to FOCJs of type II with municipalities as members.  
This thesis is an interdisciplinary work with an emphasis on economics, but 
also contributes to law and jurisprudence by providing legal recommendations 
for how FOCJs of type II can be applied in Russia. Modern realities and the 
intensifying demographic crisis in Russia demonstrate a serious need to trans-
form existing Russian public institutions juridically as well as economically and 
                                                            
1  Tiebout deals with citizens (private householders) who choose jurisdictions in which to 
live and respectively more appropriate for them combination of taxes and quality of services. 
Here, FOCJs compete for members who, according to FOCJs of type II, are municipalities.  
2  Inter-municipal public purpose association. 
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politically. Following the example of many Western countries, the Russian 
economy has been encouraged to apply adequate juridical forms of public units 
for modernizing the provision of public services (Friedrich, Chebotareva 2017). 
As a result, this makes the process of providing public services more flexible 
and strategic.  
The topic of this thesis is very important since it offers an answer to the 
question of whether inter-municipal cooperation in the form of FOCJs of type II 
is possible in Russia, and under which institutional3 conditions. In the literature, 
FOCJs of type II are not tackled as separate legal entities with their manage-
ment, supreme bodies, production and demand functions in the provision of 
school services (only partly in Friedrich, Reiljan 2011). However, it is very 
crucial to develop a microeconomic theory for FOCJs of type II, which is 
lacking so far, in order to analyse possible changes in FOCJ of type II manage-
ment behaviour if external and internal political and economic factors vary.  
In the framework of this thesis, FOCJ of type II management4 is defined as 
executive bodies which administrate and organise the daily procurement of 
FOCJs of type II. For example, a sole executive body (chairman, president, etc.) 
and collective executive bodies (council, board, presidium, committee etc.). 
FOCJ of type II executive bodies make decisions regarding the fee level for 
FOCJ of type II members, the amount and quality of factor inputs, etc. on daily 
basis. Thus, FOCJ management behaviour means the reaction of FOCJ of type 
II management bodies to changing internal and external factors, such as the 
decisions of an FOCJ of type II’s founders (municipalities) and competitors, the 
volume of labour and materials, factor prices, tax rates, financial aid from 
higher rank jurisdictions, the changing utility function, the production function, 
demand, etc. It is crucial to consider managers’ reactions because, after FOCJ of 
type II establishment, a daily procurement is delegated to the employed mana-
gement of FOCJs of type II. Mathematically, the assumptions regarding FOCJ 
of type II management behaviour are expressed via four cases of FOCJ mana-
gement utility functions in subchapter 2.2 of this thesis.  
As a research object, the author focuses on Russian school services. The 
actuality of the chosen research object has been justified above. The applicabi-
lity of the microeconomic theory developed in this thesis to other sectors of 




                                                            
3  Here, under institutions the author mainly means formal rules, such as legal acts, docu-
ments, etc.  
4  The definition of FOCJ management can be given in a narrow and broader sense. In the 
thesis, definition is narrower since it includes only managerial decisions of FOCJ executive 
bodies. However, FOCJ Assembly of Members as well as Supervisory Board also participate 
in making managerial decisions, they are usually long-term and more fundamental, e.g. in 
which legal form FOCJs should be established, which service volume should be produced, 
etc. (Eichhorn, Friedrich 1976). 
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Aim, research question and research tasks 
In this thesis, the author addresses the following main research question: Are 
FOCJs an applicable tool for inter-municipal cooperation in the provision of 
Russian school services considering FOCJ management behaviour?  
In order to answer the main research question, the author formulates several 
sub-questions: 
1. What are Functional, Overlapping, Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJs)? 
2. Which other forms of inter-municipal cooperation exist? 
3. Which types of FOCJs are suitable for inter-municipal cooperation? 
4. Is there a microeconomic theory for the FOCJs of type II that explains 
FOCJ management behaviour? 
5. How to decide which municipalities will establish an FOCJ of type II? 
6. How should FOCJ of type II management decide on the fee and factor 
input policy for the current FOCJ of type II operation? 
7. How do the optimal solutions of models, in particular, the current operation 
model, depend on the utility function of management and market forms? 
8. How to determine the optimal distribution of members between two com-
peting FOCJs of type II? 
9. How can typical financial conditions influence optimal solutions on the 
establishment, current operation and competition for members phases? 
10. Are the legal forms possible for FOCJs of type II in Russia? 
11. Are there municipalities which are allowed to cooperate in Russia? 
12. How to avoid unfavourable management decisions5 by introducing institu-
tional regulations of a particular legal company form? 
The author makes the conclusion regarding the applicability of Functional 
Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions of type II to inter-municipal cooperation 
in the provision of Russian school services based on:  
• the results of microeconomic modelling for identifying favourable manage-
ment behaviour in order to avoid the mismanagement of school FOCJs of 
type II. The decisions of management, which are not desired by member 
municipalities, do not fulfil the aims for which FOCJs of type II should be 
established. Thus, it is not possible to speak about FOCJ of type II appli-
cability to the provision of Russian school services if the aims of FOCJ 
management deviate from those emphasised by the FOCJ of type II statutory 
documents;    
• the analysis of legal documents, looking for the most appropriate legal form 
that coincides with the characteristic features of FOCJs of type II and the 
non-commercial requirements for school education activity; and 
                                                            
5  Decisions of FOCJ of type II management can be unfavourable from the member 
municipalities point of view. Management by their decisions may create such undesirable 
situation that can lead to bankruptcy of FOCJs of type II and non-fulfilment of public goals. 
Management can act not in interests of members, but, for example, in their own interests (see 
Williamson 1964; Heinen 1966; Lingnau, Härtel 2014; etc.). 
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• the interview with public officials in Russia who are responsible for the 
management of schools on a municipal and regional level, school directors 
and parents. 
Therefore, the aim of the research is to develop theoretical microeconomic 
models for FOCJ of type II management’s decision-making and the Statute for 
school FOCJs of type II in Russia. Theoretical models include the FOCJ of type 
II establishment phase, the current operations phase, competition for members 
as well as a behavioural analysis of FOCJ of type II management and members 
in the monopoly and oligopoly. The proposed models can be used as a basis for 
inter-municipal cooperation in the form of FOCJs of type II, considering the 
institutional specificities of a particular country. The Statute considers the 
following aspects:  
− the legal form in which FOCJs of type II may be established in Russia 
according to the Russian Civil Code 
− the economic requirements for FOCJ of type II establishment 
− the special requirements for schools in Russia with respect to management, 
financing and subordination 
In order to achieve the aim, the author sets up the following research tasks: 
RT1:  Define the main characteristics of FOCJs and the types of FOCJs. 
RT2:  Analyse and systematise the literature devoted to FOCJs and alternative 
forms of inter-municipal cooperation. 
RT3:  Formulate a basic microeconomic model of the establishment of an FOCJ 
of type II, considering grants from higher rank jurisdictions and special 
financial means. 
RT4:  Formulate a basic microeconomic model of the current operation of an 
FOCJ of type II, considering grants from higher rank jurisdictions, 
special financial means and different cases of FOCJ management beha-
viour under monopolistic and oligopolistic market conditions. 
RT5:  Formulate a basic microeconomic model of the competition for members 
of an FOCJ of type II, considering grants from higher rank jurisdictions 
and special financial means. 
RT6:  Identify the legal forms in which FOCJs of type II may exist in Russia 
and could be used for inter-municipal cooperation in the provision of 
school services. 
RT7:  Identify the level of municipalities in Russia that can freely and inde-
pendently decide on cooperation in the form of FOCJs of type II. 
RT8:  Develop a school FOCJ of type II Statute and Memorandum based on the 
appropriate legal form of the company (association). 
The research tasks and research questions are connected in a way that answering 
the research questions fulfils the research tasks. Answers for all research ques-





Novelty of the thesis 
This thesis contributes to literature by filling in at least four research gaps. First, 
there is no detailed investigation on FOCJs of type II as economic units. All 
previous analyses are mainly devoted to FOCJs as political instruments and 
therefore describe FOCJs of type I. Only a few approaches focus on FOCJs of 
type II where Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions are economic 
units and their management behaviour is analysed with economic theory instru-
ments (Friedrich, Kaltschütz, Nam 2004; Gabbe 2008; Friedrich, Eckardt 2014; 
Friedrich, Chebotareva 2017; Chebotareva, Friedrich 2017, 2020). Thus, this 
thesis develops a microeconomic theory for FOCJs of type II as a basis for the 
decision-making of municipalities, FOCJ management and higher rank juris-
dictions.  
Second, this thesis is the first attempt at applying the concept of FOCJs to 
Eastern European and developing countries, for example, in the Russian con-
text. Previous authors mainly observe the United States and Western Europe 
(Switzerland, Germany, etc.) and forms of inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) 
similar to FOCJs in these countries (Steiner 2003; Huber 2011; Duncombe, 
Yinger 2007; Longley, Sneed 2009).  
Third, there is no research related to inter-municipal cooperation in Russian 
school education. A few authors (Ирискина 2010; Бутова, Смирнова, Мило-
видова 2014; Гриценко 2001; Власова, Джек 2009; Рагозина 2009) have 
investigated the economic long-term cooperation of municipalities that have 
established legal company forms, but not FOCJs. These investigations are 
mostly descriptive and lack a theoretical microeconomic basis for developing 
FOCJs of type II in Russia. 
Fourth, previously, the FOCJ concept has not been analysed in the institu-
tional legal framework of a particular country for which FOCJs are suggested. 
Hence, a very important range of factors has been sorted out from the analysis 
and has not been considered in recommendations for the adequacy of FOCJs.  
Since FOCJs of type II are treated as public economic units, this thesis also 
contributes to the literature on public corporative governance (PCG) (e.g. 
Papenfuß, Schaefer 2017; Ellwood, Garcia-Lacalle 2016; OECD 2018; Boze-
man, Johnson 2015; Benz, Frey 2007; Calabrò, Torchia 2011; etc.). The aim of 
PCG is, on the one hand, to improve the effectiveness, efficiency and sus-
tainability of public sector organisations in the performance of public tasks and, 
on the other hand, to enhance public welfare and ensure the serving of public 
interests (Expert Commission of the German Public Corporate Governance-
Modelcode 2020). The first part of this aim is fulfilled by employed manage-
ment; the second by supervising municipal authorities. To maintain responsible 
management as well as supervision of municipal-owned enterprises, a special 
regulatory framework of PCG in the form of Public Corporate Governance 
Codes can be developed (OECD 2019; Spennlingwimmer 2017). This is sug-
gested for school FOCJs of type II as well.  
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This thesis is also unique in the combination of methods applied to investi-
gate inter-municipal cooperation. Qualitative (document analysis and interviews 
with local officials) and quantitative (microeconomic and mathematical model-
ling) approaches complement each other. Among the variety of methods applied 
for studying IMC, mathematical modelling has not received deserved attention 
as the method which can be involved in developing a microeconomic theory in 
order to establish inter-municipal cooperation. This thesis fills this gap as well. 
 
 
Methodology and steps of the analysis 
The interdisciplinarity of this thesis can be emphasized by the variety of methods 
applied, from mathematical modelling and literature analysis to the analysis of 
legal acts and interviews. Precisely, the study methodology has been developed 
according to the research tasks and aim of the thesis and based on literature 
analysis. In Chapter 1, the author has studied literature devoted to FOCJs and 
forms of inter-municipal cooperation similar to FOCJs of type II mainly with 
respect to school education in different countries. The relationships between 
research tasks, the methods to complete them and study results are schema-
tically demonstrated in Figure 4. 
Literature analysis has revealed a wide variety of methods for studying inter-
municipal cooperation. The most popular is a regression and statistical analysis 
(e.g. Bel, Warner 2016; Warner 2006; Silvestre et al. 2020; Bischoff, Wolf-
schütz 2020; Baba, Asami 2020; Arntsen, Torjesen, Karlsen 2018; etc.). Some 
of the preceding authors conduct surveys (Aldag, Warner 2018; Swianiewicz, 
Teles 2019; Bel, Fageda, Mur 2013); others organise case studies (Hophmayer-
Tokich, Kliot 2008), inventory and comparative analysis (Hulst, van Montfort 
2007, 2011). Interviews with local officials and document analysis are fre-
quently applied in many studies as well (Klimovský et al. 2014; De Peuter, 
Wayenberg 2007; Haveri, Airaksinen 2007). This thesis has also involved the 
latter methods due to the opportunity to receive very detailed information via 
semi-structured in-depth interviews with open-ended questions. Previous studies 
mainly concentrate on empirical methods. Theoretical methods of microeconomic 
and mathematical modelling are not widely applied. However, they are useful for 
developing a microeconomic theory to establish inter-municipal cooperation in 
countries where IMC does not exist or is not sufficiently spread.  
Stemming from the gap in literature, in Chapter 2, the method of micro-
economic theory modelling is used to analyse FOCJs’ management behaviour 
considering the importance of higher rank jurisdictions (federal and regional 
authorities) through grants and other financial aids, changes in factor prices, 
taxes, changes in demand, cases of management utility function, etc. 
In subchapter 2.2, the author extensively applies mathematical modelling 
of FOCJ of type II management behaviour and runs computer simulations using 






























Figure 4. Steps of the analysis in relation to the research tasks  
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
To develop microeconomic models, literature on competition in the oligopolis-
tic market (Stackelberg 2011; Krelle 1961; Gravelle, Rees 2004) is analysed in 
Chapter 2. Public finance literature (Musgrave, Musgrave 1989; Olson 1969) 
has been considered as well, since FOCJs of type II are public units and 
principles of public finance should be applied to their establishment and current 
operation. Literature on FOCJs has been analysed assuming that FOCJs of type 
II are economic units of public law serving as a tool for inter-municipal co-
operation. Literature on IMC in Russia is additionally observed in Chapter 3. 
To develop school FOCJs of type II Statute and Memorandum and provide 
recommendations on how to establish FOCJs in Russia, the author has con-
ducted a document analysis (see Chapter 3). Federal Act No. 131 “On the 
general principles of local self-governance organisation in the Russian Federa-
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companies have been studied. The provision of school services with the help of 
FOCJs of type II cannot be organised without considering Federal Act No. 273 
“On Education in the Russian Federation”, the Budget Code, educational 
regulations on regional and municipal levels and similar documents. Suitable 
legal forms and how they match the main features of FOCJs of type II have 
been identified with the help of document analysis. An analysis of the munici-
pality levels that are appropriate for FOCJ cooperation in Russia has also been 
conducted based on an investigation of legal acts.  
Additionally, to prepare school FOCJs of type II Statute and Memorandum 
and gather information which cannot be received from document analysis, 
interviews seem particularly appropriate to obtain information from experts 
(Walliman 2001; Creswell 2014; Miles, Huberman, Saldaña 2014). The author 
defines experts as the main decision-makers at the school administration level in 
municipalities and regions, school headmasters and parents.  
The author has conducted two blocks of interviews. One block has been 
completed in the Voronezh region of Russia. These interviews are necessary to 
learn about school circumstances in Russia with respect to financing, administ-
ration, etc. and to understand whether the characteristic features of FOCJs of 
type II are suitable for the Russian school system. The other block is an inter-
view with Bodensee water provision association (Bodensee-Wasserversorgung). 
The latter has been conducted in order to gain an insight into how management 
of the association, which applies inter-municipal cooperation, is organised in 
practice. The author aims to discover what is important for the management of 




Delineation and limitations of the analysis 
This thesis concentrates on the concept of FOCJs as a tool for inter-municipal 
cooperation. Therefore, only FOCJs of type II where municipalities cooperate is 
under investigation in this thesis. At the same time, this work does not sub-
stantially analyse other forms of inter-municipal cooperation, including joint 
projects and contracts, public-private partnerships, etc. The author provides a 
broader overview of the alternative forms of inter-municipal cooperation in 
Chapter 1. A short observation of the conditions and forms of inter-municipal 
cooperation in Russia are discussed in Chapter 3 to gain an understanding of 
how much IMC is developed in this country. This thesis does not look for the 
most appropriate form of inter-municipal cooperation and does not consider 
municipal reform as an alternative approach to deal with depopulated munici-
palities in Russia. A cost-benefit analysis of the different forms of IMC has not 
been conducted since the focus of the thesis is on the applicability of FOCJs of 
type II as a form of inter-municipal cooperation in the Russian context. There-
fore, the literature devoted to the different forms of inter-municipal cooperation 
is only discussed in order to provide an appropriate research context, and the 
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literature on the advantages and disadvantages of administrative reforms is 
excluded from the analysis.  
Additionally, the literature review mainly focuses on FOCJs and FOCJ-like 
cooperation6 in the educational sphere; other publicly provided services have 
been observed without going deeply into details since the provision of other 
public services (e.g. water supply, waste collection) can be organised with their 
own specificities, such as consideration of other production factors, by different 
levels of governance (e.g. regional, federal authorities). The investigated litera-
ture, institutional regulations and laws include the year 2020.  
The theoretical models developed in this thesis use microeconomic theory, 
not macroeconomic theory. The author does not aim to make a regional equi-
librium model for the distribution of FOCJs of type II in Russia, but rather 
analyse the internal decisions and goals of FOCJ of type II managers and 
owners (municipalities). The location and number of all FOCJs of type II in 
Russia are not determined by an equilibrium model, e.g. using Tiebout’s approach 
(Tiebout 1956). Moreover, deterministic modelling, not stochastic, is applied. 
Deterministic models do not have any random changes. In such models, the 
behaviour of an object is determined by specific values of initial conditions and 
input variables. In other words, everything in these models is precisely defined 
(determined) (Советов, Яковлев 2001). Stochastic models are not used; since 
there are no data on FOCJs of type II in Russia, no stochastic variables can be 
included. In general, any statistical analysis is not possible since there is no 
empirical evidence in Russia where FOCJs of type II do not exist. 
When modelling the management behaviour of FOCJs of type II, the author 
investigates the monopoly case and detects the reactions of FOCJ of type II 
management to the changing conditions of the oligopolistic market, excluding 
other market structures (such as Cournot 1838; Chamberlin 1933; Varian 2010). 
In oligopoly, for the sake of simplicity, the situation with two FOCJs of type II 
(duopoly) is tackled, which already makes the analysis complicated enough. For 
the models, basic ideas of production and consumer theory are used (Frisch 
1964; Henderson, Quandt 1980; Мэнкью 1999; Jehle, Reny 2011). Some 
aspects of public choice theory, in particular, voting rules for decision-making 
in FOCJs of type II in relations between the members and management of 
FOCJs of type II, are discussed in subchapter 2.3 of the thesis.   
Game theoretical approaches (Bartholomae, Wiens 2016; фон Нейман, 
Моргенштерн 1970; Петросян et al. 2012) are only partially applied in the 
model of ‘Current operation considering an active negotiating higher rank 
government’ (subchapter 2.1) and the model of ‘Current operation considering 
internal self-administrative structures’ (subchapter 2.3). Game theoretical 
assumptions are also given when modelling management behaviour in duopoly. 
                                                            
6  Under ‘FOCJ-like cooperation’ the author understands those forms of IMC which are not 
explicitly called ‘FOCJ’, but possess the same characteristics. Such as, for example, 
Zweckverband in German-speaking countries. 
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The principal-agent problem (for example, Spremann 1987; Jensen, Meck-
ling 1976, etc.) is involved in the model of ‘Current operation considering 
internal self-administrative structures’, where the principal is an assembly of 
member municipalities that can directly, through an order or by negotiation with 
management, decide on the volume of produced output, FOCJ of type II 
management is treated as an agent. Principal-agent relationships are, to some 
extent, included in the models of FOCJ establishment, current operation and 
competition for members, where FOCJs of type II receive a grant from higher 
rank jurisdictions (provinces or regions). Again, in all of these models, the 
principal-agent problem is not further developed. 
The empirical part focuses on the school services (primary, basic and se-
condary general education) of the Russian Federation. Other levels of education 
are not tackled since regional and federal authorities are in charge of vocational 
and higher educational institutions, respectively. The municipal level of admi-
nistration is responsible for school educational organisations.   
This thesis deals with decision analysis in municipalities and schools based 
on documents, laws, interviews with public officials and schools’ management 
in order to identify relevant factors for theory and the institutional performance 
of FOCJs of type II. Empirical insights from the interviews are dated from the 
period from October to November 2017 and are geographically restricted by the 
Voronezh region. This region has been selected for the analysis because it is an 
illustrative example of the socio-demographic problems that exist in Russia: de-
clining birth rate, reduction in the number of schools and pupils (see Chapter 3). 
On the regional borders, the Khokholsky and Liskinsky municipal areas are under 
observation because they not only have decreasing populations but also can be 
described as rural (school abolishment is especially intensive in rural areas).  
There are different ways to coordinate management behaviour, such as a 
special regional policy, regional subsidisation, direct orders, etc. These are not 
discussed in this thesis. Instead, the author has developed a special legal frame-
work, like Statute and Memorandum, as these documents should exclude un-
favourable management decisions in the long run. 
Since other forms of inter-municipal cooperation are discussed in Chapter 1 
only to create a research background, not to conduct a comparative analysis, the 
advantages and disadvantages of the establishment of FOCJs of type II in Rus-
sia are not extensively covered by this thesis. Nevertheless, the thesis empha-
sizes the advantages of the formalised long-term forms of IMC to which FOCJs 
of type II belong in subchapter 1.2.    
The author does not conduct an ex-post evaluation of an FOCJ of type II 
policy implementation to Russian regions since FOCJs of type II have not yet 
been introduced in Russia. Instead, an ex-ante assessment of the applicability of 
FOCJs of type II from an institutional and microeconomic theory point of view 
has been studied.  
Since the thesis is restricted to economic issues and does not discuss the po-
litical situation in Russia, whether FOCJ of type II is an attractive concept for 
Russian politicians is not investigated either. Thus, the accompanying general 
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adaptation measures after the establishment of FOCJs of type II (financing by 
Federation, Regions, Municipalities and FOCJs; changes in school planning, 
school location for parents and pupils; school relevant educational pedagogical 
questions such as matters of distance learning, changes in schooling program-
mes; necessity of transportation for teachers and pupils; career system and edu-
cation of staff and teachers; whether schools included in the FOCJs of type II 
stay legal persons or become subsidiaries thereof, etc.) are not the focus of the 
thesis and deserve special attention in further studies considering the situation in 
separate regions. Follow-up interviews with politicians are required to elaborate 
on these topics. So far, only the opinions of Russian school education authori-
ties at municipal and regional levels regarding the applicability of FOCJs of 
type II to existing Russian realities has been revealed via interviews. No re-
sistance has been detected at these levels.  
The study is lacking statistical data on FOCJs of type II in Russia, since 
these do not exist in Russia so far. Thus, the developed models cannot be veri-
fied or tested with econometric methods and the hypotheses cannot be con-
structed and tested by applying econometric analysis. 
The empirical analysis in the part concerning an interview with Bodensee 
water provision association might possess some limitations because service-
specific questions could not have been addressed to the interviewee in Ger-
many. Obviously, school and water provision services are quite different in 
terms of required equipment, knowledge of staff, etc. However, the aim of this 
interview regardless of service specification was to gain information about how 
FOCJs of type II operate in practice, what the most important provisions to be 
considered are in its Statute, what the legal basis for its procurement is, etc.  
The interview responses of Russian school educational authorities and 
school management may contain some limitations concerning their potential 
intention to show that they follow legal requirements and carefully fulfil their 
tasks. However, this does not disturb the analysis since the main aim of these 
interviews was to understand how school service provision is legally and practi-
cally organised and what is important to consider when FOCJs of type II are 
introduced in Russia. 
Additionally, prepared school FOCJs of type II Statute and Memorandum 
are exemplary for Russia, which means that they are conditionally applicable to 
other countries and other public services. Similarly, FOCJs of type II as a con-
cept for inter-municipal cooperation cannot be suggested for all regions of the 
country since population density, which affects the applicability of the concept, 
is different among Russian regions.  
 
 
Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of three chapters. The first chapter provides a literature re-
view devoted to the FOCJ concept, starting from its initial definition as a politi-
cal form of federalism to the recent definition – FOCJs of type II as economic 
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units. In which sectors and spheres functional jurisdictions are applicable and 
what forms of inter-municipal cooperation similar to FOCJs are present in dif-
ferent countries has also been discussed in subchapter 1.1. Subchapter 1.2 de-
fines the term ‘inter-municipal cooperation’ in the framework of this thesis. A 
general observation of the different forms of inter-municipal cooperation is 
given here. The links between FOCJs of type II and IMC definitions are shown 
in subchapter 1.2 as well. 
The second chapter contributes to the development of a microeconomic 
theory for the decision-making of the management and members of FOCJs of 
type II. The author models three phases of economic activity of FOCJs of type 
II, applying methods of microeconomic theory modelling and mathematical 
modelling. The optimal solutions for models of the establishment, current 
operation and competition for members of FOCJs of type II, considering diffe-
rent financial means and grants from higher level jurisdictions, are discussed in 
subchapter 2.1. Subchapter 2.2 shows how the optimal solutions for the current 
operation model of the FOCJ of type II depend on the utility function of 
management and market forms. How changes in factor inputs, the production 
function, the utility function of management, the demand function and the ne-
gotiation process between management and members defines management de-
cisions and how to avoid unfavourable management decisions is discussed in 
subchapters 2.3 and 3.4, respectively. 
The third chapter is empirical, where FOCJs of type II as a form of inter-
municipal cooperation is applied to the case of Russian school education. The 
primary, basic and secondary (complete) general education stages are investi-
gated with respect to the sources of their financing, administration and main 
decision-making bodies (subchapter 3.1). In subchapter 3.2, the author, apply-
ing document analysis, is looking for the proper legal form for FOCJs of type II 
and for the adequate level of municipalities, considering sector specifics (the 
non-commercial character of school services and who is responsible for the 
provision of school services) in Russia.  
An interview method in subchapter 3.3 plays a crucial role in collecting in-
formation about the conditions for the potential establishment of FOCJs of type 
II for Russian school services as well as in providing useful hints on how 
FOCJs of type II are performing in the legal form of Zweckverband in Ger-
many. Furthermore, the results of subchapters 3.1–3.3 and Chapter 2 have been 
used to develop recommendations in the form of Statute and Memorandum for 
school FOCJs of type II in Russia. Their exemplary provisions are shown in 
subchapter 3.4. General conclusions regarding the applicability of FOCJs of 
type II to Russian school services and possible directions for future research 
finalise the thesis.  
The relationships between chapters are shown below in Table 1, where the 
structure of the thesis is demonstrated in connection with the methods, research 
questions and research tasks.    
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1. FOCJ THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
1.1. FOCJ definition and characteristic features 
Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions is a relatively new concept 
introduced in the 1990s by Swiss scientists Frey and Eichenberger as a means to 
intensify the principles of direct democracy and federalism in Europe. The con-
cept assumes that national states as the only identity of the citizen are outdated 
in global society. Individuals can therefore also be citizens of organisations out-
side the nation. New interpretations and variations of the FOCJ concept have 
developed over time (e.g. Friedrich, Eckardt 2014), but the core statements re-
main unchanged. This chapter firstly provides a definition of Functional Over-
lapping Competing Jurisdictions and the main features which are rooted in the 
historical ideas of panarchy and anarchocapitalism (Tucker, de Bellis 2016). 
Next, it classifies FOCJs with respect to membership criteria and sums up the 
experience of those organisations that show features similar to FOCJs. The con-
nection between the developed FOCJs concept and the forms of inter-municipal 
cooperation are investigated in the following subchapter.  
Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions are economic units that 
possess four features defining their name7. They are functional because they 
may perform various functions, i.e. education, water provision, healthcare, etc. 
Overlapping means that their territories do not coincide with municipal borders 
and that more than one jurisdiction with the same functions can act in the same 
region. Jurisdictions performing different functions can also overlap in the same 
territory. FOCJs compete with one another for clients and members, who can 
be citizens, municipalities or other subjects of public and private law. Members 
can choose in which FOCJ they want to participate. They are called jurisdic-
tions because they show a degree of autonomy and authority, have internal 
democratic procedures and have the right to levy taxes and collect entrance fees 
from their members (Frey 1999, 2001, 2005, 2009; Frey, Eichenberger 1995, 
1996, 1997, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2002; Eichenberger, Frey 2006; Friedrich, 
Eckardt 2014). 
The functional orientation of these independent units enables them to offer 
citizens individual or multiple services or service packages according to their 
preferences, thus taking advantage of economies of scale, which allows them to 
offer services at a reasonable price. Furthermore, spill-overs can also be avoided 
since the circle of beneficiaries corresponds to the circle of cost bearers. Local 
differences in demand are also considered, as FOCJs are not geographically tied 
and are therefore flexible. The overlapping structure guarantees the efficient 
size of these units. Democratic political competition between FOCJs has led to 
the desired fiscal equivalence and the economic use of funds, as FOCJs also 
                                                            
7  The definition is given for this thesis. Here, FOCJs are economic units, not political 
establishments, as initially created by Frey and Eichenberger (for example, 1999, 2006). 
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have the possibility to collect taxes for their performance tasks (Frey, Eichen-
berger 1995).  
The main advantage of FOCJs, as Frey and Eichenberger have pointed out, 
is the decentralisation of powers, which allows for the consideration of multiple 
consumer preferences and the generation of more transparency for citizens re-
garding the activities of public authorities. The authors called FOCJs a ‘fifth 
freedom’8, which is intended not to destroy the nature of federal states, but to 
create alternative organisations. Therefore, the fifth freedom permits the forma-
tion and existence of FOCJs within time (Eichenberger, Frey 2006). 
In general, four types of FOCJs can be distinguished:  
− FOCJs of type I with citizens as members. Citizens living in various munici-
palities establish an FOCJ to provide services. 
− FOCJs of type II with governments as members, e.g. municipalities, coun-
ties, states, nation states, the European Union. 
− FOCJs of type III comprising municipalities, other governments, other sub-
jects of public law and of private law (firms etc.). 
− FOCJs of type IV with members who are individuals (e.g. citizens) and/or 
other private and public entities, e.g. associations, chambers, churches, mu-
nicipalities, private and public firms (Friedrich, Eckardt 2014).    
Frey and Eichenberger characterise the main features of FOCJs focusing only 
on type I. Later, Friedrich and Reiljan (2011) and Friedrich and Eckardt (2014) 
further developed FOCJ classifications, including types II, III and IV. However, 
there is not much literature devoted to FOCJs. In particular, an FOCJ theory 
integrated into a microeconomic theory with respect to supply, demand, 
management and cooperation conditions is missing.  
FOCJs have been considered as a tool for inter-governmental cooperation 
(Friedrich, Popescu 2006; Bartholomae, Popescu 2007; Friedrich, Ukrainski, 
Timpmann 2014) and alternative governments (in the case of FOCJ type I) 
without territories, like quangos (Friedrich, Ukrainski 2013). FOCJs of type II 
are widely investigated in the work of Friedrich and Reiljan (2011) and Fried-
rich and Eckardt (2014). The integration of FOCJs of type II into economic 
theory was developed in the latter work.  
Literature on FOCJs also considers functional jurisdictions as a means for 
cross-border cooperation between EU countries (Friedrich, Ukrainski 2013; 
Metis 2014; Eckardt, Gritsch 2016). Several studies have analysed historical 
cases of FOCJ-like organisations (e.g. Hansa trade union, school boards in 
England) (Frey 2005; Smith 2011; Fink 2012; Shaw 2012; Eckardt, Gritsch 
2016) and attempts to implement FOCJs in several sectors such as general edu-
cation, forestry and population policy (Friedrich, Popescu 2006; Friedrich, 
Reiljan 2011). 
The FOCJ concept, originally only FOCJs of type I, is rooted in the theory of 
panarchy introduced by Paul Emile de Puydt in 1860. De Puydt pointed to the 
                                                            
8  Four economic freedoms include free movement of labour, materials, goods and services 
(Frey, Eichenberger 1999).  
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right of people to select any form of governance without changing their place of 
life (Tucker, de Bellis 2016). He applied the idea of competitive market to poli-
tical governments. Individuals are free to consume services from any govern-
ments if they find their services to be of better quality. Previously, the same 
ideas were promoted by Gustave de Molinari in the context of security services 
(Hart 1982) and later by Le Grand E. Day, Max Nettlau, John Zube and others 
(Tucker, de Bellis 2016).   
There has been no detailed investigation of FOCJ behaviour as an owner (ju-
risdiction) and as an economic unit. There are only a few approaches to micro-
economic theory linked to FOCJs (Friedrich, Kaltschütz, Nam 2004; Gabbe 
2008; Friedrich, Eckardt 2014; Chebotareva, Friedrich 2017). 
There are some examples of local organisations whose characteristic features 
(i.e., single-functional, overlapping, competing juridical organisations) coincide 
with the definition of FOCJs. They can be found in the USA, Germany, Eng-
land, Switzerland, etc. in different fields and spheres, which is reflected in 
Table 2. 
Due to the lack of availability of primary education in districts across Eng-
land and Wales from 1870–1902, local authorities created School Boards, 
which were responsible for raising school funds and charging fees in cases 
where local funds were not sufficient (Shaw 2012). They were directly elected 
and independent of existing forms of local government (Gillard 2018). Later, 
School Boards were abolished and the provision of school education became 
more centralised. However, the system of School Boards in England became 
one of the first initiatives of local authorities to offer non-denominational edu-
cation. 
In Switzerland, the functional cooperation of municipalities exists in many 
municipal tasks, including school services (Steiner 2003). In some municipali-
ties in the cantons of Zurich, Thurgau, St. Gallen, Appenzell, etc., public mu-
nicipal schools are not administered by the political municipality, but by a sepa-
rate school municipality. The school municipality is thus an independent public-
law organisation that exists with the political municipality. The municipal ter-
ritory of the political municipality and school municipality is often identical but 
can also be different (Huber 2011). 
The most famous historical example of functional cross-border cooperation 
is the Hanseatic League. Members of this organisation followed the Hanseatic 
Statute, which established clear rules, and had trade privileges from the 12th to 
16th centuries. The aim was to represent common economic interests (Dollinger 
1976). 
In modern times, Germany and Poland conduct cross-border cooperation to 
jointly protect and preserve national park Lower Odra River Valley, which is 
located on the German-Polish border. For this purpose, a special legal form of 
cooperation with a legal personality – European Grouping of Territorial Co-




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Germany and France have a long tradition of inter-municipal cooperation (West 
2007). In these countries, municipalities cooperate in water supply, environ-
mental protection, tourism, public parks and other things. They mainly function 
in the form of public inter-municipal associations and special purpose associa-
tions (e.g. Zweckverbände in Germany) (Heinz 2007). Single functions can be 
transferred to Zweckverbände (Bolgherini 2011). For example, in the land Ba-
den-Württemberg, 147 municipalities jointly provide water from Lake Con-
stance to members of Zweckverbände Bodensee-wasserversorgung. Coopera-
tion in the form of Zweckverbände is similar to FOCJs of type II with munici-
palities as members. 
There are also examples of FOCJs of type III in Germany. Rhein-Main-
Verkehrsverbund (regional transport association), for example, comprises 15 
counties, 11 cities and the Land of Hesse (OECD 2014: 283). 
However, examples of the FOCJs of type I initially introduced by Frey and 
Eichenberger are detected in Switzerland and the USA. In the USA, special 
districts are forms of local government that provide public services similarly to 
cities. Unlike cities, they act more as private firms which consider consumer 
preferences while delivering services. Their definition varies from state to state. 
In their article, Goodman and Leland (2019) refer to the US Census Bureau, 
which defines special districts as “independent, special purpose governmental 
units that exist as separate entities with substantial administrative and fiscal 
independence from general purpose local governments”. 
Regional services commissions in Canada are autonomous bodies. The pro-
vincial government offers grants to commissions to support their establishment 
and operation. Commissions do not levy taxes from municipalities; they are 
financed mainly by user fees and have the authority to approve their own bud-
gets. Commissions operate on a full cost-recovery basis and cover both 
operating and capital costs (Slack 1997). A good example of such an organisa-
tion is Metro Vancouver Regional District, which comprises four entities and 
consists of 21 member municipalities. Although they are independent, they 
delegate certain public administration services to the District. Each entity is 
governed by the Board of Directors annually elected from local politicians. The 
number of votes directors possess in the Board of Directors is proportional to 
the population of municipalities (Slack, Bird 2013). 
 
 
1.2. FOCJ as a form of inter-municipal cooperation 
Within the framework of this thesis, the author defines inter-municipal coopera-
tion according to its main characteristics (IMC Toolkit Manual 2010):   
− based on a public or private legal basis, the mutually beneficial joint work of 
two or more municipalities9 which aims to fulfil public tasks 
                                                            
9  Municipalities are entities in the first level of territorial administration (IMC Toolkit 
Manual 2010: 7).  
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− participants who have the status of legal entities and possess the competen-
cies, powers and resources to cooperate 
− cooperation is voluntary; however, the law may occasionally oblige munici-
palities to cooperate in particular cases 
− cooperation and appropriate arrangements between municipalities are per-
manent 
− municipalities maintain indirect control over the decisions and services that 
result from cooperation 
− activity which does not refer to the cooperation of municipalities with legal 
entities of another nature and status (e.g. Regions, Federation), households, 
public and private firms 
− actions which do not include cross-border cooperation between neighbouring 
municipalities of different countries 
Following this definition, FOCJs of type I, which are more frequently discussed 
in literature on the FOCJs, only indirectly relate to inter-municipal cooperation 
via citizens who are members in this type (Chebotareva, Friedrich 2017). Mu-
nicipalities can directly be FOCJ members in types II, III and IV, but only type 
II coincides with the definition of inter-municipal cooperation. 
The thesis relies on three main streams of literature. First, literature devoted 
to the FOCJ concept, its characteristic features and the functional cooperation of 
municipalities in different fields and countries. The name of this type of 
cooperation can vary from country to country, but the author considers here that 
all of them should possess features of Functional Overlapping Competing Juris-
dictions. Subchapter 1.1 provides a more detailed overview of this literature.  
Second, in subchapter 1.2, the author opens up a broader discussion on 
FOCJs as a form of inter-municipal cooperation, considering studies devoted to 
inter-municipal cooperation as such. 
Third, literature devoted to inter-municipal cooperation in Russia has been 
analysed in subchapter 3.2 in order to show the forms of inter-municipal coope-
ration and legal possibilities for FOCJs in Russia via literature analysis. Table 3 
summarises the literature covered by the thesis and leads to the gaps which the 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This subchapter discusses the alternative forms of IMC grouped in the middle 
column of Table 3. The literature devoted to inter-municipal cooperation is 
rather diverse and covers many aspects, such as the strengths and weaknesses of 
different forms of inter-municipal cooperation (Osterrieder et al. 2006; Citroni 
et al. 2013), IMC typology (Hulst, van Montfort 2007; Osterrieder et al. 2006; 
Citroni et al. 2013), their scope and level of institutionalisation (Teles 2016; 
Swianiewicz, Teles 2019), the consequences and effects of IMC with respect to 
service level, tax collection, cost savings, reduction of municipal public 
spending (Allers, de Greef 2018; Bel, Warner 2015; Bel, Fageda 2006; Frère et 
al. 2014; Bel, Gradus 2018; Baba, Asami 2020), factors driving cooperation, 
such as state subsidies for IMC (Bel, Warner 2016; Bischoff, Wolfschütz 2020), 
small population size and fiscal stress (Arntsen, Torjesen, Karlsen 2018). Inter-
municipal cooperation has been studied using a variety of research methods: 
econometric probit and meta-regression analysis (Bel, Warner 2016; Warner 
2006), case studies (Hophmayer-Tokich, Kliot 2008), interviews with local 
officials and document analysis (Klimovský et al. 2014). The latter methods are 
applied in this thesis as well. 
Each paper devoted to inter-municipal cooperation mostly provides an origi-
nal typology of forms and types, for example, Hulst and van Montfort (2007, 
2011) offer their own classification of IMC forms. Hulst and van Montfort 
(2007) distinguish between purely inter-municipal arrangements and mixed 
institutions. They have investigated eight European countries applying inven-
tory and comparative analysis, which consider such criteria as tasks to fulfil, the 
degree of institutionalisation and the scope of decision-making powers. As a 
result, the authors distinguish between four basic types of inter-municipal co-
operation: quasi-regional governments, planning forums, service delivery orga-
nisations and service delivery agreements.   
Quasi-regional governments are established for the coordination of munici-
pal policies in one or several sectors. They have the financial resources to fulfil 
the task as well as decision-making and administrative bodies.  
Planning forums are weakly connected networks of municipalities and other 
participants which do not form a stable organisation with decision-making 
bodies. On the other hand, service delivery organisations provide services on a 
regular basis and execute those functions of municipalities which are transferred 
to them or they can be municipalities’ agents.  
By signing service delivery agreements, municipalities decide to cooperate 
in service provision without establishing a joint organisation. Municipalities 
may order services from one or several other participating municipalities or 
from an outside private company (Hulst, van Montfort 2011: 127).  
There can be different levels of institutionalisation in an inter-municipal co-
operation, from informal ‘handshake agreements’ to formal IMC arrangements. 
However, the experience of developed countries shows that to be long-lasting 
and stable, cooperation of municipalities should be formalised (Osterrieder et al. 
2006: 20). Cooperation in the form of FOCJs is the one which belongs to a for-
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mally organised type, therefore it has the advantages of the medium- and long-
term forms of IMC. 
The forms of IMC largely depend on the aims and existing capacities of mu-
nicipalities and can generally be classified in the following way (Osterrieder et 
al. 2006: 19–26): 
− Joint service provision: when municipalities are not capable of providing all 
municipal services individually, they establish a joint body to improve ser-
vice delivery. 
− Joint administration: this form of cooperation is used by municipalities to 
jointly carry out administrative functions. A joint organisation can also be 
created to fulfil the functions. 
− Joint planning and development: municipalities may develop a common plan 
of action to enhance the economic prosperity of certain territories. 
− Purchase of services: this type of cooperation implies that municipalities buy 
services from each other for a particular fee. Usually, a larger municipality 
sells to smaller ones. 
− Joint funding of investments: municipalities cooperate to create a joint pool 
of resources. In this way, they share the costs of investment in a new project. 
A clear advantage of this form is that all risks are shared as well.    
− Exchange of experience: municipalities may share their ‘good practices’ by 
providing advice or technical support to neighbouring municipalities, which 
helps increase the quality of services. 
− Creation of a new tier of government: a new level of governance can be 
created between local and central authorities. In this case, municipalities 
should transfer some of their responsibilities to a new intermediate level. 
− Multiple modalities: all previously discussed forms of IMC can be combined 
to achieve the desired goals. 
The occurrence of different forms of IMC is related to the evolutional develop-
ment of local and regional governance in Europe. In particular, the existence of 
IMC initiatives largely depends on the structure of initiatives and legal frame-
work favouring or hindering inter-municipal cooperation (Citroni et al. 2013). 
According to this criterion, some authors distinguish between bottom-up 
(voluntary) and top-down (induced) forms of cooperation. Among them, as-
sociative, contractual, networking and public-private forms are increasingly 
popular in Western European countries (Citroni et al. 2013: 210–211). There is 
also a relatively new form of IMC which comes from the shared ownership of 
municipalities in joint-stock companies and is therefore called the ‘corporative 
form’ of IMC or municipal corporations.  
Citroni et al. (2013) argue that corporative forms have advantages over con-
tracting-out and public-private partnership (PPP) because “this allows munici-
palities to maintain political control over the providers and guarantees a more 
stable framework for cooperation than PPP agreements” (Citroni et al. 2013: 
230). Additionally, municipal corporations are more flexible, possess more 
managerial freedom and higher efficiency and have closer connections to cus-
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tomers. However, over time, the management of municipal corporation may 
turn to profit-making orientation and public purposes could be neglected (Gros-
si, Reichard 2008: 613; Reichard 2002: 65). In this sense, FOCJs (especially 
type II) have the advantages of the corporative forms of IMC but avoid their 
disadvantages because zero profit (cost coverage rule) is assumed for FOCJs, 
which FOCJ management has to follow. 
IMC forms are classified for Germany by Heinz 2007: 
1.  Forms of cooperation which are not institutionalised under public law (in-
formal cooperation), such as regional conferences, networks and forums. 
They function simultaneously with institutionalised forms and mostly deal 
with the problems of regional development and urban planning. 
2.  Cooperative approaches under private law, where municipalities have in-
fluence proportional to their shares in the capital reflected in a voting power. 
The examples of such forms in Germany are associations of civil law, 
limited liability companies, etc. 
3.  Institutionalised cooperation under public law consists of different functional 
or territorial associations that provide single or multiple services. They in-
clude: 
–  Single-purpose associations created to fulfil specific tasks. They have 
management bodies that are responsible for current procurements. A 
supreme body is an association’s assembly consisting of the representa-
tives from member municipalities. They cover many spheres of activity 
from technical and social infrastructure, transportation and cultural facili-
ties to school services and management of sewage and garbage disposal. 
–  Territorial cooperation such as neighbourhood associations, regional 
planning associations, multisectoral approaches for cooperation. These 
are similar to single-purpose associations, with the main difference being 
in the composition of the assembly. Their assemblies should include the 
heads of local authorities. It is only possible to establish a multisectoral 
association when it involves different types of activities and the creation 
of an assembly with the involvement of regional authorities. 
4.  New public authorities are different to associations because “they are terri-
torial authorities at the local level and they dispose of their own revenues”. 
They are usually formed via the amalgamation of municipalities or the 
joining together of municipalities to create a new one without destroying 
existing entities. 
5.  Territorial authorities and innovative approaches imply established, two 
region-wide territorial authorities: regional city and regional county.  
 
De Peuter and Wayenberg (2007), in the application of document analysis and 
interviews with local representatives, classified four types of IMC cooperation 
in Belgium:  
− the inter-local association 
− the project association 
− the service association 
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− the mandated association 
The first form does not require the establishment of a legal personality with 
delegation municipal competencies to a newly created organisation. At least two 
municipalities should be involved, and other public and private companies can 
participate (De Peuter, Wayenberg 2007: 25). It is similar to FOCJs of type III 
with public and private legal bodies as members. This form is usually necessary 
to realise joint projects that do not require the special attention of the govern-
ment. 
The second form of IMC, according to De Peuter and Wayenberg (2007), is 
stricter because it is a special legal form where not all public and private legal 
bodies are allowed to join the project, only municipal companies, social service 
associations and the last two forms of IMC (i.e. the service association and the 
mandated association) are eligible. Supervision of governmental authorities is 
required here.  
For the last two forms, a special body of representatives must be created. 
Representatives of municipalities jointly develop a package of documents in-
cluding a business plan, a management plan and a Statute. The establishment 
has to be approved by the government. A service association is organised with a 
legal personality, but without delegation of managerial control to this associa-
tion. The latter is reversed for the mandated associations (which is similar to 
FOCJs of type II): municipalities transfer their competences related to per-
forming particular tasks to the mandated association (De Peuter, Wayenberg 
2007: 26). For service and mandated associations, councils of municipalities 
must approve their activity. Democratic bodies such as a General Assembly of 
Members and a Board of Directors manage service and mandated associations.  
The authors emphasise one disadvantage of involving private partners in 
inter-municipal cooperation. They point out that “participation of private com-
panies in forms where municipalities have given them managerial control might 
lead to blurred municipal responsibilities and conflicts of interest” (De Peuter, 
Wayenberg 2007: 29). This is one of the arguments for why the thesis con-
centrates on FOCJs of type II with only municipalities as members.   
In Finland, the forms of IMC have a relatively long history and are rather di-
verse (Haveri, Airaksinen 2007). They name some of them: inter-local agree-
ment, informal consultative forums, associations, contract-based cooperation, 
sub-regional contract, sub-regional council or government. They all differ in 
terms of degree of institutionalisation, scope of activities, range of services and 
organisational forms. Haveri and Airaksinen (2007) have applied surveys and 
interviews with different officials as the methods of their research. The inter-
view method is very frequently met in studies devoted to inter-municipal co-
operation regardless of the research questions addressed. The authors mention a 
very important advantage of the types of IMC that become part of an adminis-
trative hierarchy (similar to suggested FOCJs). They say that if municipalities 
create a joint, permanently functioning organisation, to which decision-making 
powers and resources are delegated in order to provide one or several services, 
decision-making can be quick “because the organisation is able to function 
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without special permission from cooperating municipalities” (Haveri, Airaksi-
nen 2007: 54).    
Despite the fact that the forms and motivations of IMC are changing over 
time, all of them, new and old, rely on the fundamental principles of manage-
ment autonomy and voluntary membership in France. Another principle is the 
representation of municipal members in the council of an inter-municipal orga-
nisation that is a supreme body or an executive body that consists of a president 
and a vice-president. The delegation of municipal functions to a created organi-
sation is allowed for participating municipalities. However, if a function has 
been transferred to a joint organisation before, it cannot be fulfilled by munici-
palities anymore (West 2007: 70). These principles for IMC in France are very 
similar to those which FOCJs rely on. Several forms are briefly described in the 
article. Among them: single purpose association, multi-purpose association, urban 
community, communauté d’agglomération and communauté de communes. 
Some studies distinguish between cooperation and coordination of munici-
palities (Fedele, Moini 2007: 123). Cooperation implies the establishment of 
organisational forms, while coordination is occasional and very often informal 
in its implementation. In Italy, the forms vary from collaborative agreements 
and conventions to zone plans and area pacts. 
Dutch municipalities as subjects of public law use cooperative arrangements 
to provide public services. The legislation gives permission to cooperate not 
only with municipalities, but also with other public authorities and private orga-
nisations. Local governments may also cooperate under private law (Hulst, van 
Montfort 2007: 146).   
Two forms of cooperation prevail in Spain: the mancomunidad, which is a 
pure form of inter-municipal cooperation that provides a wide range of public 
services and multi-functional purposes; and the Consortia, which incorporates 
public authorities from different levels of government, although some are exclu-
sively inter-municipal (Garrido 2007: 188). On the other hand, Consortia is 
single-purpose and used for particular projects to reach concrete objectives. 
In the United Kingdom, local strategic partnerships are established as single, 
non-statutory units where local public and private bodies and voluntary organi-
sations can participate. Their main purpose is to provide strategic coordination 
in spheres where such coordination was previously lacking (Kelly 2007: 202). 
Another form of inter-municipal cooperation in the United Kingdom is called 
‘local public service agreements’, the aim of which is to support local govern-
ments in their performance by means of making contracts between service de-
livery bodies and the Treasury. Nominally, local authorities are free to choose 
the policy areas in which to fulfil targets of local public agreements. However, 
in reality, local aims are secondary relative to the national aims of the govern-
ment (Kelly 2007: 203). Local area agreements were arranged to promote coop-
eration between public service providers. They are forms of autonomous deci-
sion-making that step away from centralised management and reduce the 
complex bureaucracy involved in administering multiple funding streams. What 
makes UK inter-municipal cooperation different is the fact that municipal inter-
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actions in the form of agreements prevail; no separate organisation is created, 
only coordinating boards with representatives from all participating parties. The 
UK forms are oriented not to the joint provision of single public services, but to 
their coordination and integration. 
The formalised inter-municipal cooperation of municipalities with the es-
tablishment of a separate legal person has been comparatively studied in Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Germany, Iceland and Portugal by 
Swianiewicz and Teles (2019). The authors apply the survey method, asking 
their questions from IMC entities. The results of their research emphasise that 
IMC forms with a formalised and harder institutionalised structure (i.e. budget 
size, number of employed people, property, etc.) possess some advantages, such 
as higher satisfaction of member municipalities, more frequent spill-overs to 
other spheres of cooperation, more visible outcomes of activities, dynamism of 
entering and leaving the ‘club’ for municipalities, etc. Since forms of IMC are 
very diverse across countries, Swianiewicz and Teles (2019) do not suggest a 
new typology. Instead, they come up with a list of dimensions that must be con-
sidered when comparison between forms and countries takes place (Swianie-
wicz, Teles 2019: 133): 
− The level of formalisation: the scale is from informal collaboration to formal 
contract agreements and hard, permanent separate legal entities. 
− The degree of enforcement: variation from completely voluntary bottom-up 
initiatives to compulsory arrangements enforced by upper-tier governments.  
− The purpose of creation: from single- to multi-purpose cooperation. 
− The number of partners: cooperation varying from minimum two-member 
parties to multiple. 
− The types of members: from purely inter-municipal cooperation to mixed 
with upper level authorities and/or private and/or public companies, volun-
tary and social organisations, etc.  
− The spheres of cooperation: for example, water provision, public transport, 
cultural halls, etc. Whether municipalities are focused on joint service provi-
sion, joint investment or joint marketing or lobbing. 
The forms of IMC may differ not only between countries, but also within one 
country (Swianiewicz, Teles 2019). However, the diversity of IMC forms is 
vast only at first glance; further investigation reveals that all forms of IMC can 
be organised into several broader groups with respect to the degree of institu-
tionalisation, scope of activities and organisational forms (Heinz 2007: 99; 
Kuhlmann 2010: 3; Swianiewicz, Teles 2019: 120). Therefore, in general, for 
the European Union, they can be summarised as follows (IMC Toolkit Manual 
2010: 13–14):  
1) Informal inter-municipal cooperation takes place when it is not necessary 
to adopt specific legal acts for cooperation and the municipalities are not 
obliged to comply with decisions. At the same time, such coordination al-
lows for the accelerated solution of many local problems, such as in the field 
of urban planning and environmental protection. 
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2) Many inter-municipal links are organised in a weakly formalised form, 
such as agreements or contracts for the provision of certain administrative 
services. 
3) Other cooperative activities could be described as economic units with an 
appropriate legal status. They are usually established in a legal form of as-
sociation based on public or private law and perform one (single) or several 
(multiple) public functions. Usually, municipalities delegate their functions 
with respect to particular public service provision to established economic 
units. These economic units possess a budget, legal status and management 
bodies. Municipalities as members form their equity capital, and their cur-
rent costs are covered by membership fees.  
4) A certain degree of financial and political autonomy is part of inter-muni-
cipal cooperation as second-level self-governing authorities: they have 
their own legal status, are strong political structures and may be authorised 
to levy and collect fees. 
5) Cooperation with other subjects of public and private law, such as 
households, public and private institutions and authorities of other level of 
administration. Such relations are analogous to FOCJs of type III and IV.  
 
This thesis does not tackle informal coordination between municipalities (first 
form of inter-municipal cooperation), inter-municipal cooperation through 
agreements and contracts, or cooperation with private partners in the forms of 
sub-contracting and public-private partnership (second and fifth types of IMC). 
However, features of inter-municipal cooperation in the form of FOCJs of type 
II coincide with the third and fourth forms of inter-municipal cooperation ac-
cording to the IMC Toolkit Manual classification presented above.  
This classification of IMC forms can exceptionally, under certain circums-
tances, be complemented by cross-border cooperation as the sixth form, 
which occurs between neighbouring countries. In practice, this form might face 
difficulties due to different and sometimes even contradicting legislation of 
bordering countries. This thesis does not address this issue. However, at the EU 
level, the obstacles hindering cross-border cooperation have been overcome by 
introducing the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) as a 
legal instrument designed to promote cooperation at the local level. 
As a form of long-term formalised cooperation, FOCJs of type II possess the 
advantages of inter-municipal cooperation and long-term cooperation, in parti-
cular. The literature shows the following main advantages of IMC: reduction in 
public spending in the provision of public services (cost reduction and econo-
mies of scale) (Niaounakis, Blank 2017; Gradus, Schoute, Dijkgraaf 2018; 
Baba, Asami 2020), less expensive services for consumers (Silvestre et al. 
2020; Bel, Gradus 2018), the public values of service quality and cross-juris-
dictional coordination (Aldag, Warner 2018) and lower transaction costs com-
pared with the private production of public services (Bel, Fageda, Mur 2013).  
FOCJs of type II have the advantages of the formalised long-term corpora-
tive forms of IMC, for example, municipalities maintain control over the servi-
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ces provided, which guarantees a more stable framework for cooperation (Cit-
roni et al. 2013). Involving private partners might lead to conflicts of interests 
due to the different aims of the parties (De Peuter, Wayenberg 2007). Some 
studies have shown that municipal corporations are more flexible, possess more 
managerial freedom and higher efficiency and have closer connections with 
customers (Grossi, Reichard 2008; Reichard 2002). Another advantage of the 
permanently functioning formalised IMC form is that decision-making is faster 
because management can decide on a daily basis without special permission 
from cooperating municipalities (Haveri, Airaksinen 2007). 
Swianiewicz and Teles (2019) emphasised that IMC forms with a formalised 
and harder institutionalised structure possess some advantages, such as higher 
satisfaction of member municipalities, more frequent spill-overs to other sphe-
res of cooperation, more visible outcomes of activities, dynamism of entering 
and leaving the ‘club’ for municipalities, etc.  
This chapter generally concludes that there is no detailed investigation of 
FOCJ behaviour as an economic unit. Only a few approaches link microeco-
nomic theory and FOCJs (Friedrich, Kaltschütz, Nam 2004; Gabbe 2008; 
Friedrich, Eckardt 2014; Friedrich, Chebotareva 2017; Chebotareva, Friedrich 
2017). Literature devoted to the cooperation of municipalities in the provision 
of school services is not extensive either, only a few approaches have studied 
this type of service (Shaw 2012; Gillard 2018; Steiner 2003; Huber 2011; Dun-
combe, Yinger 2007; Longley, Sneed 2009).  
The literature analysis has not revealed investigations on FOCJs applied to 
Eastern European and developing countries. The only example in relation to 
short-term cooperation, but not to FOCJs, is an examination of the effect of 
public-public cooperation and inter-municipal agreements on the reduction of 
local costs in Brazil (Silvestre et al. 2020).  
Among the variety of methods applied for studying IMC, such as regression 
analysis (Bel, Warner 2016; Warner 2006), case studies (Hophmayer-Tokich, 
Kliot 2008), surveys (Swianiewicz, Teles 2019), inventory and comparative 
analysis (Hulst, van Montfort 2007, 2011), interviews with local officials and 
document analysis (Klimovský et al. 2014; De Peuter, Wayenberg 2007; 
Haveri, Airaksinen 2007), mathematical modelling has not received deserved 
attention as the one which can be applied in the development of a microeco-
nomic theory to establish inter-municipal cooperation. This thesis fills in this 
gap as well. 
There have been attempts to analyse the legal form in which formalised 
long-term types of inter-municipal cooperation can exist in different countries 
(e.g. Citroni et al. 2013; Heinz 2007). However, FOCJs as a form of IMC have 
not been approached, considering the institutional legal framework of the par-
ticular country for which it is suggested. 
There is no research related to inter-municipal cooperation in Russian school 
education. Some authors (Ирискина 2010; Бутова, Смирнова, Миловидова 
2014; Гриценко 2001; Власова, Джек 2009; Рагозина 2009) have investigated 
the economic long-term cooperation of municipalities in Russia that establish 
46 
legal company forms. These investigations are mostly descriptive and lack a 
theoretical microeconomic basis for developing IMC in Russia. 
The first chapter of the thesis focuses on introducing the concept of Func-
tional Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions by defining the main components 
and types. This is followed by an analysis of existing typologies of inter-muni-
cipal cooperation in different countries. Relations between FOCJs and existing 
classifications of IMC are investigated and a suitable definition of inter-muni-
cipal cooperation is given here. FOCJs of type II are chosen as the focus of the 
thesis as an economic formalised form of inter-municipal cooperation. The next 
chapter will develop a microeconomic theory for FOCJs as a basis for munici-
palities, FOCJ management and the decision-making of higher rank jurisdic-





2. DETERMINATION OF FOCJ MANAGEMENT 
BEHAVIOUR BY MICROECONOMIC THEORY 
2.1. Basic models of the establishment, current operation 
and competition for members of FOCJs 
The first chapter draws the conclusion that FOCJs of type II can be classified as 
a form of inter-municipal cooperation. What the analysis in the previous chapter 
has also shown is that a microeconomic theory for inter-municipal cooperation 
in the form of FOCJs of type II does not exist, which means that there is no 
theoretical basis for municipalities to decide whether they will cooperate in the 
form of FOCJs of type II, how many of them should cooperate, the share they 
have to pay to the equity capital, the level of regular participation fees and con-
tributions and how municipalities as members of FOCJs of type II should be 
allocated between competing FOCJs of type II. To deal with these and other 
practical questions when establishing FOCJs of type II in Russia, this chapter 
develops microeconomic models.     
The author has divided the process of microeconomic modelling of FOCJs of 
type II into three main phases. The first phase is an establishment phase where 
the role of founders (municipalities) is crucial, since they have to decide which 
resources should be dedicated to the FOCJ of type II. The establishment phase 
is shorter and more permanent compared with current operation. The thesis pro-
vides more emphasis on the second phase, current operation, where managerial 
functions are transferred to the employed managers with particular assumptions 
regarding their behaviour. The third phase follows current operation or may go 
simultaneously with it when two (for the sake of simplicity) or more (in prac-
tice) established and operating FOCJs of type II start competing for members 
(municipalities) and clients. The decision of municipalities regarding which 
FOCJ of type II they join is based on a comparison of their costs and benefits. 
Figure 5 illustrates the key phases of the FOCJ of type II microeconomic theory 



































Figure 5. The phases of microeconomic modelling 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
The second chapter is organised in the following way. First, the author of this 
thesis presents basic models of three phases, extending the analysis by grants 
from higher rank jurisdictions (Russian regions and Federal government) and 
other financial means. Second, management behaviour on the current operation 
phase is investigated by introducing different market forms and four types of 
utility function of FOCJ management. The last subchapter 2.3 contains a de-
tailed discussion on how restrictions on production factors and output; changes 
in production function, utility function of managers and demand function; and 
the structure of principal-agent relations between the members and management 
of FOCJs of type II affect the optimal solutions of the current operation model 
of FOCJs of type II.  
 
 
The model of the establishment of FOCJs of type II considering 
higher rank jurisdictions with a non-negotiable grant 
In order to establish school FOCJs of type II in Russia, municipalities that join 
an FOCJ of type II have to decide which resources should be dedicated to the 
equity capital of the FOCJ of type II. A municipality might provide funding 
through tax payments, credit or resources in kind, e.g. real estate. The solution 
of this model is an optimal share of member municipalities, which they should 
contribute to the equity capital and the optimal number of participants based on 
the comparison of the benefits and costs municipalities face as a result of co-
FOCJ Microeconomic Theory 
Basic model of FOCJ 
establishment 
(subchapter 2.1) 
Basic model of FOCJ 
current operation 
(subchapter 2.1) 
Basic model of FOCJ 
competition for members and 











FOCJ management behaviour: 
Case I, Case II, Case III, Case IV 
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operation (Friedrich, Reiljan 2011; Friedrich, Eckardt 2014; Friedrich, Chebo-
tareva 2017; Chebotareva, Friedrich 2017).    
The contribution of a municipality i to the equity capital of the FOCJ of type 
II is ei and  ∑ei (i=1, …, n) shows the total amount of resources Ē dedicated by 
all municipalities. In this model, each municipality participates with only one 
kind of financing. The financial contribution of other members equals 
ER= Ē - ei. The higher share a municipality i has in the equity capital of an 
FOCJ of type II, the more benefits it receives because the voting power of this 
municipality within the FOCJ of type II might grow and more favourable solu-
tions for this municipality might be achieved. These benefits are marked with 
the parameter bi. Therefore, the benefits each participant gets are equal to bi*
eiĒ.  
The dedication of resources by a municipality to the FOCJ of type II also 
shows some negative effects, such as the loss of centrality of the municipality, 
the movement of buyers to places abroad, the higher transportation time and 
other unfavourable effects on the achievement of municipal goals. These are 
reflected by ci. The model maximises the utility function10 of a municipality i: 
 
Ui= bi*
eiĒ -ci*ei (1) 
 






ER(ER+ ei)2 - ci= 0 (2)   
 
After all necessary elaborations and substitutions, we get the optimality condi-
tion11: 
 
eiĒ =1- cibi *Ē  (10)  
 
(10) is the optimal proportion of municipality i in the equity capital of the FOCJ 
of type II.   
Municipalities are eager to participate in FOCJs of type II if they get higher 
benefits bi; then their shares of financing (
ei
Ē
) grow. If the costs (ci) increase, the 
                                                            
10  For other possible types of utility functions, the author refers to the discussion in 
subchapter 2.3 devoted to the ‘Conditions with respect to utility function’.  
11  (ER + ei)2= bici *ER  (3)        ER + ei = bici * ER  (4)         Ē = bici * ER    (5)       Ē = bi
ci
* Ē - ei (6)   
Ē2 = bi
ci
*(Ē - ei) (7) : Ē               Ē = bici *( Ē - eiĒ ) (8)                Ē = bici *(1 - eiĒ ) (9) 
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share shrinks. All shares of finance must add up to 1. Hence, the optimal num-
ber n of municipalities participating in an FOCJ of type II results from12: 
 
n = 1+ ∑ ci
bi
*Ē  (11) 
 
Due to the importance of regional authorities in the participation of school fi-
nancing revealed by the interviews (see Annex 4), a further step in the extension 
of the FOCJ establishment model is to consider a grant from the regional 
government (Chebotareva, Friedrich 2017b). If a higher rank government pro-
vides grant G as a lump-sum for FOCJ establishment, the total FOCJ of type II 
equity capital (Ē) that participants have to cover is deducted by grant G. This 
means that establishment costs are partly covered by higher rank authorities. 
The equity capital which is left for participants to cover is E1: 
 
Ē - G = E1  (12) 
 
In this case, the share of each municipality in the equity capital increases 
eiĒ =1- cibi *E1, which means less participants: 
 
 n = 1+ ∑ ci
bi
*E1   (13) 
 
The model of the establishment of FOCJs of  
type II considering different means of financing 
Russian member municipalities may choose several ways of financial participa-
tion i in the FOCJ of type II (Friedrich, Chebotareva 2017). The contribution of 
a municipality i to the equity capital of the FOCJ of type II is similar to the pre-
vious model ei. It can consist of j types of financing ∑ eijmj=1 . The benefits a mu-
nicipality achieves are related to the municipality’s participation in financing 
the equity capital, which results in  eij∑ ∑ eijmj=1ni=1 . The sum ∑ eijni=1  are all financial 
means of type j of all municipalities. The financial contribution of the other 
municipalities equals ERij= E - eij- ∑ Ejmm-j , where E = ∑ ∑ eijmj=1ni=1  are all finan-
cial means of all financial types of all municipalities, eij is a contribution of 
municipality i with j type of financing, ∑ Ejmm-j  is the financial contribution to the 
equity capital with the other types of financing. The benefits of municipality i 
increase when a municipality has a higher proportion of equity capital in an 
FOCJ of type II. These benefits are illustrated by parameter bi. Therefore, the 
benefits develop as bi*
eij
E
. Moreover, there are opportunity costs cij per financing 
                                                            
12  ∑ ei
E
n
i=1 = n-E ∑ cibini=1    (where eiĒ ∗ n = 1). 
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- ∑ cij*eijmj=1    (14) 
 






(ERij+eij+ ∑ Ejmm-j - eij)
ERij+eij+ ∑ Ejmm-j 2 - cij= 0  (15) 
 
From elaboration of terms one receives: 
 
bi*
(ERij+ ∑ Ejmm-j )
ERij+eij+ ∑ Ejmm-j 2 - cij = 0  (16) 
 
Substituting the following expression (17) into (16)  
 
ERij= E - eij- ∑ Ejmm-j   (17) 
 
leads to  
 
bi*(E-eij) = cij*E








= E  (19) 
 






*E  (20) 
 
(20) is the optimal proportion of one way of financing j of municipality i in the 
FOCJ of type II.  
With higher benefits bi of municipality i, its share of financing through j is 
increasing. If the opportunity costs of j are increasing, the share shrinks.  
To determine total financial means, all shares of finance must add up to 1. 





i=1 = ∑ ∑ (1- cijbi *E) = 1mj=1ni=1   (21) 
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E = n-1∑ ∑ cij/bimj=1ni=1             (22) 
 
are the total financial means dedicated to equity capital of the FOCJ of type II 
(see Friedrich, Chebotareva 2017). 
 
 
The model of the current operation of FOCJ of type II considering 
higher rank jurisdictions with a non-negotiable grant 
The FOCJ of type II current operation phase follows the FOCJ of type II es-
tablishment phase. In current operation, an FOCJ of type II provides school 
services to the citizens of participating municipalities. The demand for school 
services is formed by citizens (mainly by parents with school-age children), and 
an FOCJ of type II reflects the supply side. The costs that occur during the pro-
cess of current service provision must be covered by the member municipalities 
of an FOCJ of type II. Thus, the basic model of current operation is introduced 
to provide a contribution rule for FOCJ members. They must pay a fee that is 
equal to per unit costs. Demand for FOCJ of type II services also depends on 
the contribution to be paid. The FOCJ of type II must control cost levels be-
cause municipalities that consider costs too high can quit the FOCJ of type II. 
For the sake of simplicity, only the case of two variable factors – labour (L) and 
materials (M) – is depicted. Labour is defined as teachers, school administrative 
and management staff and maintenance personnel. Materials are tangible re-
sources that are employed to provide services and can be consumed within one 
production period. For a school FOCJ of type II, this includes educational and 
methodological literature, materials for studying fine arts, modelling, natural 
sciences, etc. A special case of the Cobb-Douglas production function13 X = 
L*M is assumed so that α = 1, β =1. 
The FOCJ of type II current operation is carried out by FOCJ management 
that possesses a utility function related to the output (X) and labour input (L) of 
the relevant FOCJ of type II. For the sake of this thesis, output X reflects the 
number of students enrolled in a school FOCJ of type II. For more details on 
labour, materials, output, utility function, demand function, etc., subchapter 2.3 
provides a more in-depth discussion. The author assumes that FOCJ members 
receive services only from the FOCJ of type II, i.e. the FOCJ of type II is a mo-
nopoly. 
     
                                                            
13  In the initial Cobb-Douglas function, output depends on two factors – labour L and 
capital K, such as X = A*Lα * Kβ, where A is a technological coefficient (total factor 
productivity), α and β are shares of labour and capital as factors of production in the volume 




Figure 6. Optimal decision for FOCJ of type II management 
Source: Compiled by the author based on Friedrich 2006; Fladung, Friedrich 2008; 
Friedrich, Reiljan 2011; Friedrich, Eckardt 2014; Friedrich, Chebotareva 2017; Chebo-
tareva, Friedrich 2017. 
 
 
In Figure 6, a set of output-labour curves presented in the first quadrant, which 
are related to the production possibilities of FOCJs of type II depending on the 
available budget. Budget lines are respectively illustrated in the fourth quadrant. 
The budget is formed by FOCJ members (municipalities) by paying participa-
tion fees. For the sake of simplicity, only two variable factors – labour and ma-
terials – are assumed. A cost coverage rule is introduced in this model, which 
means that budget is used only to cover labour and material costs, excluding 
profit since an FOCJ of type II is a non-profit-maximising firm. A variable cost 
function is demonstrated in the third quadrant, fixed costs (if they occur) are 
assumed to be covered by municipalities separately (outside the model). In the 
second quadrant, there is a contribution revenue or turnover curve. Each point 
of this curve reflects budgets of different sizes. An added-up demand function 
of member municipalities is also marked in the second quadrant.   
FOCJ of type II service provision can be labour or material intensive. Hence, 
two points on output-labour curves become relevant. Connecting them yields a 
possible solution curve (space) in the first quadrant. Additionally, in the first 
quadrant, the utility function of FOCJ management dependent on output and 
labour input is considered and expressed through indifference curves I1 and I2. 
An optimal solution for the model is where the highest indifference curve 
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touches a possible solution space (point C). Hence, an output at the point of 
management utility maximisation is described by B. An optimal fee that FOCJ 
members must pay to cover costs is shown in point A in the second quadrant. 
The basic model of current operation can be described not only graphically 
as it is above, but also algebraically. The following assumptions are imple-
mented: 
U = U (X, L) – management utility function14, which depends on X – output and 
L – labour input. 
P = P(X) – FOCJ of type II demand function; X = f (L, M) – FOCJ of type II 
production function.15    
Only two variable factors are used – labour and materials, therefore the 
variable cost function is formulated as K = l*L + m*M, where L – labour, l – 
factor price of labour, M – materials, m – factor price of materials. 
P(X)* X = l* L + m*M  – contribution revenue equals to total variable costs. 
Utility maximization of management under the cost coverage constraint 
leads to the following Lagrange equation: 
 
Λ = U (X (L, M), L) + λ(P(X)X - l*L - m*M), where X = f (L, M)  (23) 
 
∂Λ/∂X = U′(X) + λ (P′(X)*X + P) = 0                                 (24) 
 
∂Λ/∂L = U′(X)*X′(L) + U′(L) + λ(P′(X)*X′(L)*X + P* X′(L) - l) = 0  (25) 
 
∂Λ/∂M = U′(X)*X′ (M) + λ (P′(X)*X′(M)*X + P*X′(M) - m) = 0  (26)   
 
∂Λ/∂λ = P(X)X - l*L - m*M = 0   (27)      
  
The first-order conditions reflect two optimality conditions. One concerns the 
equivalence of the relation of marginal utilities of marginal factor-inputs to the 
proportion of respective marginal profits caused by the factor contribution (28) 
and the other refers to the contribution rate under cost coverage (29). 
 
 U'(X)*X'(L) + U'(L)
U'(X)*X'(M)
= P'(X)*X'(L)*X + P*X'(L) - l
P'(X)*X'(M)*X + P*X'(M) - m
    (28)  
 
P = l *L + m *M 
X
                                              (29) 
 
                                                            
14  For other possible kinds of utility functions, the author refers to the discussion in sub-
chapter 2.3 devoted to the ‘Restrictions with respect to utility function’. 
15  For other possible kinds of production functions, the author refers to the discussion in 
subchapter 2.3 devoted to the ‘Restrictions with respect to production function’. 
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Two optimality conditions are defined for point C in Figure 6 where the highest 
possible indifference curve touches a possible solution space, so that manage-
ment utility is maximized in this point. 
The model of current operation can be applicable for the analysis of how op-
timal solution changes under the condition that a lump-sum grant G from higher 
rank jurisdictions is introduced. If an FOCJ of type II receives a grant from a 
higher rank jurisdiction, the scope of financing of FOCJ of type II increases 
since turnover increases:  
 
The first optimality condition stays the same, compared with the case without 
grant if G is a lump-sum grant. However, the second condition changes. The 
contribution fee for FOCJ members is deducted by G/X, which means that 
member municipalities will pay less membership fees because of the higher-
rank grant (Friedrich, Chebotareva 2017; Chebotareva, Friedrich 2017): 
 
P = l *L + m *M - G 
X
  (31) 
 
The model of current operation considering a non-negotiable grant can be 




Figure 7. The model of the current operation of FOCJ of type II considering higher 
rank jurisdictions with a non-negotiable grant 
Source: Compiled by the author based on Friedrich, Eckardt 2014; Friedrich, Chebo-
tareva 2017; Chebotareva, Friedrich 2017. 
 
P(X)* X + G = l L + m M     (30) 
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In Figure 7, the turnover curve gets a push to the left to the size of the grant as 
long as there is a demand by clients (members). The budget lines move up to 
the right in parallel (red dotted lines in the fourth quadrant). The output-labour 
curve moves to the right and the solution space becomes bigger. The optimal 
solution moves from point C to D. The solution will be a smaller contribution 
(the contribution fee decreases from point A to F) and a larger service volume 
(from B to E). Such grants and subventions can be paid to the FOCJ of type II 
by a higher-level jurisdiction, other municipalities, private and public com-
panies, or by the member municipalities (Friedrich, Chebotareva 2017). 
  
 
The model of the current operation of FOCJ of  
type II considering different means of financing 
This model is an extension of the basic model of current operation discussed 
above. Therefore, the assumptions stay the same. In particular, municipalities 
have to cover variable costs of current operation. There are two variable factors 
L and M and a factor finance F. Financial costs are also part of the total costs. 
These costs may be linked to special factor inputs in current production and 
treated as part of the factor prices, e.g., by special inventories, price conditions, 
waiting time costs, costs according to different policies of asset maintenance, 
etc. Some costs are due to the special financial conditions for ways of finance 
(Friedrich, Chebotareva 2017). Therefore, the production function is X = f (L, 
M, F).  
Special variable costs are from finance F if production time is influenced 
through production, procurement and delivery for which price f has to be paid. 
Special reserves are necessary to overcome difficulties ϝ. The respective costs 
are KvF = (f + ϝ) * F. 
There are variable labour costs related to L, which are due to the amount of 
labour, the labour costs (price l) and that part of finance costs Ȋ related specially 
to labour, such as fulfilling requirements with respect to labour guarantees, so-
cial expenses, etc. Thus, the relevant costs are KvL= (l + Ȋ)*L. 
The variable costs for material and pre-services are linked to the material 
prices m, etc. and special financing to store and transport materials related to 
finance costs ὴ. The respective costs are KvM = (m + ὴ) *M. 
Therefore, the cost function reads as follows: 
 
KvF+KvL+KvM = (f + ϝ)*F+ (l + Ȋ)*L + (m + ὴ)*M (32)  
 
As costs should be covered through a levy, the contribution payment must equal 
these costs. The volume of services demanded from the FOCJ of type II de-
pends on the contribution level.  
 
P = P (X)  (33)  
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The amount to finance through the contribution equals: 
 
P(X)*X = ( f + ϝ )*F + (l + Ȋ)*L + (m + ὴ)*M  (34) 
 
Managements’ utility function expresses the aims of FOCJ of type II depending 
on output and the volume of labour inputs.  
 
U = U(X, L)  (35) 
 
Management maximizes utility leading to the following Lagrange formulation:  
 
Λ = U(X(L, M, F), L) - λ(P(X)*X - (f + ϝ)*F - (l + Ȋ )*L - (m + ὴ)*M)  (36)  
 








- λ (( ∂P
∂X
*X + P)* ∂X
∂F










- λ (( ∂P
∂X
* X + P)* ∂X
∂L











 = P(X)*X - (f + ϝ)*F- (l + Ȋ)*L - (m + ὴ)*M = 0   (40) 
 
Two basic financial optimality conditions result again. One concerns the input 
of production factors and implies the following financial guidelines: the relation 
between marginal utilities from changing finance and material marginally 
equals the relation of the marginal profits connected to finance and materials 
(41). The relation of marginal productivities equals the marginal profits that 









∂M )  = (( ∂P∂X *X + P)* ∂X∂F  - (f + ϝ)) / (( ∂P∂X *X + P)* ∂X∂M  - (m + ὴ))  





∂M = (( ∂P∂X *X + P)* ∂X∂F  - (f + ϝ)) / ( ∂P∂X *X + P * ∂X∂M  - (m + ὴ))  (42) 
                      
For labour variation results: the relation between marginal utilities from chang-
ing finance and labour marginally equals the relation of the marginal profits 












 ) = (( ∂P
∂X
*X + P)* ∂X
∂F
 - (f + ϝ)) / (( ∂P
∂X
 + P)* ∂X
∂L
- (l + Ȋ))  
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  (43) 
The other financial optimality condition refers to the size of municipalities’ fee 
that municipalities have to pay considering different means of financing. The 
contribution has to equal the average costs: 
 
P = (f + ϝ)*F+ (l + Ȋ)*L + (m + ὴ)*M 
X
   (44) 
 
The finance conditions are reflected in the factor prices through ϝ, Ȋ, ὴ. If the 
size of finance-related factor prices changes with factor inputs because of ϝ (F), 
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  - λ (( ∂P
∂X
*X + P) * ∂X
∂L
 - (l + ∂Ȋ
∂L










*X + P * ∂X
∂M
- ὴ + ∂ὴ
∂M
*M + ὴ = 0   (47) 
                               
∂Λ
∂λ
 = P(X)*X - ((f + ϝ(F))*F - (l + Ȋ(L))*L - (m + ὴ(M))*M) = 0  (48) 
 
A change in the financial parts of costs (factor prices) changes the relation of 
marginal utilities and marginal profits and therefore the inputs, outputs, and the 
levy (fee).  
Effects of finance are demonstrated in different ways (see Figure 7). If the 
financing of variable costs become more expensive, that means ϝ*F, Ȋ*L, and 
ὴ*M grow and the budget curves shrink and move to the left at the labour or 
other variable factor axes. The output-labour curves shrink and the possible 
solution curve move inwards. The contribution increases and the service level 
decreases (Friedrich, Chebotareva 2017).  
 
 
The model considering an active negotiating  
higher rank government 
FOCJs of type II can also receive grants on the basis of negotiation with higher 
rank authorities (e.g. with regions or provinces in some countries) (Chebo-
tareva, Friedrich 2017). By means of this grant the FOCJ of type II as well as 
donating higher-level jurisdictions maximize their utility. The regional govern-
ment utility function depends on the X – FOCJ output and the size of condi-
tional grant F. In the current case, the FOCJ of type II negotiates about grant F. 
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Therefore, the utility function16 of the higher rank jurisdiction (assume a region) 
is UR = gXL*X – gFL*F (49), where gXL and gFL are utility weights.  
The utility of the FOCJ of type II depends on the amount of production X 
which in turn is implicitly influenced by the amount of the grant (F) and the 
grant as such, which emphasises the importance of the grant for the FOCJ of 
type II (gFG*F component): 
 
UFOCJ = (a – b*X)X+(a – b*X)X(F) + gFG*F  (50)  
 
where a, b – parameters, and gFG – the value of one unit of grant F for the FOCJ 
of type II. 
Both partners possess utility functions, which can be expressed with respect 
to the volume of services X and the grant F. For each negotiator a set of indif-
ference curves, which gives a Pareto-optimal path of possible negotiation occurs 
(Friedrich, Gwiazda, Nam 2004). To determine the indifference curves of the 
region, the author differentiates the utility function of the region with respect to 
X and F: 
 
dUR = ∂UR∂X  dX+ ∂UR∂F  dF = gXLdX-gFLdF = 0  (51)    
 
The author finds derivation of the utility curve of FOCJ of type II: 
 
dUG = ∂UG∂X  dX+ ∂UG∂F  dF = (a-2bX)dX+((a-bX) ∂X∂F +gFG)dF = 0  (52) 
 
To identify Pareto solution, both sides of two equations (51) and (52) are di-









+gFG)dF = 0  (54) 
 
For the sake of simplicity, in equation (54) the expression  ∂X
∂F




= n   (55) 
 
From the equations (53) and (54) the author finds the relations dF
 dX
 as a condition 
for Xpareto identification:  
 
                                                            
16  For other possible kinds of utility functions, the author refers to the discussion in 










= - a - 2bX
a - bX n + gFG   (57) 
 
In the point of indifference curves’ tangency, their slopes are equal, therefore, 




= - a - 2bX
a - bX n + gFG    (58) 
 




2bgFL+ bgXLn     (59) 
 





2bgFL+ bgXLn ) – gFL*F   (60) 
 
And into the utility function of the FOCJ of type II: 
 
UFOCJ = 2(a – b*(
a + gXLgFG+ agXLn
2bgFL+ bgXLn ))( agFL+ gXLgFG+ agXLn2bgFL+ bgXLn ) + gFG*F   (61) 
 
From the equation (61), the author isolates F: 
 
F =
- 2(agFL-gXLgFG)(gXLgFG+ a(gFL+ gXLn))
b(2gFL+ gXLn)
2  + UFOCJ
gFG
    (62) 
 
Then, received F (62) should be inserted in utility function of the region (60) 
which results in: 
 
UR = gXL3gFG2n+2a2gFL2(gFL+gXLn)+agXLgFG(2gFL2+gXLgFLn+gXL2n2)-bgFL(2gFL+gXLn)2UFOCJ bgFG(2gFL+gXLn)2  (63)  
   
Parameters of (63) can be rearranged, so that one can receive: 
 























2 = ȹ  (65)  
 
so that (64) can be modified: 
 
UR = - 
gFLUFOCJ 
gFG
+ ȹ  (66) 
 
To find the negotiation solution, Nash product must be maximised considering 
the restriction (66) for the possible utility distribution between the region and 
the FOCJ.  
NP = (UR - URmin)*(UFOCJ – UFOCJmin) – Nash product function, where URmin 
denotes minimal utility level of higher rank jurisdiction, and UFOCJmin – minimal 
utility level of the FOCJ. 
Implementing the Lagrange method, the Nash solution occurs: 
 
Lag = (UR - URmin) * (UFOCJ – UFOCJmin) - λ(ȹ -UR- gFLgFG *UFOCJ)  (67) 
 












= ȹ -UR- gFLgFG *UFOCJ = 0   (70) 
 
From (68) and (69) follows that if the left sides are equal, the right sides should 
be equal as well: 
 
UFOCJ – UFOCJmin = gFGgFL (UR - URmin)  (71) 
 





(UR  - URmin) + UFOCJmin   (72) 
 
And inserted in the first order condition (70): 
 
ȹ -UR- gFLgFG *( gFGgFL (UR  - URmin) + UFOCJmin) = 0  (73) 
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Simplification of equation (73) provides the Nash utility of the region: 
 
URNash=





   (74) 
 
From the first order conditions (68)-(70) the same sequence of steps should be 





 ȹ + UGmin - gFGgFLURmin
2
  (75) 
 
In order to find the solution for grant F as a result of negotiations, Nash utility 
of the region (74) should be inserted in the initial utility function of the region 
(49) instead of the initial UR, or Nash utility of the FOCJ of type II (75) should 
be similarly inserted in the initial utility function of the FOCJ of type II (50) 
instead of UFOCJ considering output (59). For the sake of simplicity, the author 
finds F through the regional utility function:   
 








) – gFL*F   (76) 
 
After all possible simplifications17 and isolation of F from the formula (76), the 
following solution has been received: 
   
F = 4gXL
2gFLgFG
2 + gXL3gFG2n - 2a2gFL2 gFL+gXLn  + agXLgFG 2gFL2+5gXLgFLn+gXL2n2
2bgFLgFG 2gFL+gXLn





2UFOCJmin - bgFL 2gFL+gXLn
2URmin
2bgFLgFG 2gFL+gXLn
2   (77)  
 
From these results, a negotiation solution is determined according to Nash for a 
cooperative non-zero-sum game. As long as the output is not dependent techni-
cally on F, the output gets fixed and the size of F is determined. If the evalua-
tion of the FOCJ of type II also depends on the output increase allowed by the 
grant, there is a solution where output volume depends on the evaluation of the 
grant, the evaluation of additional output allowed by the grant and the evalua-
tion of the negotiating partners of the output (see formula 59). 
The amount of the grant F resulting from negotiations is determined by this 
output, the minimum utilities of the negotiators and the parameters of the evalu-
ation functions. It is reflected by the formula (77). 
From the solution obtained for F and X, we can see that with the higher grant 
induced, the evaluation of the additional output by the FOCJ management, the 
                                                            
17  Calculation of the grant size has been possible with the help of Wolfram Mathematica 
software. 
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volume of X and the size of F will increase. Formula (77) shows that if the 
FOCJ of type II minimal utility level grows, the grant F increases as well. How-
ever, an increase in the minimum utility of the region will affect the grant size 
negatively. The increase in the value of one grant unit for the FOCJ of type II 
(gFG) positively influences the grant F. For more conclusions, additional calcu-
lations may be done. 
 
 
The model of FOCJ of type II competition  
for members considering higher rank jurisdictions  
with a non-negotiable grant 
The basic model of FOCJ of type II competition for members illustrates the 
distribution of members between two already established and competing FOCJs 
of type II (Friedrich, Eckardt 2014; Friedrich, Chebotareva 2017; Chebotareva, 
Friedrich 2017). The net-benefit of FOCJ members increases until a particular 
point when one additional member, who before this point took part in cost re-
duction, now entails declining utility for other member-participants. Hence, 
there is an optimal size for an FOCJ of type II. And if the size grows, it leads to 
congestion of the FOCJ of type II and a decrease in the quality of services pro-
vided. A net-benefit to a member results from the service and the contribution 
paid. For one FOCJ of type II this net-benefit is reflected in curve TL in Figure 
8 in the left-hand section. The middle graph shows the situation for the com-
peting FOCJ of type II (KP). Left of assignment G it makes no sense for pos-
sible members of the FOCJ1 to stay with FOCJ2. The same is true for possible 
members of FOCJ2 right of point G. Therefore, the size of FOCJ1 turns out to 
be N1 and that of FOCJ2 is N2 (Friedrich, Reiljan 2011; Friedrich, Eckardt 
2014). 
The two or more FOCJs of type II can also receive grants from other juris-
dictions including higher rank jurisdictions (Chebotareva, Friedrich 2017). If 
the amount of grant is equal for both competing FOCJs of type II, then curves 
TL and KP move up, and the new allocation point G1 does not change the dis-
tribution of members among FOCJs of type II. The members of both FOCJs of 
type II will just have higher net-benefit than before receiving the grant (see 
Figure 8). The members still choose that FOCJ of type II which allows the 





Figure 8.  Distribution of FOCJ members when both FOCJs of type II receive equal grant 
Source: Compiled by the author based on Friedrich 2006; Friedrich, Eckardt 2014; 





Figure 9.  Distribution of FOCJ members when FOCJ2 of type II receives bigger grant 
Source: Compiled by the author based on Friedrich 2006; Friedrich, Eckardt 2014; 
Chebotareva, Friedrich 2017.   
 
 
If one of the competing municipalities receives (for example, FOCJ2) a bigger 
grant, then the net-benefit curve moves up again, but with different distance. A 
new allocation of point G1 appears (Figure 9). In the far-right hand picture, the 
crossing point of the two optimal net-benefit curves reflects the resulting allo-
cation of members to the two FOCJs of type II. For some FOCJ1 members, 
FOCJ2 gives a higher net-benefit. Hence, the distribution of members between 
the two FOCJs of type II has changed. A similar result occurs when, for 
example, FOCJ2 gets a grant, but FOCJ1 does not have one. In this case, more 
FOCJ1 members are willing to change their service provider in favour of 
FOCJ2, since they will perceive higher net-benefit. 
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The model of FOCJ of type II competition for  
members considering different means of financing 
The two FOCJs of type II can also apply different financial policies (Friedrich, 
Chebotareva 2017). For example, the first FOCJ of type II may practice fi-
nancing through contributions, and the second one through a mix of fees and 
public debt. Now, the curve TL reflects financing by members’ contributions 
while the curve KP refers to the mix of fees and debt financing. The different 
ways of FOCJ of type II financing determines the allocation point G in Figure 10. 
For each financial policy, one can draw a net-benefit curve for members. 
The financial policies can be different or the same in the two FOCJs of type II. 
The members still choose that FOCJ of type II which allows the highest net-
benefit. In Figure 10 in the left-hand part of the picture the two curves depicted 
do not cross. The potential FOCJ members decide following the higher curve. 
The same is true with the second FOCJ of type II. If more advantageous finan-
cial policies are available, the allocation point G results. If only less advanta-






Figure 10. Distribution of FOCJ members in case of different financial policies 
Source: Friedrich 2006; Friedrich, Eckardt 2014; Friedrich, Chebotareva 2017. 
 
 
If many financial policies are available and the net-benefit curves cross with 
respect to one FOCJ of type II, then the curves between the crossing points must 
be compared. The curves of highest net benefit between the crossing points 
show the most favourable financial policy. A curve of optimal financing results 
for the respective FOCJ. For the other FOCJ of type II a similar construction of 
the optimal financing curve takes place. The optimal finance curves are trans-
ferred into the far-right hand picture. The crossing point of the two optimal 
curves reflects the resulting allocation of members to the two FOCJs of type II 
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and the related optimal financial policy (see Figure 11). A change in financing 





Figure 11. Distribution of FOCJ members in case of different financial policies, 
crossing net-benefit curves and adjustment curves ABCD and FHIJ 
Source: Friedrich 2006; Friedrich, Eckardt 2014; Friedrich, Chebotareva 2017. 
 
 
A given number of possible FOCJ of type II members should be allocated be-
tween two FOCJs of type II according to the following microeconomic finance 
FOCJ principles. If the FOCJs of type II are ordered by the net benefits per 
member, which stem from optimal finance of FOCJs (member sizes), the split 
between the two FOCJs of type II is determined by the member size of equal net 
benefit per member. 
 
 
2.2. Modelling of FOCJ management behaviour  
in monopoly and oligopoly 
The model of current operation of FOCJs of type II can be used for the analysis 
of production results considering the different behaviour of management de-
fined by their goals. Classically, it is assumed that the management’s main goal 
is profit maximisation (Cournot 1838; Krelle 1961). However, this is not always 
the case. For example, Baumol (1959) as well as other authors (Mert 2018; 
Zabojnik 1998; Sklivas 1987) claim that a firm maximises its sales or turnover. 
Due to the split of the managerial and ownership functions, management is sup-
posed to have aims that differ from the profit maximisation of owners. The 
management of corporations most likely maximise sales, since this assures the 
higher salaries of personnel whose interests top managers aim to satisfy. Addi-
tionally, decisions on price in the company are justified by prioritising its ob-
jectives rather than following the “simple concept of profit maximisation” 
(Lanzillotti 1958: 939). 
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Williamson (1964) investigated the model of managerial discretion where he 
assumed that management in corporations maximise utility depending on their 
own objectives and not the utility of stakeholders. Hence, profit maximisation 
might not necessarily be an objective of management in corporations; some-
times they only want to receive the minimum level of profit, which guarantees 
their position (Marris 1964). 
The objectives of top management may be power, influence, prestige, secu-
rity, success and self-realisation as well as the formal objective of financial 
remuneration (Heinen 1966; Lingnau, Härtel 2014: 18). The idea that managers 
have their own purposes, which are different from cost minimisation, has be-
come a reason for X-inefficiency (Leibenstein 1966).  
The principal-agent problem of firms is also rooted in principals (owners) 
and agents’ (management of a firm) difference of interests, which was dis-
cussed, for example, by Jensen and Meckling (1976); Tirole (2006); Ross 
(1973); Myerson (1982); etc.       
The game-theoretical approach to the management utility function resulting 
in the Condorcet paradox is implemented in Machina (1987). The external 
competitive conditions of companies affect the internal incentives of manage-
ment, leading them away from classical profit maximisation for strategic rea-
sons, as in Fershtman and Judd (1987). 
There is also a flow of literature devoted to the goals of public enterprises 
(e.g. Moore 2013; Thiemeyer 1975; Peltzman 1971; Meynhardt 2015; Bozeman 
2007). The management of public enterprises should aim to achieve some pub-
lic goals. However, even in public enterprises, the personal goals of manage-
ment may still shape their utility function. In general, the utility function of the 
management of public enterprises can reflect different objectives, such as: 
− personal goals (Williamson 1964, Leibenstein 1966); 
− public goals operationalised by FOCJ II managers (Thiemeyer 1975; Parts 
2010); 
− public goals set by public bodies, e.g. assembly of FOCJ members, higher 
rank government (Thiemeyer 1975; Ploom, Haldma 2013; Matzembacher, 
Raudsaar, Mets 2019); 
− operationalisation of public interests (Bozeman 2007); 
− idea on the common good (bonum commune) in the interpretation of mana-
gement (Diggs 1973); 
− mission of the FOCJ (Hill, Jones, Schilling 2014);  
− perception of public welfare (Graaff 1963; Bös 1981, 1986; Blankart 1980, 
Rees 2006); 
− perception of management determined by the general ideas of good mana-
gement in the sector (Rainey 1989); 
− leading idea of a management concept (Skidmore 2006; Friedrich, Ukrainski, 
Timpman 2014); 




Since FOCJs of type II are public enterprises, FOCJ management may possess 
utility functions which include public as well as private components, such as 
output; labour and output; labour input; profit maximisation; labour and profit 
(Friedrich, Feng 2000; Feng, Friedrich 2013; Dehne, Friedrich, Nam 2009: 10–
11; Friedrich, Kaltschütz, Nam 2004: 22). Similar to Friedrich, Ukrainski and 
Timpmann 2014, the author assumes that the management of FOCJs maximise 
their utility, which depends on output and labour as is shown in Table 4. The 
objectives of FOCJ management are linked to output and labour and reflected in 
the form of applied utility functions. For the discussion of the form of the utility 
function, turn to subchapter 2.3.  
 
 
Table 4. FOCJ of type II management utility functions: four Cases  
 Maximization 
 Output Labour 
Case I + + 
Case II +  
Case III  + 
Case IV - + 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
FOCJ of type II management evaluates: 
1) output and labour input positively X*Lβ - Case I. 
2) only output positively γ*X - Case II. 
3) only labour input positively δ*L - Case III. 
4) labour positively and output negatively αL – X + β - Case IV. 
The author is modelling management behaviour on the current operation stage 
in monopoly as well as in oligopoly,18 considering four cases of management 
behaviour and looking for a Launhardt-Hotelling solution (Launhardt 1885; 
Hotelling 1929) and Krelle-Ott spaces (see Krelle 1961, Ott 1970).   
In the model, only two FOCJs of type II are involved. Hence, for simplicity, 
a duopoly is under observation here. Compared with a perfect competition or 
monopoly, the reaction of firms to the action of a competitor is important in 
oligopolistic markets. Additionally, the different behavioural assumptions of 
duopolists result in several models for oligopolistic markets (Varian 1992: 447). 
They may act autonomously19 as in the Cournot model (Cournot 1838), where 
production volumes are used as parameters of actions (strategic variables). In 
                                                            
18  Oligopoly is one of the forms of market structures that is characterized by a relatively 
small number of competitors, who can influence the market price. Oligopoly, which has only 
two competitors, is called ‘duopoly’ (Varian 2010).  
19  The autonomous behaviour means that if one FOCJ decides to change their service fee, 
they do not consider the reaction of their rival (another FOCJ).  
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the Cournot model, it is assumed that when a rival chooses the output to pro-
duce, they select the output which maximises their profit without considering 
the production plans of another duopolist (Varian 1992: 262). Autonomous 
behaviour is also assumed in the Bertrand model of price competition between 
oligopolists (Bertrand 1883) and in the Edgeworth model (Edgeworth 1925). In 
the Launhardt-Hotelling model, where the parameter of action is the price, auto-
nomous behaviour is assumed as well (Launhardt 1885, Hotelling 1929, Dos 
Santos Ferreira 1998).  
Furthermore, other behaviour leads to different oligopoly models, such as 
the Stackelberg leader-follower model where one firm (leader) makes a decision 
regarding its production volume before another (follower) (Stackelberg 2011). 
On the behaviour of duopolists, Bowley (1924) describes that a firm in the 
oligopolistic market believes that the price it chooses affects the prices selected 
by the rivals and takes this into consideration (Friedman 1983: 106). In the 
Ragnar Frisch model, it is assumed that one competitor always reacts by the 
same percentage to the parameter change of another competitor (Frisch 1933).  
Other behaviours relate to negotiations between competitors on solutions 
with compensations. They may end up in the solution where they maximise 
joint profit and compensate profit loss for others (Krelle 1961: 284). In her 
thesis, the author assumes the autonomous behaviour of two FOCJs of type II, 
FOCJ1 and FOCJ2, which manipulate fees for their services as parameters of 
action. 
Moreover, the oligopoly models can also be classified according to the main 
objectives of competitors, e.g. profit maximisation, volume (production) maxi-
misation (Krelle 1961), revenue maximisation, utility maximisation (Friedrich 
1978). Most oligopoly models deal with profit maximisation. Krelle introduced 
a special behaviour of competitors. The competitor reacts to the action of their 
rival only if the rival tries to force them into a situation where they lose profit. If 
a competitor is not pushed into a situation with lower profit, they do not react. 
This is a short description of the Krelle model under the specifications of Ott 
(1970), which is used in this thesis.  
Developing a FOCJ of type II oligopolistic model, the author is stemming 
from a monopoly situation. In Figure 6 of subchapter 2.1, only one case of utili-
ty maximisation is illustrated. The management of this monopoly maximises 
output and labour, its utility function depends on both parameters: U (X, L). 






Figure 12. Utility maximization of four cases of FOCJ of type II management behaviour 
Source: Compiled by the author.  
 
 
In Figure 12, the monopoly situation is transformed for the needs of oligopolis-
tic market but illustrates the situation for only one FOCJ of type II considering 
four cases of management behaviour. In the first case, UII(X, L), the FOCJ 
management utility function depends on output X and labour input L; they 
maximise both. If the indifference curves in the first quadrant are horizontal, 
this means that FOCJ management aims to maximise the firm output X (UI(X)). 
The indifference curves of the third case of FOCJ management behaviour 
(UIII(L)) reflect the utility, which is dependent on labour, and are parallel to the 
output axis in Figure 12. The fourth case of management behaviour, UIV(-X,+ 
L), shows that the management is willing to produce more only if it applies 
more labour. In other words, if the management of case four has to produce 
more, it is less satisfied unless it has more labour. The optimal solution can be 
found for all four cases where the highest indifference curve touches the space 
of possible solutions in the first quadrant.  
In Figure 12, the higher demand curve in the second quadrant corresponds to 
the higher possible solution curve (dotted line in the first quadrant) related to 
higher costs and, as a result, higher revenue in the second quadrant, which is 
omitted here. The points at which the indifference lines of the second manage-
ment type touch the possible solution space give a reaction line of FOCJ of type 
II one ( ), which connect all of the points of management utility maximi-R1II
sation. This reaction line R1II is transmitted to the second quadrant with respect 
 Moreover, the demand curves of the first FOCJ of to a different demand level.
type II given the price of the second FOCJ of type II are shown in the second 
quadrant. The same sequence of steps can be taken for the first, third and fourth 
types of management, which result in reaction lines R1I, R1III, and R1IV in the 
second quadrant.  
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The difference of the current work from the other oligopolistic models, such 
as Krelle, is that the author is going to maximise the utility of FOCJ of type II, 
not profit. The utility approach is combined with Launhardt-Hotelling auto-
nomous behaviour and Krelle behaviour, as is shown in Table 5. Moreover, a 
special case of utility maximisation related to the volume of production is intro-
duced in the first column of Table 5. If utility is dependent on labour and out-
put, another case appears in the second column. In the second column, there is 
one case where the utility increases if labour and output become larger (Case 
II), whereas in another case, utility is only increased if the management is com-
pensated by higher labour (Case IV). Finally, if management utility depends 
only on labour, this case is marked in the third column. 
 
 













model if utility 
depends on output X.
Launhardt-Hotelling 
model if utility depends 
on output X and labour 
input L. 
Launhardt-Hotelling 
model if utility 
depends on L. 
Krelle 
behaviour 
Krelle model if 
utility depends on 
output X. 
Krelle model if utility 
depends on output X and 
L. 
Krelle model if 
utility depends on L. 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
To sum up, the following assumptions are implemented as a basis: 
–  There are only two FOCJs of type II in the market and they provide hetero-
geneous services. 
–  It is a non-cooperative game. 
–  The costs are fully covered by FOCJ of type II in oligopoly as well as in the 
monopoly case. 
–  For the sake of simplicity, demand functions have a linear form. 
–  Firms select fees for their services independently. 
–  Consumers prefer cheaper services. 
–  For determining an equilibrium, it is a static model. For explaining the steps 
of adaptation, it is a dynamic model. 
–  The fee (price) is the parameter of action. 
–  Utility of FOCJ of type II management is maximised here.  
 
There are two assumptions about competitors’ behaviour: 
–  Competitors act autonomously (behaviour according to the Launhardt-Hotel-
ling model). 
72 
–  If FOCJ one changes its product price, the competitors react only if they lose 




Figure 13. Reaction lines of two FOCJs of type II with respect to four cases of manage-
ment behaviour  
Source: Schematically compiled by the author. 
 
 
The reaction line shows a combination of fees p1 and p2 such that each fee 
combination maximises utility under the other FOCJ of type II’s fee choice. 
Graphically, the reaction lines, which have been identified in algebraic form for 
the cases, can be schematically illustrated in Figure 13. Hence, 16 points of 
intersection appear. This means that there can be interactions between FOCJs of 
type II with the same case of management behaviour (e.g. Case I and Case I) or 
with a different case of management behaviour (e.g. Case I management of the 
first FOCJ of type II and Case II of the second one). However, the author calcu-
lates combinations of p1 and p2 only with the same case of management be-
haviour (crossing points of reaction lines of the same colour). 
 
 
Launhardt-Hotelling model in utilities 
In this model, instead of isoprofit curves, isoutility curves are used since the 
FOCJ of type II is not interested in profit, but in maximisation of management 
utility under the condition of full cost coverage. Isoutilities (or equal utility 
curves) show the combination of FOCJ of type II fees (p1, p2) that guarantee a 
duopolist (one FOCJ of type II) the same amount of utility (moving along u1 
means that FOCJ management has equal utility in each point on u1 curve). For a 
given utility achieved e.g. corresponding to point A in Figure 14, an isoutility 
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curve exists, which is represented by an average utility curve in the second 
quadrant of Figure 14. The respective (p1, p2) points of the utility are found by 
connecting the points between the demand curve and the average utility curve in 
the second quadrant. The isoutility curves are shown in the first quadrant of the 
Figure 14 result. The closer to the price axis an isoutility curve of the corres-
ponding FOCJ of type II lies, the lower the level of equal utility it reflects. The 
reaction curve of the FOCJ1 of type II demonstrates its reaction on the changes 
in the service fee of the duopolist 2. Similarly, a set of isoutility curves and a 




Figure 14. Isoutility and average utility curves of one FOCJ of type II 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
Figure 15 shows the Launhardt-Hotelling solution in prices (fees) and the refer-
red isoutility curves. The management of both FOCJs of type II maximise their 
utility if they behave autonomously. In the first quadrant, isoutility curves are 
constructed for both FOCJs of type II, similar to Figure 14 for only one of them. 
The reaction lines are transmitted from the second quadrant for the first FOCJ 
of type II and from the fourth quadrant for the second FOCJ of type II. Point A 
where the reaction lines overlap gives the solution according to the autonomous 
behaviour of the Launhardt-Hotelling model. However, the isoutility curves 
overlapping in the first quadrant result in the solution area according to Krelle 





Figure 15. Isoutility and average utility curves of two FOCJs of type II 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
Behind the Launhardt-Hotelling model with autonomous behaviour, the fol-




Figure 16. The process of adaptation and equilibrium identification in the Launhardt-
Hotelling model 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
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If two FOCJs of type II have realised the fee combinations p1, p2 characterised 
by point S in Figure 16, and FOCJ2 is looking for an action to change the fee, 
FOCJ2 move from point S to point W to the reaction line where its utility is 
maximised. But then FOCJ1 reacts by moving its fee to the fee in point V to 
maximise its utility. Then FOCJ2 reacts by moving to its reaction line again 
until they reach equilibrium point A. 
The implementation of the Launhardt-Hotelling model to the condition of 
FOCJ allows identification of FOCJ fees p1 and p2 where the oligopolistic 
market with two firms reaches its equilibrium under the condition of full cost 
coverage. Moreover, the combination of these fees varies depending on the case 
of management behaviour each FOCJ of type II possesses.  
It is possible that FOCJs of type II might not reach the Launhardt-Hotelling 
solution, for example, for external reasons or owner interventions. If they do, 
they do not realise cost coverage. Hence, they might realise a profit that contra-
dicts the initial features of the FOCJ of type II. If such situations appear, the 
management can try to hide the profit using an appropriate cost accounting 
approach, by considering the municipality’s costs as the FOCJ’s costs or by 
referring the costs of one product to another one if the FOCJ of type II produces 
different goods in order to equalise turnover and costs artificially. To avoid this 
situation, a special restriction in the institutional environment of a country must 
be introduced, e.g. by the rules stated in laws and Statutes.  
With the Launhardt-Hotelling model, it is possible to find out how the 
management acts on factor markets; what happens if it changes the employment 
level L. Different Launhardt-Hotelling solutions for different qualities of pro-
duction can be compared based on the resultant fees and utility. Moreover, this 
model can analyse how restrictions on factors and output, and also subsidies, 
can change the solution. 
 
  
Krelle-Ott model in utilities 
Krelle questions autonomous behaviour and introduces his assumption of oligo-
polist behaviour. He assumes the following behaviour of competitors: if by an 
external effect or market adaptation, a combination of fees p1 and p2 is charac-
terised by point H results, competitor 2 decides to increase their utility by 
moving from point H to point N down with the fee p2 until they reach higher 
isoutility curve U = 20. However, Ott suggests that if competitor 2 goes down 
with their price, then they should move further down to their utility maximising 
line R2 until point G, as shown in Figure 17. Therefore, the author follows the 
assumptions of Krelle behaviour under Ott specifications. However, Krelle and 
Ott aimed to maximise not utility, but profit, and instead of isoutility curves, 





Figure 17. Krelle and Ott behavioural assumptions 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
If FOCJ2 of type II starts moving from point N up, where its utility according to 
schematics is 5 (see Figure 18) until its reaction function according to Krelle-
Ott behavioural assumptions, a countermovement of FOCJ1 of type II that also 
moves to its own reaction line (thick black line in Figure 18) will bring FOCJ2 
to a better situation with a higher utility U = 10 compared with the initial 
position in point N. If the movement of FOCJ2 starts from point Z, it again ends 
up in a situation with a higher utility than before initiating a movement, and 
there will be a similar result if it starts from point Q. However, if FOCJ2 of type 
II decreases its fee from point H moving towards its reaction function down-
wards, then the reaction of FOCJ2 will push FOCJ2 to the isoutility curve with 
a lower level of utility as shown with the arrows from point H. The same will 
happen if FOCJ2 starts moving from point K increasing its fee until the maxi-
mum preferable fee is reached. Hence, there is an area in Figure 18 where 
FOCJ2 prefers not to move with the price at all because it will only lose. This is 
the area DGSTE. 
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Figure 18. Schematically: the Krelle-Ott area for FOCJ2 of type II 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
For FOCJ1 of type II, the Krelle-Ott space can be identified following the same 
logic as FOCJ2 of type II. Starting from point C in Figure 19, FOCJ1 moves 
towards its reaction function in the direction of fee decrease because FOCJ1 
wants to achieve a higher utility level. The reaction of FOCJ2, according to the 
Krelle-Ott assumption, will be to move to the FOCJ2 reaction line, also aiming 
at a higher utility. Then, FOCJ1 increases its utility from 5 to 10 and improves 
its position compared with the initial situation. If FOCJ1 increases the fee 
stemming from points R or F to its reaction line, the countermovement of 
FOCJ2 will bring FOCJ1 to a better position with a higher utility level. How-
ever, if FOCJ1 decreases the fee from point J, it will lose utility as a result of 
the FOCJ2 reaction and reach a level of utility lower than 20, which was pre-
viously higher. The same situation occurs when FOCJ1 moves from point Y to 
its reaction line as shown with the arrows. Hence, there is a particular area 
formed by the highest possible isoutily curve of FOCJ1 that touches the reaction 
function of FOCJ2 and the reaction line of FOCJ1, namely the AOSWB area, 




Figure 19. Schematically: the Krelle-Ott area for FOCJ1 of type II 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
Therefore, there are two regions, DGSTE for FOCJ2 and AOSWB for FOCJ1, 
where they do not move in either the direction of fee increase or decrease. Both 
regions overlap, hence the area SGIW in Figure 20 where the non-fee-change 
regions cross appears. If the two FOCJs of type II end up by adaptation or 
external influences in this area, they do not react anymore. Therefore, a region 
of fees p1 and p2 where the fees are not changed by the FOCJs of type II can 
exist. The SGIW area is also calculated algebraically for four cases of manage-
ment behaviour further in the text.  
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Figure 20. Solution space according to Krelle-Ott  
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
The result of the Krelle-Ott model adaptation to FOCJs of type II shows that 
there is an area of fee combination p1 and p2 where two FOCJs of type II are not 
willing to move; they do not change their service fees, since the countermove of 
a competitor brings them into a situation with a worse utility level. The Krelle-
Ott space can also move depending on the change in market parameters. 
The solution of the model has been identified from the side of FOCJ mana-
gement. However, principal-agent relations can also be introduced where FOCJ 
members are a principal and management is an agent. 
 
 
General algebraic settings for four cases  
of management behaviour 
In the thesis, the author investigates four cases with respect to the different 
management behaviour described not only graphically, but also mathematically. 
Hence, four algebraic assumptions for each case become relevant.  
The first case is a basic case. In the first case, FOCJ management aims to 
maximise its utility depending on output X and labour input L: U (X, L) = γ 
X*Lβ. 
When β = 0 and γ > 0, the second case results. When γ = 1 and β ∈ (0; +∞), 
the first case becomes relevant. The third case occurs when β = 1 and X has a 
power of 0, γ > 0. The fourth case occurs when FOCJ management evaluates 
output negatively and labour positively such as U (X, L) = αL – X + β. 
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The production function X = L*M, for the sake of simplicity, is dependent 
only on two variable factors: labour (L) and materials (M). For the discussion of 
possible production functions, see subchapter 2.3. 
Demand functions20 are linear for monopoly as well as for oligopoly. Index 1 
of parameters denotes that the market situation for FOCJ1 of type II is 
described; for FOCJ2 of type II, the parameters of the models possess index 2. 
Functions X1= a1- b1p1+ d1p2 and X2= a2- b2p2+ d2p1 are oligopolistic 
demand functions of FOCJ1 and FOCJ2, respectively, where p1 and p2 are 
prices for the services of FOCJ1 and FOCJ2. X1= a1- b1p1 and X2= a2- b2p2 are 
the demand functions if FOCJ1 and FOCJ2 function in monopoly. 
The Lagrange function has been constructed so that the utility of manage-
ment is maximised under the restrictions of variable costs coverage by turnover, 
i.e. p1*X1= L1* l1- M1* m1, where p1- the service fee of FOCJ1 (or further in 
the text, oligopolist (duopolist) 1), L1- amount of labour units used for service 
provision, l1- labour price, M1 - amount of materials involved in FOCJ1service 
provision, m1 - factor price of materials, X1 - output of FOCJ1. The other 
restriction of the Lagrange function is that a particular production function is 
used so that the production factors labour and materials are used for service 
provision of FOCJ1. This function is a special case of the Cobb-Douglas 
production21 function (Allen 1967: 49). Other production functions, such as the 
Leontief and CES production functions have not been applied for the analysis in 
this thesis (Allen 1967: 53, Varian 1992: 19–20).    
All parameters such as a1, a2, b1, b2, d1, d2, l1, l2, m1, m2, X1, X2, p1, p2 are 
positive real numbers. For Case I, β1, β2; for Case II, γ1, γ2; for Case III, δ1, δ2; 
and for Case IV, α1, α2, β1, β2 are positive. Parameters a1, b1, d1, a2, b2, d2 and 
factor prices l1, m1, l2, m2 are strictly positive, p1 and p2 > 0 are strictly positive 
as well.  
For counting the optimal solutions of the parameters labour, materials, out-
put, utility, optimal fee for both FOCJs of type II, computer software Wolfram 
Mathematica has been applied. This mathematical tool is especially useful for 
solving differential equations and partial differential equations of higher order, 
which is the case for this thesis. Additionally, it is applied for mathematical 
manipulation and visualisation of results. 
 
 
Case I: U = X* Lβ 
In the first case, FOCJ management aims to maximise its utility U (X, L) = X*Lβ 
depending on output X and labour input L. Two constraints are applied. One is a 
                                                            
20  For the restrictions with respect to demand function, turn to subchapter 2.3. 
21  Cobb-Douglas production function X = AKαLβ where A is a constant coefficient and α 
and β are positive parameters. Here, parameter A is absorbed into X, α and β are assumed to 
be equal to 1. So that α + β >1 the increasing return to scale takes place. 
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cost coverage rule: p*X = Ll + Mm. The second is a particular production 
function: X = L*M. Hence, the following Lagrange function is written out: 
 
Lag = X*Lβ - λ1(p*X - L*l - M*m) - λ2(X - L*M)  (78) 
 




















= LM - X = 0                    (83) 
 
Out of the first order conditions (79)-(83), the following optimal solutions with 








                             (85) 
 
The output X at the optimal point can be received by multiplying L and M: 
 







                     (86) 
 
Hence, utility at the point of maximisation is calculated as:  
 









                     (87) 
 
In the next step, production should be connected to consumption via the demand 
function so that all of the produced units of X are also consumed. For this, the 
optimal output received from the first order conditions must be equalised with 
the assumed demand function. Here, two cases of monopoly and oligopoly can 
be investigated separately: 
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1) In monopoly, the whole demand is addressed only to FOCJ1 without 
consideration of the FOCJ2 service fee:  X = a - b*p. 
2) However, in oligopoly (duopoly), FOCJ1 considers the reaction of another 
FOCJ2 to its price change, which is reflected in FOCJ1 and FOCJ2 demand 




First, the optimal output received in formula (86) should be equal to the demand 
in monopoly so that everything produced must be consumed. Therefore, the 




= a - b*p                     (88) 
 
Equation (88) has three roots with respect to p. Manipulation with parameters 
shows that the third solution is suitable22. However, for the analysis, the author 
is more focused on the numerical solution and assumes the following parameter 
values:  
 
a = 10, b = 0.2, m = 20, l = 10, β = 2              (89)  
 
Thus, an optimal p under the assumption (89) yields 11.8188, which is, for 
comparison, higher than in Case II below where only output is maximised. 
With p = 11.8188, solutions for L (formula 84), M (formula 85), X (formula 
86) and U (formula 87) can be counted under the assumption (89) as well:  




In the case where management maximises output and labour, indifference 
curves are shown in the first quadrant of Figure 21 below. A set of possible 
solution spaces is presented in the first quadrant by green and red round curves. 
An optimal solution is where the highest indifference curve touches the possible 
solution space. Transferring these points to the second quadrant allows the 
construction of a reaction function that connects all optimal points. The reaction 
function (reaction line) shows the utility maximising fee of FOCJ1 under the 
                                                            
22  Optimal fee from the equation (88) results in three solutions. Their forms are too 
complicated to include them into the thesis; therefore, the author avoids analytical solutions 
in the text. Instead, she has made parameter manipulations with the help of Wolfram Mathe-
matica software in order to realize, which solutions of fees are positive real numbers and 
suitable for the analysis. Manipulation has shown that there is only one p, which under given 
parameter assumption (89) guarantees positive fees. 
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choice of the FOCJ2’s fee (p2) (Varian 2010: 500). For each utility level Uconst = 
10 and Uconst = 5, a set of points on the demand functions in the second quadrant 
become relevant. To find these points as crossing points with the demand func-
tions, average utility curves are necessary. Average utility functions can be 
found by dividing constant utility by X. In the second quadrant, average utility 
functions are hyperbolic red and green dashed curves.  
The next step would be to transfer the received (p1; p2) combinations in the 
second quadrant to the system of coordinate p1 – p2 visualized in the right-hand 
lower corner of Figure 21. The combinations of FOCJ1 and FOCJ2 fees that 
guarantee a constant level of utility for FOCJ1 yield isoutility curves. The same 
analysis is possible for FOCJ2. 
 
 
Figure 21. Schematically: steps of isoutility curve and reaction line construction when 
maximising output and labour input 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
In the case of oligopoly, the demand function of an oligopolist FOCJ1 considers 
a change in the fee of FOCJ2 and vice versa. Hence, according to (86) and the 
oligopolistic demand function, the cohesion between production and consump-





= a1 - b1*p1 + d1*p2
l2m2(2+β2)2
p22(1+β2)
 = a2 - b2*p2 + d2*p1
                     (90)  
 
Solving the first equation of the system of equations (90) with respect to p1 and 
the second equation with respect to p2 provides the reaction curves of FOCJ1 
and FOCJ2, respectively. The solution of the entire system of equations (90) 
results in the intersection of the Launhardt-Hotelling points of reaction curves23. 
However, the analysis is restricted by the first quadrant of the p1 - p2 system of 
coordinates. Therefore, only positive real values can be solutions. The following 
parameter values are assumed: a1 = 5, a2 = 3, b1 =1.5, b2 = 2.5, d1 = 3.5, d2 = 3, 
m1 = 10, m2 = 10, l1 = 8, l2 = 8, β1 = 2, β 2 = 2, U1const = 5, U2const = 5, the 
Launhardt-Hotelling solution can be illustrated by Figure 22 and results in p1 = 





Figure 22. The Launhardt-Hotelling solution for Case I of management behaviour 
under particular parameter combination 
Source: Compiled by the author using Wolfram Mathematica program. 
                                                            
23  Sequential steps of analytical solutions can be provided on request. However, numerical 
solutions of all four cases are more relevant and useful for comparison. 
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Figure 22 demonstrates, on the right-hand side, the reaction curves of FOCJ1 
(red curve) and FOCJ2 (blue curve) with the Launhardt-Hotelling solution. On 
the left-hand side, a tool bar shows how parameters of equations can be changed 
to influence the optimal solution. The moment Figure 22 captures is described 
by the assumed parameters.  
The next step is to find the constant utility curve (isoutility curve) by di-
viding utility function U = X* Lβ by demand X and fixing utility at a particular 
lever, for example, 5,10,15, etc. Or simply in general form at the level U1const 
and for FOCJ2 at the level U2const, such as: 
 
U1const
a1 - b1*p1 + d1*p2
= ( m1(β1+2)





a2 - b2*p2 + d2*p1
= ( m2(β2+2)
p2(β2+1) )β2  (92) 
 
The equation (91) cannot be easily solved with respect to p1 in order to find the 
equal utility curve (isoutility curve) of FOCJ1. Hence, to solve (91), β1 is 
assumed equal to 2. The solution of (91) then results in two branches of the 
FOCJ1 isoutility curve, as shown in Figure 20. However, only one branch of the 
equal utility curve exists in a positive quadrant24: 
 
p1 = 
4(-2b1m12+ 4b12m14 + 9m12(a1 + d1p2)U1const)
9U1const
         (93)  
 
The branch (93) of this isoutility curve is necessary to calculate Stackelberg 
point W25 as schematically shown in Figure 20 (Varian 1992: 296), where the 
isoutility curve of FOCJ1 touches the reaction line of FOCJ2. In point W, the 
steepness of the isoutility curve of FOCJ1 and the steepness of the FOCJ2 re-






4b12m14 + 9m12(a1 + d1p2)U1const
                     (94) 
 
                                                            
24 Another branch of FOCJ1 isoutility curve p1 = -
4(2b1m12+ 4b12m14 + 9m12(a1 + d1p2) U1const)
9U1const  cannot be 
considered, since 2b1m12 > 0 and 4b12m14 + 9m12(a1 + d1p2) U1const  ≥ 0.  
25 Stackelberg equilibrium is the optimum of the leader (firm 1) in a tangency point of the 
isoprofit curve with the reaction curve of the follower (firm 2) (Varian 1992: 296). 
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To obtain the steepness of FOCJ2 reaction line dp1
dp2
, p1 from the equation 
l2m2(2+β2)2
p22(1+β2)
 = a2 - b2*p2 + d2*p1 must be isolated: 
 
p1 = -
a2 - b2p2-l2m2(2 + β2)2p22(1 + β2)
d2
           (95) 
 





-b2 + 2l2m2(2 + β2)2p23(1 + β2)
d2
            (96) 
 
In order to find the point of tangency W, (94) and (96) must be equalized: 
 
2d1m12






       (97) 
 
Equation (97) must be solved with respect to p2. As a result, seven points of 
tangency become relevant. Only positive p2 can be claimed as solutions. 
Assuming a1 = 5, a2 = 3, b1 =1.5, b2 = 2.5, d1 = 3.5, d2 = 3, m1 = 10, m2 = 10,  
l1 = 8, l2 = 8, β1 = 2, β 2 = 2, U1const = 5, U2const = 5, one p2 = 4.88392 becomes 
relevant. Substituting this p2 into the reaction curve of FOCJ2 (95), the 
Stackelberg solution at the point of tangency yields p1 = 9.03246; p2 = 4.88392.     
To obtain the Stackelberg solution at point G, as shown in Figure 20, the 
steepness of the isoutility curve of FOCJ2 should be found (92), differentiating 






4b22m24 + 9m22(a2 + d2p1)U2const          (98) 
 
From the reaction line of FOCJ1 (90) l1m1(2+β1)
2
p12(1+β1)




a1 - b1p1-l1m1(2 + β1)2p12(1 + β1)
d1










-b1 + 2l1m1(2 + β1)2p13(1 + β1)
d1
  (100) 
 
The steepness of the isoutility curve of FOCJ2 and the reaction curve of FOCJ1 
must be equalised in order to find p1 at the point of tangency: 
 
-
-b1 + 2l1m1(2 + β1)2p13(1 + β1)
d1
= 2d2m22
4b22m24 + 9m22(a2 + d2p1)U2const          (101) 
 
Seven solutions of (101) become possible. However, only positive p1 are 
solutions under parameter assumption a1 = 5, a2 = 3, b1 =1.5, b2 = 2.5, d1 = 3.5, 
d2 = 3, m1 = 10, m2 = 10, l1 = 8, l2 = 8, β1 = 2, β 2 = 2, U1 = 5, U2 = 5. The 
Stackelberg point p1 = 5.50571; p2 = 4.95257 appears by substituting p1 
received from (101) in the reaction curve of FOCJ1 (99).  
In the next step, the author is looking for the crossing points of the two isou-
tility curves of FOCJ1 and FOCJ2. For this, the following system of equations 
should be solved26: 
 
U1const




a2 - b2*p2 + d2*p1
= ( m2(β2+2)
p2(β2+1) )β2
             (102)  
 
The crossing points of the reaction curves and isoutility curves can be shown in 
Figure 23: 
 
                                                            
26  Calculations consist of several steps which are too complicated to include their detailed 
description into the thesis. For the sake of simplicity, the author has included only an 
essence of these calculations. Therefore, the one, who is interested in the complete sequence 




Figure 23. The Krelle-Ott area for Case I of management behaviour 
Source: Compiled by the author using Wolfram Mathematica program. 
 
 
Under the assumption a1 = 5, a2 = 3, b1 =1.5, b2 = 2.5, d1 = 3.5, d2 = 3, m1 = 10, 
m2 = 10, l1 = 8, l2 = 8, β1 = 2, β 2 = 2, U1const = 5, U2const = 5, there is a thick black 
point p1 = 52.4737, p2 = 43.1864 in Figure 23 where the isoutility curves of 
FOCJ 1 (red dotted curve) and FOCJ 2 (blue dotted curve) cross. This is also a 
numerical solution for the system of equations (102). Figure 23 shows the 
Krelle-Ott area which lies between the purple point of the Launhardt-Hotelling 
solution (crossing point of FOCJ 1 (red) and FOCJ 2 (blue) reaction curves), the 
black point of the intersection of two isoutility curves and the Stackelberg 
points of tangency, which are not shown in Figure 23 to avoid graphical com-
prehension.   
 
Case II: U = γ*X  
In Case II of FOCJ of type II management behaviour, management utility 
depends on how much output is produced in an FOCJ of type II. The Lagrange 
function under two constraints should be written out as: 
 
Lag = γ*X - λ1(p*X - L*l - M*m) - λ2(X - L*M)      (103) 
 





















 = LM - X = 0 (108) 
 
From partial derivatives (104) – (108), the optimal solutions with respect to X, 
















                 (112) 
 
The difference between the monopoly and oligopoly cases is in the demand 
function applied for monopoly: X = a - b*p and for duopoly: 




Again, the production side (111) should be equalised with consumption 




 = a - b*p                (113) 
 
Solving (113) with respect to p, yields three roots27:  
                                                            
27 Calculations consist of several steps which are too complicated to include their detailed 
description into the thesis. For the sake of simplicity, the author has included only an 
essence of these calculations. Therefore, the one who is interested in the complete sequence 





(a3-54b2lm+6√3 b2lm(-a3+27b2lm))1 3⁄ +(a3-54b2lm+6√3 b2lm(-a3+27b2lm))
1 3⁄
3b




(a3-54b2lm+6√3 b2lm(-a3+27b2lm))1 3⁄ +ⅈ(ⅈ+√3)(a3-54b2lm+6√3 b2lm(-a3+27b2lm))
1 3⁄
6b




(a3-54b2lm+6√3 b2lm(-a3+27b2lm))1 3⁄ +(-1-ⅈ√3)(a3-54b2lm+6√3 b2lm(-a3+27b2lm))
1 3⁄
6b
   (116) 
 
Manipulation with parameters using the Wolfram Mathematica program for all 
three p values shows that solution (115) provides only negative values of p 
under different combinations of parameters’ values. Solution (116) of the equa-
tion contains positive values of p; however, it also implies reverse relations 
between factor prices l, m and service fee p so that with the increase in factor 
prices, the service fee decreases. This has to be the opposite – factor price 
increase influences the increase of p.  
Solution (114) provides positive real solutions for p. If parameter a is 
decreasing, l, m should also decrease in order to keep the value of p real. 
Therefore, for the monopoly case, the optimal fee of FOCJ1 as a monopolist 
can be described by the formula (114). The same optimal solution can be found 
for FOCJ2, FOCJ3, etc. that behave as monopolists with management maxi-
mising utility depending on output. 
Under a particular parameter combination, the same as in Case I: a = 10, b = 
0.2, m = 20, l = 10, optimal p for monopoly turns out to be 10. 
Substitution of parameters in (109)–(112) provides the following numerical 




In the case where management maximises output, indifference curves are hori-
zontal, as shown in Figure 24 below. A set of possible solution spaces is 
presented in the first quadrant by green and red circle curves. An optimal 
solution is where the highest indifference curve touches the possible solution 
space. Transferring these points to the second quadrant results in the reaction 
function. The reaction function (reaction line) shows the utility maximising fee 
of FOCJ1 under the choice of the FOCJ2’s fee (p2) (Varian 2010: 500). For 
each utility level Uconst = 10 and Uconst = 5, a set of points on the demand 
functions in the second quadrant becomes relevant. To find these points as 
crossing points with demand functions, average utility curves are necessary. 
Average utility functions can be found by dividing constant utility by X. In the 
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second quadrant, average utility functions look like horizontal red and green 
dashed lines. The next step would be to transfer the received (p1; p2) com-
binations to the system of coordinate p1 – p2 visualised in the right-hand lower 
corner of Figure 24. The combinations of fees of FOCJ1 and FOCJ2 that 
guarantee a constant level of utility for FOCJ1 yield isoutility lines. The same 




Figure 24. Schematically: steps of isoutility curve and reaction line construction when 
maximizing output 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
In duopoly, there are two service providers. Both have their demand functions 
considering a competitor’s change in price. Hence, the following system of 




= a1 - b1*p1 + d1*p2
4l2m2
p22
= a2 - b2*p2 + d2*p1
                 (117) 
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The solution of the first and second equation of the system of equations (117) 
with respect to p1 and p2 will result in reaction curves28 for FOCJ1 and FOCJ2, 
respectively. However, for the purpose of the analysis, the author is interested in 
such combinations of (p1; p2) which are the optimal solutions for both equations 
of the system (117). The crossing points of reactions curves are the Launhardt-
Hotelling solution.  
The system of equations (117) can be solved analytically as well as graphi-
cally, as shown in Figure 25. Figure 25 demonstrates, on the right-hand side, the 
reaction curves of FOCJ1 (red curve) and FOCJ2 (blue curve) with the 
Launhardt-Hotelling solution. On the left-hand side, a tool bar shows how para-





Figure 25. The Launhardt-Hotelling solution for Case II of management behaviour 
under particular parameter combination  
Source: Compiled by the author using Wolfram Mathematica program.  
 
                                                            
28  The reaction curve of FOCJ1 of type II depicts the utility maximizing fee of FOCJ1 of 
type II (p1) given various believes FOCJ1 of type II might have about the fee of FOCJ2 of 
type II (p2) (Varian 1992: 286, Varian 2010: 500). 
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It is also possible to receive a numerical solution. As the interest is only in real 
positive numbers, under given parameter combination (116), the solution is p1 = 
9.79816, p2 = 3.72298:  
 
a1 = 5, a2 = 3, b1 =1.5, b2 = 2.5, d1 = 3.5, d2 = 3, m1 = 10, m2 = 10, l1 = 8, l2 = 8, 
γ1 = 0.4, γ2 = 0.3, U1const = 5, U2const = 5  (118)  
 
In the next step, the isoutility curves29 for FOCJ1 and FOCJ2 must be con-
structed by dividing the utility function U1 = γ1*X1 over X1, and U2 = γ2*X2 over 
X2 so that utility is fixed at a particular level, such as: 
 
U1const
a1- b1*p1 + d1*p2





a2 - b2*p2 + d2*p1
= γ2    for FOCJ2  (120) 
 
To find the Stackelberg points (Varian 1992: 296) where the isoutility curve of 
FOCJ1 (119) touches the reaction curve of FOCJ2:  4l2m2
p22
= a2 - b2*p2 + d2*p1 , 
and the isoutility curve of FOCJ2 (120) touches the reaction curve of FOCJ1: 
4l1m1
p12
= a1 - b1*p1 + d1*p2, their steepness should be equalised30 so that the 
steepness of the reaction curve of FOCJ2 dp1 
dp2
= b2 - 8l2m2p23
d2
 should be equal to the 











       (121) 
 
                                                            
29  Isoutility curve (in analogy to isoprofit curve with profit maximizing firms) reflects those 
combinations of fees p1 and p2 that yields a constant level of utility to a firm (Varian 2010: 
501). 
30  Calculations consist of several steps which are too complicated to include their detailed 
description into the thesis. For the sake of simplicity, the author has included only an 
essence of these calculations. Therefore, the one, who is interested in the complete sequence 
of steps, should turn to the author for their demonstration. 
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 should be equal to the 











       (122) 
 
Under parameter combination (118), another Stackelberg point is p1 = 3.09439, 
p2 = 9.44601. 
To find the crossing point of the isoutility curves of FOCJ1 and FOCJ2, the 
author solves the following system of equations with respect to p1 and p2: 
 
U1const
a1 - b1*p1 + d1*p2
= γ1
U2const
a2 - b2*p2 + d2*p1
= γ2
                                                                 (123) 
 
Hence, the analytical solution of the system of equations (123) is the following 
combination of parameters: 
 
p1 = -
d1U2constγ1 + b2U1constγ2 - a1b2γ1γ2 - a2d1γ1γ2
b1b2γ1γ2 - d1d2γ1γ2 , p2 = - b1U2constγ1 + d2U1constγ2 - a2b1γ1γ2 - a1d2γ1γ2b1b2γ1γ2 - d1d2γ1γ2      (124) 
 
The numerical solution of (124) is determined by the assumption (118) and 
results in p1 = 9.8642, p2 = 6.37037. 
Schematically, the crossing points of reaction curves and isoutility curves 
can be illustrated with the help of Figure 26: 
 
Under assumed parameter combination (118), p2 at the Stackelberg point 
receives a value of 2.60991. Substituting p2 in the isoutility curve of FOCJ1 




Figure 26. The Krelle-Ott area for Case II of management behaviour 
Source: Compiled by the author using Wolfram Mathematica program. 
 
 
In Figure 26, two points are shown. The purple one reflects the crossing point of 
FOCJ1 (red) and FOCJ2 (blue) reaction curves and the black one is the crossing 
point of the isoutility curves of FOCJ1 (red dotted curve) and FOCJ2 (blue 
dotted curve). The area between these two points and the Stackelberg points of 
tangency is the Krelle-Ott area for Case II of management behaviour. 
 
 
Case III: U = δ*L 
In Case III, the utility function of FOCJ management depends on labour input, 
singularly considering two constraints of the cost coverage rule and special 
production function: 
 
Lag = δ*L - λ1 (p*X - L*l - M*m) - λ2 (X - L*M)   (125) 
 
Case III should be treated specially because the utility function can naturally 
infinitely grow. In order to find optimal solutions for labour, materials, output 
and fee, demand for FOCJ services should be restricted by considering a 
particular demand function. Technically, the consumption part expressed by the 
demand function must be plugged into the Lagrange function in a first step. A 
direct demand function X = a - b*p has to be reversed for monopoly so that 
p = a - X
b
.   
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For duopoly, from the system of equations X1= a1 - b1*p1 + d1*p2
X2= a2 - b2*p2 + d2*p1
, p1 and p2 
have to be expressed so that: 
 
 
p1 = a1 + d1p2 - X1b1
p2 = a2 + d2p1 - X2b2     (126) 
 
Therefore, Lagrange function for monopoly is: 
 
Lag = δ*L - λ1 ( a-Xb *X - L*l - M*m) - λ2 (X - L*M)  (127) 
 
In oligopoly, for FOCJ1: 
 
Lag = δ1*L1 - λ1(( a1 + d1p2 - X1b1 )*X1 - l1*L1 - m1*M1) - λ2(X1 - L1*M1)  (128) 
 
For FOCJ2 only the index changes:  
 
Lag = δ2*L2 - λ1((
a2 + d2p1 - X2
b2
)*X2 - l2*L2 - m2*M2) - λ2(X2 - L2*M2)  (129) 
 
Next, monopoly and oligopoly situations should be analysed separately in order 
to find optimal solutions for labour, materials, output, utility, Launhardt-Ho-




The Lagrange function (127) should be differentiated to find the first order con-









)λ1- λ2 = 0   (130) 
 
From (130), λ2 can be isolated: 
 
λ2 = - (a - 2X)λ1b     (131) 
 




= δ + lλ1 + Mλ2 = 0                               (132) 
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In formula (132), λ2 is substituted by (131) and λ1 is isolated: 
 
δ + lλ1 + M(-
(a - 2X)λ1
b
) = 0   (133) 
 
So that, from (133), λ1 can be expressed: 
 
λ1 = - bδbl - aM + 2MX   (134) 
 




= mλ1 + Lλ2 = 0                          (135) 
 
From the partial derivative for M (135), by substituting λ2 and λ1 with (131) and 
(134), respectively, and X = LM: 
 
m(- bδ
bl - aM + 2MLM
) + L(-
(a - 2LM)(- bδ
bl - aM + 2MLM
)
b
) = 0   (136) 
 
M can be isolated from (136) which results in: 
 
M = aL - bm
2L2
    (137) 
 





= lL+ mM - (a-X)X
b
 = 0                  (138) 
 
In formula (138), X must be substituted by LM as it comes from the first order 
condition for λ2 (140) and M by formula (137): 
 









 = 0         (139) 
 




= LM - X = 0                  (140) 
 
The expression (139) yields three roots of L. However, only one point is 
relevant since it does not contain imaginary numbers. Thus, an optimal solution 
for L in monopoly results: 
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L = 112bl (a2+ a4-24ab2lm
(a6-36a3b2lm+24(9b4l2m2+√3 b6l3m3(-a3+27b2lm)))1 3⁄ + 
+(a6-36a3b2lm+24(9b4l2m2+√3 b6l3m3(-a3+27b2lm)))1 3⁄ )                (141)   
 
An optimal solution for M can be received from (137) by substituting L found in 
the previous step (141): 
 
                  
                                                                                                                              
    (142)   
 
L should be multiplied by M to find X so that a general analytical solution for 
output in monopoly results: 
           
                                                                                                                              
 (143) 
 
By inserting the optimal solution for X into formula p = a - X
b
, an optimal fee 
level in monopoly results: 
 
                        
                                                                                                                        (144) 
 
After simplifications (144) has been modified as: 
 
                                                                                                                              








(a6-36a3b2lm+24(9b4l2m2+√3 b6l3m3(-a3+27b2lm)))1 3⁄ +(a6-36a3b2lm+24(9b4l2m2+√3 b6l3m3(-a3+27b2lm)))
1 3⁄
                                                                                                                              


















(a6-36a3b2lm+24(9b4l2m2+√3 b6l3m3(-a3+27b2lm)))1 3⁄ +(a6-36a3b2lm+24(9b4l2m2+√3 b6l3m3(-a3+27b2lm)))
1 3⁄
                                                                                                                              
 
p = 
a - (a2- 6b2lm
a2+ a
4-24ab2lm
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    (146) 
 
Assuming a = 10, b = 0.2, m = 20, l = 10, δ = 0.2, as in the two previous cases, 
monopoly fee, labour, materials, output and utility show the following numeri-




As for the two previous cases, in the third case, isoutility curves must be con-
structed as shown in Figure 27. In the right-hand lower corner, there are 
isoutility curves which have been received from the average utility functions in 




Figure 27. Schematically: steps of isoutility curve and reaction line construction when 
maximizing labour 
Source: Compiled by the author. 





(a6-36a3b2lm+24(9b4l2m2+√3 b6l3m3(-a3+27b2lm)))1 3⁄ + 
+(a6-36a3b2lm+24(9b4l2m2+√3 b6l3m3(-a3+27b2lm)))1 3⁄ )  
Thus, an optimal analytical solution for utility according to formula (125) is: 
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In oligopoly, the analysis again starts with the identification of the first order 
conditions for the functions (127) and (128), sequentially. For duopolist 1, the 




















= l1L1 + m1M1-
a1 + d1p2 - X1 X1
b1




= L1M1 - X1 = 0   (151) 
 
Following the same logical steps as in monopoly above, an optimal L1 can be 
received from the first order conditions by the required substitutions and 
simplifications. L1, which does not contain imaginary numbers, can be con-











Similarly, M1 can be found from the first order conditions (147)–(151). Under 
substitution (153), it results in: 
 
M1 = 6b1l1(-12b12l1m1+(a1+d1p2)(a12+k11 3⁄ +2a1d1p2+d12p22+(a1+d1p2)(-24b12l1m1+(a1+d1p2)3)k11 3⁄ ))
(a12+k11 3⁄ +2a1d1p2+d12p22+(a1+d1p2)(-24b12l1m1+(a1+d1p2)3)
k11 3
⁄ )2    (154) 
 
The optimal solution for X1 is therefore the multiplication of L1 and M1, which 
were found earlier under the assumption (153): 
 
 
k1 = a16+216b14l12m12+6a15d1p2+15a14d12p22-36b12d13l1m1p23+d16p26-4a13(9b12l1m1-5d13p23) + 
+24√3 -b16l13m13(a13-27b12l1m1+3a12d1p2+3a1d12p22+d13p23)-3a12(36b12d1l1m1p2-5d14p24)+ 
+a1(-108b12d12l1m1p22+6d15p25    (153) 
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X1 = 12 (a1+d1p2) - 6b12l1m1a12+k11 3⁄ +2a1d1p2+d12p22+(a1+d1p2)(-24b12l1m1+(a1+d1p2)3)
k11 3
⁄   (155) 
 
Hence, the analytical solution for the utility of duopolist 1 (FOCJ1) considering 
the utility function of the third type, U1 = δ1*L1, is: 
 
U1 = δ1* a12+k11 3⁄ +2a1d1p2+d12p22+(a1+d1p2)(a13-24b12l1m1+3a12d1p2+3a1d12p22+d13p23)k11 3⁄12b1l1   (156) 
 
The reaction curve of FOCJ1 can be received from the system of equations 
(126) by plugging the optimal X1 (155) into the first equation of the system. 
After simplification and under substitution (153), the reaction curve of FOCJ1 
is: 
 
p1 = a1+d1p2+ 12b12l1m1a12+k11 3⁄ +2a1d1p2+d12p22+(a1+d1p2)(-24b12l1m1+(a1+d1p2)3)k11 3⁄2b1    (157) 
 
For duopolist 2 (FOCJ2), the same sequence of steps to find optimal L2, M2, X2, 
U2 and the reaction curve p2 must be done, stemming from the Lagrange func-
tion (129) and the first order conditions resulting from its differentiation. Since 
duopolist 2 has the same production and utility functions as duopolist 1, the 
optimal analytical solutions only differ in indexes.    
Therefore, the analytical solution for labour of duopolist 2 is: 
 





  (158) 
 
The analytical solution for materials of duopolist 2 is: 
 
M2 = 6b2l2(-12b22l2m2+(a2+d2p1)(a22+k21 3⁄ +2a2d2p1+d22p12+(a2+d2p1)(-24b22l2m2+(a2+d2p1)3)k21 3⁄ ))
(a22+k21 3⁄ +2a2d2p1+d22p12+(a2+d2p1)(-24b22l2m2+(a2+d2p1)3)
k21 3
⁄ )2   (159) 
 








⁄   (160) 
 
The analytical solution for utility of duopolist 2 is: 
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U2 = δ2* a22+k21 3⁄ +2a2d2p1+d22p12+(a2+d2p1)(a23-24b22l2m2+3a22d2p1+3a2d22p12+d23p13)k21 3⁄12b2l2   (161) 
 
The analytical solution for the fee level of duopolist 2 and their reaction curve 
is: 
 




To find the Launhardt-Hotelling solution, the following system of equations 




⎪⎪⎧p1 = a1+d1p2+ 12b12l1m1a12+k11 3⁄ +2a1d1p2+d12p22+(a1+d1p2)(-24b12l1m1+(a1+d1p2)3)k11 3⁄2b1
p2 = a2+d2p1+ 12b22l2m2a22+k21 3⁄ +2a2d2p1+d22p12+(a2+d2p1)(-24b22l2m2+(a2+d2p1)3)k21 3⁄2b2
  (164) 
 
Launhardt-Hotelling is p1 = 10.3332, p2 = 7.18927 under the (165) parameter 
combination:  
 
a1 = 5, a2 = 3, b1 =1.5, b2 = 2.5, d1 = 3.5, d2 = 3, m1 = 10, m2 = 10, l1 = 8, l2 = 8, 
δ1 = 0.2, δ2 = 0.2, U1const = 5, U2const = 5   (165)  
 
Under the given parameter combination, there is only one positive crossing 




k2 = a26+216b24l22m22+6a25d2p1+15a24d22p12-36b22d23l2m2p13+d26p16-4a23(9b22l2m2-5d23p13) + 
+24√3 -b26l23m23(a23-27b22l2m2+3a22d2p1+3a2d22p12+d23p13)-3a22(36b22d2l2m2p1-5d24p14)+ 




Figure 28. The Launhardt-Hotelling solution for Case III of management behaviour 
Source: Compiled by the author using Wolfram Mathematica program. 
 
 
To develop an isoutility curve for FOCJ1, its utility function U1 = δ1*L1 should 
be divided by X1 and fixed at a particular level U1const, as has been done in the 
two previous cases31: 
 
U1const









             (166) 
 













                                                            
31  Calculations consist of several steps which are too complicated to include their detailed 
description into the thesis. For the sake of simplicity, the author has included only an 
essence of these calculations. Therefore, the one, who is interested in the complete sequence 
of steps, should turn to the author for their demonstration. 
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The same should be done to receive an isoutility curve for FOCJ2: 
 
U2const








              (168) 
 




The isoutility curve of FOCJ1 and the reaction curve of FOCJ2 should have 
equal steepness dp1/dp2 at the point of their tangency. The same is true for the 
steepness dp2/dp1 of the isoutility curve of FOCJ2 and the reaction curve of 
FOCJ1. This is necessary to find the Stackelberg points of tangency.   
When equalising the steepness of the isoutility curve of FOCJ1 and the 
reaction curve of FOCJ2, two Stackelberg points become relevant under the 
given parameters’ combination: p1 = 2.60336, p2 = 6.29225 and p1 = 14.0917,  
p2 = 9.25925.   
When the steepness of the isoutility curve of FOCJ2 and the reaction 
function of FOCJ1 are equal, the following Stackelberg point results in p1 = 
10.8312, p2 = 2.34085.                                                                              
In order to find the isoutility crossing point, the following system of equa-
tions must be solved: 
 
⎩⎪⎪⎨


























Figure 29. The Krelle-Ott area for Case III of management behaviour 
Source: Compiled by the author using Wolfram Mathematica program. 
 
 
Figure 29 demonstrates the crossing point of the isoutility curves of FOCJ1 (red 
dotted line) and FOCJ2 (blue dotted line), which is shown by a thick black 
point. Under assumed parameter combination (165), this point is p1 = 14.2137, 
p2 = 9.29524 found as a solution of the (170) system of equations. The purple 
point is the Launhardt-Hotelling solution, thus the area located between these 
two points is the fee stability (Krelle-Ott) area for Case III. The Stackelberg 
points delineate the Krelle-Ott area as a tangency point of the FOCJ1 reaction 
(red) curve and the FOCJ2 isoutility curve and a tangency point of the FOCJ2 
reaction (blue) curve and the FOCJ1 isoutility curve. The Stackelberg points are 
omitted in Figure 29 for the sake of simplicity.  
 
 
Case IV: U = α*L - X + β 
In the fourth case, management maximises the utility function, which positively 
depends on labour (L) and negatively on output (X) and is expressed by the 
formula:  
 




The following Lagrange function is written out under two constraints: 
 
Lag = α*L - X + β - λ1*(p*X - L*l - M*m) - λ2*(X - L*M)  (172) 
 




















 = LM - X = 0  (177) 
 
From the first order conditions (173)-(177), the author has received optimal X, 
L, M and U: 
 
L = 
m(l - pα + l(l - pα))
p(l - pα)
              (178) 
 
M = 
l + l(l - pα)
p
              (179) 
 
X = -
m(l + l(l - pα))(l - pα + l(l - pα))
p2(-l + pα)
              (180) 
 
U = α*L - X + β = α*(
m(l - pα + l(l - pα))
p(l - pα)
) - (-
m(l + l(l - pα))(l - pα + l(l - pα))
p2(-l + pα)
) + β (181) 
 
After simplification, (181) transforms into: 
 
U = 
-2lm + mpα - 2m l(l - pα) + p2β
p2





To find a solution for the optimal fee when there is only one FOCJ of type II 
that provides services, the author connects the production and demand side, as 
was done in previous cases of management behaviour: 
 
-
m(l + l(l - pα))(l - pα + l(l - pα))
p2(-l + pα)
 = a - b*p              (183) 
 
From the equation (183), an analytical solution for p can be found. Here, five 
points become possible. However, only four of them under particular parameter 
combination (i.e. a = 10, b = 0.2, m = 20, l = 10, β = 30, α = 0.1) are positive. 
However, for comparison between cases, only p = 10.004 is considered. 
Formulas (178)-(182) should be recalculated considering assumed parameter 





In the case where management evaluates labour positively and output nega-
tively, indifference curves are shown in the first quadrant of Figure 30. Again, a 
set of possible solution spaces is presented in the first quadrant by green and red 
circle curves. An optimal solution is where the highest indifference curve 
touches the possible solution space. Transferring these points into the second 
quadrant results in the reaction function. The reaction function (reaction line) 
shows the utility maximising fee of FOCJ1 under the choice of the FOCJ2’s fee 
(p2). For each utility level Uconst = 10 and Uconst = 5, a set of points on the 
demand functions in the second quadrant become relevant. To find these points 
as crossing points with demand functions, average utility curves are necessary. 
Average utility functions can be found by dividing constant utility by X. In the 
second quadrant, average utility functions are hyperbolic red and green dashed 
curves.  
The next step would be to transfer the received (p1; p2) combinations in the 
second quadrant to the system of coordinate p1 – p2 visualised in the right-hand 
lower corner of Figure 30. The combinations of FOCJ1 and FOCJ2 fees that 
guarantee a constant level of utility for FOCJ1 yield isoutility curves. The same 




Figure 30. Schematically: steps of isoutility curve and reaction line construction when 
maximising output under the condition that labour grows32 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
Reaction curves for FOCJ1 and FOCJ2 can be found when the oligopoly 
demand function is equalised with the production side represented by the 
optimal output (180) specified for each FOCJ, such as33: 
 
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧- m1(l1 + l1(l1 - p1α1))(l1 - p1α1 + l1(l1 - p1α1))p12(- l1 + p1α1)  = a1 - b1*p1 + d1*p2
-
m2(l2 + l2(l2 - p2α2))(l2 - p2α2 + l2(l2 - p2α2))
p22(- l2 + p2α2)
 = a2 - b2*p2 + d2*p1
        (184) 
 
Isolating p1 from the first equation and p2 from the second equation of system of 
equations (184) provides reaction curves of FOCJ1 and FOCJ2, respectively. 
                                                            
32  How the points of the reaction line located in the second quadrant depends on the shape 
of the solution space in the first quadrant and the steepness of indifference curves. 
33  Calculations consist of several steps which are too complicated to include their detailed 
description into the thesis. For the sake of simplicity, the author has included only an 
essence of these calculations. Therefore, the one who is interested in the complete sequence 
of steps should turn to the author for their demonstration. 
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To find the Launhardt-Hotelling solution, the system of equations (184) must be 
solved with respect to p1 and p2. Graphically, it is solved in Figure 31 with p1 = 




Figure 31. The Launhardt-Hotelling solution for Case IV of management behaviour 
Source: Compiled by the author using Wolfram Mathematica program. 
 
 
Figure 31 demonstrates, on the right-hand side, the reaction curves of FOCJ1 
(red curve) and FOCJ2 (blue curve) with the Launhardt-Hotelling solution. On 
the left-hand side, a tool bar shows how parameters of equations can be changed 
to influence the optimal solution.  
Next, isoutility curves must be constructed for FOCJ1 and FOCJ2 as was 
described in previous cases. Thus, an isoutility curve for FOCJ1 is: 
 
U1const
a1 - b1*p1 + d1*p2
 = 
α1*(
m1(l1 - p1α1 + l1(l1 - p1α1))
p1(l1 - p1α1)
) - (- 
m1(l1 + l1(l1 - p1α1))(l1 - p1α1 + l1(l1 - p1α1))
p12(- l1 + p1α1)
) + β1
- 
m1(l1 + l1(l1 - p1α1))(l1 - p1α1 + l1(l1 - p1α1))
p12(- l1 + p1α1)
    (185) 
 
The isoutility curve for FOCJ2 can be described as: 
 
U2const
a2 - b2*p2 + d2*p1
 = 
α2*(
m2(l2 - p2α2 + l2(l2 - p2α2))
p2(l2 - p2α2) )-(-m2(l2 + l2(l2 - p2α2))(l2 - p2α2 + l2(l2 - p2α2))p22(-l2 + p2α2) ) + β2
-
m2(l2 + l2(l2 - p2α2))(l2 - p2α2 + l2(l2 - p2α2))
p22(-l2 + p2α2)
          (186) 
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The Stackelberg points where the highest possible isoutility curve of FOCJ1 
touches the reaction curve of FOCJ2 should be found. For this, the author has 
calculated their steepness dp1/dp2 and equalised them.  
The steepness of the isoutility curve of FOCJ2 and the reaction curve of 
FOCJ1 dp2/dp1 should be equal as well. 
Under parameter combination a1 = 5, a2 = 3, b1 =1.5, b2 = 2.5, d1 = 3.5,  
d2 = 3, m1 = 10, m2 = 10, l1 = 8, l2 = 8, α1 = 0.1, α2 = 0.2, β1 = 30, β2 = 25,  
U1const = 5, U2const = 5, two Stackelberg points have been identified:  
p1 = 6.94195, p2 = 6.34924 (p1 is received by substituting p2 in the reaction 
curve of FOCJ2) and p1 = 7.52821, p2 = 3.41203 (p2 is received by substituting 
p1 in the reaction curve of FOCJ1). 
To find the crossing points of isoutility curves, the following system of equa-





a1 - b1*p1 + d1*p2
 = 
α1*(
m1(l1 - p1α1 + l1(l1 - p1α1))
p1(l1 - p1α1)
) - (- 
m1(l1 + l1(l1 - p1α1))(l1 - p1α1 + l1(l1 - p1α1))
p12(- l1 + p1α1)
) + β1
- 
m1(l1 + l1(l1 - p1α1))(l1 - p1α1 + l1(l1 - p1α1))
p12(- l1 + p1α1)
U2const
a2 - b2*p2 + d2*p1
 = 
α2*(
m2(l2 - p2α2 + l2(l2 - p2α2))
p2(l2 - p2α2) )-(-m2(l2 + l2(l2 - p2α2))(l2 - p2α2 + l2(l2 - p2α2))p22(-l2 + p2α2) ) + β2
-
m2(l2 + l2(l2 - p2α2))(l2 - p2α2 + l2(l2 - p2α2))
p22(-l2 + p2α2)
  (187)      
 
Under parameter combination a1 = 5, a2 = 3, b1 =1.5, b2 = 2.5, d1 = 3.5, d2 = 3, 
m1 = 10, m2 = 10, l1 = 8, l2 = 8, α1 = 0.1, α2 = 0.2, β1 = 30, β2 = 25, U1const = 5, 
U2const = 5, there is a crossing point of isoutility curves of FOCJ1 (red dotted 
curve) and FOCJ2 (blue dotted curve), p1 = 11.9102, p2 = 3.79144, which is 
shown in Figure 32 as a black point. The purple point illustrates the Launhardt-
Hotelling solution as a crossing point of FOCJ1 (red) and FOCJ2 (blue) reaction 
curves. The small area between these two crossing points and two Stackelberg 
points of tangency, which are not demonstrated in the Figure 32, is the Krelle-





Figure 32. The Krelle-Ott area for Case IV of management behaviour 
Source: Compiled by the author using Wolfram Mathematica program. 
 
 
It is necessary to note that the β coefficient included in the utility function of 
Case IV under the given parameter combination should be bigger than 15, 
otherwise the Stackelberg points become negative, which means that they exist, 
but only in negative quadrants p1- p2.  
In Table 6, the author has grouped the optimal analytical solutions for Case 
I, Case II, Case III and Case IV with respect to labour, material, output, utility 
and fee. For Case III, analytical solutions are found in monopoly and duopoly 
separately, considering the demand function already on the Lagrange stage. The 
analytical solutions of fees for Cases I, II and IV are not included in Table 6 
because of their comprehensiveness. Instead, their numerical solutions in mono-
poly (see Table 7) and oligopoly (see Table 8) are demonstrated34.  
 
                                                            
34  The analytical solutions of p can be provided on request. The numerical solutions of p 
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Table 7. Four cases: numerical solutions in monopoly** 
Solutions Case I (+X, +L) Case II (X) Case III (L) Case IV (-X, +L) 
L 2.25628 4.  11.6569 4.1066 
M 3.38443 2. 0.414214 1.94789 
X 7.63623 8. 4.82843 7.99921 
U 38.8747 3.2 2.33137 22.4115 
Monopoly fee 11.8188 10. 25.8579 10.004 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
**Note: a = 10, b = 0.2, m = 20, l = 10, β = 2 (Case I), γ = 0.4 (Case II), δ = 0.2 (Case 
III), α = 0.1 (Case IV), β = 30 (Case IV) 
 
 
Table 8. Four cases: numerical solutions in oligopoly***  
Solutions Case I (+X, +L) Case II (X) Case III (L) Case IV (-X, +L)35 
L1 1.26036 2.0412 17.916 2.10995 
L2 3.17874 5.37204 12.8425 5.5048 
M1 3.02487 1.63296 0.818408 1.58121 
M2 7.62897 4.29763 1.24793 4.19383 
X1 3.81244 3.3332 14.6626 3.33628 
X2 24.2505 23.087 16.0265 23.0862 
U1 6.05613 1.33328 3.5832 26.8747 
U2 245.037 6.92611 2.56849 3.01478 
Launhardt-
Hotelling 
p1 = 10.579, 
p2 = 4.19453 
p1 = 9.79816, 
p2 = 3.72298 
p1 = 10.3332,  
p2 = 7.18927 
p1 = 9.79886, 






p1 = 9.03246; 







p1 = 5.50571; 




p1 = 1.08979, 







p1 = 3.09439,      




p1 = 2.60336,  
p2 = 6.29225.  
p1 = 14.0917,  





p1 = 10.8312,  




p1 = 6.94195, 







p1 = 7.52821, 
p2 = 3.41203 
                                                            
35 The resulting solutions largely depend on the parameter combinations. Numerical solu-
tions for labour, materials, output and fees must be positive. Therefore, not all intersections 
of the reaction curves and isoutility curves with particular parameter values lead to positive 
solutions for variables. Negative parameters are excluded, so that the range and values of 
parameters is limited. Additionally, from the rest of parameter values, the program may not 
be able to identify positive solutions of variable. Especially, at first Launhardt-Hotelling 
crossing point in positive values must be identified by the software. So far, specific solutions 
for chosen parameters have been figured out. These parameters are partly the same as in 
Cases I, II and III, but with special parameter values for α and β. The author also admits that 
there might be solutions for variables with other positive parameter values and coefficients 
before X, which have not been determined yet.    
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p1 = 52.4737, 
p2 = 43.1864 
p1 = 9.8642, 
p2 = 6.37037 
p1 = 14.2137,  
p2 = 9.29524 
p1 = 11.9102, 
p2 = 3.79144. 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
***Note: a1 = 5, a2 = 3, b1 =1.5, b2 = 2.5, d1 = 3.5, d2 = 3, m1 = 10, m2 = 10, l1 = 8, l2 = 
8, β1 = 2, β 2 = 2 (Case I), γ1 = 0.4, γ2 = 0.3 (Case II), δ1 = 0.2, δ2 = 0.2 (Case III), α1 = 
0.1, α2 = 0.2 (Case IV), β1 = 30, β2 = 25 (Case IV), U1const = 5, U2const = 5. L1, M1, X1, U1, 
L2, M2, X2, U2 are calculated in Launhardt-Hotelling point. 
 
 
The highest monopoly fee has been identified for the FOCJs of type II maxi-
mising labour (Case III). In oligopoly, the highest Launhardt-Hotelling combi-
nation p1 and p2 is also in Case III of management behaviour (see Table 8). The 
lowest fees are in the management maximising output (Case II) in oligopoly as 
well as in monopoly.  
Management maximising output (Case II) shows the highest output result in 
monopoly. However, in duopoly, the highest output is produced by management 
maximising labour (Case III). This can be explained by the high proportion of 
labour involvement since this case of management behaviour is interested in 
labour. However, the total output of FOCJ1 and FOCJ2 in Case III is not much 
bigger compared with the other cases, which means that labour productivity is 
likely not high in the third case.  
Management of Case IV shows relatively high output as well as utility. This 
can be explained by the chosen parameter combination or because they involve 
more labour, which they estimate positively, therefore producing more. Conse-
quently, labour increase positively affects utility both in monopoly and oligo-
poly.  
Management of Case I maximising output and labour obtains the highest 
utility in monopoly and oligopoly and shows the second highest level of output 
in oligopoly. In terms of fee level, management maximising output is the most 
preferable both in monopoly and duopoly. It shows the lowest FOCJ fees. In 
terms of output, again, management oriented towards output (Case II) shows the 
best performance in monopoly and management oriented towards output and 
labour (Case I) in duopoly (neglecting less productive Case III management). 
Therefore, Cases I and II of management behaviour are more favourable from 
the point of view of FOCJ members. Fees are generally higher in monopoly 
than in the oligopolistic market and total output is bigger in oligopoly than 
monopoly. 
An additional result of this subchapter is that demand functions for the 
production factors labour and material can be derived from the optimal solu-
tions in the formulas with respect to M and L in Table 6. Such as, for example, 
the labour demand function for Case I in monopoly is L = m(2+β)(a/b-1/b*X) (1+β), for 
materials, the demand function is M = l(2+β)(a/b-1/b*X). Similarly, for Case I, FOCJ1 
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obtains L1 = m1(2+β1)(a1/b1 - 1/b1*X1+d1/b1*p2) (1+β1) and the FOCJ1 demand function for 
material is M1 = l1(2+β1)(a1/b1 - 1/b1*X1+d1/b1*p2).  
For duopolist 2, the demand function for the production factors looks the 
same only with index 2. For the other cases of management behaviour, the 
factors’ demand functions can be similarly derived.  
The supply function of the FOCJ of type II can be obtained from the formula 
for the optimal X in monopoly and oligopoly (see Table 6). For example, for 
Case I, the FOCJ supply function is X = lm(2+β)2
p2(1+β)
; for Case II: X = 4lm
p2
, where p is 
different for monopoly and duopoly. A reverse demand in monopoly is p = a/b-
1/b*X; demand of FOCJ1 in duopoly is p1 = a1/b1 - 1/b1*X1+d1/b1*p2; demand 
of FOCJ2 in duopoly is p2 = a2/b2 - 1/b2*X2 + d2/b2*p1. 
For the Krelle-Ott area, numerical examples have shown that the smallest fee 
stability area is due to Case IV with management evaluating labour positively 
and output negatively. The biggest fee stability area is with Case I, where mana-
gement evaluates both labour and output positively. Cases II and IV have com-
parable Krelle-Ott areas. Case III of management behaviour has three points 
where the Stackelberg equilibrium is reached. Therefore, the shape of the 
Krelle-Ott space is not smooth in this case.  
 
 
2.3. Discussion of management decisions considering 
different restrictions  
In the basic model of current operation (subchapter 2.1), FOCJ management is 
not restricted in decision-making with respect to output, labour and fee. How-
ever, they can be coordinated from inside by the Assembly of Members or from 
outside, for example, through the active participation of higher rank jurisdic-
tions. Various conditions, which can be characterised by restrictions, different 
utility functions, production functions, conditions of demand, internal negotia-
tion between management and members, etc. affect management decisions. 
How management decisions can be influenced is shown in this subchapter and 
the coordinating rules that must be imposed in order to regulate management 
behaviour are reflected in the institutional framework of FOCJs of type II (the 





Restrictions with respect to labour 
Sometimes school FOCJs of type II meet restrictions with respect to labour. For 
the needs of FOCJs of type II, labour is defined as teachers, school administra-
tive and management staff and maintenance personnel. These restrictions can be 
imposed by the normative acts of municipalities or regions, the internal regula-
tions of a school or the FOCJ Statute.  
In Russia, for example, the Federal State Educational Standards (FSES) for 
General Education (Orders of the Ministry of Education and Science of the 
Russian Federation No. 373 of 6 October 2009, No. 1897 of 17 December 2010 
and No. 413 of 17 May 2012) include requirements for the number of peda-
gogical, managerial and other employees. The number of pupils per teacher is 
set by each subject of the Russian Federation separately. The number of other 
staff of schools (administrative and management staff, educational support and 
junior service staff, teachers not involved in the educational process) is optimal 
if it is 53 percent of the number of teachers (Order of the Government of the 
Russian Federation No. 1313-r  of 11 September 2008 (ed. from 13 July 2011) 
“On the realisation of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation” 
from No. 607 of 28 April 2008 “On the estimation of the efficiency of the 
activity of local governments of city districts and municipal areas”).    
In some countries, there are additional restrictions with respect to the em-
ployment cone (cone of positions). For example, in Germany. Employment 
cones describe the distribution of all jobs in an organisation. The position plan 
is dependent on personnel requirements, the budget approach and the budget 
plan (Eichhorn, Friedrich, Jann 2003). The employment cone is applied in 
public administration including school staffing. In Russia, staff schedules 
should be compiled in public and private companies by filling in T-3 form 
(Госкомстат РФ 2004). It is the normative document of an enterprise that 
formalises the structural units, staff composition and the number of employees 
of the organisation with indication to the amount of salary depending on the 
position held. The period within which a staff schedule is valid is usually one 
year and it should be approved by the order of the head of the organisation.     
Therefore, such restrictions on staff employed in school FOCJs of type II can 
be considered using the FOCJ of type II model of current operation in cases 
where only one FOCJ provides services on the market (monopoly case) and 
where two or more FOCJs of type II deliver services (oligopoly). Depending on 
the type of management behaviour, the restrictions on labour will affect optimal 
solutions differently.  
Assuming Case I of management behaviour depending on labour and output, 





Figure 33. Restrictions on labour in Case I of management behaviour 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
Restrictions on labour can be rather strict or rather loose. This means that 
management can be forced to use no less than, for example, L2 units of labour, 
or management is allowed to use no more than L2. In the former case, the 
minimum amount of labour that management can employ is L2. In the latter 
case, the restriction means that management can employ maximum L2. There-
fore, the flexibility of the restriction affects the solution. If FOCJ management 
is forced by the Statute or higher ranking jurisdictions to involve no less than L2 
units of labour, the optimal solution is somewhere outside of the optimal solu-
tion space and a cost coverage rule is not possible to realise. However, if 
management of the first case can use only less than L2, they prefer to reach their 
optimal amount of labour at point C, which is smaller than L2 (LC < L2). 
Another situation is when the number of labour units is restricted by the 
statements in a Statute or by a direct order of the owners of an FOCJ of type II 
from the left of the optimal point, such as LC > L1. This means that FOCJ 
management cannot employ more than L1 units of labour. Hence, management 
adopts this restriction by moving to its second best position from the mana-
gement utility point of view, given labour restrictions. Graphically, this move-
ment is shown from point C to point D in Figure 33, where FOCJ management 
is forced to switch to a lower utility level (from I2 to I1). New optimal point D 
corresponds to points F and E where higher output and lower fee are reached 
compared with the initial situation (point C).  
When dealing with Case II of FOCJ management, which is maximising 
output, again, two restrictions relative to optimal point C appear: L1 < LC and  
L2 > LC. If restrictions on labour are set so that no more than L2 is allowed (see 
Figure 34), this restriction does not affect the optimal plan for FOCJs of type II. 
Similar to the case above, if the restriction is formulated as ‘no less than’ L2, 
there is no possible solution because the restriction is outside the optimal 






Figure 34. Restrictions on labour in Case II of management behaviour 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
However, if FOCJ management is allowed to employ labour in an amount 
smaller than L1, the next preferable solution for management is at point Z. An 
optimal solution shifts from point C to point Z, where management loses its uti-
lity. Hence, an FOCJ produces less output (point T) collecting higher fees from 
their members (point K). 
For the third case of FOCJ management maximising labour, only two situa-
tions are possible: L is bigger than L2 and L is smaller than L2 (for example, L1 





Figure 35. Restrictions on labour in Case III of management behaviour 





When labour should be not more than L2, FOCJ management can still reach its 
most preferable point C. If only labour smaller than L1 possible, then there is a 
range of new optimal output solutions WY and new optimal fees RJ. FOCJ 
management loses its utility moving from I2 to I1 indifference curve, however, 
for FOCJ members and clients it might mean both a decrease as well as an 
increase in output and fees.  
In the fourth case of management behaviour, indifference curves of manage-
ment utility function have a positive slope to the L-axis, which means that 
management evaluates output positively only if they can employ more labour. 
Restrictions on labour in this case as well as in previous cases can be no more 
than L2 and no less than L2 (at least L2). Restriction L2 from the right of point C 
does not disturb the possibility to reach optimality C in Figure 36. However, if 
labour employment is restricted from the left of point C and requires less than 




Figure 36. Restrictions on labour in Case IV of management behaviour 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
In point H, management experiences utility loss since they are forced to move 
into a situation with lower utility (I1). At the same time, output is also de-
creasing (point N) and the participation fee is higher (point V) compared with 
the optimal case in point A. 
The following general conclusions can be made when restrictions on labour 
are introduced: 
1) Restrictions on labour from the right of optimal point C (more than the 
optimal amount of labour is allowed to be employed) do not affect an FOCJ 
of type II optimal plan if the restrictions are formulated as ‘no more than L2’. 
Then, FOCJ management is free to turn to their optimal solution C. 
2) Restrictions on labour formulated as ‘no less than L2’ are not feasible. 
3) Restrictions on labour in an amount ‘no more than L1’ affect the FOCJ of 
type II optimal plan depending on the type of management behaviour, as 
shown in Table 9: 
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Table 9. Restrictions on labour from the left of the optimal point 
 FOCJ management behaviour 
 Case I Case II Case III Case IV 
Utility loss + + + + 
Output loss - + +/- + 
Fee increase - + +/- + 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
In all four cases, management loses their utility regardless of the utility func-
tion. Management maximising output and labour (Case I) does not experience 
output loss if labour is restricted from the left of the optimal point (L1). This can 
also be true for management maximising labour (Case III) since this case pro-
duces a range of new combinations – ‘output-fee’. However, for the manage-
ment of Cases II and IV, maximising output and output and labour, reduction in 
output for FOCJ as well as a fee increase are observed. For Case III, the partici-
pation fee can be higher or lower in comparison with the optimum. Labour 
reduction in FOCJs of type II with the first case of management results in a fee 
decrease, which is positive for FOCJ members.   
The same results can be achieved by conducting an analysis within the oligo-
polistic market structure and four cases of FOCJ management behaviour. For 
this, in Figures 33–36, a set of demand functions is illustrated in the second 
quadrant and a group of possible solution spaces is marked in the first quadrant 
so that the FOCJ1 reaction line can be constructed in the second quadrant. 
It can be concluded that if an FOCJ of type II possesses either Case II or IV 
and sometimes Case III of management, any restrictions with respect to labour 
should be avoided. In all cases, if working hours increase, output will grow with 
the same amount of labour and budget, too.  
 
 
Restrictions with respect to materials 
FOCJ management decisions on the current operation stage can be analysed con-
sidering restrictions on materials. Again, four cases of management behaviour are 
assumed. In Figure 37, restrictions on materials involved in the FOCJ of type II 
service provision process are introduced. Materials are tangible resources that are 
employed to provide services. In a school FOCJ of type II sense, under ‘mate-
rials’, we can understand, for example, educational and methodological literature, 
materials for studying fine arts, modelling, natural sciences, etc. 
Similar to the restrictions on labour, restrictions on materials are analysed 
for monopoly where only one FOCJ of type II delivers services. Restrictions on 
materials that FOCJs of type II may face can be smaller or bigger than the 
optimal amount of materials for FOCJs of type II in point C in Figure 37.  
If management maximises labour and output, and the level of available 
materials is less than optimal Mopt, for example, M1, then the FOCJ management 
cannot produce since it does not fulfil a cost coverage rule (the solution is 
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somewhere outside the possible solution space). However, if an FOCJ of type II 
involves more materials than its optimal level from a managerial point of view, 
say M2, then the solution space is deducted and the second best point for the 
management under given restrictions is E, where a higher output with a lower 




Figure 37. Restrictions on materials in Case I of management behaviour 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
There are two situations: 1) management is allowed to use more material re-
sources, say, M2; and 2) management is forced, for example, by the Assembly 
of Members, to apply more than their optimal level of materials. If the first 
situation occurs, FOCJ management will produce with their optimal amount of 
materials Mopt and they move to their optimum. In the second case, the solution 
of the model shifts from point C to point E. Each ‘output-labour’ combination 
of points on a possible solution curve is produced with a different budget. This 
is reflected in the second quadrant on a turnover curve and also in the fourth 
quadrant with respect to different budget lines. 
Management of the second case maximises output. The reaction of this 
management to the restrictions with respect to materials is shown in Figure 38. 
Initially, before the restrictions are introduced, management realises their opti-
mal solution at point C with the optimal amount of materials Mopt and the bud-
get illustrated as a thick black line in the fourth quadrant of Figure 38. If 
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management of Case II is required to use no more than M2 amount of materials, 
they prefer to move to their optimal point C with Mopt materials. If management 
is required to use more than M2 (at least M2), they need a higher budget (red 
line) than the optimum and the solution shifts from point C to point G with a 
lower output and a higher service fee in the first quadrant. Management expe-
riences utility loss here, moving to a lower indifference curve I1. With the same 
budget, production can be material-intensive (point G) or labour intensive (point 
D). If management is required to use less than Mopt, then the solution shifts to 
point D with M1 smaller than Mopt. Restrictions on materials even stricter than 
M1 will result in the case where FOCJ of type II production under cost coverage 
is not feasible. For such production, it is required to have an unachievably big 





Figure 38. Restrictions on materials in Case II of management behaviour 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
The third case of management behaviour implies vertical indifference curves 
where the optimal solution is again at point C. Here, the optimal solution can be 
reached only with the maximum possible budget, which is represented by a 
thick black line in the fourth quadrant of Figure 39. An FOCJ of type II cannot 
afford a bigger budget, hence production is not possible if a cost coverage 
condition must be held.  
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Restrictions on materials below and above the optimal level are illustrated in 
Figure 39. If management maximising labour is required to use no more than 
M2, they can still produce with their optimal level of materials Mopt. However, if 
management is required to use more than M2, the minimum amount that they can 
use is M2. For production, they need a smaller budget (red line) than in the opti-
mal case (thick black budget line). With the same budget, FOCJs of type II can 
produce more or less output (point Y or S) with the same combination of labour 
and materials as shown in Figure 39. Since this management case is interested in 
labour only, different labour productivity is the reason for the two outputs.  
If management is required to use no more than M1 materials, production is 





Figure 39. Restrictions on materials in Case III of management behaviour 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
Management may possess a utility function that depends on output and labour 
input, evaluating labour positively and output negatively. If more than optimal 
Mopt is required, the solution of the model moves from point C to point J (see 
Figure 40), where an FOCJ of type II loses output and service fees increase. If 
restrictions below Mopt are imposed, it does not affect the optimal plan of an 




Figure 40. Restrictions on materials in Case IV of management behaviour 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
Therefore, the effect of restrictions on materials depending on the management 
case can be synthesised in Table 10, distinguishing between limitations on 
materials if the application of more than Mopt is required and if the application 
of less than Mopt is required. Restrictions on materials less than the optimal 
point do not affect the optimal plan of an FOCJ of type II. However, if an FOCJ 
of type II requires materials more than the optimal, the optimal solution shifts 
and loss of utility in all cases is observed, which means that FOCJ management 
does not like to use more material resources. This is different from the results of 
the labour restrictions discussed above where management does not like to use 
less labour since it reduces their utility.  
 
 
Table 10. Restrictions on materials from above of the optimal point 
 FOCJ management behaviour 
 Case I Case II Case III Case IV 
Utility loss + + + + 
Output loss - + +/- + 
Fee increase - + +/- + 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
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Output loss and fee increase are not observed in Case I of FOCJ management 
behaviour. For Cases II and IV as well as for Case III in particular situations, it 
is recommended not to impose restrictions on materials requiring more mate-
rials than the optimal. Therefore, in the FOCJ of type II Statute, the way in 
which management decide on the amount of materials involved in the educa-
tional process must be set out. Materials should be linked to the produced 




Restrictions with respect to real (fixed) capital 
For school FOCJs of type II, real (fixed) capital means the assets that are not 
consumed within one production period and continuously used for a long time. 
Real capital for a school FOCJ of type II can be real estate, buildings and 
constructions, such as a school building, utility rooms, a piece of land on which 
a school is located, etc.   
A change in the fixed capital of FOCJs of type II does not affect FOCJ 
turnover in the second quadrant of Figure 40, hence it does not affect budget 
lines in the fourth quadrant since FOCJ turnover p*X = l*L + m*M is compiled 
only from variable labour and materials. However, having larger fixed capital 
results in an upward shift of output-labour curves, which makes the production 
possibility curve pushed up as shown in the first quadrant (red lines).  
There are three situations: 1) an FOCJ of type II possesses fixed capital 
which is less than it actually requires to provide its services; 2) the fixed capital 
of an FOCJ of type II is optimal; and 3) an FOCJ of type II possesses fixed 
capital which is more than it actually requires to provide its services. These 
situations are shown in Table 11. 
 
 
Table 11. Productivity matrix of FOCJ of type II fixed capital 
 Fixed capital is 
increased  
Fixed capital is decreased  
Fixed capital is smaller 
than optimal 
Productivity Productivity 
Fixed capital is  
optimal 
Productivity Productivity 
Fixed capital is bigger 
than optimal 
Productivity Productivity 





If an FOCJ of type II possesses real capital which is smaller than its optimal 
size (for example, a school building is very small, not enough rooms, no sports 
ground for pupils, etc.), productivity36 increases with the growth of fixed capital 
as is reflected in Figure 41 by the red curve. The initial point C here shows an 
optimal solution with respect to management, but not with respect to available 
fixed capital. Therefore, point D describes the optimal solution with respect to 
both management and fixed capital. If fixed capital is smaller (represented by 
the black bold line in the first quadrant) than FOCJ requires, and it is decreased 
even more, then productivity shrinks and possible solution space moves inwards 
(blue line). A new optimal solution with respect to management results is shown 




Figure 41. Restrictions on real capital in Case I of management behaviour when fixed 
capital is smaller than optimal 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
If an FOCJ of type II possesses fixed capital that is optimal, a decrease as well 
as an increase in fixed capital will only reduce the productivity of the FOCJ of 
type II, as shown in Figure 42 through solution space reduction (blue curve). 
                                                            
36  Here, the productivity of all factors is meant: labour, materials and fixed capital hidden 
in the graph. This is also true for one factor since the increase of one factor influences the 
growth in productivity of the others. 
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Hence, if real capital is above or below the optimal size compared with point C 
where the FOCJ of type II reaches its optimality with respect to real capital and 
management, then the FOCJ of type II loses output and the service fee grows. 





Figure 42. Restrictions on real capital in Case I of management behaviour when fixed 
capital is optimal 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
An FOCJ of type II’s fixed capital can be bigger than optimal, as illustrated in 
Figure 43 by the thick black curve, which means that point C is an optimal 
solution with respect to management but not optimal with respect to the volume 
of fixed capital used. For example, the school building might be too big and it 
might take time for teachers and pupils to move from one room to another, 
which consumes time from the actual studying process. If fixed capital is bigger 
than is required and an FOCJ management makes it even bigger, productivity 
shrinks, which is illustrated by the reduction of possible solution space (blue 
curve). Then, a new optimality from a managerial point of view is reached at 
point K, with a smaller output and a higher fee. However, again, fixed capital is 
not at its optimal level at K.  
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If an FOCJ of type II possesses fixed capital that is over the optimal level 
and reduces it, for example, by moving into a new smaller building, then 
productivity is increased and the FOCJ of type II optimal solution is described 
by point D. At point D, there is an optimal solution with respect to management 





Figure 43. Restrictions on real capital in Case I of management behaviour when fixed 
capital is bigger than optimal 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
The effect of the real capital increase on the FOCJ of type II optimal solution 
can be additionally observed considering different cases of management beha-
viour. In all four cases, the parameters of the optimal plan with respect to output 
and fee have the same trends as in the case discussed above, where management 
maximises output and labour. This means that when real capital reaches the 
optimal level, output increases and fee decreases.  
Since fixed capital can become more or less than optimal, which happens 
because new members join an FOCJ of type II or some members leave, there 
should be a rule imposed that defines the optimal amount of capital for FOCJs 
of type II. It could be set out in the Statute that capital stock depends on the 
Assembly’s decision by voting or is directly linked to the amount of produced 
output (number of pupils).   
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Restrictions with respect to output 
Literature devoted to the economics of education mainly defines output in the 
educational sector by pupils’ test scores and graduation rates (Hanushek 1979: 
354; Harris 2010: 127; Krueger 1999). However, some other measures of output 
in education exist as well. For example, student attitudes, attendance rates, 
college continuation and dropout rates (Hanushek 1979: 355). Enrolment rates 
can also measure output in education (Glewwe, Lambert 2010). For the sake of 
simplicity, output X reflects the number of students enrolled in school FOCJs of 
type II. However, the author does not exclude other possible assumptions 
regarding in which terms FOCJ output can be measured, for example, for the 
purposes of potential statistical modelling (see Soto 2002). 
An FOCJ of type II might have to produce no less than the certain amount of 
output (educate a certain number of pupils) required by the Assembly of Mem-
bers. Fulfilling this condition, FOCJ management still makes decisions based on 
their utility function and looks for the best solution under the imposed limita-
tions. 
In the first case of FOCJ management maximising output and labour input, 
an optimal solution for the current operation model is at point C with Xopt 
amount of output and a fee level at point A, as shown in Figure 44. X3 is the 
maximum possible output received with minimum costs. If an FOCJ of type II 
Assembly of Members requires output of no less than X1, FOCJ management 
can still reach their optimum at C. If it is required to produce no more than X1, 
the next best solution from the management point of view is G, and a utility 
reduction from I3 to I1 can be noticed.    
However, if a higher ranking FOCJ body sets X2 as the minimum acceptable 
amount of output, the next preferable solution for FOCJ management is at B, 
with a fee described by point R. 




Figure 44. Restrictions on output in Case I of management behaviour 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
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In Figure 45, restrictions on output are shown for the management maximising 
output. For this case of management, the most preferable solution is at D; all 
other solutions are less preferred. Hence, if an FOCJ of type II Assembly im-
poses output restrictions, this can only result in a worse solution in the sense of 
output and fee. However, if it is a case, and an FOCJ of type II must produce no 
more than X1, the next preferable solution for FOCJ management will be at 
point B or C depending on whether it is a material or labour-intensive method 





Figure 45. Restrictions on output in Case II of management behaviour 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
Management maximising labour achieves an optimal solution at C, where the 
highest possible indifference curve touches the possible solution space. Xopt and 
fee A are the parameters of the optimal plan in Figure 46. If an FOCJ of type II 
Assembly requires production of no less than X1 smaller than Xopt, then mana-
gement chooses to produce Xopt. If the restrictions on output are to produce no 
more than X1, the solution of the model is at point G with the high fee described 
by point K.  
If the minimum required output is no less than X2, where X3 is the maximum 
possible production output, then output grows from Xopt to X2 and FOCJ of type 
II fee shrinks and defined by point R.  
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Figure 46. Restrictions on output in Case III of management behaviour 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
In the fourth case of management behaviour, restrictions on output and their 
consequences are illustrated. This management maximises output only if they 
are allowed to have more labour. In Figure 47, this is shown with the positive 
slope of indifference curves. The minimum requirements for output, which is 
smaller than optimal output, such as to produce no less than X1, return the 
solution to optimal solution point C. If the restrictions are formulated so that the 
allowed level of production is no more than X1, then the next best solution for 
FOCJ management is at point G. With the output restricted on the level X2, an 
optimal solution lies at B, between C and the maximum possible D. The 
solution shifts from point C to point B where a smaller indifference curve is 
reached. Output X2 is guaranteed to the FOCJ of type II Assembly, with fee R to 





Figure 47. Restrictions on output in Case IV of management behaviour 





Table 12. Restrictions on output above the optimal point 
 FOCJ management behaviour 
 Case I Case II Case III Case IV 
Utility loss + + + + 
Output loss - + - - 
Fee increase - + - - 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
Therefore, in all four cases of management behaviour, management experiences 
utility loss. In Cases I, III and IV, loss of utility takes place because manage-
ment is forced to produce more than they would like to (see Table 12). In Case 
II, loss of utility is explained by the fact that management is forced to produce 
less than they prefer. In Cases I, III and IV, restrictions on output from above 
the optimal point decrease the FOCJ of type II service fee. In the second case, 
management themselves maximises output, hence any restrictions on output can 
only make the situation worse, with smaller output and a higher fee. Therefore, 
in the Statute, it is suggested to not set output restrictions with the management 
behaviour of Case II.  
In all four cases, restrictions on output from below optimal point C do not 
change the optimal plan if the restrictions are formulated as ‘no less than’. 
There is a reduction of management utility, an output decrease and a fee in-
crease if the restriction is formulated as ‘no more than’ X1. Therefore, for the 
FOCJ of type II Statute, it is crucial to include a statement regarding the munici-
palities that participate in FOCJs of type II and whether children from other 
municipalities can attend school FOCJs of type II.   
 
 
Restrictions with respect to production function  
The production function selected for the mathematical formulation in this thesis 
is a special case of the Cob-Douglas function: X = L*M, where output depends 
on two factors: labour and materials. In the initial Cobb-Douglas function, out-
put depends on two factors: labour L and capital K, such as X = A*Lα * Kβ, 
where A is a technological coefficient (total factor productivity) and α and β are 
shares of labour and capital as factors of production in the volume of output, 
respectively37 (Allen 1967: 49, Walters 1963: 5). The technological coefficient 
includes technology and human knowledge. It can be absorbed and the Cobb-
Douglas production function can be rewritten as X = Lα * Kβ (α > 0, β > 0), 
which has been done for the purpose of this thesis in order to simplify algebraic 
                                                            
37  For the purposes of current thesis, constant coefficient A is a fixed factor (fixed capital). 
For the sake of simplicity, this factor is hidden and appears only in the analysis of the restric-
tions on real capital. 
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computations. The substitutive relationships between production factors are 
assumed here. 
The Cobb-Douglas function is a special case of the constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) production function X = [gLρ + (1−g)Cρ]1/ρ when the 
elasticity of substitution is approaching one (Allen 1967: 53, Varian 1992: 19–
20).  In the CES production function, X is an output, L and C are factor inputs, g 
is a share of factors and β = 1
1- ρ
 is the elasticity of substitution. 
When the CES elasticity of substitution is approaching zero, this results in 
the Leontief production function. In the Leontief function, production factors 
are used in a fixed proportion as the factors are absolute complementarities, 




), where K and L are capital and labour inputs, respec-
tively, and v and u are given constants, which are positive and defined by the 
existing technology (Allen 1967: 35). The output quantity reaches a limit if a 
production factor is not available in a sufficient quantity. The relations between 
factors are not substitutive here, hence in the graph (for example, Figure 46), 
there are no output-labour curves, only points. Therefore, under the assumed 
analysis, the author sorts out the production functions with factor inputs that are 
not substitutive.  
The Tinbergen-Solow equation P = ertLkC1−k with parameter ert captures 
exogenous technological progress over time (Humphrey 1997: 53), which this 
thesis is not aiming to analyse, as this additional parameter ert makes the calcu-
lus more complicated. Moreover, the microeconomic production function for a 
firm is assumed, not the production function on a macro-level since the author 
deals with FOCJs as companies/economic units providing public services.   
Some earlier works devoted to production functions are not considered in the 
thesis either, such as Von Thünen’s production function (Lloyd 1969: 21). 
However, Von Thünen’s production function can be called a predecessor of the 
Cobb-Douglas production function and probably the first algebraic formulation 
of a particular production function: p = h(g + k)n, where p is a product of a unit 
of labour, k is a quantity of capital per labourer, g is a positive constant, n is a 
constant less than one and h is also a constant, which is “the parameter that 
represents fertility of soil and efficiency of labour” (Lloyd 1969: 31). If parameter 
g is zero and both sides are multiplied by L, the following equation results: Lp = 
hkn L, which is in fact a Cobb-Douglas function (Humphrey 1997: 53). 
Preceding Cobb-Douglas, production functions were also formulated by 
Turgot and Wicksell. The production function of the latter algebraically looks 
the same as that of their successors Cobb and Douglas (Samuelson 1979). Other 
macroeconomic production functions such as Uzawa (1962) and Sato (1967) 
production functions aggregate a two-factor CES production function into a 
production function with n number of factors, which makes mathematical 
formulation much more difficult. 
A huge amount of literature devoted to production functions at the micro 
level can be found in sources originally written in German. In comparison with 
the production functions applied in macroeconomic analysis, micro-level func-
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tions consider the technical or engineering side of a production process. For 
example, the Gutenberg production function, which was the first production 
function developed for the industrial production and purposes of business 
administration (Betriebswirtschaftslehre). In German literature, this production 
function is called ‘production function of type B’. Of particular interest here 
within industrial management was the connection between production and the 
costs caused thereby. Gutenberg has divided production factors into human 
work, machines and materials and given the machines a central role in his con-
siderations. He suggested that production should be analysed for each unit of 
machinery separately, not for a firm as such. Mathematically, in this type of 
production function, production quantity depends on the number of active 
machines, intensity and the time they operate (Albach 1980: 55). Similar to the 
Leontief production function, factor inputs in the Gutenberg function are only 
partly substitutive, hence, again, output-labour curves cannot be constructed, 
only points with respect to a particular budget become relevant. The highest 
achievable point is a solution. 
Heinen has expanded and modified the Gutenberg production function. His 
function is known as the ‘type C production function’. Heinen distinguishes 
between the technical consumption function and the economic consumption 
function. Technical consumption functions show the quantitative relationships 
between factor input and the technical power of the aggregates. Economic con-
sumption functions, on the other hand, represent the relationship between factor 
input and the product quantities produced by the potential factors (Fandel 1991: 
119). 
The production function of type D is called the ‘Kloock production func-
tion’. Here, it is assumed that the company is divided into individual sub-divi-
sions in order to be able to take organisational and technical production con-
ditions into consideration. The Heinen production function is extended so that 
“multi-stage production processes with cyclical interlacement” are taken into 
consideration (Fandel 1991: 181). The supply interdependencies and production 
relationships are described in the general form of an input-output analysis, 
which is the first attempt to apply the Leontief input-output tables to the theory 
of firm production (Fandel 1991: 182).  
An input-output analysis is also applied in the production function of type E 
and developed by Hans-Ulrich Küpper. Among other factors, he considers time 
an important variable factor. Küpper refines the analysis of Klook by looking at 
several periods and, in addition to procurement, production and sales points, other 
operational areas. Thus, further facts, such as batch production, set-up or storage 
of intermediate or end products, can be considered (Brecher et al. 2012: 45). 
The Matthes production function (type F) is developed from the Küpper 
production function and supplemented by structural, process-related, social and 
financial constraints. The network planning technique is used for this purpose. 
In addition to individual production orders, financial processes are also con-
sidered. Individual processes are represented by the Heinen or Gutenberg pro-
duction function (types B and C). Depending on the desired level of detaliza-
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tion, entire production systems, including the associated financial flows or 
individual production processes, can be inspected (Brecher et al. 2012: 45–46). 
All of the abovementioned production functions are not tackled in the thesis. 
What makes them all different is their shape with respect to the type and degree 
of substitutability between labour and materials as factors of production. In her 
thesis, the author assumes X = Lα *Mβ production function, where α = 1 and β = 
138. However, following changes in the quality of education, the production 
function can change as well. Then, technological factor A may become relevant 
and the proportion of factors may differ so that a Cobb-Douglas general form of 
production function, X = A*Lα * Kβ, can describe production relationships. 
Hence, different qualities of output due to technological or any other changes 
are reflected by applying different production functions. The quality of edu-
cation can be differentiated considering, for example, the educational ap-
proaches or concepts that are implemented, the different sets of subjects taught, 
the reliance of teaching technics on modern equipment and so on. In Figure 48, 
possible solution spaces reflect the different production functions assumed for 
different qualities: quality 1 and quality 2. One or several qualities are permitted 
by the FOCJ of type II Statute. For different qualities, optimal solutions result in 
point F and E, respectively. 
    
 
 
Figure 48. Optimal solutions for an FOCJ of type II with respect to different qualities 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
                                                            
38  There is an increasing return to scale if α +β > 1, and decreasing returns to scale if α +β 
< 1. In the Cobb-Douglas production function a constant return to scale is assumed very 
often, so that α +β = 1, then a proportional coefficient for one factor is α and for the other 
factor is (1- α) (Allen 1967: 50). 
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Therefore, in the FOCJ of type II Statute, it should be set out by the Assembly 
whether the quality of school services is equal among members and non-
members of the FOCJ of type II. It should be explicitly defined by the FOCJ of 
type II Statute that FOCJ members get access to services of higher quality com-




Restrictions with respect to utility function 
The utility function of FOCJ of type II management describes which goals 
management evaluates the most. The goals can be defined by the values they 
have, beliefs and ethical norms. However, the utility function can also be im-
posed by the Assembly of Members or an even higher ranking jurisdiction if 
management is not powerful enough. Therefore, the Statute of the FOCJ of type 
II should define the goals an FOCJ of type II is designed to reach, and the 
responsibilities of management should be stated there as well, since FOCJ 
management cannot be constantly controlled by its principal (Assembly of 
Members).  
In this thesis, four cases of management utility functions are assumed (more 
detailed descriptions in subchapter 2.2). The first case maximises output and 
labour input, the second case evaluates only output positively, the third case 
maximises labour only, the fourth case evaluates labour positively and output 
negatively. Within the Statute, Cases III and IV of FOCJ management should be 
excluded and the management utility function should be changed in the direc-
tion of the higher evaluation of X, focusing on Cases I and II. 
The author assumes substitutive utility functions, such as a Cobb-Douglas 
special case, where labour can be substituted by output and vice-versa ac-
cording to the evaluation of management39 U(X, L) = X*Lβ. For the fourth case, 
the linear utility function U(X, L) = αL – X + β represents that FOCJ mana-
gement produces more only if more labour can be employed, similarly to how 
the consumption of ‘bads’ (see Varian 2010: 43) can be described. Loss of 
utility from increased production of X should be compensated by the utility gain 
from increased consumption of labour.  
 The abovementioned functions and the utility function for perfect comple-
ments (Leontief function for utilities) are just special cases of the CES utility 
function, as has been discussed in the section devoted to the production func-
tions. 
However, management may possess not only substitutive preferences, but 
also other kinds, which it is not possible to describe functionally. For example, 
lexicographic preferences cannot be modelled using utility function since they 
                                                            
39  The author assumes a direct utility function describing preferences of the FOCJ of type II 
management regardless market prices. In contrast, an indirect utility function considers 
market prices (Henderson, Quandt 1980: 41). 
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are not continuous, and indifference curves can only be illustrated as points, not 
curves (Матершева et al. 2008: 20–21). In this case, management always 
prefers a set in which they get more L regardless of the number of X, and only if 
both sets contain the same number of L does the number of X matter. In Figure 
49, points belonging to regions V, including points on the bold line above A, are 
preferred to A, since the sets to the right of A contain more L and the sets on the 
bold line above A contain the same amount of L and more X. In the area W, 
including the thin line down from A, there are points that are less preferred than 
set A (since the sets to the left of A contain less L and the sets on the thin line 
contain the same L but less X). But if all sets of area V are preferred to set A, 
and set A is preferred to all sets of area W, then there can be no sets between 
which and set A the consumer does not distinguish. This means that many 
‘indifferent’ sets are represented by a single set A. This reasoning explains why 






L L1 L2 
V  W  
A 
 
Figure 49. Lexicographic preferences 
Source: Матершева et al. 2008: 20–21. 
 
 
In other words, management prefers a combination X and L that definitely con-
tains L, but in distinguishing between different combinations of X and L, 
management will prefer the combination which contains more X. 
In contrast to lexicographic preferences, quasilinear preferences can be 
expressed by the utility function. The utility function can be represented as U(L, 
X) = V(L) + X , where V(L) is a nonlinear part of the utility function and X is a 
linear part of the utility function. The quasilinear or ‘partially linear’ utility 
function is linear in X but possibly non-linear in L. The linear part describes a 
product consumed in relatively large quantities compared with a non-linear pro-
duct, the consumption of which practically does not change or changes rela-
tively insignificantly with the growth of the second product (Varian 1992: 164). 
Management can also possess satiated preferences. Then, utility function can 
be represented as U = U*- [(X*- X)2 + (L*- L)2], where X and L are the 
consumed goods, X* and L* are coordinates of satiation points, i.e. volumes of 
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X and L that maximise management satisfaction and U* is the maximum utility 
of the satiation point (Матершева et al. 2008: 22). 
In FOCJs of type II, decisions can be made by comparing several alterna-
tives and evaluating how well they fulfil the final goal. To this end, the utility 
value analysis can be applied. It is a methodology that is intended to provide 
rational support for decision-making on complex problems. The choice between 
alternatives is made based on multiple criteria selected by management or the 
Assembly of Members. A particular value is assigned to each criterion de-
pending on a decision-maker. At the end, a total value for each alternative is 
calculated from the weighted sum of individual values per criterion. The 
deciding theoretical basis for utility value analysis is the additive multicriteria 
value function, such as: Ui= ∑ uic* wcCc=1 , where Ui – total utility value of an 
alternative i; uic – utility value for each alternative criterion; wc – the weight of 
each criterion should add up to 1 (Götze, Northcott, Schuster 2008: 175–176).  
In order to decide, a cost-benefit analysis allows the comparison of alter-
natives. In contrast to the utility value analysis, a cost-benefit analysis estimates 
costs and benefits in a monetary form, and management acts in favour of the 
alternative which gives the highest net benefits according to the formula: NB = 
TB – TC, where NB – net benefits, TB – total benefits, TC – total costs (Cellini, 
Kee 2015: 494).  
Despite having different approaches to decision-making in an FOCJ of type 
II and different utility functions describing the behaviour of management that 
affects an FOCJ of type II optimal solution, the result depends on who is 
actually empowered by the FOCJ of type II Statute and Memorandum to make 
decisions: whether FOCJ management deicides freely or the FOCJ Assembly of 
Members orders management or whether optimality can be achieved by means 
of negotiation. An FOCJ of type II Assembly can impute the utility function of 
management or set its goals by formulating the goals generally or more con-
cretely. This also affects the freedom of managers’ decisions. The list of an 
FOCJ management’s rights and responsibilities should be reflected by the FOCJ 
of type II Statute and Memorandum. 
 
 
Restrictions with respect to demand function 
The demand function for an FOCJ of type II depends on the market structure 
within which an FOCJ of type II functions. To define a market structure, nume-
rous criteria can be applied. The author stems from only one criterion following 
Stackelberg – the number of economic agents from the demand and supply side 
(Stackelberg 2011). Stackelberg summarises all possible market situations in 
























  Number of economic agents (Supply side) 
One Few Many 
One Bilateral 
Monopoly 
Reduced Monopsony Monopsony 
Few Reduced 
Monopoly 
Bilateral Oligopoly Demand Oligopoly 
Many Monopoly Oligopoly Free competition 
Source: Compiled by the author based on Stackelberg 2011: 3.  
 
 
According to the Stackelberg matrix, in this thesis, the author focuses on mono-
poly and duopoly as a special case of oligopoly with only two suppliers. In the 
context of FOCJs of type II, monopoly means that there is only one FOCJ of 
type II providing school services to both FOCJ members and possibly to non-
members. Duopoly (oligopoly) means that there are (at least) two FOCJs of type 
II providing school educational services and competing with one another or 
with other public and private schools40. Therefore, it is important to set out in 
the Statute who is allowed to demand services from an FOCJ of type II, whether 
there is one service consumer (meaning only member municipalities) or several 
(for example, FOCJ members and non-members – other municipalities, not 
participating school FOCJs of type II).  
Clarification of demanders and suppliers in the Statute defines the market 
structure and influences solutions for an FOCJ of type II optimal plan, as shown 
graphically in Figure 50:  
                                                            
40  In the thesis, it is assumed and analyzed a competition only between two FOCJs of type 
II. However, the analysis can be extended by considering competition between an FOCJ of 
type II (public law unit) and a private school, which has a profit maximization as the main 
goal. In this case, a new point of equilibrium results. New optimality parameters can be 




Figure 50. Optimal solutions with respect to different demand functions  
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
In the case of monopoly, there is only one demand function D1: X = a - b*p for 
FOCJ1, an optimal plan is described by point C with a particular output and 
participation fee. In oligopoly, a set of demand curves for FOCJ1 D1, D2, etc. 
considering a change in another FOCJ of type II fee – p2 can be reflected by the 
direct demand function X1 = a1 – b1*p1 + d1*p241. Hence, there is a path of 
optimal solutions such as C, D, etc., which are possible to achieve.  
For the sake of simplicity, the lineal demand function is assumed in the 
thesis. However, the shape can be different. For example, a kinked demand 
function can be considered. Initially, a kinked demand function was constructed 
under the assumption that if one oligopolist decreases prices, other oligopolists 
will follow them in order not to give up their market share. However, other 
oligopolists will not increase their prices if one of them initiates a price increase 
of their services. For this one, their demand function has a kink in the initial 
(market price) point so that the demand curve in the section above this point is 
                                                            
41  In oligopolistic market, demand cannot be unlimited. The combination of parameters a1 
+ d1*p2 is responsible for the shift of demand functions to the left in parallel as shown in 
Figure 50. Hence, it is possible to set limitations on parameters, such as a1 + d1*p2 ≤ w1. The 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be applied to maximization problem if both the goal function 
and restrictions are concave (Henderson, Quandt 1980: 386). Increase in fee p2, and, con-
sequently, increase in demand continues until parameter combination a1 + d1*p2 achieves its 
limit w1.  
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flatter (more elastic demand) than in the section below (less elastic demand). 
The consequence is that a change in costs or demand does not affect the price of 
a firm. This theory was originally used to explain price rigidity in the conditions 
of oligopoly (Sweezy 1939; Sen 2004: 100). Drakopoulos (1992: 2) attempts to 
explain the shape of a kinked demand function by the behaviour of customers, 
informational asymmetry, customer loyalty and product addiction.  
An FOCJ of type II can also have a kinked demand function where the part 
of the demand function with lower price elasticity describes the demand of the 
students from the same municipality in which the school is located or from 
nearby municipalities so that the FOCJ of type II fee increase (decrease) will 
not affect their desire to attend this school too much because it is in an advan-
tageous location. However, children from those municipalities that are relatively 
further from school can also participate in school FOCJs of type II. Besides the 
participation fee, these municipalities will additionally pay transportation costs. 
Thus, for this group of consumers from farther located municipalities, the de-
mand function will be more elastic and they will be more sensitive to the school 
FOCJ of type II fee change. Therefore, it is important to describe in the school 
FOCJ of type II Statute what these municipalities are – members of the FOCJ of 
type II and where they are located because this information defines the demand 
function of the FOCJ of type II.  
In general, demand for FOCJ of type II services can be created by: 
1) parents of member municipalities and non-members (parents are deman-
ders); 
2) parents via municipalities (municipalities are demanders); and 
3) municipalities and parents (both are demanders). 
According to the Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Fede-
ration”, Article 67 and the information learnt from the interviews (see Annex 4), 
admission to municipal schools should first be offered to those citizens who live 
in the territory to which said educational organisation is assigned, and in the 
second order, access to schools can be provided to pupils from other territories 
if there are free places in the school. Thus, this condition makes the demand 
function for Russian school services less elastic since the demanders are geo-
graphically homogeneous.  
What can also affect the demand for the FOCJ of type II’s services is the 
level of school. Whether an FOCJ provides only primary educational services or 
basic or secondary (complete) education affects demand size. The elasticity of 
the demand function is also defined by the level of general education services: 
perhaps demand is less elastic for older students because they are able to with-
stand longer distance travel than smaller children. Therefore, this information 
regarding the stage of school education the school is focused on should be 
emphasised in the FOCJ of type II Statute as well. It is also required by law in 




Restrictions resulting from the relations between FOCJ 
management and members  
When analysing the current operation model, it was assumed that the members 
(municipalities) represented by the Assembly of Members only intervene by for-
mulating the cost coverage rule, which FOCJ management must follow. Here, 
management freely chooses the solution it prefers with respect to their utility 
function, determining an output. However, according to stipulations set out in the 
Statute of an FOCJ of type II, its Assembly of Members might directly influence 
the output and management must fulfil members’ wishes by following an order. 
Another case is possible when members and management negotiate a solution and 
the output volume. In general, three situations are feasible: 
1) An agent (management) is powerful: management makes decisions on pro-
duced output following their own preferences. 
2) A principal (Assembly) is powerful: management is restricted by the As-
sembly of Members regarding the produced output, for example, by setting a 
minimum output requirement. 
3) Negotiation between management and the Assembly of Members: manage-
ment have their requirements with respect to the minimum utility they would 
like to receive and members have requirements with respect to the minimum 
output to be produced. 
Therefore, the utility function of FOCJ of type II members is introduced into the 
model. The utility function of members is derived from the marginal utility 
function by means of FOCJ of type II demand function integration. At the point 





Figure 51. Construction of the utility function of FOCJ of type II members 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
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The area under the demand function is consumer surplus which measures the 
utility that consumers (FOCJ of type II members) receive from services (Hicks 
1942; Varian 2010: 245). The demand function basically illustrates the di-
minishing law of marginal utility when members are ready to pay for every 
additional unit of output if it is becoming cheaper. This leads to Figure 52 
where, in the second quadrant, the demand function and the minimum utility 
function of the management are introduced. The minimum function of the 
management shown in this quadrant corresponds to the minimum utility in-
difference curve Imin of the management in the first quadrant. If this minimum 
utility is not reached, FOCJ management ceases its activities. Therefore, the 
solution space presented by the thick line is only available between C and E. 
The best solution for the management is at D, and the best solution for the 
members is at F where they get maximum utility. However, to reach F point is 
not feasible, and the next best solution for FOCJ of type II Assembly would be 
point C. 
1)  If the position of members is more powerful, the solution of the model is at 
C.  
2)  If management could decide freely, it would choose point D.  
3)  If the members and management determine the output to produce by 




Figure 52. Internal self-administrative structures of FOCJ of type II considering the 
minimum utility of management 




Figure 53 can also illustrate the negotiation interval from point C to D, where 
the vertical axis is dedicated to the utility of the members and the horizontal 
axis shows the utility of management. The utility transformation line CD high-
lights the Pareto optimal combination of utility of both partners. Applying the 
concept of maximising the Nash product to find a negotiation solution leads to 
point S (Figure 53), where the highest reachable indifference curve of the set of 




Figure 53. The Nash solution of negotiations between management and members of the 
FOCJ of type II 
Source: Chebotareva, Friedrich 2017. 
 
 
In some Statutes, according to the legal form of the FOCJ of type II, the mem-
bers may, through an Assembly of Members, elect management by voting. If 
the minimum output necessary to be re-elected is present, then management has 
to fulfil this requirement of members. The election process should also consider 
the minimum utility of management to continue their activity within FOCJ of 
type II and the restriction induced by the cost coverage requirement. Therefore, 
an output higher than C (in Figure 54), the maximum possible, which the 
solution space allows, is not feasible. Restriction on output smaller than D still 
allows management to reach its optimal solution. In contrast, a minimum output 
requirement higher than D, such as G, does not allow management to reach its 
best situation D. The best position for management in this case is then solution 
G. If there are still negations between management and members, the negotia-
tion corridor is between C and G.   
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Figure 54. Internal self-administrative structures of FOCJ of type II with the minimum 
output and utility of management 
Source: Chebotareva, Friedrich 2017. 
 
 
In Figure 55, the Nash product solution is attained at point S. In this way, a 





Figure 55. The Nash solution of negotiations between management and members of the 
FOCJ of type II with the minimum requirement to output 
Source: Chebotareva, Friedrich 2017. 
 
147 
In the current model, a finite cooperative game is assumed; therefore, Nash 
solution (equilibrium) exists. In cooperative games, players have coinciding 
interests when parties are able to come to a joint plan of action (Kelly 2003: 72; 
Nash 1953: 128). The driving force behind this game is fairness according to an 
arbiter. The main criticism of game theory and the Nash approach in particular 
is that each player knows the utility function of the other, the reality is 
simplified and therefore many situations are left out of the analysis (Luce, 
Raiffa 1957: 134). Raiffa (Luce, Raiffa 1957: 136), using the same approach of 
‘arbitrated fairness’, introduces a negotiation model where utility is distributed 
in fixed proportions among players. If the utility is equally divided between two 
players, then the game ends up at the Nash solution.  
Different approaches to solving the bargaining problem are shaped by a wide 
range of factors (driving forces)42. In the bargaining process of Zeuthen, the risk 
of conflict is emphasised as a central factor (Zeuthen 1930). The Zeuthen 
bargaining solution leads to the Nash equilibrium. However, Zeuthen’s rea-
soning is based on a more complicated “fairly plausible psychological model of 
the bargaining process” (Harsanyi 1956: 151).    
Risk and the reaction to a risk are also driving forces in Pen’s theory of 
bargaining (Pen 1952), which is rooted in Zeuthen’s theory. However, Pen has 
additionally considered factors such as uncertainty and bargaining tactics, 
                                                            
42  Literature devoted to game theory is very rich in many aspects, especially, in conside-
ration of factors defining results of negotiations. The author compiled the following non-ex-
haustive list of factors: 
− Consequences of negotiation time (Bishop 1964; Hicks 1963). 
− Negotiation costs (Cross 1965). 
− Abilities of players to learn the behaviour of opponents (Cross 1965). 
− Maximisation of added gains (Krelle 1961). 
− The problem of ‘fair’ division: the central assumption is that players make ‘fair’ division 
by themselves, which means they are satisfied by the share they receive. Sometimes 
players use a mediator, but do not involve an arbiter because players know their prefe-
rences better (Steinhaus 1948: 101–104).  
− Principles of payoff distribution between players, known as Shapley value and τ-value: 
each player gets a payoff which is equal to his average contribution of the total coalition 
(Osborne, Rubinstein 1994: 289–298; Tijs 1981; Branzei, Dimitrov, Tijs 2005: 28–31). 
− Time of bargaining until the solution is reached. Such as, in Rubinstein bargaining model 
(Rubinstein 1982). The longer the bargaining is, the smaller shared pie gets because a 
discount factor plays a role. 
− Payoffs of the game depend on the type of players. Such as, in a signalling game where 
one player, the transmitter, emits signals and the receiver tries to draw conclusions about 
the type of transmitter by observing the emitted signals (Bartholomae, Wiens 2016: 179). 
− Selected strategies play a role. For example, Tit-for-tat strategy: a player, who uses the 
Tit-for-Tat strategy, begins the interaction with a cooperative move. Then, one Tit-for-
Tat player follows the other player's last move (Bartholomae, Wiens 2016: 156–157).  
− Distribution of benefits based on minimax or maximin strategies can be applied as well 
(Luce, Raiffa 1957: 67). 
The result of a game depends on the assumed market form and the behaviour of actors, con-
nected to the market form. 
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which is the essence of the bargaining process to his mind (Saraydar 1971: 
281). Both Zeuthen and Pen’s solutions result in the Nash equilibrium if two 
bargainers have the same parameters of risk.    
Sometimes, the costs of conflict lead to a solution of negotiations between 
parties. For example, Hicks (1963) suggests that the time of negotiation plays a 
role. If a conflict between the employer and employees takes a long time, a 
trade union must be compensated with a higher wage rate, but it is unfavourable 
for firms to increase a wage rate. Hence, negotiations stop when the “em-
ployer’s concession curve” and the “trade union’s resistance curve” cross. This 
is the point of the highest possible wage rate that workers can receive as a result 
of negotiations when the conflict can be avoided (Hicks 1963: 143).        
Decisions in FOCJs of type II can be made not only based on the game-
theoretical approach by means of bargaining between management and mem-
bers, but also by aggregating individual preference into collective (social) prefe-
rences applying different voting rules. At least three possible situations can 
occur: 
1) Decisions in FOCJs of type II are made by management, then the Associa-
tion Council can vote for the alternatives. 
2) Decisions in FOCJs of type II are made by the Assembly of Members, which 
means that the management utility function is imputed by members. Here, 
again, voting rules are applicable for decision-making in Assembly.  
However, through FOCJ management, utility function social benefits can 
be imputed. Then, FOCJ management acts in the public interest, maximising 
net social benefit as done in Eerma (2014: 94). 
3) Management considers the political aims of the FOCJ of type II Assembly of 
Members and therefore wishes to maximise votes so that the FOCJ As-
sembly of Members can be re-elected.  
For the first and second situations, different voting rules can be stipulated in the 
FOCJ of type II Statute. One option is that decisions are made based on a con-
sensus, which means that each voter should agree in order to reach a common 
decision. With this rule, a selected alternative is efficient in a Pareto sense (Hill-
man 2009: 161).  
Another possible rule is a majority rule, where the alternative is considered 
elected if it gets more than half of the votes. However, majority voting can 
result in the cycling of alternatives, which is known as the ‘Condorcet paradox’. 
It means that voting does not give a Condorcet winner, but an alternative which 
beats any other alternative in a pairwise vote (Persson, Tabellini 2000: 21). In 
the case of cycling, setting the agenda or the order of voting on the alternatives 
can determine a stable voting result. 
To avoid cycling, a simple majority (plurality rule) can be applied which 
does not require a fifty percent threshold. The winning alternative is the one that 
gains the largest number of votes (Muller 2003: 147). This rule has an ad-
vantage that it helps to avoid voting cycling because the collective choice can 
always be made among set alternatives without implying an additional agenda. 
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The Borda count can be applied to make decisions in the Association 
Council as well as in the Assembly of Members; each voter typically has h 
points according to the number of alternatives, voters should distribute h points 
among alternatives so that the first preferred alternative gets h, the second h-1 
and so on. The alternative which receives the maximum number of total points 
is the winner. With a large number of voting alternatives and voters, the Borda 
count can be rather complicated. In contrast, approval voting, which allows 
voting for (approving) any number of alternatives from the list. This requires 
voters to select only candidates whom they approve and not compare alterna-
tives between one another as is done in the Borda count (Muller 2003: 156). 
For the third situation, where management consider the political aims of the 
FOCJ of type II Assembly of Members, the multi-level administration model 
can be applicable in the case of the provision of school services (see Friedrich, 
Ukrainski, Timpmann 2014: 58). This model is based on the principal-agent 
model in the framework of an FOCJ of type II administrative structure 
consisting of three levels: FOCJ of type II Assembly of Members as a higher-
level principal, FOCJ management (Association Council) as a mid-level prin-
cipal and school management as an agent. In Figure 56, two schools are as-
sumed – secondary and primary – as management of the lowest level. 
It is also assumed that the Assembly possesses political aims and in order to 
maximise the votes of the electorate that is citizens of municipality 1 and 2, the 
Assembly wants to satisfy voters by maximising total budget Dn, which is used 





Figure 56. The multi-level administration model for school services 
Source: Adopted from Friedrich, Ukrainski, Timpmann 2014: 58.  
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School 1 and school 2 provide educational services to those citizens who are 
from municipality 1 and municipality 2 in the amount of X1 and X2, respecti-
vely. Voters from both municipalities have their voting functions where they 
positively evaluate the public services they receive i1*X1 and i2*X2 and nega-
tively evaluate what they have to contribute to the budget in the form of taxes in 
order to receive these services (-f1*Dn and –f2*Dn) (see Figure 55). Voting 
function for the FOCJ of type II Assembly consists of citizens’ voting func-
tions; therefore, the Assembly maximises: V = V1 + V2 = -f1*Dn + i1*X1 –f2*Dn 
+ i2*X2  max. 
FOCJ management (middle level principal) should distribute the total budget 
Dn among schools based on the schools’ production functions, X1 = L1* M1 and 
X2 = L2* M2, so that FOCJ management maximises their utility function 
depending on the output of both schools: Uman = X1* (X2)2. FOCJ management 
is acting in favour of the FOCJ of type II Assembly that aims to be re-elected by 
voters from municipality 1 and 2. The more X1 and X2 they get, the higher the 
chances that representatives of the Assembly will be elected again. This argu-
mentation explains the form of management utility function. 
At first, management of the lowest level solves an optimisation problem at 
each school separately by maximising utility function, U1 = L1β1 * X1, consi-
dering school production function X1 = L1* M1 and budget composition Dn1 = 
l*L1 + m*M1, where L1 and M1 are labour and materials, respectively, and l and 
m are factor prices. As a result of optimisation, the following relations between 
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43  Settings: U1 = L1β1 * X1, X1 = L1* M1, D1n = l*L1 + m*M1  M1 = 
D1n - l*L1m  














- β1+2 * lm * L1β1+1= 0,  L1β1*D1n∗(β1+1)m  = β1+2 ∗ lm * L1β1+1  L1 =
D1n(β1+1)l β1+2   
X1= L1*M1= D1n β1+1l β1+2 * D1n - l*L1m = D1n β1+1l β1+2 * D1n - l*D1n(β1+1)l β1+2m    
After simplifications:  
X1=
D1n
2 (β1+1)l*m*(β1+2)2   
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In the next step, optimal output, which was received for two schools, should be 
inserted into the utility function of the FOCJ management Uman = X1*(X2)2, ma-
ximising utility under the total budget constraint: Dn = D1n + D2n (budgets for 
school are compiled from total budget). Hence, the following Lagrange function 
should be solved: 
 
Lag = X1*X2
2 - λ1(Dn- D1n- D2n)  max44                   (190) 
 
From the Lagrange function, the algebraic relations between the budgets of two 








In the last stage, in the voting function, V = V1 + V2 = -f1*Dn + i1*X1 –f2*Dn 
+ i2*X2, X1 and X2 should be substituted with the results in formulas (188) and 
(189), and budgets for schools should be substituted with respect to in relation 
to the total budget found from FOCJ management utility maximisation so that 
the following voting function is received: 
 
V = - f1*Dn + i1*
(13Dn)2(β1+1)
l*m*(β1+2)





2               (191) 
 
V = - f1*Dn + i1*
Dn2(β1+1)
9*l*m*(β1+2)
2 – f2*Dn + i2*
4Dn2(β2+1)
9*l*m*(β2+2)
2               (192) 
 
Vote maximisation via differentiating to Dn for both municipalities results in an 
optimal budget for school service provision within an FOCJ of type II admi-
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44 Lag = D1n2 (β1+1)
l*m*(β1+2)





















4  + λ1= 0  
∂Lag
∂λ1









4  − D2n4 (β2+1)2l2*m2*(β2+2)4 * 2D1n(β1+1)l*m*(β1+2)2 = 0  D2n = 2D1n 
Dn- D1n- 2D1n = 0  D1n = 13 Dn  D2n = Dn − 13 Dn = 23 Dn 
45 dV
dDn
= - f1+ 2i1 β1+19*l*m* β1+2 2 Dn – f2+ 8i2 β2+19*l*m* β2+2 2 Dn= 0   
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Depending on the voting rule set out in the FOCJ of type II Statute, the results 
(elected policy or person for a particular position) can differ. Additionally, the 
basic management concept should be reflected in the FOCJ of type II Statute via 
the list of top managers’ responsibilities. Different management concepts con-
tain diverse and sometimes contradicting goals, which defines management 
utility function.  
Management concepts show the relations between managers and employees 
on different levels in a company; they reflect the possibility to delegate the right 
to make decisions to managers of the lower level inside an economic unit, such as 
an FOCJ. In the context of FOCJs of type II, management concepts can shape 
relations between FOCJ management and school directors, for example. Various 
management concepts are well described in Friedrich, Ukrainski and Timpmann 
(2014: 114–132) and rely on different leading ideas as a key element.  
For example, the Harzburg management model is based on the delegation of 
authority and responsibility within a company. The model implies abandoning 
authoritarian forms of management and encouraging the management of a com-
pany to work alongside employees (Grunwald, Bernthal 1983).  
Simultaneously with the Harzburg concept in Germany, management by ob-
jective concept was under development in the USA, headed by Peter Drucker. 
The essence of this concept is the cooperative process of goal-setting, direction 
selection and decision-making. An important part of goal-oriented management 
is measuring and comparing the current performance of employees with one 
another and against a set of established standards. When employees themselves 
are involved in the process of setting goals and determining the actions required 
to achieve, they are more motivated to perform their duties (Odiorne 1965).  
Douglas McGregor (1960) developed ‘Theory X’ and ‘Theory Y’ of mana-
gement. The core idea lies in how management sees workers. According to 
theory X, workers have no incentives to work if there is no material stimulus 
and they avoid responsibility if possible. In this theory, management assumes 
that employees are lazy and want to avoid work. As a result, workers should be 
closely monitored and control systems should be developed for this purpose.  
Contrary to theory X, in theory Y, management assumes that employees can 
be ambitious, have internal incentives and exercise self-control and self-gover-
nance. Employees are considered to enjoy their duties related to both mental 
and physical work. There is a chance to increase productivity by giving em-
ployees the freedom to work without being bound by the rules. Theory Y 
managers believe that, under favourable conditions, most people want to work 
well. They believe that the satisfaction of doing their job well is a powerful 
incentive. The theory Y manager will try to remove obstacles that prevent em-
ployees from fully realising themselves.  
The successor to McGregor’s XY theory was ‘Theory Z’ introduced by 
William Ouchi, whose main idea was to suggest to American companies the 
features of Japanese management they would benefit from (Ouchi 1981). In his 
opinion, the success of the Japanese management model is based not on the 
active implementation of modern innovative technology, but on a special 
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attitude towards the employee: team spirit and a corporate culture, lifelong em-
ployment and joint decision-making play a crucial role. The relationship 
between managers and employees is based on trust, and employees participate 
in the decision-making process with management (Friedrich, Ukrainski, Timp-
mann 2014). 
In public management, there is a concept of public value (Moore 1995; Skid-
more 2006). Public management should be oriented towards reaching multiple 
public objectives; each activity of management should create public value. This 
concept is similar to management by objective; however, the set of objectives 
focuses on a wider range of values expressed not only in a monetary way. 
Some management concepts are applicable to private firms, some are suitab-
le for public management only; however, the majority of management concepts 
can be practiced both in the public and private sector. For example, manage-
ment by networking (Van de Walle, Groeneveld 2011). This concept describes 
how management of an economic unit can benefit from participating in net-
works and collaborating with other public or private actors (Klijn, Koppenjan, 
Termeer 1995). Different actors have different objectives; therefore, fulling the 
aims of actors cannot be a leading idea for this type of management. 
There are many more management concepts not described in the thesis; they 
are different by their leading ideas and relations between components (see 
Friedrich, Ukrainski, Timpmann 2014: 115). However, the reason the discus-
sion of some of them is important in the framework of this thesis is that mana-
gement concepts define relations between levels of management and their 
responsibilities, which should be set out by the FOCJ of type II Statute in order 
to avoid unfavourable management approaches. 
The second chapter first provides basic models of the establishment, current 
operation and competition for members of FOCJs of type II based on produc-
tion, consumer and utility theory. Basic models are further elaborated by in-
cluding an analysis of how grants and other financial means influence the initial 
optimal solution. In the following subchapter 2.2, more emphasis has been 
given to the model of current operation since the analysis of management re-
actions in monopoly and oligopoly is the focus here. Additionally, this sub-
chapter included a literature analysis of the different behaviours of management 
defined by their goals. Thus, four cases of FOCJ management behaviour are 
assumed, which are mathematically expressed by management’s utility func-
tions. The novelty of this thesis also concerns the part where management beha-
viour is analysed with mathematical tools. Subchapter 2.3 of this chapter pro-
vides a discussion on how management decisions can be shaped by restrictions 
on factor inputs, changes in production function, management utility function, 
demand function, the negotiation process between management and members. 
The second chapter has also prepared a basis for avoiding unfavourable mana-
gement decisions and developing institutional legal framework for FOCJ of 
type II management and members. The next chapter studies the possibility of 
applying FOCJs of type II to the empirical conditions in the provision of 
Russian school services. 
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3. APPLICATION OF FOCJs UNDER EMPIRICAL 
CONDITIONS IN RUSSIA 
3.1. Object of empirical research and methodology 
Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions perform in different spheres, 
such as water supply, solid waste collection, cultural and educational services, 
fire protection, etc. as was discovered in the first chapter of the thesis. In this 
thesis, the FOCJ concept has been applied to school services.  
In reality, school FOCJs of type II have mainly been found in Germany and 
Switzerland and are known as Schulzweckverband. Zweckverband is a special 
purpose association used as a legal form for municipal joint services provision 
in German-speaking countries. Practical essentialities of special purpose as-
sociations have been discovered via an interview with Bodensee Zweckverband 
management in subchapter 3.3. In Russia, such a special legal form for FOCJs 
of type II does not exist. Therefore, an appropriate one should be selected from 
existing legal forms with the help of document analysis. Additionally, it must be 
checked whether all Russian municipalities can freely and independently make 
decisions regarding cooperation in FOCJs of type II. These goals are fulfilled in 
subchapter 3.2. The opinion of Russian schools’ decision-makers regarding the 
applicability of FOCJs of type II is revealed in subchapter 3.3 via interviews. 
Subchapter 3.4 synthesises the empirical and theoretical results reflected by the 
exemplary school Statute and Memorandum. The current subchapter analyses 
school service provision and explains the methodology of analysis of the appli-
cability of FOCJs of type II to the provision of Russian school services.      
Explaining sector choice for the implementation of FOCJs of type II requires 
an understanding of the Russian educational system, its administration and 
financing principles, focusing mainly on primary, basic and secondary (comple-
te) general education. According to Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the 
Russian Federation”, the management of Russian education is based on the 
principles of legality and democracy, the autonomy of educational organisa-
tions, the information openness of the education system and consideration of 
public opinion and has a state social character.  
Management of the education system includes: interacting federal executive 
bodies, executive authorities of the regions of the Russian Federation and local 
self-government bodies that administer education; strategic planning for the 
development of the education system; adoption and implementation of the state 
programmes of the Russian Federation, federal and regional programmes aimed 
at the development of the education system; monitoring of the education sys-
tem; informational and methodological support of the activities of federal state 
bodies, executive authorities of the subjects of the Russian Federation, which 
are responsible for state administration in the field of education, and local 
government bodies, which are responsible for administration in the field of edu-
cation; state regulation of educational activities; independent assessment of the 
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quality of education, public and socio-professional accreditation; training and 
professional development of the employees of federal state bodies and state 
authorities of the subjects of the Russian Federation exercising public admi-
nistration in the sphere of education, local self-government bodies that carry out 
management in the sphere of education and heads and teachers of educational 
organisations (Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federation”, 
Article 89, § 1–2). 
The state regulation of educational activity is aimed at establishing unified 
requirements for the implementation of educational activities and procedures 
related to the establishment and verification of compliance with these require-
ments by educational organisations. The state regulation of educational activi-
ties includes (Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federation”, 
Article 90): 
− licensing of educational activities; 
− state accreditation of educational activities; and 
− state control (supervision) in the sphere of education.  
In Figure 57, the author visualises a structure of Russia’s education system. It 
comprises general education as the first stage of education, including pre-
school, primary, basic and secondary education. Educational programmes of 
pre-school, primary general, basic general and secondary general education are 
successive (Article 63, § 1). Secondary (complete) general education is compul-
sory in Russia (Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federation”, 
Article 66, § 5).  
The second stage is professional education consisting of vocational educa-
tion and higher professional education with the opportunity to obtain a Bac-
helor’s, Master’s and specialist degree. The next level of higher education in-
volves the preparation of highly qualified personnel. At this stage, scientific 
degrees of candidate and doctor of sciences are awarded. Additional education 
and professional training imply life-long learning. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the three stages of general education – pri-
mary, basic and secondary (complete) – are referred to as ‘school education’. 
Modelling inter-municipal cooperation with the help of FOCJs of type II is 
conducted on a school level. After completing basic general education, students 
either move on to the next stage of school education – secondary (complete) 
general education – or continue studies in a vocational professional institution.  
At the end of the ninth and eleventh years, state examinations take place, 
after which school students receive a ‘Certificate of basic general education’ 
and a ‘Certificate of secondary complete general education’, respectively. The 
final exam after the secondary stage of school is called the ‘Unified State 




Figure 57. Education system in Russia 
Source: Compiled by the author based on Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the 
Russian Federation”, Article 10. 
 
 
The school system in Russia involves public and private schools, gymnasiums 
and lyceums that can also be financed from municipal budgets and private 
sources. Gymnasiums and lyceums usually provide advanced education pro-
grammes and have a ‘focus’ or specialisation. Gymnasiums tend to focus on 
humanities and languages, and lyceums focus on natural sciences, e.g. physics 
and mathematics. Before Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian 
Federation” was issued, admission to gymnasiums and lyceums was compe-
titive. Currently, all schools, including gymnasiums and lyceums, should ensure 
admission to the educational organisation for citizens who are entitled to receive 
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general education of an appropriate level and who are residing in the territory to 
which this educational organisation belongs (Federal Act No. 273 “On Educa-
tion in the Russian Federation”, Article 67, § 3). However, parents may enrol 
their child in any school of their choice if there is a vacant place. Admission to 
the state or municipal educational organisation can be refused only on the 
grounds of the absence of free places. In the case of the absence of places in the 
state or municipal educational organisation, parents (legal representatives) ap-
proach the executive body of the region of the Russian Federation that exercises 
public administration in the field of education or a local government body that 
manages in the field of education (Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the 
Russian Federation”, Article 67, § 3–4).  
The majority of Russian schools provide general education at all three stages – 
primary, basic and secondary (complete). However, a number of schools pro-
vide only primary general education services until the fourth year or primary 
and basic school services until the ninth year. The majority of such schools are 
located in rural settlements, where the number of pupils is insufficient for pro-
viding school services at all stages.  
 
 
Administration of the school system in Russia 
According to the Constitution, Russia is a federal state and is currently divided 
into 85 subjects. They include oblasts, krays, republics, cities of federal signi-
ficance and other entities. Subjects of the Russian Federation comprise munici-
palities of different forms (see Figure 58). Local self-governance is carried out 
across the territory of the Russian Federation by (Federal Act No. 131 “On 
Local Self-Governance in the Russian Federation”, Article 10): 
− municipal areas (муниципальные районы); 
− municipal and urban districts (муниципальные и городские округа); 
− urban districts with intra-city division (городской округ с внутригород-
ским делением); 
− urban settlements (городские поселения); 
− rural settlements (сельские поселения); and 
− intra-city areas of federal cities (внутригородских территориях городов 
федерального значения).  
Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federation” 46 specifies the 
responsibilities of the federation, regions and municipalities regarding school 
education. 
 
                                                            
46  Administration of the school system in Russia is based on several main acts including the 
Constitution, Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federation”, regional acts, 
for example, Act of Voronezh Region No. 84 “On Regulation of Particular Relationships in 
Education in the Territory of the Voronezh Region”, etc. Different aspects, related to edu-




Figure 58. Federal structure and levels of municipalities in Russia 
Source: Compiled by the author based on Federal Act No. 131 “On the general 
principles of organisation of local self-governance in the Russian Federation”, Articles 
2, 10.   
 
 
At the Federal level, the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Fede-
ration is responsible for state policy elaboration and implementation for schools 
and the education system in general. The Ministry of Education also develops and 
approves Federal State Education Standards for all levels of education and 
provides the legal framework for the education system (Article 6, § 1).  
Regional educational authorities are represented by Departments or Offices 
of Education (depending on the region) (see Figure 59). Their responsibilities 
are also set out in Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federa-
tion” and include state control over educational organisations and education 
offices in municipalities as well as their licensing and accreditation; elaboration 
and implementation of regional educational programmes considering the cultu-
ral peculiarities of the territory; financial support of school programmes through 
subventions from regional budgets; monitoring of education systems at a 





























Figure 59. School administration and financing in the Russian Federation 
Source: Compiled by the author based on Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the 
Russian Federation”  
 
 
Municipal areas (муниципальные районы) and urban districts (городские 
округа) also have responsibilities regarding school service provision. Municipal 
authorities create appropriate study conditions for children in schools and have 
the right to establish, reorganise and liquidate municipal educational organisa-
tions and found municipal educational organisations. Municipal areas and urban 
districts are also responsible for constructing and maintaining school buildings 
and registering the children who reside in the territory in school (Federal Act 
No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federation”, Article 9). Transportation of 
school pupils between municipalities should also be organised by the municipal 
authorities responsible for schools (Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the 
Russian Federation”, Article 40, § 2). Travel time should not exceed 30 minutes 
one way according to paragraph 2.5 of “Requirements for the placement of 
general education organisations”. The other forms of municipalities, such as 
Federal level 
Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation 
Regional level (subjects of Russia: oblast, kray, republic) 
Department of Education in Regions 
Municipal level level (municipal areas and urban districts) 
Department of Education in Municipalities 
School level 
Sole executive body – school director; 
Collegiate bodies – general meeting, teachers’ council, governing 
board, etc. 
Federal grants for schools 
and special programmes 
Regional subventions and 
special grants 
Municipal expenses for 
school maintenance 
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rural and urban settlements, are not competent to make decisions concerning 
school service provision in Russian municipalities.  
Municipalities relate to regions via participation in different regional pro-
grammes and competition for regional grants. Regional education departments 
can only frame the overall strategy of education development. Relations be-
tween municipal and regional authorities are regulated, for example, by Pro-
vision No. 191 of 13 March 2013 “On the approval of the Regulation on the 
Department of Education, Science and Youth Policy of the Voronezh Region”. 
School rectors are subordinates to the heads of education departments of 
municipal areas and urban districts, not to regional authorities. 
Municipal authorities consider parents’ opinions in the provision of school 
policies, for example, opening and closing schools in a particular territory. The 
decision to reorganise or liquidate a municipal general education organisation 
located in a rural settlement should be made considering the opinions of the 
residents of said rural settlement (Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the 
Russian Federation”, Article 22, § 12).  
In the case of termination of the activities of an education organisation, the 
cancellation of its relevant license, the revocation of its state accreditation under 
the relevant educational programme or the expiry of the state accreditation 
period for the relevant educational programme, the founder (municipal autho-
rity) and (or) the authorised management body of the school should transfer 
pupils to other organisations engaged in educational activities in educational 
programmes at an appropriate level and focus (Federal Act No. 273 “On Edu-
cation in the Russian Federation”, Article 34, § 9). 
Schools have autonomy, which means independence in implementing edu-
cational, scientific, administrative, financial and economic activities and in 
developing and adopting local regulations in accordance with Federal Act No. 
273 “On Education in the Russian Federation”, other regulatory legal acts of the 
Russian Federation and the Statute of the educational organisation (Federal Act 
No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federation”, Article, 28).  
The structural subdivisions of the educational organisation, including 
branches and representative offices, are not legal entities and act on the basis of 
the Statute of the educational organisation and the regulations on the relevant 
structural subdivision approved in accordance with the procedure established by 
the Statute of the educational organisation (Federal Act No. 273 “On Education 
in the Russian Federation”, Article 27, § 4).  
Schools may also have various structural units that ensure the implemen-
tation of educational activities, taking into consideration the level, type and 
direction of educational programmes, the form of education (methodological 
and educational-methodical units, laboratories, design offices, training and edu-
cational production workshops, clinics, training facilities, training grounds, 
training and demonstration centres, educational theatres, exhibition halls, edu-
cational circus arenas, educational dance and opera studios, educational concert 
halls, etc.) (Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federation”, 
Article 27, § 1, 2).  
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Management bodies of schools consist of the sole executive body in a 
school, such as a director, and collegiate bodies (Federal Act No. 273 “On Edu-
cation in the Russian Federation”, Article 26): 
− general council 
− teachers’ council 
− governing board 
− high school student body 
− parents’ committee. 
Collegiate bodies, if elected, should be set out in the school Statute.   
The head of a school is appointed by the founder (Federal Act No. 273 “On 
Education in the Russian Federation”, Article 51, § 1). Candidates for the posi-
tion of head of an educational organisation should have higher education and 
meet the qualification requirements specified in the qualification handbooks for 
the relevant positions of heads of educational organisations and (or) profes-
sional standards.  
Nowadays, management of schools additionally includes student councils 
and employee unions in order to consider the points of view of school pupils, 
parents (legal representatives) of juvenile pupils and teachers (Federal Act No. 
273 “On Education in the Russian Federation”, Article 26, § 6). Parents as well 
as teachers have the right to take part in the management of educational orga-
nisations in the form determined by the Statute of the organisation (Federal Act 
No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federation”, Article 44, § 3, subsection 
7; Article 47, § 3, subsection 9). Teachers are required to have professional 
vocational or higher education; they should meet the qualification requirements 
specified in the qualification guides and (or) professional standards (Federal Act 
No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federation”, Article 46, § 1).  
Some educational organisations (schools) implement the network form of 
educational programmes. This form provides an opportunity for students to 
learn an educational programme using the resources of several organisations 
that carry out educational activities, including foreign ones, and also, if ne-
cessary, using the resources of other organisations (Federal Act No. 273 “On 
Education in the Russian Federation”, Article 15, § 1). 
The opportunity to introduce school educational districts in Russia is set out 
in Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federation” as well. A 
school educational district is a union of educational organisations (schools) 
realising educational programmes and concluding a cooperation agreement with 
so-called ‘basic school’, which serves as a resource centre for all members of 
the school district (Пивоваров 2015).  
School education should comply with the Federal State Educational Standard 
(FSES), which is elaborated for each stage separately. Federal state educational 
standards and federal state requirements provide the following (Federal Act No. 
273 “On Education in the Russian Federation”, Article 11): 
1) Unity of the educational space of the Russian Federation. 
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2) Continuity of the main educational programmes of primary general, basic 
general, secondary (complete) general, vocational and higher education. 
3) Variability in the content of educational programmes of the corresponding 
level of education, the possibility to form educational programmes of diffe-
rent levels of complexity and orientation, considering the educational needs 
and abilities of students. 
4) State guarantees on the quality of education based on the unity of mandatory 
requirements to the conditions for the implementation of basic educational 
programmes and the results of their completion. 
The federal state educational standards include the following requirements 
(Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federation”, Article 11): 
1) The structure of the main educational programmes (including the ratio of the 
mandatory part of the basic educational programme and the part formed by 
the participants of the educational process) and their scope. 
2) The conditions for the implementation of basic educational programmes, 
including personnel, financial, material and technical and other conditions. 
3) The results of learning. 
Educational organisations develop educational programmes in accordance with 
the federal state educational standards (FSES), considering relevant exemplary 
basic educational programmes (Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Rus-
sian Federation”, Article 12, §§ 5, 7).  
  
  
Financing of school education in Russia 
This thesis focuses on the school level. The reason for this delineation is that 
different stages of Russian education are financed from different sources and 
budgets. It is important to consider the sources of school financing since FOCJ 
must be incorporated into the budget system of the Russian Federation. For 
example, higher education in Russia is financed from the federal budget. Re-
gional budgets cover expenses of vocational educational institutions (Federal 
Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federation”, Articles 6–9). Costs 
related to schools are split between different levels of administration. They are 
financed mainly from two sources: regional and municipal budgets.  
Municipalities receive regional subventions which are determined by the 
number of children and normative standards according to the law on the regio-
nal budget47 with respect to types of educational programme and stages of edu-
cation. Normative costs of state or municipal educational services provision are 
determined for each level of education in accordance with the Federal State 
Educational Standards for each type of educational programme (Federal Act 
No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federation”, Article 99, § 2). Regional 
subvention covers employee salaries and educational costs such as textbooks, 
                                                            
47  Regions of the Russian Federation elaborate acts “On budget”. For example, закон «О 
бюджете Воронежской области». 
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furniture, educational and laboratory equipment, etc. Expenditures on remune-
ration of pedagogical personnel of municipal general education organisations 
should not be lower than the level corresponding to the average salary in the 
respective region of the Russian Federation in which such general education 
organisations are located (Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian 
Federation”, Article 99, § 3). The maintenance of buildings and structures and 
utility expenses is financed from the municipal budget (Federal Act No. 273 
“On Education in the Russian Federation”, Article 8, § 3).  
The main principle for school financing is ‘money follows children’, meaning 
per capita finance. This principle attracts private schools in school service pro-
vision. Private schools as well as public schools in terms of education are 
financed according to the number of students. They can receive subventions 
from regional budgets if they have a licence and a state accredited educational 
programme. The only difference is that in private schools, parents may pay fees 
and cover maintenance costs by themselves. Private schools usually have a 
wider range of services (e.g. language or dance classes) and have the right to 
charge parents for these services.   
Subventions for schools come from the regional budget to every munici-
pality, and municipalities distribute them across schools. There are also coeffi-
cients, which are used to additionally finance schools in rural and urban areas, 
for schools with innovative platforms as well as for schools which implement 
the Federal State Educational Standards48 (FSES) and schools with high 
regional rankings based on the results of regional test scores.  
Some school resources can also be provided from the federal budget. For 
example, school buses are usually purchased through federal programmes. 
However, maintenance of buses is the responsibility of municipalities. Additio-
nally, schools, municipalities and regions may apply for special federal grants. 
Usually, financing is provided from separate federal projects or programmes, 
e.g. the Federal Grant Programme of Education Development in Russia 2016–
202049. An educational organisation has the right to acquire additional financial 
resources by providing commercial services and receiving voluntary contribu-
tions and/or target contributions.  
For small-sized schools50 and educational organisations located in rural areas 
and implementing basic general education programmes, normative costs for the 
provision of educational services should include the costs of educational acti-
                                                            
48  The Federal State Educational Standards are obligatory requirements to the educational 
programmes of primary (начальное), basic (основное) and secondary (среднее) general 
education, vocational education and higher education institutions, which have a state 
accreditation. 
49  Федеральная целевая программа развития образования на 2016-2020.  
50  Small-sized schools (малокомплектные школы) are educational organisations, which 
realise main educational programmes and located distantly from other educational organisa-
tions, have no transport access and/or small number of pupils (Federal Act No. 273 “On 
Education in the Russian Federation”, Article 99, § 4). 
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vities that do not depend on the number of pupils (Federal Act No. 273 “On 
Education in the Russian Federation”, Article 99, § 4).  
Figure 60 shows what the administration and financing of Russian schools 
will look like after introducing FOCJs of type II for the provision of school 
services (right-hand side) in comparison with the existing system (left-hand 
side). The author believes that these two approaches may co-exist and develop 
in parallel. With the introduction of school FOCJs of type II, municipal areas 
and urban districts, which previously provided school services separately, are 
going to provide them jointly. Therefore, regional subventions and special 
school grants from the regional level of school administration will be trans-
ferred to a school FOCJ first and later distributed between each particular 
school included in the FOCJ of type II. Similarly, federal school grants will be 
delivered to FOCJs of type II first and later distributed between schools (see 
Figure 60 right-hand side). Currently, expenses related to school maintenance 
are covered by municipalities via municipal Departments of Education (Figure 
60, left-hand side). After creating school FOCJs of type II, this task should be 
fulfilled by FOCJ management bodies (sole and collegiate) from the FOCJ of 
type II budget (Figure 60 left-hand side). 
School management will mainly be conducted by FOCJs of type II. Schools 
as well as municipalities may transfer their responsibilities regarding school 
administration to the FOCJ level. This reorganisation allows schools and muni-
cipalities to reduce administration costs since all school management functions 
will be transferred to one level (FOCJs of type II level). A school FOCJ of type 
II may include one or more schools under its administration. Schools may still 
have some personnel that tackle everyday issues. For example, school directors 
and maintenance administrators, as shown in Figure 60 on the right-hand side. 
However, general decision-making and management of schools is moved to 
FOCJs of type II as well as the responsibility to cover schools’ costs. FOCJs of 
type II form their own budget to cover costs via regional and federal sub-
ventions and grants, municipal regular fees and other sources that should be set 














Figure 60. Currently existing versus FOCJ of type II system of school administration 
and financing in the Russian Federation 
Source: Compiled by the author.  
   
 
The FOCJ of type II Statute and Memorandum are important in demonstrating 
the practical applicability of FOCJs of type II to the Russian circumstance. 
Figure 61 shows the methodology of the elaboration of empirical results. Four 
methods have been applied to develop empirical results. First, literature devoted 
to FOCJs has provided the FOCJ definition and the characteristic features which 
should be the basis for the Statute and Memorandum (Chapter 1).  
Second, results and conclusions from theoretical microeconomic modelling 
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and include optimal solutions for FOCJ member and management decision-
making (Chapter 2).  
Third, document analysis has been applied to develop the FOCJ of type II 
Statute and Memorandum based on the legal form of association (union) and 


















Figure 61. The methodology of the elaboration of empirical results 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
 
Fourth, interviews with Russian officials responsible for school administration 
at municipal and regional levels, school directors and parents as well as with the 
Bodensee water provision association in Germany have been conducted (sub-
chapter 3.3). These are necessary to gather information of practical importance 
for the FOCJ of type II Statute and Memorandum that cannot be received using 
other methods. 
For the interviews, the author developed questions stemming from the litera-
ture analysis, the results of microeconomic theoretical modelling and the pre-
liminary document analysis. The interview findings have amended the FOCJ of 
type II microeconomic models developed in Chapter 2.  
 
 
3.2. Analysis of legal forms and municipalities suitable for 
school FOCJs  
Literature devoted to inter-municipal cooperation in Russia mainly concludes 
that inter-municipal cooperation is underdeveloped (Бутова, Пухова, Щукин 
2013; Ладыгин 2011; Маркварт 2010; Gutnikova 2012; Даутов 2018; Гай-

















concerning inter-municipal cooperation hinder the development of inter-muni-
cipal cooperation in Russia (Петроградская 2011; Урманов 2013; Маркварт 
2010; Остапец 2017). Other factors impeding inter-municipal cooperation are 
the lack of (1) methodological support for IMC from the state as well as from 
the expert community; (2) government inclusion in the cooperation process; (3) 
stimulus for municipalities to improve the management of municipal budgets; 
and (4) qualification of municipal employees (Рагозина 2009; Рамазанов 
2019).   
A significant amount of literature describes the forms of IMC in Russia. 
Classification approaches are based on several criteria, one of which is the legal 
forms for executing inter-municipal cooperation. Non-public companies, limited 
liability companies, autonomous non-commercial organisations and funds are 
the legal forms of inter-municipal cooperation discussed in Russian literature 
(Урманов 2013, Арумова 2012, Миронова 2017).  
Some authors (Гриценко 2001; Власова, Джек 2009; Рагозина 2009; Koz-
lova, Makarova 2018: 136) distinguish between contractual (short-term and 
long-term contracts) and associative forms of inter-municipal cooperation. 
These forms are dominant. Others (Ирискина 2010; Бутова, Смирнова, Мило-
видова 2014) add to this classification economic forms of cooperation in Rus-
sian municipalities, including commercial and non-commercial organisations in 
the legal forms mentioned above. Representative bodies of municipalities estab-
lish these forms of cooperation in accordance with Federal Act No. 131 “On the 
general principles of organisation of local self-governance in the Russian Fede-
ration” and other federal acts of particular company forms, such as Federal Act 
No. 14 “On Limited Liability Companies”. Economic forms of IMC are not 
popular in Russia because of the following reasons: lack of collaborative tradi-
tions between municipalities (instead, there is a long tradition of a strong, cent-
ralised system of municipal management), lack of information about the forms 
of and legal opportunities for inter-municipal cooperation, lack of trust in civil 
law contracts as an effective means of public service provision, lack of financial 
resources and specially trained staff, etc. (Ирискина 2010; Маркварт 2010). 
Public-private partnership is considered a form of cooperation of municipali-
ties with private firms in Russia (Frolova et al. 2017). There can also be forms 
of inter-municipal cooperation without creating legal persons and delegating 
legal powers to them, such as consultation, working groups, joint arrangements, 
etc. (Негодуйко 2008; Рагозина 2009). These can be formal and informal. 
However, cooperation between Russian municipalities is mainly informal. 
Another stream of literature is devoted to historical aspects of IMC develop-
ment in Russia, including the stages before the Revolution, the Soviet period 
and the modern period (Москаленко 2016; Лякишева, Шлегель 2017; Ириски-
на 2010). Possible spheres of IMC are discussed in some papers, among these 
are common innovative projects, tourism, solid waste recycling, retraining for 
municipal employees (Бутова, Смирнова, Миловидова 2014; Pakhalov, Saks 
2020), water provision, household waste collection and communal services 
(Gutnikova 2012). 
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The advantages of inter-municipal cooperation in Russia and its stages of 
development are discussed in literature as well. The authors emphasise the posi-
tive consequences for Russian municipalities, such as cost reduction due to eco-
nomies of scale, access to a wider pool of resources and increase in service 
quality and, as a result, municipal budget economy (Gutnikova 2012; Ладыгин 
2011; Меркулов 2020). 
Тургель (2015) and Gutnikova (2012) have conducted a quantitative statis-
tical analysis of inter-municipal development at the federal and regional levels. 
They conclude that inter-municipal cooperation in Russia prevails in non-com-
mercial forms. These organisations primarily perform analytical, expert and 
consulting functions. Municipal areas and rural settlements are the most active 
municipalities in establishing commercial forms of inter-municipal cooperation.  
Some authors have investigated the role of inter-municipal cooperation in 
the development of regional agglomerations (Михайлова 2010; Бабун 2012; 
Победин 2013; Рождественская, Кабалинский 2016; Антонов 2020). Some-
times inter-municipal cooperation is called “an alternative to municipal amalga-
mation” under difficult demographic conditions (Маркварт 2010). 
Cases of cross-border cooperation show that Russia established municipal 
contacts primarily with the neighbouring countries of the Baltics region, Fin-
land, Norway and Poland (Tynkkynen 2008; Anishenko, Sergunin 2012; Fedo-
rov 2013; Zaitseva, Korneevets, Semenova 2016; Цветкова 2017) in tourism, 
migration policy, environment protection, etc.  
Councils of municipalities of Russian Federation subjects are established in 
the form of associations. Nowadays, inter-municipal cooperation in Russia 
exists mainly in the form of unions and associations of municipal formations, 
sometimes based on the size of municipalities or territorial characteristics, such 
as the Association of Siberian and Far Eastern Cities of Russia, the Union of the 
Russian Science Cities’ Development and the Association of Small and 
Medium-sized Cities of Russia (Kozlova, Makarova 2018: 136). These organi-
sations are voluntary and aimed at developing local self-government and inter-
municipal cooperation. They also organise informational support for members, 
interactions with regional and federal authorities, exchange of experience and 
common preparation of projects.  
The literature on inter-municipal cooperation shows that there is a lack of 
inter-municipal cooperation initiatives in Russia. Specifically, there are no 
examples of inter-municipal cooperation in the Russian education sector. 
Although a few authors (Ирискина 2010; Бутова, Смирнова, Миловидова 
2014) have investigated the long-term economic cooperation of municipalities, 
these investigations are largely descriptive and lack a theoretical microeco-
nomic basis for developing this form of cooperation in Russia. 
Figure 62 summarises the possible Russian forms of inter-municipal co-





Figure 62.  Legal opportunities for inter-municipal cooperation in Russia according to 
the literature and document analysis 
Source: Compiled by the author based on Federal Act No. 131 “On the general 
principles of organisation of local self-governance in the Russian Federation”, Articles 
8, 68.  
 
 
In order to decide which legal company form is the most appropriate for 
creating school FOCJs of type II in Russia, the author has not only analysed 
literature on IMC, but also conducted a detailed investigation matching FOCJs’ 
main features with legal company forms according to the Russian Civil Code. 
It is important to note here that the Russian legislation system does not have 
a division between public and private law. The term ‘public forms of property’ 
is not used. Instead, there are two terms – state and municipal forms of property, 
which are set out in the Constitution of the Russian Federation (Винницкий 
2013). Traditionally, FOCJs of type II operate, for example, in Germany in the 
form of special purpose public associations, Zweckverband. In Russia, all legal 
company forms (state, municipal or private) operate under the Civil Code, 
















































FOCJs of type II in the legal form under public law due to the lack thereof in 
the Russian legal system.  
Furthermore, Russian state and municipal authorities enter into property 
relations equally with natural and legal persons (Винницкий 2010). This can be 
explained historically due to the long-standing existence of the state socialistic 
form of property. After the fall of the command system, state authorities have 
equal rights with natural and legal persons in relations with property (Винниц-
кий 2010). Now, due to the increasing role of public enterprises, a special 
public law regime should be introduced in Russia. This law should regulate the 
activities of state executive bodies, executive bodies of local self-government 
and public enterprises (Винницкий 2010). The position of public enterprises 
should be highlighted in this public law, including FOCJs of type II which do 
not yet exist. 
Nowadays, the Civil Code is the main legal source that regulates the eco-
nomic relations of legal entities, including local self-government bodies, and 
persons. However, there is no special legal form for establishing FOCJs of type 
I with citizens as members in Russia. An FOCJ of type I is a special form of 
direct self-governance, which means municipalities without territories. There 
are forms of direct democracy in Russia, too, such as citizens’ meetings (сход 
граждан), public hearings (публичные слушания). However, these are not 
suitable for inter-municipal cooperation because they can be applied only within 
one community with a restricted number of citizens (usually no more than 100 
people) (Federal Act No. 131 “On the general principles of organisation of local 
self-governance in the Russian Federation”, Article 25). Additionally, sub-
chapter 1.2 has concluded that FOCJs of type I are only indirectly related to 
inter-municipal cooperation and FOCJs of type II with municipalities as 
members match the IMC definition.   
According to Federal Act No. 131 “On the general principles of organisation 
of local self-governance in the Russian Federation”, Article 68, municipalities 
can establish inter-municipal companies in two commercial legal forms – non-
public joint stock companies51 and limited liability companies. Inter-munici-
pal organisations can also be established in non-commercial forms of autono-
mous non-commercial organisations and funds (Article 69). Additionally, 
municipalities may form associations for their joint activities on a voluntary 
basis (Article 8, § 3).  
The key features of these and other commercial and non-commercial legal 
forms, such as partnerships, productive cooperatives, unitary enterprises, consu-
mer cooperatives, public organisations, associations and units, funds, establish-
ments and autonomous non-commercial organisations according to the Russian 
Civil Code, have been compared with FOCJ characteristics in Table 14. Legal 
forms of companies in Russia should match the key features of FOCJs. The list 
                                                            
51  After the amendments to the Russian Civil Code, closed joint-stock companies were 
named non-public joint stock companies. 
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of FOCJ features has been elaborated by the author on the basis of FOCJ-related 
literature and comprises the following: 
− functions (sectors) where a legal form could be used  
− opportunities to overlap with other companies of the same legal form  
− members (founders) within the legal form 
− competition for members 
− existence of membership 
− establishment of decision-making bodies and their functions 
− existence of published Statute 
− democratic procedures, set out in the Statute 
− the right to fix fees 
− admission of members and their exit 
− members’ influence the Association Council 
− connection of membership to service consumption   
In Table 14, FOCJ features are included in columns. The rows of Table 14 con-
tain the legal forms of companies according to Russian legislation. This table 
has been made by the author in order to find legal forms suitable for creating 
FOCJs of type II in Russia. In the description of legal forms, the author looks 
for those features that are important for FOCJs, especially of type II. The ana-
lysis has shown that the main difficulty is finding legal company forms that 
match all FOCJ features simultaneously.  
The analysis starts with a sole proprietor who is a natural person carrying 
out an entrepreneurial activity without establishing a legal entity. This form is 
not suitable for the FOCJs of type II since membership of more than one is only 
feasible for inter-municipal cooperation.  
In the non-public joint stock company shares cannot be publicly purchased. 
Therefore, this condition restricts membership for FOCJs of type II because 
members (municipalities) cannot freely quit one FOCJ and become a member of 
another one. As a result, there can be several non-public joint stock companies 
in one municipality and they can compete with one another for clients but not 
freely for members. In addition, members do not necessarily consume a joint 
stock company’s services. Questions concerning service prices and member 
fees are not specified by the law, but prices for services can be set out in the 
company’s establishment document (a Statute).   
A limited liability company (LLC) may perform all legal forms of activi-
ties, except those which require licensing. It is a very crucial condition for 
school FOCJs of type II since educational activity should be licensed. Partici-
pants may quit and join an LLC, freely buying its shares or selling shares either 
to other members or to other natural or legal persons. The main body of a 
limited liability company is a general meeting of shareholders. The LLC’s 
founding document is the company’s Statute, where the procedure and con-
sequences of members’ termination of activity is described. Particular Statutes 
may also contain other legal conditions. Unlike a joint stock company, a limited 
liability company is not required to have a Board of Directors in Russia. There-
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fore, members may govern the company themselves and at the same time pro-
duce services for internal consumption as well as for external users. Competi-
tion in LLCs is restricted by the number of participants, which may not exceed 
50. It is stated in the law who may fix fees, but an LLC Statute may include 
details that are not discussed in the law, such as the right to fix member fees and 
contributions.    
A public joint stock company compared with non-public may compete for 
members because shares can be publicly sold (public subscription). Still, com-
petition for members is rather difficult since personal participation is not as im-
portant for this legal form as it is, for example, for a partnership or a coopera-
tive, as discussed below. However, management functions are concentrated in 
the hands of the Board of Directors. 
In Russia, partnerships may be established in the form of a general partner-
ship (GP) and a limited (commandite) partnership (LP) (see Figure 63). A li-
mited (commandite) partnership is a partnership in which, along with the 
members carrying on business activities on behalf of the partnership and liable 
for the partnership’s obligations with their property (general partners), there are 
one or more members – investors (limited partners) – who bear the risk of 
losses related to the partnership’s activities to the extent of their contributions 
and do not take part in the partnership’s business activities. The number of com-
manditaires (limited partners) is restricted (see Civil Code of the Russian 
Federation, Article 82). Limited partners can be natural persons, legal persons 
and governmental units (for example, municipalities) (see Civil Code of the 
Russian Federation, Article 66). Members-investors can participate financially 
within their share, but their participation rights are limited; therefore, they do 
not take part in decision-making processes. Decisions in limited partnerships 
may be made by a majority of votes. The condition for how decisions are made 
must be set out in its Foundation Agreement (учредительный договор). Mem-
bers most likely make decisions on the prices of the services provided (though 
information about how this is done is not specified in the law), and members 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Natural persons as well as individual entrepreneurs and commercial companies 
can be members of the general partnership (GP). GP operates on the basis of 
the Foundation Agreement, which includes information about the size of the 
capital, the amount and procedure of changes in the shares of participants, etc. 
All members of the general partnership take part in its management, and deci-
sions are made by a majority vote of members. Members must participate in its 
activity but can terminate membership in the partnership at any time. 
A production cooperative may be suitable for establishing either an FOCJ 
of type I or type IV with natural persons and natural and legal persons as mem-
bers (see Table 14). Production cooperatives can be established for providing 
multiple services. Provision of public services is also permitted. Membership is 
based on personal participation. There may also be some members whose mem-
bership is not based on their labour input. Decisions are made by the general 
meeting of members and all legal procedures are set out in its foundation 
document also known as its Statute (Federal Act No. 41 “On Production Co-
operatives”). A Statute must be approved by the general Assembly of Members. 
The executive bodies of a production cooperative are the Chairman and the 
Board of Directors of the cooperative; these positions are set out in its Statute. 
Only members of the production cooperative can be members of the Board of 
Directors and the Chairman. Members are free to leave the production coopera-
tive and transfer their shares to other members.   
State and municipal enterprises operate in the form of unitary enterprises, 
which do not have property rights. The Russian Federation, its subjects and its 
municipalities are the owners of unitary enterprise property. Unitary enterprises 
in Russia cannot be established on the basis of a combination of property that 
belongs to the Russian Federation, subjects of the Russian Federation, or muni-
cipalities (Federal Act No. 161 “On the State and Municipal Unitary Enter-
prises”). The specific characteristics of unitary enterprises assume the existence 
of a sole owner of the indivisible property. Since multiple membership is a very 
important criterion for an FOCJ, the legal form of unitary enterprises is not 
suitable for the establishment of an FOCJ of type II. 
A consumer cooperative is a non-commercial organisation. It is based on a 
membership, where members can be natural persons or natural persons and 
legal persons. This means that only FOCJs of type I and type IV can be estab-
lished in the form of a consumer cooperative. Consumer cooperatives are aimed 
at satisfying participants’ (members’) material and other needs by combining 
members’ property share contributions. Therefore, they may perform different 
functions. The Statute of the consumer cooperative must contain the size of 
share contributions made by the members as well as the structure and the order 
of making the share contributions. In addition, it includes the responsibility they 
bear for violating share contributions. The composition of management bodies 
and the order of their decision-making, including the issues with respect to 
which decisions are adopted unanimously or by a qualified majority of votes, 
should be set out by its Statute. The procedure for covering the losses of the 
cooperative should be agreed among its members.  
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Public organisations are voluntary organisations of natural persons aimed at 
satisfying their non-material needs, representing and protecting common inte-
rests. FOCJs of type II cannot be established in the form of a public organi-
sation since only natural persons can be members. The Statute of a public orga-
nisation should include information about its name and location, the objective 
and purpose of its activities, the terms for entering and quitting, the competence 
of its bodies and the procedures for making decisions, participants’ (members’) 
property rights and obligations and the procedures for distributing any property 
remaining after liquidation of the organisation. Members of public organisations 
may use its services and are obligated to pay the membership fees and make 
other material contributions set out in its Statute. The general meeting of mem-
bers makes decisions about membership fees. Members also have the right to 
leave public organisations at any time.  
In associations (unions), legal persons and (or) natural persons as well as 
municipalities can be members (e.g. the Association of Siberian and Far Eastern 
Cities of Russia, the Union of the Russian Science Cities’ Development and the 
Association of Small and Medium-sized Cities of Russia). Other characteristics 
of associations are very similar to the one discussed above in relation to public 
organisations. Membership is generally voluntary but in some cases may be 
mandatory. An association (union) is established to represent and protect pro-
fessional interests, achieve social goals, meet spiritual needs or achieve other 
non-commercial aims. FOCJs of types I, II, III and IV can be established as 
associations (unions).  
Associations (unions) include non-commercial partnerships, self-regulatory 
organisations, employers’ associations, associations of trade unions, associa-
tions of cooperatives, associations of public organisations and chambers of 
commerce (CC of the RF, Article 50, section 3). These forms of associations are 
not independent legal forms but are varieties within the legal form of associa-
tions (unions). Non-commercial partnerships are applicable for FOCJ types I, II, 
III and IV, while self-regulated organisations are suitable for FOCJs of types I, 
III and IV since they are established to fulfil only professional activities.  
Funds as well as autonomous non-commercial organisations (ANOs) do 
not have membership, which means that these legal forms cannot be used for 
the establishment of FOCJs of type II since membership is a crucial feature of 
FOCJs of type II. Although founders of ANOs can be Russian municipalities, it 
is rather difficult to organise FOCJs in this form as no membership and demo-
cratic procedures are involved. However, if an FOCJ’s Statute allows only 
founders, not members, then it is possible to use this legal form for FOCJs with 
amendments.  
Establishments (учреждения) are usually created for providing managerial, 
cultural or other non-commercial functions. They can be state, municipal or 
private. State and municipal establishments are divided into state-owned (казен-
ный), budgetary and autonomous establishments. Hence, the founder can be a 
natural person, a legal person or the Russian Federation, a subject of the Rus-
sian Federation or a Russian municipality. Autonomous establishments would 
179 
be a good form to create FOCJs of type II if more than one founder were 
allowed. However, establishments cannot have co-founders (Civil Code of the 
Russian Federation, Article 123.21). 
A public law company (публично-правовая компания) is a unitary non-
commercial organisation established by the Russian Federation that operates in 
the interests of the State and society52. Similar to a public law company, state 
corporations and state companies are established by the Russian Federation 
on the basis of a property contribution to perform social, managerial or other so-
cially useful functions. State corporations and companies do not have member-
ship (Federal Act No. 7 “On Non-commercial Organisations”, Article 7.1, 7.2). 
In general, unitary organisations are not suitable for inter-municipal cooperation 
in the form of FOCJs of type II since unitary enterprises do not have member-
ship and property is indivisible, which means that it cannot be distributed 
between members after liquidation.  
Currently, schools in Russia are functioning in one of three legal forms of 
establishment: 
− municipal budgetary general education establishments (муниципальные 
бюджетные общеобразовательные учреждения) 
− municipal state general educational establishments (муниципальные казен-
ные общеобразовательные учреждения) 
− private general education organisations (частные общеобразовательные 
учреждения) 
Educational organisations can only be established in one of the non-commercial 
forms in Russia (Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Fede-
ration”, Article 22). Therefore, in Table 15, only the company forms marked in 
bold are applicable for establishing FOCJs cooperation for the provision of 
Russian school services. However, for FOCJs of type II, there is only one legal 
non-commercial form which is appropriate – an association (union). 
All considered legal forms are grouped in Table 15 according to FOCJ type. 
Black marks those legal company forms that are suitable for school FOCJs of 
type I, II, III and IV, respectively: 
 
  
                                                            
52  According to the Federal Act No. 236 “On public law companies in the Russian Federa-
tion and on amendments to certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation”. 
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Table 15. Legal forms according to FOCJ types 
FOCJ type I FOCJ type II FOCJ type III FOCJ type IV 
Public joint stock 
company 






































  Associations 
(unions) 
Source: Compiled by the author based on Civil Code of the Russian Federation and 
Federal Act No. 7 “On Non-commercial Organisations”. 
 
 
Additionally, as discovered in subchapter 3.1, local self-government is carried 
out in the entire territory of the Russian Federation in the forms of urban settle-
ments, rural settlements, municipal areas, municipal and urban districts and 
intra-city territories of federal cities (Federal Act No. 131 “On the general prin-
ciples of organisation of local self-governance in the Russian Federation”, 
Article 10, Articles 15, § 11, Article 16, § 13). However, only upper-level muni-
cipalities (see Figure 58 in subchapter 3.1): municipal areas, municipal and 
urban districts and urban districts with intra-city division may organise the pro-
vision of school services in municipalities. They have the authority to establish, 
reorganise and liquidate school educational organisations and are responsible 
for the maintenance of buildings and structures of municipal educational insti-
tutions and the arrangement of adjacent territories (Federal Act No. 273 “On 
Education in the Russian Federation”, Article 9). The other types of municipa-
lities such as rural and urban settlements do not make decisions concerning the 
provision of school services in Russia.  
 
 
3.3. Empirical insights for school FOCJs via interviews 
There are two streamlines of interviews conducted for the purposes of this 
thesis, one of which investigates the special conditions related to schools in 
Russia. Such as how schools are financed, how they are managed at the muni-
cipal and regional level, in which juridical forms schools operate and so on. 
These interviews took place in one of the Russian regions.  
The second category of interviews was undertaken in Baden-Württemberg in 
Germany, where an interview was conducted with the Deputy Financial 
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Director of Bodensee water provision association. The aim of this interview was 
to gain information about how an FOCJ of type II operates in practice, what is 
important to consider in its Statute, what the legal basis is for its procurement, 
etc. The latter interview might be limited with respect to the focus of the thesis 
because the author could not have asked questions related to schools. School 
and water provision services are quite different in terms of technical supply, re-
quired knowledge of staff, etc. However, those questions related to FOCJ 
management are very suitable to ask from the interviewee in Stuttgart, espe-
cially considering the more than half a century experience of Bodensee Wasser-
versorgung.     
 
 
Interviews with experts in the provision of  
Russian school services 
The author of the thesis pursued multi-faceted aims in conducting interviews in 
Russia. The first aim was to identify the features of FOCJs of type II as a tool 
for inter-municipal cooperation in the institutional environment of the provision 
of Russian school services. Second, since the interviewees are considered ex-
perts, they became a source of relevant information on the legal possibilities for 
inter-municipal cooperation in the provision of school services, the involvement 
of municipalities and regions in decision-making regarding cooperation, the 
political and economic limitations of FOCJs of type II, the service-specific con-
ditions in Russia, the budget opportunities of the municipalities and regions for 
establishing such cooperation, etc. The relations between municipalities of dif-
ferent levels and municipalities and region with respect to school services, using 
one region as an example, are investigated as well. Another aim was to verify 
the microeconomic models represented in Chapter 2 and adjust them with res-
pect to the conditions of the country and the sector.  
For these purposes, the Voronezh region of the Russian Federation was 
selected to conduct interviews and gain necessary information. This region has 
sociodemographic problems that exist throughout Russia. In the Voronezh 
region during the decade from 2005–2015, 245 schools were closed (reduction 
in the number of schools from 1075 to 830), and 327 of the 830 schools (i.e. 
one-third of them) are small-sized schools (see Figure 66). This reflects the 
demographic problems of the decreasing population, with the number of pupils 
enrolled in schools declining by an average of 37.3% in the Voronezh region 
from 2000 to 2010 (compared with 33.6% in Russia as a whole); this number 
only started increasing in 2014 in the Voronezh region. However, considering 
that the birth rate in the region grew insignificantly and even dropped in 2016 
(see Figure 65), which corresponds to the country’s trend in birth rate (see 
Figure 3 in Introduction), the school enrolment rate will not change much in the 
Voronezh region and in Russia as a whole. At the same time, education and 
school education expenditures are increasing in current, but not fixed, prices 
(see Figure 64). 
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Figure 64. Education expenditures of the Voronezh region in 2010–2019, million 
roubles 




Figure 65. Birth rate (per 1000 population) in the Voronezh region, 1990–2019  
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According to the Act of the Voronezh region “On administrative and territorial 
organisation of the Voronezh region”53, the Voronezh region includes the follo-
wing municipal units: 
− three urban districts (Borisoglebskyi, Voronezh, Novovoronezh) 
− 31 municipal areas, including 28 urban settlements and 418 rural settlements 
Among these 34 municipalities, Khokholsky and Liskinsky municipal areas 
have been selected for the interviews because they have decreasing populations 
and can be described as rural (Russian State Statistics Service, official web-
pages of Khokholsky and Liskinsky municipal areas). Interviews were con-
ducted with authorities in local areas where schools are small and the process of 
school reorganisation and school network optimisation has recently taken place. 
Moreover, the institutional structure of municipal-regional subordination is uni-
fied in Russia and regulated by Federal Act No. 131 “On the general principles 
of organisation of local self-governance in the Russian Federation” and with 
respect to school services administration by Federal Act No. 273 “On Education 
in the Russian Federation”. 
Interviews were conducted within a two-month period from October to 
November 2017. Interviewees from Khokholsky and Liskinsky municipal areas 
were asked the same questions. Each interview group has their list of questions; 
                                                            
53 Закон Воронежской области от 27.10.2006 № 87-ОЗ (ред. от 06.07.2017) «Об 
административно-территориальном устройстве Воронежской области». 
 
Figure 66. Overall number of school education organisations (primary, basic, secondary) 
and number of enrolled pupils (thou. people) in the Voronezh region (beginning of 
academic year) 
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however, the questions overlap between groups (see Annex 2). Most inter-
viewees asked to see the questions prior to their interview; therefore, all inter-
viewee participants were provided with the question lists in advance. Addi-
tionally, the official webpages of schools and education departments in the 
municipalities and region were studied before the interviews took place so that 
the author could collect preliminary information and gain an understanding re-
garding subordination and the tasks of particular people in educational 
departments. 
The data were collected based on face-to-face, semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews with follow-up questions (Adams 2015; Galletta 2013; Fontana, Frey 
2000; Oltmann 2016). The interviews took place in the offices of school 
directors and heads of regional and municipal department of education and with 
parents at schools. 
Generally, the author has distinguished five main groups of interviewees 
because they are expected to be the main decision-makers in the Russian school 
system (see Annex 3): 
1) representatives of parents at schools 
2) school directors 
3) heads of rural and urban settlements (lower rank municipalities) 
4) heads of education department in municipal areas (higher rank municipality) 
5) regional authorities responsible for school education development, education 
financing and municipal relations 
The total number of interviewees is 18. The number of participants in each of 
the five groups (school directors; heads of education department in municipal 
areas (higher rank municipality); heads of rural and urban settlements (lower 
rank municipalities); representatives of parents’ bodies at schools; regional 
authorities responsible for school education development, education financing 
and municipal relations) averaged at three. The sample is considered sufficient 
since the interview aims do not require the compilation of a sample for statis-
tical analysis, but rather the use of these data for qualitative research.  
Permission to record audio was asked at the beginning of each interview. Of 
the 18 interviews, 11 were recorded and transcribed with the help of the oTran-
scribe online service by the author of the thesis. The other seven interviews 
were analysed using hand-written notes because the participants did not give 
permission to be recorded. Interviews lasted between 20 and 70 minutes. Each 
interview began with a self-introduction of the interviewer and an explanation 
of the research objectives (see Annex 2). At the end of the interviews, each 
respondent was thanked and asked about the opportunity to be contacted again 
if there was a need to clarify any questions. 
Among 18 interviewees, five were school directors in budgetary and state 
(kazennyi) establishment legal forms of schools, three were heads of rural 
settlements, two were Heads of Education Departments of the Khokholsky and 
Liskinsky municipal areas of the Voronezh region. Additionally, the author 
interviewed a consultant of the Department for Licensing, Supervision and 
Confirmation of Documents of the Department of Education of the Voronezh 
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region, a specialist of the pre-university education department of Voronezh 
State University, the chief specialist of the Voronezh Institute of Education 
Development, an advisor of the General Education Provision Office of the 
Department of Education, Science and Youth Policy of the Voronezh region, 
the Deputy Head of the Department of Education, Science and Youth Policy of 
the Voronezh region and the Head of the Office for Interaction with Munici-
palities of the Department for the Development of Municipalities of the Voro-
nezh region and two interviewees were members of a parents’ committee (see 
Annex 3).  
The possible limitations are that the responses of authorities might be biased 
since they may want to show that they fulfil their tasks according to law and 
place themselves in a more favourable light. However, the principle aim of the 
interviews was not to identify the respondents’ opinion regarding certain issues, 
but rather to understand how school service provision is legally and practically 
organised in Russia.  
Interview questions have been categorised as follows (see Annex 2):  
– general issues (see questions to school directors 1–7; questions to heads of 
municipal areas 1–11; questions to heads of rural settlements 1–9; questions 
to parents’ bodies in schools 1–9; questions to the Advisor of General 
Education Provision Office 1–4, 13, 18, 20–21, 26; questions to the Deputy 
Head of the Department of Education, Science and Youth Policy of the 
Voronezh Region 1, 10, 12–16, 18) 
– legal issues (see questions to school directors 8–9; questions to heads of 
municipal areas 22–23; questions to heads of rural settlements 10–12; ques-
tions to the Advisor of General Education Provision Office 5–6; questions to 
the Deputy Head of the Department of Education, Science and Youth Policy 
of the Voronezh Region 4) 
– financial issues (see questions to school directors 10–13; questions to heads 
of municipal areas 24–28; questions to heads of rural settlements 13–17; 
questions to the Advisor of General Education Provision Office 7–12; 
questions to the Deputy Head of the Department of Education, Science and 
Youth Policy of the Voronezh Region 2–3, 5–6, 11) 
– issues related to teachers (see questions to school directors 14–18; ques-
tions to heads of municipal areas 12–15) 
– issues related to school management (see questions to school directors 19–
25; questions to heads of municipal areas 16–21; questions to the Advisor of 
General Education Provision Office 14–17, 19, 22–25; questions to the De-
puty Head of the Department of Education, Science and Youth Policy of the 
Voronezh Region 7–9, 17) 
– issues related to inter-municipal cooperation (see questions to heads of 
municipal areas 29–30; questions to heads of rural settlements 18–20; ques-
tions to the Advisor of General Education Provision Office 27; questions to 
the Department of Municipal development of the Voronezh region 1–8) 
– concluding questions requiring FOCJ explanation (see questions to 
school directors 26–29; questions to heads of municipal areas 31–38; ques-
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tions to heads of rural settlements 21–28; questions to the Advisor of Gene-
ral Education Provision Office 28–34; questions to the Deputy Head of the 
Department of Education, Science and Youth Policy of the Voronezh Region 
19–26) 
For both streamlines of interviews in Russia and in Germany, interview ques-
tions are designed based on the main characteristics of FOCJs of type II ob-
tained from the literature analysis (Chapter 1) and the basic theoretical micro-
economic models developed in Chapter 2. Interview answers, in turn, have 
again affected the chapters of the thesis, such as Chapter 2 where amendments 
to the models have been included and subchapter 3.4 where the exemplary 
school FOCJ of type II Statute and Memorandum is developed (see Figure 67). 
Therefore, the methodology developed assists in contributing to the literature 




Figure 67. Design of the interview questions  
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
Interview answers have been translated from Russian into English and syste-
matised with respect to the groups of interviewees and categories of questions 
so that answers between groups can be compared (see Annex 4). In total, the 
author received the following answers: 
1. General issues include answers from 1–10. 
2. Questions related to school management and administration include answers 
from 11–21. 
3. Questions related to teachers include answers from 22–27. 
4. Questions related to parents include answers from 28–29. 
5. Legal aspects include answers from 30–31. 
6. Financial aspects include answers from 32–40. 
7. Questions related to cooperation include answers from 41–45. 
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Content analysis is implemented to analyse all of the interview answers (Hsieh, 
Shannon 2005; Mayring 2014). However, the author discusses only the most 
important interview topics with respect to FOCJs of type II. Table 16 shows the 
relevant features and characteristics of FOCJs included in the rows. They were 
received from the literature analysis in Chapter 1 and from the analysis of FOCJ 
management behaviour in Chapter 2. In the columns, the author has included 
three groups of interviews which provided deeper insights into the questions 
and can therefore be called the “main decision-makers in the provision of Rus-
sian school services”. In Table 16, ‘X’ means that the information related to a 
particular FOCJ of type II feature was discovered during interviews with one or 
several groups of interviewees.  
The text which follows Table 16 explains this Table in detail with reference 
to the interviewees’ answers as a direct citation from their speech (see Annex 
4). In fact, the author is looking for special characteristics of FOCJs of type II in 
the replies.  
 
 
Table 16. Relevant features and characteristics of FOCJs of type II discovered from the 
interviews 












Jurisdictions perform different 
functions (e.g. school services)  
X X X 
Several school FOCJs of type II 
overlap in the same municipal area 
X X X 
Competition between FOCJs of 
type II for members (munici-
palities) and clients (parents and 
children)  
X X X 
Public aims of school education  X X 
Membership of more than one 
(several municipalities should be 
members of one FOCJ of type II)  
 X  
Decision-making bodies and 
democratic procedures of FOCJs of 
type II 
X X  
Published Statutes X X  
Levy fees and contributions: users 
pay for services  
X   
Members and clients are free to 
enter and quit according to FOCJ 
Statutes 
X X  
Members have right to vote for 
FOCJ managers 
X X X 
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X X  
Municipalities may be asked to pay 
an equity capital (price) to enter 
FOCJs of type II 
X X X 
People with special well-grounded 
knowledge are needed  
X   
Provision of services, such as 
school services, to clients (parents) 
and members 
X X X 
Private forms of companies should 
be applicable 
X X X 
Exploitation of economies of scale X X X 
Maximization of management 
utility 
X   
Maximization of the utility of 
members 
 X  
Maximization of the utility of 
higher rank authorities 
  X 
FOCJs of type II possess budget 
and financial conditions 
X X X 
FOCJs of type II possess 
production conditions 
X X X 
FOCJs of type II possess demand 
function which can be monopolistic 
as well as oligopolistic 
X X  
Self-financing of FOCJs of type II X X X 
Special restrictions related to inputs 
and outputs (e.g. employment 
cones, regional mobility of staff and 
transportation requirements) 
X X X 
Relations between municipal, 
regional and federal authorities with 
respect to schools 
 X X 
Locations with respect to school 
levels (primary, basic, secondary) 
  X 
Demand risks and development, 
changes in factor prices, changes in 
techniques and quality of school 
subjects 
X X  




The focus of the thesis is the school services. This sphere is regulated in Russia 
by Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federation”. The specifi-
cities of these services have been discussed with all groups of interviewees.  
Functional jurisdictions overlap and compete with one another for clients 
and members. Similarly, schools in Russia compete for pupils and financing. 
The competitiveness of schools is confirmed through the interviews. All groups 
agree that there is competition between schools (see Annex 4, answer 8: “…we 
compete for a better position in school rankings with other schools in the Khok-
holsky municipal area…”).  
Membership of other members (i.e. individuals and legal persons) in 
school services relates to the fact that teaching services can be provided from 
outside the school by individuals with special education and that such services 
are not restricted by the internal pool of teaching capabilities of the school (see 
Annex 4, answer 26: “Since we don’t have it in our Statute, we cannot purchase 
educational services from outside…” – school director. “The teacher can work 
part-time in another general educational organisation. In this case, a civil law 
contract is needed…” – representative of the regional educational department). 
At the same time, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, an FOCJ of type II 
Statute should state that a third party may provide services to schools included 
in the FOCJ of type II and, secondly, a civil contract must be signed between 
the FOCJ of type II and a legal or physical person to provide such services. 
Membership of more than one municipality (several municipalities should 
be members of the FOCJ of type II). So far, schools belong to the municipality 
in which they are established (see Annex 4, answer 31: “Since schools are 
currently in the legal form of state and municipal establishments, only one 
municipality can be a founder (Article 123.21 CC)” – representative from the 
educational Department in the region).   
FOCJs are usually created to achieve a better quality of education by means 
of employing higher qualified personnel and implementing new educational 
programmes and techniques. These all are related to the aims for which the 
school FOCJ of type II is created and the purposes FOCJ management is going 
to reach. The interviewees have provided the author with an explanation which 
purposes Russian schools pursue (see Annex 4, answer 3: “The main task of the 
educational management body is organising in all educational institutions a 
high-quality level of free publicly available education. The quality of education 
is a priority.” – head of educational department in a municipal area).  
FOCJs of type II can levy fees if its Statute allows this. Today, education in 
Russian municipal and state schools is free of charge for parents, all expenses 
related to teaching are covered from the budgets of the regions and maintenance 
expenses by municipalities (see Annex 4, answer 34: “Municipal schools do not 
charge parents, only payments for meals and personal initiatives of parents and 
voluntary donations, sponsorship…” – school director). Therefore, the financial 
burden after the implementation of an FOCJ of type II will stay with regions 
and municipalities as members. Fees can be charged from parents only if it is a 
school of a private legal form of establishment. 
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One of the most important FOCJ features is that FOCJ of type II members 
(municipalities) and clients (parents with their children) are free to enter and 
leave school functional jurisdictions (see Annex 4, answer 8: “…the choice of 
school is the right of parents. A child is enrolled in the place of residence. If 
there are vacant places, a child can study in another school…” – head of 
educational department in a municipal area).  
School FOCJs of type II may exist in the monopolistic or oligopolistic 
market. This feature relates to who is allowed to consume services from the 
FOCJ. As it has been learnt from the interviews, children from other munici-
palities can also consume school services from the municipality in which the 
school is located (see Annex 4, answer 8: “…and we have some children from 
neighbouring settlements…” – school director).  
Usually FOCJ of type II members have some voting rights, such as voting 
for managers. Currently in Russian schools, managers – directors – are usually 
appointed by the school founder (municipality). This is confirmed by all inter-
viewee groups (see Annex 4, answer 17: “The director is appointed by the 
founder, municipality. There are particular requirements to the education, work 
experience, etc. Usually a new director is chosen from the staff members”).  
Decision-making bodies for schools are educational departments in munici-
palities, a sole executive body (director) and collegiate bodies in schools (see 
Annex 4, answer 18: “The governing council is the most important body, it is 
the collegial body, combining parents, teachers, children, representatives from 
the village community and from the founder” – school director). Parents must 
be influential since “they are a part of a Governing Council at school and ap-
prove many decisions…” (school director) (see Annex 4, answer 20).  
School directors perceive the role of parents as very important, which is the 
opposite to the heads of education departments in municipalities (see Annex 4, 
answer 20: “The role of parents is additional, supporting...” – heads of edu-
cational departments), but they all agree that “parents do not influence the elec-
tion of the school director, since there are special requirements for the director 
position.” However, “parents influence through the Governing council; 
together with them, we approve the programme of school development, but not 
the educational programme” – director of kazennyi general education school. 
Educational organisations function based on a Statute. The Statute of the 
educational organisation should contain the following information (Federal Act 
No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federation”, Article 25): 
1)  the type of educational organisation 
2)  the founder or founders of the educational organisation 
3) types of educational programmes implemented, indicating the level of 
education and (or) orientation 
4)  the structure and competence of the management bodies of the educational 
organisation, the procedure for their formation and terms of office 
Municipalities as founders and members may be asked to pay an equity capital 
to enter an FOCJ of type II (see Annex 4, answer 15: “The founder of schools 
(municipality) is a property owner. Schools acquire the right of operative 
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management of schools’ property” (CC Article 123.21). The most appropriate 
legal form of an association as an FOCJ of type II implies that members are 
obliged to participate in property formation (CC Article 123.11). 
People with special well-grounded knowledge are needed for school FOCJs 
of type II. Nowadays, the requirements for teachers’ qualifications are imposed 
by Order of Ministry of Healthcare and Social Development of the Russian 
Federation No. 761н “On the approval of a unified job evaluation manual for 
managers, experts and clerks”, Section “Qualification characteristics of emplo-
yees in education”, subsection 2 “Positions of teaching employees” (see Annex 
4, answer 22: “Higher or professional vocational education in education or 
pedagogy or in the sphere of a teaching subject without requirements for work 
experience or higher or professional vocational education and additional pro-
fessional education with respect to the specialisation of the educational orga-
nisation without requirements for work experience”). 
For the school FOCJ of type II, private legal forms of companies must be 
applicable. Establishing schools also restricts private legal forms to non-com-
mercial ones (see Annex 4, answer 31: “Any non-commercial form can provide 
educational services, but it must meet the licensing requirements of the Federal 
Service for Supervision of Education and obtain accreditation; only in this case 
can educational activities be conducted” – head of education department in 
municipal area). At the same time, the head of the regional educational depart-
ment in the Voronezh region noted “…the organisational and legal form of 
schools in the Voronezh region: municipal budgetary general education es-
tablishment, municipal state (kazennyi) general educational establishment and 
private general education organisations” (see Annex 4, answer 31), which also 
coincides with how school directors answered this question.  
Participation of several municipalities in an FOCJ of type II allows econo-
mies of scale. This effect is aimed to be realised in Russia through school 
districts created in municipalities (see Annex 4, answer 10: “It was organised 
because not every school in the rural area has the necessary equipment to pro-
vide high quality services… accessibility of education for each student with 
rational use of material, technical, human and financial resources of educa-
tional institutions…”).  
To solve the issues of small-sized schools, the network form of implemen-
ting educational programmes provides an opportunity for pupils to study 
educational programmes using the resources of several educational organisa-
tions (see Annex 4, answer 13: “If a school is small, but the conditions for 
equipment and infrastructure should be created the same as in all large schools, 
a networking system with large basic schools is organised. For this purpose, 
there are school buses (transportation of children for laboratory work in 
physics and chemistry, the work of scientific societies for gifted children, joint 
seminars and pedagogical councils are organised” – head of educational 
department in municipality).  
Concerning the utility of regional authorities, the interview reveals that 
they would prefer the idea of more centralisation instead of a further decent-
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ralised school system (see Annex 4, answer 45: “We already have distant forms 
of learning realised through networking for those schools that do not have 
enough equipment or qualified teachers or teachers for specific subjects. And to 
my mind, there is no sense incorporating a new level of public administration” – 
representative from the regional educational department). However, for school 
management and the heads of educational departments in municipalities the 
idea of inter-municipal cooperation in school service provision has found 
support (see Annex 4, answer 45: “Yes, it could be a solution for small-sized 
schools…” – school director. “It would be an interesting result of cooperation if 
one municipality is offered the resources it does not have…” – head of edu-
cational department in the municipal area). 
Schools in Russia, similar to FOCJs of type II have their own budgets. 
School directors being the main managers administer the budget (see Annex 4, 
answer 36: “The director develops the school budget. I include expenses that 
must be covered. I consider the previous year’s expenses, the number of 
children and what I plan to do next year or repair next year…” – school 
director. “The school manages its budget. Centralised or decentralised ac-
counting service estimates the school costs” – regional educational department). 
FOCJs of type II imply self-financing, which means that FOCJs of type II 
must cover the costs of schools. As members are municipalities, their obligation 
is to finance school FOCJs of type II. Municipalities in Russia finance school 
education organisations through taxes (see Annex 4, answer 32: “…building 
maintenance costs and utility costs are paid from local budgets…”) and regio-
nal budgets’ payments (“…for the realisation of school education programmes, 
municipalities allocate subventions from regional budgets, including labour 
costs, costs of textbooks, equipment for teaching aims… The number of subven-
tions for each municipality is calculated based on the number of students and 
norms according to types of educational programme and levels of study. 
Subvention can be increased by the integrated coefficient in the case of victory 
in competition and high results based on the results of the regional ranking of 
schools…” – head of educational department in the municipal area). Addi-
tionally, “the delivery of children for lessons to schools and back is at the 
expense of the municipality… The maintenance of school buses is the respon-
sibility of the municipality” – head of municipal educational department (see 
Annex 4, answer 37). 
For the FOCJs of type II, important information includes the sources from 
which participation fees and equity capital are allowed to be paid according to 
the Statute. Therefore, municipalities may pay an equity capital (price) and 
cover school costs from other sources as well (see Annex 4, answer 32: “educa-
tional institutions are entitled to raise additional financial resources through 
the provision of paid additional services and other services as well as through 
voluntary donations and earmarked contributions from private and legal 
persons” – head of municipal educational department).  
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Schools can gain additional financing by competing for grants (see Annex 
4, answer 32: “…additionally, via participation in federal and regional pro-
grammes, we may receive grants...” – school director).  
Special transportation requirements for pupils put restrictions on output 
(see Annex 4, answer 14: “According to paragraph 2.5 of Section II "Require-
ments for the placement of general education organizations", for the transpor-
tation of students of general education organisations in rural areas to general 
education organisations and back, the travel time should not exceed 30 minutes 
one way” – regional representative). There are also special requirements for 
employees in the educational sector, in particular, for teachers (see Annex 4, 
answer 22: “Pedagogical higher or vocational education, teacher category: 
first, highest or adequacy for the position. It’s difficult to receive the first or 
highest category since they get an additional 20 or 40% payment” – school 
director).  
Relations between municipal, regional and federal authorities with 
respect to schools are defined by “Legal Act, Art. 7, 8, 9 "On Education in the 
Russian Federation", there are powers of the Federation, there are powers of 
the subject of the Russian Federation – this is the Voronezh region and there 
are powers of local self-government bodies carried out in the sphere of 
education, all powers are delimited by the law.” (“The powers of the Russian 
Federation in the sphere of education transferred for implementation to the 
state authorities of the subjects of the Russian Federation” – regional 
educational department representative) (see Annex 4, answer 11). 
Locations with respect to school level (primary, basic, secondary) in-
fluence FOCJ decisions whether all three stages must be together or can be split 
up (see Annex 4, answer 7: “It’s historically defined and also depends on the 
demographic situation how many children of particular ages live in this or that 
municipality…” – representative from the regional educational department). 
 The labour factor price (teacher salary) depends on “how many teaching 
hours they have, the category, additional payments for their achievements, 
bonuses for the combination of several positions” – school director) (see Annex 
4, answer 24). The quality conditions of subjects are guaranteed by the FSES 
(see Annex 4, answer 4: “We implement the Federal State Educational Stan-
dards to develop our programme. New standards allow us to have speciali-
sation in different subjects in our school” – school director). 
The author makes several important conclusions from the interviews. First, 
cooperation between municipalities in school service provision has not been 
identified. However, cooperation among schools is evident. For example, within 
one municipality, school districts with basic schools as technological and 
resource centres can be established. 
Second, lower rank municipalities (urban and rural settlements) are not 
responsible for schools, only higher rank municipalities (municipal area and 
urban districts) can be members and founders of school FOCJs of type II in 
Russia.  
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Third, there are three groups of interviewees that are considered the main 
decision-makers of the provision of Russian school services. Among them are 
school directors, heads of educational departments in municipalities and edu-
cational authorities in regions. They provided deeper insights with respect to the 
research problems addressed in the thesis. The opinions of parents and heads of 
rural and urban areas are of a recommendatory character: they gave a more 
general understanding of their roles and tasks in the administration of the school 
education process. This result is also confirmed by the document analysis of the 
Federal Acts and Regional Regulations on education.  
Fourth, Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federation” has 
delimited powers between the Federation, regions and municipalities in the 
questions related to general education. For example, school founders – edu-
cation departments in municipalities – decide on school establishment, reorgani-
sation and liquidation, and regional authorities in education influence schools 
via regional subsidies for covering schools’ variable costs. Moreover, edu-
cational expenses (labour costs, textbooks, equipment, etc.) are covered from 
regional budgets based on per capita financing, while building and territory 
maintenance are funded from the municipal budget. Private schools, similar to 
municipal ones, can apply for regional subsidies. However, maintenance costs 
must be covered by the founders of private schools. Schools may apply for 
many federal and regional grants and programmes aimed at general educational 
organisations. 
Fifth, there are two legal forms of municipal schools in Russia: state (kazen-
noe) municipal establishment and budgetary municipal establishment and one 
private form – private educational establishments. Other non-commercial legal 
forms can be involved as well. 
Six, parents are free to choose any school, even in neighbouring munici-
palities; therefore, schools compete with one another for children, funding and 
sometimes even teachers. 
Seventh, schools have sole and collegiate internal self-administrated struc-
tures. The sole managerial body is a director who is appointed by the founder 
(educational department in municipality). Governing councils are collegiate 
bodies at schools. 
 
 
An interview with Bodensee water provision association  
Bodensee water provision association (Bodensee Zweckverband) is one of the 
biggest examples of inter-municipal cooperation in public service provision in 
Baden-Württemberg, Germany. It combines 147 municipalities, which means 
that Bodensee Wasserversorgung belongs to the FOCJ of type II with munici-
palities as members.  
The aim of the interview was to gather information about the financial, 
organisational and juridical aspects of public service provision in the form of 
Zweckverband, which is in fact an FOCJ of type II inter-municipal cooperation. 
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This information is necessary to prepare recommendations (Statute and Memo-
randum) on how to establish FOCJs of type II in Russia. 
 Germany is one of the few countries where FOCJ of type II inter-municipal 
cooperation has been functioning in practice for a long time, and a special legal 
form of Zweckverband has been introduced for this purpose. Therefore, another 
aim was to learn from the experience of the country in which FOCJs of type II 
successfully exist and find out the important provisions to consider from the 
management point of view, the provisions the Statute and other internal docu-
ments should include, the main legal acts related to its work, how costs are 
covered and decisions made, the responsibilities of management bodies, etc. 
This explains the choice of the interviewee, who is the Deputy Financial 
Director of Bodensee water provision association.  
For a qualitative analysis, the number of interviewees is sufficient if an 
expert is competent to answer all of the questions. This is the case here; how-
ever, the results of this interview have some limitations related to sector speci-
ficity, which is different to that which is investigated in the thesis.   
The interview took place on 23 July 2018 in the Bodensee Zweckverband 
office in Stuttgart, Germany, and lasted over one hour. It has been recorded and 
translated from German into English with the help of German native speakers 
and online translating platform DeepL.  
The interview questions are listed in Annex 5 of the thesis and consist of 22 
items. They were compiled based on the main characteristics of FOCJs of type 
II obtained from the literature analysis in Chapter 1 and the basic theoretical 
microeconomic models developed in Chapter 2, similar to the interviews in 
Russia (see Figure 65). The author prepared questions in English and sent to the 
interviewee both English and German translated versions before the interview 
started (see Annex 5).  
Interview answers are grouped in Annex 6. A number of useful conclusions 
can be made from this interview. For example, the interview revealed that 
municipalities, in order to cooperate, rely on the law on inter-municipal coope-
ration in Germany (Gesetz über kommunale Zusammenarbeit), and this legal act 
has references to other laws, including a special purpose associations law for 
Baden-Württemberg (the Gemeindeordnung für Baden-Württemberg) (see 
Annex 6, answer 4). This is different from Russia, where the legal basis for 
inter-municipal cooperation is not sufficiently developed at the federal as well 
as regional level.  
The reason Zweckverband is a good legal form, according to the interviewee, 
is that it has a non-profit status, which means that the Bodensee association has 
no right to make a profit and this is marked in the Statute (see Annex 6, answer 
7). This provision is in line with the cost coverage rule of the model of current 
operation in Chapter 2 and also reflected in the exemplary Statute for the school 
FOCJ of type II association for Russia.  
All members of Bodensee water provision association follow the principle of 
solidarity, which means that they pay the same water rate as an annual fee (see 
Annex 6, answer 9: “Sipplingen, which is directly at the source, pays the same 
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water price as, for example, the municipality of Bad Mergentheim, which is 
located 200 kilometres further north”). This price is fixed to cover costs; 
therefore, no profit is expected. 
The supreme body is an Association Assembly where all members are 
represented and meet once per year. In the decision-making process, the number 
of votes is distributed proportionally to the number of quotas of water (see 
Annex 6, answer 9: “Another special feature is that we have three groups of 
members. In group 1, for example, all members are involved with more than 
1000 litres/second ("second litres"). There is only the city of Stuttgart in it. This 
means that the city of Stuttgart has 33% of the votes”). The decision is made by 
the qualified majority of votes of 75 percent. This or a similar voting process 
should also be defined by the FOCJ of type II Statute.  
Additionally, there are other “committees under this association meeting. 
There is a personnel committee in which personnel matters are discussed…” 
(see Annex 6, answer 14). The Association Assembly approves an annual 
business plan (see Annex 6, answer 43: “in the business plan for the coming 
business year, all of the costs of the individual municipalities are included 
...and this business plan is approved by 183 members”), an assets plan (invest-
ment plan) and other plans and documents of the association (see Annex 6, 
answer 27: “For the next years, we have investment sums between 22 and 27 
million (in the business plan) per year and for the current operation we have 
between 75 and 80 million in budgets”).  
Management is elected at Association Assembly meetings. Managing direc-
tors can decide whether they want to be public or private servants (see Annex 6, 
answer 20: “…here in Stuttgart, it can also be quite different. We have a second 
large special purpose association, the Landeswasserversorgung, which also 
supplies the city of Stuttgart. They still have a lot of public servants there”). 
This provision can be relevant for Russia, too, meaning that FOCJ of type II 
employees must not necessarily be public servants.  
The question regarding Bodensee water provision association’s participation 
fee and equity capital formation is especially relevant. Members must contribute 
equity capital. Equity capital is tied to the participation quota; the shares of 
participation are exclusively linked to water quantities (see Annex 6, answer 32: 
“The water supply that the individual members have is based on this partici-
pation rate. The participation rate is based on litre per second”). The members 
can trade shares neither on a market nor among themselves. Here, it is important 
not how much a member consumes, but how much water members estimate 
they need in joining the Zweckverband. When new members join, or an existing 
member grows, they increase their participation quotas, which means more 
litres per second. However, because other communities financed for a longer 
time, there is a surcharge (for new members) to this capital. In addition to the 
21,000 euros per 1 litre/second, there is another 16,000 euros to cover what 
others have already pre-financed (see Annex 6, answer 36).  
It is also important to set out in the Statute what kind of competences the 
management, the Assembly of Members and different committees with the 
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Assembly of Members have (see Annex 6, answer 46: “For example, manage-
ment may decide on resolutions up to €250,000 alone. Everything over it then 
needs different committees’ confirmation. For example, we have a construction 
and procurement committee, then we have the Board of Directors and all 
investments over €1,000,000 are decided at the association meeting. The 
management decides on day-to-day business – for everything that goes beyond 
day-to-day business, there are various responsible committees. This is laid 
down in the Statute”). 
The association does not get grants from the EU or the Federation (see 
Annex 6, answer 39: “Zweckverbände here in Baden-Württemberg does not 
receive any subsidies according to the current water law”). However, at the 
same time, they do not have to pay some taxes for functioning under public law 
and not distributing profit among their members (see Annex 6, answer 51: “As 
we have no profit-making intentions, we generally do not have to pay at least 
corporation tax and trade tax… The Zweckverband is taxed as a corporation 
under public law”). 
If additional services (usually complemented services) are provided by the 
school FOCJ of type II, for example, educational consultation or seminars or 
technical support, it should also be set out in the Statute (see Annex 6, answers 
52, 53: “It is also the case that we offer water services in addition to actual water. 
It is set out in our Statute… we offer services and specialists to solve technical 
problems. We provide operating engineers to the member municipalities”).  
The interviewee points to the advantages and disadvantages of joint public 
service provision (see Annex 6, answer 54: “The biggest advantage of the 
Zweckverband for its members is the possibility that large, strong communities 
support smaller communities. For small communities, their own water supply 
would become much more expensive than the supply via Zweckverband… The 
decision-making process is slow. However, this is also the case for private 
corporations...”). 
Water provision association Bodensee introduces a two-part tariff as mem-
bers’ regular payments (see Annex 6, answer 55: “The price paid by members is 
made up of two elements. For their ‘participation quota’, members pay a basic 
price for the possible water supply. For the amount of water actually drawn, 
they pay a water price that depends on the amount of water drawn”). A two-
part tariff can also be introduced in school FOCJs of type II (see sub-chapter 3.4 
Statute provisions related to membership fees).  
The element of competition always exists, according to the interviewee, 
since municipalities themselves may provide water (see Annex 6, answer 57: 
“Possible competitors are in particular the members themselves. Therefore, the 
Zweckverband must keep the water price low enough. If the self-supply becomes 
cheaper due to technical progress, members could supply themselves, e.g. from 
river water”). There is also another Zweckverband, ‘Landeswasserversorgung’, 
which is a strong competitor for Bodensee water provision association.    
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3.4. Discussion of empirical results, recommendations  
for introducing school FOCJs in Russia:  
FOCJ Statute and Memorandum 
In subchapter 2.3, the author introduced special conditions with respect to 
labour, materials, fixed capital, output, etc. to analyse how management react to 
these conditions and which decisions are consequently made. However, those 
decisions of management that are not preferable by FOCJ of type II members 
can be excluded via stipulations in the establishment documents of FOCJs of 
type II. Therefore, the current subchapter demonstrates how the solutions of 
theoretical modelling resulting from unfavourable management behaviour can, 
in practice, be avoided by translating economic categories into legal language. 
For example, upper-rank FOCJ bodies or higher ranking jurisdictions may set 
out some variables, such as credits, on a particular level. FOCJ members should 
be able to influence executive bodies to pursue public goals through require-
ments concerning qualities and quantities of output and the fulfilment of the 
cost coverage rule. On the other hand, FOCJ management should have enough 
freedom in decision-making to create inter-municipal cooperation that is attrac-
tive for current and potential member municipalities. For all of these and other 
aspects, establishment documents are especially necessary. 
Additionally, the author invokes the outcomes of the interviews described (in 
subchapter 3.3) and the analysis of the legal forms that are suitable for the inter-
municipal cooperation of FOCJs of type II in Russia (subchapter 3.2) to change 
unfavourable management decisions into desired ones. Therefore, the author has 
prepared an exemplary Statute and Memorandum in this subchapter, which is 
not the only way to ‘correct’ management actions. There are other ways which 
are not discussed in this thesis, such as special regional policy, regional subsidi-
sation, taxation, etc. However, by introducing a special legal framework like the 
Statute, unfavourable management behaviour can be excluded in the long run.    
As discovered in subchapter 3.254, Federal Act No. 131 “On the general 
principles of organisation of local self-governance in the Russian Federation” 
determines two commercial legal forms – non-public joint stock company and 
limited liability company (Article 68), and two non-commercial – autonomous 
non-commercial organisations and funds (Article 69), which are appropriate for 
the cooperation of municipalities in Russia. Since the FOCJ of type II is 
modelled for Russian school services, educational services can be provided only 
by non-commercial legal entities according to Federal Act No. 273 “On Edu-
cation in the Russian Federation”, Article 22. However, according to the ana-
lysis conducted in subchapter 3.2, autonomous non-commercial organisations 
and funds are not suitable for FOCJs of type II since they do not assume 
membership of their founders, and then no participation fees can be collected 
for the current operation activity. Hence, in order to incorporate FOCJs of type 
                                                            
54  See subchapter 3.2. Here, the results of subchapter 3.2 are shortly repeated. 
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II into the Russian legal system, a legal form of associations (unions) should be 
included in Article 69 of the Federal Act No. 131 “On the general principles of 
organisation of local self-governance in the Russian Federation” as a possible 
legal form for municipalities to cooperate55.  
The activity of associations is regulated by the Civil Code of the Russian 
Federation and Federal Act No. 7 “On Non-commercial Organisations”. Ac-
cording to Article 14, § 1 of the latter, members of an association are required to 
compile a Memorandum (учредительный договор) of association and a Sta-
tute (устав) approved by them. In the Memorandum of association, the mem-
bers undertake to establish a non-profit organisation, determine the procedure 
for joint activities to establish a non-profit organisation, the conditions for the 
transfer its property and participation in its activities and the conditions and pro-
cedure for the withdrawal of founders (participants) from its composition.  
The recommended provisions that should be included in the Statute of a non-
commercial organisation are described by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian 
Federation. In accordance with the Article 52 of the Civil Code of the Russian 
Federation, legal entities act on the basis of Statutes approved by their founders 
(members). The Statute of a non-commercial organisation approved by its foun-
ders (members) must contain information on: 
–  the name; 
–  the legal form; 
–  the location; 
–  the procedure for managing the activities of a non-commercial organisation; 
and 
–  the subject and purpose of the non-commercial organisation’s activity. 
In addition to the information that all legal entities must include in their Statu-
tes, non-commercial organisations in accordance with Federal Act No. 7 “On 
Non-commercial Organisations”, Article 14, should additionally include infor-
mation regarding: 
–  the rights and obligations of the participants (members) of a non-commercial 
organisation; 
–  the terms and procedure for the admission and withdrawal (for corporate 
non-commercial organizations) of members (members); 
–  the sources of property formation; 
– the procedure for making amendments to the Statute; 
– the procedure for the use of property in the case of liquidation; 
– non-commercial organisation symbols: description of emblems, coats of 
arms, other heraldic signs, flags and anthems (if used); and 
                                                            
55  In practice, Russian municipalities already cooperate in the legal form of associations 
and unions, such as, for example, the Association of Siberian and Far Eastern Cities of Rus-
sia, the Union of the Russian Science Cities’ Development and the Association of Small and 
Medium-sized Cities of Russia, etc. However, the author noticed gaps in the legal system of 
the Russian Federation. Thus, it is suggested to amend the Federal Act No. 131 “On the 
general principles of organisation of local self-governance in the Russian Federation” by 
considering other legal forms for inter-municipal cooperation of Russian municipalities. 
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– the structure, competence, formation procedure and terms of office of the 
governing bodies and the procedure for making decisions and acting on 
behalf of the organization. 
The Statute of the association (union) must additionally contain information on 
the procedure for decision-making by the bodies of the association (union) on 
the issues that are decided unanimously or by a qualified majority of votes as 
well as on the property rights and obligations of the members of the association 
(union). The Statute of a non-profit organisation may contain other provisions 
that do not contradict the legislation of the Russian Federation. 
As mentioned earlier in the text, the current subchapter combines the results 
received from the analysis of the theoretical models in Chapter 2, the empirical 
insights obtained from the interviews (subchapter 3.3) and the analysis of legal 
forms suitable for the Russian school FOCJs of type II (subchapter 3.2). Table 
17, on the one hand, connects the results of legal investigations, interviews and 
management theory results with the features of FOCJs of type II and, on the 
other hand, points to the regulations and stipulations set out in the proposed 
Memorandum and Statute.  
Table 17 shows the logic of the analysis and results reflected in the establish-
ment documents for the FOCJ. In the columns of Table 17 are the features of 
FOCJs of type II which are necessary to consider in the establishment docu-
ments of FOCJs of type II. In the rows, the sources of these stipulations are 
reflected. The sign + means that the need to include, for example, information 
regarding the name and legal form has been obtained from the analysis of legal 
acts. Moreover, the importance of school location has been discussed during the 
interviews and also through the analysis of legal acts. How the goals and 
subject of the activity of an FOCJ of type II, stated in the Statute, define the 
behaviour of management is a result of theoretical analysis, legal act analysis 
and interviews. Additionally, Table 17 shows whether the stipulations, received 
from legal acts, interviews and/or theoretical modelling are considered in the 
Memorandum or in the Statute or in both. Particular paragraphs of the exemp-
lary Statute and Memorandum, which contain these stipulations, are marked in 
Table 17 as well.  
The general difference between Statute and Memorandum is that a Statute is 
more detailed; it contains guidelines on how the association should work, while 
a Memorandum expresses an initiative of parties to establish an association. 
Some provisions of the Statute and Memorandum overlap, as is shown in Table 
17. However, others are specific to the Statute.  
 
 
Layout of FOCJ of type II features in Memorandum and Statute 
Members of the association must be marked both in the Statute in § 2.1 and the 
Memorandum in § 1.1. Sometimes, if there are different groups of members, 
such as full members and associated members or members awaiting the 
approval of their membership, it should also be marked in the establishment 
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documents along with the rights and obligations of different groups. Groups of 
members may differ by the quality of school services provided to them or by the 
range of services they are allowed to consume from the FOCJ of type II. This 
information should be defined by the FOCJ of type II Statute as well. The 
exemplary Statute provided below includes a list of municipalities that have the 
right to get services from the FOCJ of type II on the basis of membership. 
Special conditions for non-member municipalities are not assumed here. 
However, whether children from other municipalities can attend school FOCJs 
of type II affects the size of the output; therefore, it should be marked in the 
FOCJ of type II Statute. Otherwise, only children from member municipalities 
can get school services from the FOCJ of type II. Moreover, clarification of 
consumers in the Statute defines the market structure and demand function and 
influences solutions for an FOCJ of type II optimal plan.  
Both the Statute and Memorandum contain the goals and subject of activity. 
The non-commercial nature of school educational activity sorts out profit maxi-
misation as a goal of the school FOCJ of type II. Instead, educational goals pre-
vail, which is reflected in the theoretical models of Chapter 2 by management 
utility maximisation, not profit. Additionally, the type of management FOCJ 
members desire can also be defined by the goals and tasks the FOCJ Statute 
contains so that unfavourable Cases III and IV of FOCJ management are simply 
excluded by paragraphs 1.1–1.2 and 4.1 of the FOCJ of type II Statute.  
The Statute should include the competencies of executive bodies, such as 
the Chairman of the Association in § 13, the Association Council in § 14, the 
Supervisory Board in § 15 and the Parents’ Board in § 16. The competencies of 
management bodies described in the Statute are necessary because they bind 
management activities to Cases I and II of management behaviour, avoiding 
Cases III and IV. The competencies of FOCJ of type II executive bodies reflect 
the basic management concept, which, in turn, shapes relations between FOCJ 
management and school directors and between management of different levels. 
The rights and obligations of members are included in both the Statute and 
Memorandum. However, the Statute should elaborately describe them and the 
Memorandum may or may not contain them. In the example below, the rights 
and obligations of members are marked in § 5.1–5.2 of the Memorandum and § 
5-6 of the Statute. Paragraphs of the Statute devoted to members in § 2 and the 
Assembly of Members in § 10 show how powerful they are in relation to 
executive bodies, the kinds of decisions they allow FOCJ of type II executive 
bodies to make and what the Assembly decides independently.  
It is important to set out in the Statute the rule of the entrance and annual 
membership fee payment (§ 2.8–2.9) and the sources of their payment (§ 
2.11). According to the information received from the interviews and legal act 
analysis, regional authorities in education finance labour costs and costs of 
materials related to the educational process, such as acquisition of textbooks. 
Municipalities are responsible for the maintenance of the buildings and struc-
tures of schools and the arrangement of adjacent territories. Therefore, a two-
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The tasks and fields of activity must be stipulated in the Statute and Memo-
randum since this provision relates to the demand for the services of the FOCJ 
of type II. Whether an FOCJ of type II provides only primary educational 
services or basic or secondary (complete) education influences the demand size. 
Therefore, the tasks and fields of activity should be emphasised in the Statute as 
well. This is also required by law in Russia (Federal Act No. 273 “On Educa-
tion in the Russian Federation”, Article 25). 
Decisions made by the General Assembly of Members as well as executive 
bodies are based on the procedure of decision-making defined in the Statute 
for the Assembly (§ 10.4-10.7, 11.1) and for the executive bodies (§ 14.7-14.10, 
15.11, 16.9-16.12). In the exemplary Statute, there are only two voting rules 
applicable depending on the subject of voting – simple majority and qualified 
majority of two-thirds. However, other rules can be stipulated in the Statute as 
well. Each member of the Assembly has a number of votes proportional to the 
statistical number of school-age children in municipalities, as is set out in § 11.1 
(interviews with Bodensee Zweckverband, see Annex 6).  
 The number of votes members have in the General Assembly can be defined 
not only by the number of school-age pupils in municipalities, but also by the 
number of pupils belonging to different school levels (primary, basic and secon-
dary general education), the number of taught hours, the share of municipalities 
in equity capital, the number of inhabitants in municipalities, etc. Here, the 
number of school-age pupils is a criterion, which means that number of votes is 
directly related to output (number of pupils). 
Paragraph 2.3 of the Statute provides that the decisions on the schools in-
cluded in the FOCJ of type II are transferred to the FOCJ of type II supreme and 
executive bodies. Municipalities alone cannot decide on school educational 
matters once they become members of an FOCJ of type II. Other responsi-
bilities not related to schools remain in the sphere of municipalities’ decision-
making. They are regulated by Federal Act No. 131 “On the general principles 
of organisation of local self-governance in the Russian Federation”, Articles 14-
16.  
The provision of § 2.8 defines the rule of entrance fee payment. It says 
that if a new member municipality joins the Association, it must contribute to 
the FOCJ of type II’s property and pay an entrance fee, which is related to the 
statistical number of school-age pupils in said municipality. However, the 
municipalities that established the Association pay their share of property based 
on the results of the FOCJ of type II establishment model (see chapter 2).  
 In § 2.9, the rule of annual membership fee is explained. Municipalities 
pay a two-part tariff (referring to interviews with Bodensee Zweckverband, see 
Annex 6). The first part is a lump-sum fee related to the maintenance of the 
buildings and structures of schools that finances current fixed costs. The second 
part is related to those variable costs not covered by the regional subsidy for 
schools. This part is expressed by the formula P = l*L + m*M - G
X
 according to the 
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optimal solution of the model of current operation with a non-negotiable grant 
in Chapter 2. G/X means per-pupil subsidies from the region.  
If member municipalities get grants or any other financial support from the 
budgets at the federal or regional level concerning the activity of the schools 
included in the FOCJ of type II, they are obliged to transfer these grants to the 
Association. It is regulated by § 6.10 of the Statute to avoid the redirection of 
some targeted payments, which municipalities receive for schools, for the 
achievement of other purposes. 
The Association is a subject of taxation and social insurance fee payment. 
This process is due to the obligations of the Association Chairman according to 
§ 13.5 of the Association Statute. 
After the Association liquidation, the property contribution of members 
must be returned to them in the share of their participation and used by munici-
palities for educational, cultural, social and other statutory purposes. However, 
if this is not possible, municipalities may use it for other purposes not pro-
hibited by law. This provision of § 21.9 of the Statute emphasises the priority of 
the non-commercial goals of the Association and is therefore also included in § 
8.5. 
It is required by the Civil Code of Russia for an association to form a sup-
reme body that is the General Assembly of Members and a sole executive body 
(the Chairman). Other executive bodies are optional. The exemplary Statute 
additionally includes the competences of the Association Council, the Super-
visory Board and the Parents’ Board. Decisions of the Parents’ Board have an 
advisory character, but they can have an influence via the Supervisory Board 
since representatives from the Parents’ Board attend the Supervisory Board 
meetings, too (see § 15.2). The Parents’ Boards can be organised in each school 
separately or one Parents’ Board for all schools included in the FOCJ of type II 
may function. In the latter case, parent representatives from each school partici-
pate the FOCJ Parents’ Board. 
The internal organisational structure of the Association can be visualised 





Figure 68. Organisational chart of the FOCJ of type II 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
In general, the management of schools included in the Association is conducted 
by FOCJ of type II executive bodies. However, there should be managers who 
solve everyday issues at the level of schools, as shown in Figure 68. Such 
managers are, for example, school directors, deputy directors of studies, persons 
responsible for the maintenance of buildings, etc. School directors might be 
appointed with the approval of the Chairman of the Association. If this is the 
case, this responsibility must be included in the list of the Chairman’s compe-
tences (§ 13.5).   
The Statute includes paragraphs regarding subsidiaries and representative 
offices in § 20. However, these provisions are optional and are necessary only 
if, for example, they possess a unique teaching approach which can be adopted 
by schools in other territories. 
Paragraph 2.3 of the Association Memorandum stipulates the procedure for 
state registration of the Association. The state registration of non-commercial 
organisations, including associations, is regulated by Article 13.1 of Federal Act 
No. 7 “On Non-commercial Organisations” and Federal Act No. 129 “On the 
state registration of legal entities and individual entrepreneurs”. Non-commer-
cial organisations have a special registration regime, which means that the 
documents must first be submitted to the authorised body (Federal Registration 
Service) or its territorial bodies. The Federal Registration Service, in accor-
dance with paragraph 8 of Article 13.1 of Federal Act No. 7 “On Non-Com-
mercial Organisations”, within 14 working days, decides on registration (to 
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register or not) and then the tax authorities register an association in the Unified 
State Register of Legal Entities. The list of documents required to be delivered 
to the Federal Registration Service is set out in paragraph 5 of Federal Act No. 
7 “On Non-commercial Organisations”. For the Association, the main docu-
ments are its Statute and Memorandum.  
Next, the author delivers legal suggestions in the form of an exemplary Sta-
tute and Memorandum for a school FOCJ of type II in the Voronezh region in 
which her interviews took place in order to demonstrate how legal framework 
for FOCJs of type II can be created in practice. The interdisciplinarity of the 
thesis allows the consideration of the exemplary documents presented below as 
one of the thesis results, making it attractive for colleagues in jurisprudence, 
too.     
 
 
Exemplary Memorandum of the Russian school FOCJ of type II  
in the legal form of Association 
 
§ 1. General provisions 
1.1. The members of the Association are the following legal entities56 registered 
in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation: 
− Khokholsky municipal area, 
− Nizhnedevitsky municipal area,  
− Repiyovsky municipal area,  
− Ostrogozhsky municipal area,  
− Liskinsky municipal area  
hereinafter referred to as the “Members”, in accordance with the civil legislation 
of the Russian Federation, have entered into this Memorandum on the follo-
wing: 
The Members create a school association named “School Association in the 
southeast of the Voronezh region”, hereinafter referred to as the “Association”. 
1.2. This association is registered as a legal entity by the body carrying out state 
registration57, has a separate property right of ownership, has an independent 
balance sheet, accounts in banks, can acquire property and personal non-pro-
perty rights in its own name, and can be a plaintiff and a defendant in court.  
The Association carries out its activity in accordance with the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation, the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the Federal 
Act No. 7 “On Non-Commercial Organizations”, the Federal Act No. 273 “On 
Education in the Russian Federation”, and other laws and regulations of the 
Russian Federation and the Voronezh region and its Statute. 
                                                            
56  Neighbored municipalities. 
57  Based on Federal Act No. 129 “On state registration of legal entities and individual 
entrepreneurs”, Article 2. 
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1.3. The main objective of the Association's activity is a joint school service 
provision, in particular primary, basic and secondary educational services in 
accordance with the Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian 
Federation” and Federal State Educational Standards. 
1.4. The Association is liable for its obligations with all its property. The Asso-
ciation is not liable for the obligations of its members.  
1.5. Location of the Association: the city of Voronezh, ___________ street, 
house_______. 
1.6. The Association is established without limitation of the period of its acti-
vity. 
 
§ 2. Statute of the Association, procedure of joint activity on creation  
of the Association 
2.1. The Statute of the Association is the main legal act, which determines the 
order of organization of its activity, rights and obligations of its members, the 
order of the Association management, the order of reorganization and liquida-
tion of the Association. 
2.2. Compliance with the provisions of the Statute is mandatory for all 
members of the Association equally. 
2.3. Performance of actions on state registration of the Memorandum and the 
Association Statute is entrusted to _______________ who represents Khok-
holsky municipal area. Members are obliged to assist in registration of consti-
tuent documents by providing necessary information and issuing documents.  
 
§ 3. The property of the Association 
3.1. The Association owns and operates school buildings, structures, plots of 
land, sport facilities and equipment, inventory, monetary funds in roubles, and 
bonds. 
3.2. The sources of formation of the Association's property in monetary and in-
kind forms are: 
− regular and lump-sum payments from the Members; 
− voluntary property contributions and donations, including those with a speci-
fic purpose, for the implementation of specific programs of the Association; 
− income from the sale of school services for those municipalities that are not 
FOCJ of type II members;  
− grants and donations from higher level jurisdictions; 
− dividends (income, interest) received on shares, bonds, other securities and 
deposits; 
− other receipts not prohibited by law.  
3.3. The rule and forms of entrance and annual membership fees’ payments of 
the Association members is determined by § 2 of the Association Statute. 
3.4. The value of the contributed property shall be assessed by the General As-
sembly of Members in roubles. 
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3.5. Membership fees are used to support activities provided for by the Statute. 
The procedure of its payment is determined by § 2.9 of the Association Statute. 
3.6. The General Assembly of the Association approves annually the financial 
plan, business plan, property plan, debt plan, and other plans of the Association 
stated in § 10.3 of the Association Statute. The budget shall be developed on the 
basis of the funds at the disposal of the Association and planned revenues.  
3.7. Implementation of the budget is organized by the Chairman of the Associa-
tion. On the basis of a power of attorney issued by the Chairman, the execution 
of these functions may be entrusted to other management personnel of the 
Association.  
3.8. The Association is liable for its obligations with the property. 
3.9. At liquidation of the Association, the property which has remained after 
satisfaction of creditors is directed to the purposes it has been created for, and 
(or) to the municipal purposes. In case property of the liquidated Association 
cannot be used according to its stated purposes, the income from its disposal 
will be distributed to the member municipalities in the proportional share of 
their participation according to § 8.5 of the Association Statute. 
 
§ 4. Membership in the Association 
4.1. The members of the Association may be legal municipal entities that 
recognize its Statute and express their will to become Members of the Associa-
tion in a duly established form. 
4.2. Members of the Association are its founders, as well as new legal entities 
who become members. 
4.3. Members of the Association retain their autonomy and rights as legal 
municipal subjects. They possess their autonomy and rights concerning those 
rights, which are not allocated to the school Association.  
4.4. Admission of a new member of the Association is carried out by the 
General Assembly of the Association on the basis of the submitted application 
to the Association Council. The Chairman shall introduce the applicant at the 
next meeting of the Council from the date of submission of the application. The 
decision on admission shall be made by the General Assembly of the Associa-
tion Members in accordance with the procedure established by the Association 
Statute, § 2.8.  
4.5. A new member of the Association is obliged to make an entrance and 
annual fee in the term and in the amount established by the General Assembly 
of the Association in the Statute, the new member of the Association bears 
subsidiary responsibility according to § 2.4. of the Association Statute.  
4.6. The rights of participation in the Association shall not be transferred to 
third parties.  
4.7. A member of the Association has a right to withdraw from the Association 
at its own discretion after the end of the financial year.  
4.8. A member shall withdraw from the Association by submitting a written 
application not later than 3 (three) months prior to the end of the respective 
financial year. At the same time, the Association, within three months from the 
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date of receipt of the application for withdrawal, shall make calculations under 
contracts of other obligations that it has concluded with the Association. In case 
of withdrawal of a member from the Association, the procedure provided for by 
the Statute of the Association shall apply.  
4.9. A member of the Association can be excluded by the decision of the Ge-
neral Assembly of the Association members on the following grounds:  
− performance of actions/inactions contrary to the goals and tasks fixed in the 
Association Statute and/or causing material damage to the Association 
and/or damage to its business reputation;  
− violation of the provisions of the Statute;  
− failure to comply with the decisions of the governing bodies of the Associa-
tion, including the payment of entrance and membership fees, as well as 
additional property contributions. 
4.10. With regard to the liability of the excluded member or the member volun-
tarily leaving the Association, the rules fixed in § 7.6 and § 2.4 of the Associa-
tion Statute shall apply. 
4.11. In case of withdrawal/exclusion of an Association member, regular mem-
bership fees are not refundable. 
4.12. Upon the decision of the Association's Assembly, other municipalities 
may be included in the Association as its associated members. In case the As-
sembly of Members decides about inclusion of associated members, their rights 
and obligations should be determined by the Statute of the Association fol-
lowing the respective amendments in the Statute. 
 
§ 5. Rights and obligations of Association’s members 
5.1 Members of the Association have rights: 
− Members have the right to participate in making decisions regarding the 
Association;  
− Members have the right to elect and be elected to the bodies of the Asso-
ciation;  
− Members have the right to submit for consideration of the executive bodies 
of the Association proposals on the issues within their competence and to 
participate in the discussion of these issues; 
− Members have the right to participate in voting at the General Assembly of 
the Association members; 
− Members have the right to participate in projects and programs of the As-
sociation in the field of education, science, editorial and publishing and other 
activities; 
− Members have the right to participate in scientific conferences, symposiums, 
exhibitions and other events organized by the Association; 
− Members have the right to receive information on the activities of the As-
sociation and to get acquainted with its accounting, business plan, financial 
plan, property plan, debt plan, staff plan, project plan, etc.;  
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− Members have the right to appeal against decisions of the Association's 
bodies, which have civil legal consequences;  
− Members have the right to request, on behalf of the Association, to com-
pensate damages caused to the Association;  
− Members have the right to appeal, acting on behalf of the Association, its 
transactions and to demand the application of the consequences of their 
invalidity, as well as the application of the consequences of the invalidity of 
insignificant transactions of the Association. 
− Members have the right to quit the Association at the end of each financial 
year, announcing three months in advance. 
− Members may have additional rights, which must be stipulated in the Statute 
of the Association. 
5.2 Members of the Association have obligations: 
− Members are obliged to participate in the formation of the Association's pro-
perty of the Association in the following composition: Khokholsky, Nizhne-
devitsky, Repiyovsky, Ostrogozhsky, Liskinsky municipal areas form the 
Association property in the proportions defined by the rule stipulated in § 2.9 
of this Statute. Property of the Association includes school buildings, school 
lands, busses, municipal subsidies from the budgets of different levels and 
other forms of participation marked in § 7.3 of the Association Statute. 
− Members are obliged to not to disclose confidential information about the 
Association's activities; 
− Members are obliged to participate in decision-making according to the 
requirements formulated in § 10.2 of the Statute;  
− Members should not harm the Association;  
− Members are not expected to take any actions (inaction) that significantly 
complicate or make it impossible to achieve the goals for which the 
Association was established;  
− Members are obliged to pay property shares related to their membership and 
annual membership fees;  
− Members have to make additional contributions to the property of the As-
sociation if the Association Assembly of Members has made an appropriate 
decision;  
− Members are obliged to provide information about the number of pupils by 
levels of school education and other socio-economic information, which 
determines the volume of the Association’s services and its operation;  
− Members are obliged to control licensing and accreditation of educational 
activity;  
− Members are obliged to transfer to the Association the grants and donations 
which they received for conducting an activity of those schools that are 
included in the operations of the Association; 




§ 6. Procedure for managing the Association and control over its activities 
6.1. The management bodies of the Association are as follows:  
− the General Assembly of Members; 
− the Chairman of the Association; 
− the Association Council; 
− the Supervisory Board; 
− the Parents Board. 
6.2. The supreme governing body of the Association is the General Assembly 
of Association Members (hereinafter referred to as the General Assembly). 
6.3. Members of the Association take part in the General Assembly of the 
Association through their heads or other representative by the power of attor-
ney. The norm of representation from each municipality-member in the As-
sembly of Members is 1 (one) person. Each member of the General Assembly 
has the number of votes proportional to the number of pupils registered on the 
territory of municipality that participate in the Association based on the data of 
Voronezh region state statistics service according to § 2.9 of the Association 
Statute. 
6.4. To carry out the current management of the Association's activity in the 
period between the convocations of the General Assembly of the Association, a 
permanent collegial executive body – the Association Council – is elected for 5 
(five) years. The Association’s Council consists of a minimum of 4 (four) 
persons. Members of the Association’s Council may be re-elected repeatedly. 
6.5. The current management of the Association is carried out by the sole exe-
cutive body – the Chairman of the Association – who is responsible for the 
goals and objectives of the Association and is accountable to the General As-
sembly of the Association Members. The Chairman of the Association is elected 
by the General Assembly from its members for a period of 5 (five) years.   
6.6. To carry out the current organizational and executive activities of the As-
sociation, the Council of the Association forms the Secretariat of the Associa-
tion, the number of which is determined by the General Assembly. 
6.7. Competence and procedure of election of each management body is deter-
mined by the Statute of the Association.  
6.8. The Association establish the Parents Board, which carries out its activities 
on a voluntary basis, in the manner prescribed by § 16 of the Statute of the As-
sociation. 
6.9. To control the executive bodies of the Association, the General Assembly 
elects the Supervisory Board in accordance with the procedure established by 
the Association's Statute in § 15. 
 
§ 7. Procedure of joint activity of members on creation of the Association 
7.1. The members assume the responsibility for the creation of the Association 
and the state registration of the Association at their own expense. 
7.2. After signing the present Memorandum and approval of the Association 
Statute by the General Assembly, all necessary documents shall be submitted to 
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the relevant bodies for state registration of the Association in accordance with 
the procedure established by Federal Act No. 129 “On state registration of legal 
entities and individual entrepreneurs”.  
7.3. To ensure the activity of the Association, the members, who signed this 
agreement, shall transfer to the Association as their entrance fees in monetary 
and in kind form the funds in the amount of ______ roubles, within 30 (thirty) 
calendar days from the date of state registration of the Association. 
7.4. The authorized person marked in § 2.3 of this Memorandum who performs 
all functions related to the state registration of the Association (Applicant) is 
determined by the General Assembly and reflected in the minutes of the Gene-
ral Assembly of Members. 
 
§ 8. Entry into force of the Memorandum of the Association and the 
procedure for amending  
8.1. This Memorandum has been drawn up and signed in 3 (three) identical 
authentic copies having equal legal force.  
8.2. This Memorandum shall come into force from the date of its signing by the 
authorized representatives of all members. 
8.3. The Memorandum may be amended or terminated by a decision of the Ge-
neral Assembly of Members. The decision to change or terminate the contract 
shall be made by a qualified majority of votes (two thirds of the total number of 
the Association members). 
8.4. Amendments and additions to the present Memorandum come into force 
from the moment of their state registration in the order established by the cur-




§ 9. Details and signatures of Association members 
 
 Exemplary Statute for the Russian school FOCJ of type II in  
the legal form of Association (union) 
 
§ 1. General provisions58 
1.1. The school Association carries the name “School Association in the south-
east of the Voronezh region”, hereinafter referred to as the “Association”. It is a 
membership-based non-profit organization established to achieve the tasks 
                                                            
58  This exemplary Statute for the school FOCJ of type II in Russia considers several legal 
Acts of the Russian Federation, such as the Civil Code of Russia, Federal Act No. 7 “On 
Non-commercial Organisations”, Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian 
Federation”. However, there are more legal acts of regional and local levels, which might 
regulate the investigated activity. Therefore, all details that cannot be fixed by this Statute 
remain the responsibility of the author.     
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provided in this Statute, including educational, scientific, social, cultural and 
other socially useful goals59. 
1.2. The Association provides primary, basic and secondary general education 
services in accordance with the decisions of Association General Assembly of 
Members, the Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federation”, 
Federal State Educational Standards and other legal acts. 
1.3. The Association office is located in the city of Voronezh by the add-
ress______. 
 
§ 2. Members of the Association 
2.1. Association members are: 
− Khokholsky municipal area, 
− Nizhnedevitsky municipal area,  
− Repiyovsky municipal area,  
− Ostrogozhsky municipal area,  
− Liskinsky municipal area (further in the text - Association municipalities). 
2.2. Other municipal areas and urban districts60 may join the school Association 
as new members61.  
2.3. Members of the Association remain their autonomy and rights as legal 
municipal subjects. They possess their autonomy and rights concerning those 
rights, which are not allocated to the school Association. 
2.4. The Association is not answerable for the obligations of its members. 
Members of the Association bear subsidiary liability62 for the debts of this As-
sociation which are left to cover after satisfying creditors’ claims with the As-
sociation property63. Association members bear subsidiary liability during two 
years after termination of their membership.  
                                                            
59  Based on Federal Act No. 7 “On Non-commercial Organisations”, Article 11 “Associa-
tions (unions)”, § 5: “The name of the association (union) should contain an indication of the 
main subject of its activity with the words “association” or “union” included”. 
60  Municipalities are exclusively considered as members since only FOCJs of type II are 
investigated in the thesis.  
61  Based on FA No. 7 “On Non-commercial Organisations”, Article 11, § 1 and the Civil 
Code of the RF, Article 123.9 § 1: “Legal entities and (or) citizens may form associations 
that are non-commercial organizations based on membership in order to represent and pro-
tect common including professional interests, to achieve socially useful, as well as other pur-
poses that are not contrary to federal laws and having non-commercial nature”. “The number 
of founders of an association (union) cannot be less than two”. 
62  Applicability of subsidiary responsibility is regulated by the Civil Code of the Russian 
Federation, Article 399, § 1: “Prior to filing claims against a person who has a subsidiary 
liability in accordance with the law, other legal acts or the terms of the obligation, the 
creditor must file a claim against the principal debtor. If the principal debtor refuses to 
satisfy the creditor’s claim or the creditor does not receive a response to the claim within a 
reasonable period of time, the claim may be brought against the person bearing subsidiary 
liability”. 
63  Based on FA No. 7 “On Non-commercial Organisations”, Article 11, Art. 399, § 3-4. 
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2.5. The minimum number of members of the Association is two. The number 
of municipal areas and urban districts of Voronezh region limit the maximum 
number of members of the Association. 
2.6. The procedure for admission to the Association and exclusion from the 
membership of its members, the amount and method of payment of entrance 
and annual membership fees shall be specified in this Statute, which is adopted 
by a decision of the General Assembly by a simple majority vote of the mem-
bers present at the meeting. 
2.7. Admission to the Association is carried out by the Chairman of the As-
sociation in accordance with the Statute.  
2.8. A new member must pay its share of property contribution (entrance fee) 
which is defined proportionally to the number of school-age pupils registered on 
the territory of the municipality that participate in the Association based on the 
data of Voronezh region state statistics service64. In return, a new member re-
ceives school education services of which quality is comparable to the average 
level already provided to its Members. 
2.9. Members of the Association must pay annual membership fees in the 
amount of costs which are not covered by subsidies from Voronezh region. A 
two-part tariff for covering annual membership fees is applicable where muni-
cipalities pay a lump-sum fee, related to maintenance of buildings and struc-
tures of schools, financing current fixed costs and those variable costs which are 
not covered by the region, and Voronezh region covers per-pupil variable 
costs65.  
2.10. Members of the Association may pay target and additional property con-
tributions to its property. The amount and method of payment of target and 
additional property fees are determined by the decision of the General As-
sembly of the Association by a simple majority of votes of the present members 
of the General Assembly. 
2.11. Entrance and annual membership fees can be paid in the form of: 
− resources in kind (buildings, lands, equipment, etc.);  
− monetary contributions; 
                                                            
64  The model of the establishment of FOCJs of type II, which is introduced in chapter 2, 





*Ē). However, if a new member joins an FOCJ of type II, the total equity capital Ē 
grows, then the solution is not optimal anymore and a new optimal share for each 
municipality ei
Ē
 must be found. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, for new entering 
members the share, that they must pay, relates to the number of school-age pupils in these 
municipalities. 
65  According to the model of current operation, described in chapter 2, the optimal fee that 
municipalities have to pay results in formula: P = l*L + m*M - G
X
. Variable costs comprise 
expenses on labour and materials, related to realisation of educational process, covered by 
regional subsidies in Russia. However, some variable costs which are not related to the 
educational process are financed by municipalities. The model assumes that current fixed 
costs are covered by each municipality separately.  
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− municipal subsidies; 
− donations and grants from higher level jurisdictions; 
− charitable donations, etc. 
2.12. Membership in the Association shall be terminated in cases of: 
− voluntary withdrawal from the Association; 
− exceptions from the members of the Association; 
− liquidation of the Association. 
2.13. A member of the Association may be excluded from its membership for 
failure to fulfil its statutory obligations. The decision on exclusion shall be 
made by the decision of the General Assembly by a qualified majority of votes 
(2/3 of the General Assembly of Members present at the meeting). 
 
§ 3. Legal status of the Association 
3.1. The Association in its activities shall be guided by the Constitution of the 
RF, Civil code of the Russian Federation, the Federal Act No. 273 “On Edu-
cation in the Russian Federation”, the Federal Law No. 7 “On Non-Commercial 
Organizations”, other federal laws and regulations of the Russian Federation, 
laws and other legal acts of the Voronezh region, regulatory legal acts of local 
governments of the Khokholsky, Nizhnedevitsky, Repiyovsky, Ostrogozhsky, 
Liskinsky municipal areas, as well as this Statute.  
3.2. The Association is considered to be established as a legal entity from the 
moment of its state registration in accordance with the procedure established by 
law66.  
3.3. The association is established without limitation of the period of activity. 
3.4. The Association has in ownership a separate property, is responsible for its 
obligations with this property, may acquire and exercise property and non-
property rights in its own name, bear obligations, be a plaintiff and defendant in 
court, enter into other legal relations. 
3.5. The Association has an independent balance sheet and has the right to open 
settlement, currency and other accounts with banking institutions and other cre-
dit organizations in the Russian Federation in accordance with the established 
procedure. 
3.6. The Association shall have a round seal registered in accordance with the 
established procedure.  
3.7. Interference in the activities of the Association of state and other bodies, 
except those authorized by law, is not allowed. 
 
§ 4. Tasks and field of activity 
4.1. The Association has the following tasks:  
− primary, basic and secondary education service provision for Anoshkinska-
ya, Bodejevskaya, Vladimirovskaya, Voznesenovskaya, Divnogorskay, Dob-
rinskaya, Drakinskaya, Yermolovskaya, Zaluzhenskaya secondary schools 
                                                            
66  Civil Code of the Russian Federation, Article 51. 
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located in Liskinsky municipal area; Kurbatovskaya, Kuchugurovskaya 
secondary schools, Mikhnevskaya, Nororotaevskaya basic schools located in 
Nizhnedevitsky municipal area; Pobedinskaya, Ternovskay basic schools, 
Pokrovskaya, Soldatskaya, Storozhevskaya, Uryvskaja secondary schools 
located in Ostrogozhsky municipal area; Istobinskaya, Kolbinskaya, Krasno-
lipevskaya, Platavskaya secondary schools located in Repiyovsky municipal 
area; Staronikolskaya, Kostenskaya, Oskinskaya, Yablochenskaya secondary 
schools located in Khokholsky municipal area in accordance with the 
Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federation” and the State 
Educational Standards;  
− material and technical support of educational activities, equipment of pre-
mises in accordance with state and local norms and requirements, including 
federal state educational standards, federal state requirements, educational 
standards;  
− organization of meals for students and employees; 
− creating conditions for students to participate physical education and sports; 
− assistance in the activities of pupils’ organisations and groups; 
− organization of scientific and methodical work, including the organization 
and holding of scientific and methodical conferences and seminars; 
− formation of open and publicly accessible information resources containing 
information on the activities of the Association, and providing access to such 
resources by placing them on the information and telecommunication net-
works, including the official website of the Association on the Internet; 
− other tasks in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation.  
4.2. The territorial scope of the Association results from the fulfilment of its 
task under § 4.1.  
4.3. Educational activity of the Association is a subject to licensing as well as 
the state accreditation67.  
4.4. The Association is not oriented to profit maximization, it should follow a 
cost-covering principle. 
 
§ 5. Association members’ rights68 
5.1. Members have the right to participate in making decisions regarding the 
Association;  
5.2. Members have the right to elect and be elected to the bodies of the Asso-
ciation;  
5.3. Members have the right to submit for consideration of the executive bodies 
of the Association proposals on the issues within their competence and to 
participate in the discussion of these issues; 
                                                            
67  In accordance with Federal Act No. 99 “On licensing of certain types of activities”, 
Article 12, § 1, section 40. The procedure for getting licence is regulated by Article 13.  
68  Based on Civil Code of the RF, Article 123.11 “Rights and duties of an association 
(union) member”, § 1 and Article 65.2, § 1.  
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5.4. Members have the right to participate in voting at the General Assembly of 
the Association members; 
5.5. Members have the right to participate in projects and programs of the 
Association in the field of education, science, editorial and publishing and other 
activities; 
5.6. Members have the right to participate in scientific conferences, sympo-
siums, exhibitions and other events organized by the Association; 
5.7. Members have the right to receive information on the activities of the As-
sociation and to get acquainted with its accounting, business plan, financial 
plan, property plan, debt plan, staff plan, project plan, etc.;  
5.8. Members have the right to appeal against decisions of the Association's 
bodies, which have civil legal consequences;  
5.9. Members have the right to request, on behalf of the Association69, to 
compensate damages caused to the Association70; 
5.10. Members have the right to appeal, acting on behalf of the Association, its 
transactions and to demand the application of the consequences of their 
invalidity, as well as the application of the consequences of the invalidity of 
insignificant transactions of the Association; 
5.11. Members have the right to quit the Association in the end of each finan-
cial year announcing three months in advance; 
5.12. Members have the right to decide on amendments in the Memorandum of 
the Association; 
5.13. Members may have additional rights, which must be stipulated in this 
Statute. 
 
§ 6. Association members’ obligations71 
6.1. Members are obliged to participate in the formation of the Association's 
property of the Association in the following composition:  
Khokholsky, Nizhnedevitsky, Repiyovsky, Ostrogozhsky, Liskinsky municipal 
areas form the Association property in the proportions defined by the rule 
stipulated in § 2.8 of this Statute. Property of the Association includes school 
buildings, school lands, busses, subsidies from the budgets of different levels 
and other forms of participation marked in § 7.3 of this Statute. 
6.2. Members are obliged to not to disclose confidential information about the 
Association's activities; 
6.3. Members are obliged to participate in decision-making according to the 
requirements formulated in § 10.2;  
6.4. Members should not harm the Association;  
                                                            
69  Civil Code of the Russian Federation, Article 182, § 1.  
70  Civil Code of the Russian Federation, Article 53.1. 
71  Based on Civil Code of the Russian Federation, Article 123.11 “Rights and duties of an 
association (union) member”, § 2 and Article 65.2, § 4.  
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6.5. Members are not expected to take any actions (inaction) that significantly 
complicate or make it impossible to achieve the goals for which the Association 
was established.  
6.6. Members are obliged to pay property shares related to their membership 
and annual membership fees;  
6.7. Members are obliged to make additional contributions to the property of 
the Association if the Association Assembly of Members has made an appro-
priate decision.  
6.8. Members are obliged to provide information about the number of pupils by 
levels of school education and other socio-economic information, which deter-
mines the volume of the Association’s services and its operation. 
6.9. Members are obliged to control licensing and accreditation of educational 
activity. 
6.10. Members are obliged to transfer to the Association the grants and dona-
tions which they received for conducting an activity of those schools that are 
included in the operations of the Association. 
6.11. Members may have additional obligations, which must be stipulated in 
this Statute. 
 
§ 7. Property of the Association72 
7.1. The Association owns and operates school buildings, structures, plots of 
lands, sport facilities and equipment, inventory, monetary funds in roubles, and 
bonds.  
7.2. The Association shall be liable for its obligations with the property, which 
may be foreclosed on under the legislation of the Russian Federation.  
7.3. The sources of formation of the Association's property are: 
− Regular and lump-sum payments from the Members, financial and resources 
in kind; 
− Voluntary property contributions and donations including those with a speci-
fic purpose, for the implementation of specific programs of the Association; 
− Income from the sale of school services for those municipalities that are not 
FOCJ members; 
− Grants and donations from higher level jurisdictions; 
− Dividends (income, interest) received on shares, bonds, other securities and 
deposits; 
− Other receipts not prohibited by law.  
7.4. The property of the Association is used only for realization of the purposes 
and solution of the tasks provided by the Statute of the Association in § 4.1.  
7.5. The period of regular payments from the members of the Association is the 
beginning of each financial year.  
7.6. If a member leaves the Association, it receives its share of participation in 
the property formation deducted by its share of the Association debt.  
                                                            
72  FA No. 7 “On Non-commercial Organizations”, Article 26 “Sources of property forma-
tion of a non-commercial organization”, § 1-4.  
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7.7. The Association has to consider a cost-covering principle. If in the finan-
cial period the Association receives profit, it should not be distributed among 
the members of the Association, but must be used for the statutory purposes. 
 
§ 8. Non-commercial status 
8.1. The Association pursues exclusively and directly the non-commercial 
purposes defined in § 4.1 of this Statute. The Association does not pursue profit 
making as its purpose and does not distribute the profit among the participants 
according to § 7.773.  
8.2. The Association may carry out income-generating activities insofar as they 
serve the purposes stated in § 4.1 of this Statute74.  
8.3. The budget of the Association may only be used for the statutory purposes.  
8.4. The Association should not favour any person by expenditure which is not 
in line with the purpose of the association or by disproportionately high remu-
neration.  
8.5. At liquidation of the Association, the property which has remained after 
satisfaction of creditors is directed to the purposes it has been created for, and 
(or) to municipal purposes. In case property of the liquidated Association can-
not be used according to its stated purposes, the income from its disposal will be 
distributed to the member municipalities in the proportional share of their 
participation. 
 
§ 9. Bodies of the Association 
The bodies of the Association are 
− the General Assembly of Members75. 
− the Chairman of the Association. 
− the Association Council76. 
− the Supervisory Board. 
− the Parents Board. 
 
§ 10. Tasks of the General Assembly of Members 
10.1. The main function of the Association's General Assembly of Members is 
to guarantee that the Association complies with the purposes and tasks for 
which it was established. 
                                                            
73  FA No. 7 “On Non-commercial Organisations”, Article 2 “Non-commercial organisa-
tion”, § 1. 
74  Based on Civil Code of the Russian Federation, Article 50 “Commercial and non-com-
mercial organisations”, § 4.  
75  As it is marked in FA No. 7 “On Non-commercial Organisations”, Article 29 “The 
supreme governing body of a non-commercial organisation”, § 1 for Associations (unions): 
“The supreme governing body for the association (union) in accordance with its Statute is 
the General Assembly of Members”. 
76  Based on Civil Code of the RF, Article 123.10, § 2: “An association (union) forms a sole 
executive body (chairman, president, etc.) and can form permanent collective executive 
bodies (council, board, presidium, committee)”.  
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10.2. The General Assembly shall be held at least once a year. An extra-
ordinary General Meeting may be convened as necessary by the Chairman, the 
Association Council, as well as on the recommendation of the Supervisory 
Board or initiative group of at least 10% of the Association members.  
10.3. Exclusive competence of the General Assembly of Members of the 
Association includes the following issues:  
− the definition of priority areas of Association's activities, principles of 
formation and use of its property; 
− the opening and closing schools, merging schools, location of new schools, 
types of provided educational services (primary, basic, secondary general 
education); 
− the organisation of pupils’ transportation to schools with the help of school 
buses; 
− the election of the Chairman of the Association as well as of the Deputy 
Chairman of the Association from among the members of the Association 
Assembly; 
− the exclusion of members of the Association and the admission of new 
members; 
− the amendment of the Statute of the Association and the dissolution of the 
Association; 
− the formation of bodies of the Association and early termination of their 
powers; 
− to take decisions on the establishment of other legal entities, on the partici-
pation of the Association in other legal entities, on the establishment of 
branches and on the opening of representative offices of the Association; 
− to take decisions on the budget plan, as well as to take decisions on the 
taking up of additional credits during the provisional budget implementation; 
− the adoption of the annual financial report, business plan, financial plan, 
property plan, debt plan, staff plan, project plan, and their approval; 
− the appointment of the auditor for the Association; 
− to take decisions on loan agreements and similar legal transactions, 
− the granting of planning contracts for the construction, extension or sub-
stantial modification of school facilities, 
− the granting of construction contracts and services with a value of more than 
______ mln. rubles, 
− the appointment and dismissal of a Chairman, Council members, Super-
visory Board members; 
− to take decisions on participation in another FOCJ. 
− to take decisions on reorganization and liquidation of the Association, 
appointment of the liquidation commission (liquidator) and approval of the 
liquidation balance sheet. 
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The issues referred to the exclusive competence of the General Assembly of 
Members of the Association may not be transferred for decision to other bodies 
of the Association77. 
10.4. The General Assembly of Members of the Association is authorized, if 
more than half of its members are present at the said meeting.  
10.5. A decision of the General Assembly of an Association may be made 
without holding a meeting by absentee voting, except for making decisions on 
the issues specified in paragraph 10.3. Such voting may be conducted by ex-
change of documents by post, telegraph, teletype, telephone, electronic or other 
communication ensuring authenticity of transmitted and received messages and 
their documentary confirmation. 
10.6. Decisions on the competence of the General Assembly (except for the 
issues of exclusive competence) are made by a simple majority of votes partici-
pating in the General Assembly of Members of the Association.  
10.7. Decisions on issues of exclusive competence are made by a qualified 
majority of 2/3 of votes of its members present78.   
10.8. The Association shall not be entitled to pay remuneration to the represen-
tatives of the Members of the General Assembly of Members for the perfor-
mance of their functions, except for the reimbursement of expenses directly 
related to participation in the work of the Assembly79. 
10.9. The General Assembly of Members may establish special purpose com-
mittees, such as a committee for educational matters, financing, projects, staff 
committee, etc. 
 
§11. Composition of General Assembly of Members 
11.1. Members of the Association take part in the General Assembly of the As-
sociation through their heads or other representative by the power of attorney. 
The norm of representation from each municipality-member in the Assembly of 
Members is 1 (one) person. Each member of the General Assembly has the 
number of votes proportional to the number of school-age pupils80 registered on 
the territory of municipality that participate the Association based on the data of 
Voronezh region state statistics service.   
11.2. General Assembly of Members is elected for 5 (five) years. The number 
of re-elections is not limited. 
                                                            
77  Based on FA No. 7 “On Non-commercial Organisations”, Article 29 “The supreme 
governing body of a non-commercial organization”, § 3.  
78  Based on FA No. 7 “On Non-commercial Organisations”, Article 29 “The supreme 
governing body of a non-commercial organization”, § 4. 
79  Based on FA No. 7 “On Non-commercial Organisations”, Article 29 “The supreme 
governing body of a non-commercial organization”, § 5.  
80  The number of votes, which members have in the General Assembly, can be defined not 
only by the number of school-age pupils in municipalities, but can also be defined by the 
number of pupils, belonging to different school level (primary, basic and secondary general 
education), by the number of taught hours, by the share of municipalities in equity capital, 
by the number of inhabitants in municipalities, etc. 
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11.3. Compensation of The Chairman of the Association, the Deputy Chair-
man(s), Members of Council and Supervisory Board is regulated by the rules 
for the state civil service of the Russian Federation81. 
 
§ 12. Convening of the General Assembly of Members 
12.1. The Association Assembly shall be convened by the Chairman of the As-
sociation in writing or electronically, stating the agenda, place and time of the 
meeting. The invitation must be made so that a period of at least one-week elap-
ses between its receipt and the day of the meeting. In urgent cases, the Chair-
man of the Association may reduce the period to twenty-four hours; the reduc-
tion of the period to less than three days shall be applied to cases of unavoidable 
necessity.  
12.2. The Association General Assembly meeting must be convened at least 
once a year. It must also be convened if the Association Council requests it, 
stating the subjects to be discussed. Similarly, at the request of the Supervisory 
Board of the Association, certain items of deliberation shall be included in the 
invitation referred to § 12.1.  
12.3. The Department for the Development of Municipalities of the Voronezh 
Region as a supervisory authority from the Voronezh region shall be timely in-
formed by the Chairman of the Association, enclosing the agenda. Its represen-
tatives shall have the right to participate in the Assembly meeting of the 
Association. Upon request, they shall be given the floor. 
12.4. The representative of the Department of Education, Science and Youth 
Policy of the Voronezh Region responsible for school matters and the school 
headmasters shall be invited to the meetings and have to be heard, unless the 
Association Assembly decides otherwise for the individual case.   
12.5. The meetings of the Association Assembly shall be chaired by the Chair-
man of the Association or – if he is not available to do so – by the Deputy 
Chairman of the Association. He appoints a secretary to record the minutes, 
who does not have to be a member of the Association Assembly.  
12.6. A record of the results of the negotiations of the Association Assembly 
shall be kept and signed by the Chairman of the Association and the Secretary. 
Copies of the minutes shall be sent to the Association Members, the Association 
Council, Supervisory Board and the Department for the Development of 
Municipalities of Voronezh Region (the supervisory authority).  
 
§ 13. The Chairman of the Association 
13.1. The Chairman of the Association is the sole executive body of the As-
sociation. The Chairman of the Association is accountable to the General As-
sembly of the Association and the Supervisory Board. The Chairman carries out 
the current management of the Association's activity in accordance with the 
decisions of the General Assembly and the Association Council.  
                                                            
81  Federal Act No. 79 “On State Civil Service of the Russian Federation”, Article 50. 
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13.2. The Chairman of the Association and his or her deputy shall be elected 
from the members of the General Assembly of Members.   
13.3. When establishing the Association, the Chairman is elected at the General 
Assembly of the Association. The period of the Chairman’s office is 5 (five) 
years. The number of re-elections is not limited. 
13.4. The Chairman acts without a power of attorney on behalf of the Associa-
tion, represents its interests in relations with public authorities and local govern-
ments, legal entities and citizens, and other persons, both in the Russian Federa-
tion and abroad, makes transactions, concludes contracts, issues powers of 
attorney, issues orders, carries out other legally significant and actual actions on 
behalf of the Association, except those referred to the competence of the Gene-
ral Assembly and the Association Council.  
13.5. The competence of the Chairman of the Association includes the fol-
lowing: 
− Implementation of the general management of the Association, ensuring the 
execution of decisions of the General Assembly, Association Committee, 
programs and projects of the Association; 
− Making decisions on operational issues of the Association's internal activity, 
approval of the Association's internal documents, except for the documents, 
approval of which is attributed to the competence of other bodies of the 
Association; 
− Determination and approval of the staff schedule and structure of the As-
sociation's working bodies, issuance of orders and other administrative docu-
ments on the Association's activities within the scope of its authority, 
issuance of instructions mandatory for all employees of the Association; 
− Compliance the Association activity with Civil Code, Federal Act No. 273 
“On Education in Russia”, and other relevant legal acts; 
− Opening of Association accounts in banking institutions, with the right of the 
first signing of financial documents; 
− Within the scope of the powers granted to him by the General Assembly, the 
Chairman manages the property and funds of the Association; 
− General management of the activities of the organizations created by the 
Association, coordination of the activities of branches and representative 
offices of the Association if they are created; 
− Maintenance of the register of Association members, admission to the As-
sociation and registration of voluntary resignation from the Association 
members; 
− Preparation of necessary materials and organization of the General Assembly 
and Association Council meetings, preparation of the annual report on the 
Association activities; 
− Exercising other functions that do not fall within the competence of other 
bodies of the Association. 
− Control over tax payment of the Association. 
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− In fulfilling his duties, the Chairman of the Association shall make use of a 
managing director and other auxiliary staff to be appointed or hired by the 
Association Assembly. 
 
§ 14. Competence of the Association Council 
14.1. The Association Council is a permanent collegial management body, 
carries out current management of the Association and is accountable to the 
General Assembly of the Association and Supervisory Board. The Association 
Council is elected by the General Assembly of the Association members for a 
period of 5 (five) years.  
14.2. The competence of the Association Council includes the resolution of all 
issues that do not constitute the exclusive competence of other governing bodies 
of the Association, such as the Chairman, The General Assembly of Members, 
Supervisory Board and the Parents Board82. 
14.3. Quantitative composition of the Council is determined by the decision of 
the General Assembly of the Association, but may not be less than 4 (four) 
members.   
14.4. The Association Council consists of the Chairman of the Association, the 
member who is an expert in education, the member who is an expert in finances 
and management, construction and maintenance, transportation. The deputies of 
the Council members to be nominated by the Association members must belong 
to the Association Assembly.    
14.5. If a member of the Association has appointed other persons according to 
the Association Assembly, these persons shall also represent the member of the 
Association in the Association Council.  
14.6. The Association Assembly for important reasons may dismiss the ap-
pointed members.  
14.7. Each Council member shall have the same number of votes in the Coun-
cil as the Association member represented by him in the Association Assembly.  
14.8. If there is an equal number of votes while making decisions, the votes of 
the Chairman are decisive.  
14.9. The Association Council is authorized to make decisions if more than 
half of the Association Council members are present at its meeting. 
14.10. Decisions are made by a simple majority of votes of the Association 
Council members present at the meeting. The Chairman shall lead the meetings, 
form the agenda and organize the work of the Association Council. Meetings of 
the Council shall be recorded. Minutes and decisions of the Council of the 
Association are signed by the Chairman of the Association.   
14.11. For the meetings and resolutions of the Association Council, the pro-
visions for the Association Assembly shall apply mutatis mutandis.  
14.12. The invitation period shall be determined in accordance with § 12 of the 
Association Statute. 
                                                            
82  FA No. 7 “On Non-commercial Organisations”, Article 30 “Executive bodies of a non-
profit organisation”, § 2. 
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§ 15. Supervisory Board83 
15.1. Supervisory board is established to control the activities of the executive 
bodies of the Association.  
15.2. The Supervisory Board of the Association includes members of the Asso-
ciation and representatives from the Parents Board. The number of members of 
the Supervisory Board cannot be less than 5 (five).  
15.3. Members of the Supervisory Board of are elected by the General As-
sembly for the period until the next annual General Assembly meeting. 
15.4. The members of the Supervisory Board are elected by cumulative voting: 
the number of votes belonging to each Association member is multiplied by the 
number of people to be elected to the Supervisory Board, and the member has a 
right to give the votes received in this way for one candidate or distribute them 
between two or more candidates. Candidates with the biggest number of votes 
are considered elected to the Supervisory Board of the Association. 
15.5. People elected to the Supervisory Board of the Association can be re-
elected an unlimited number of times. 
15.6. The Supervisory Board of the Association elects the Head of the Super-
visory Board from its members by majority of votes from total number of 
members of the Supervisory board. 
15.7. Members of the Council of the Association cannot comprise more than ¼ 
(one fourth) of the Supervisory Board of the Association. The Chairman of the 
Association cannot simultaneously be a Chairman of the Supervisory Board. 
15.8. Meetings of the Supervisory Board of the Association shall be convened 
as necessary, but not less than once every six months. Members of the Super-
visory Board of the Association do not act on behalf of the Association with 
third parties. 
15.9. By decision of the General Assembly, members of the Supervisory Board 
may be paid remuneration and/or reimbursed for expenses related to the perfor-
mance of their functions as members of the Supervisory Board during the 
period of performance of their duties. The amount of such remunerations and 
compensations shall be established by the resolution of the General Assembly 
of Members.  
15.10. The issues referred to the exclusive competence of the Supervisory 
Board of the Association cannot be transferred to the decision of the executive 
bodies of the Association. The Supervisory Board exclusive competences are: 
− approval, upon submission by the executive bodies, the business plan and 
other plans marked in § 10.3; 
− convening annual and extraordinary General Assembly of Members; 
− approval of the agenda of the General Assembly of Members; 
− determination of the price (monetary value) of the Association property; 
− formation of committees of the Supervisory Board; 
                                                            
83  Based on Federal Act No. 208 “On Joint Stock Companies”, Articles 64-68. 
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− determination of principles and approaches to risk management, internal 
control and internal audit of the Association; 
− approval of internal documents of the Association, except for internal docu-
ments, approval of which is referred to the competence of the General 
Assembly of Members, as well as other internal documents of the 
Association, approval of which is referred by the Statute of Association to 
the competence of the executive bodies of the Association; 
− approval of transactions of the sum more than _______ mln. roubles; 
− approval of credits in the sum more than ___________ mln. roubles; 
− approval of the leading staff appointment; 
− initiation of claims against Association management. 
− emergency decisions in case there is no possibility to make decisions by the 
General Assembly of Members.  
15.11. Decisions are made by a simple majority of votes of the Supervisory 
Board members present at the meeting. 
 
§ 16. The Parents Board 
16.1. The Parents Board is established to consider the opinion of parents (legal 
representatives) of juvenile pupils on the management of the educational institu-
tion and the adoption of local regulations affecting the rights and legitimate 
interests of juvenile pupils. 
16.2. The Parents Board are elected from the parent committees of the schools 
managed by the Association annually, not later than September 15. 
16.3. Composition of the Parents Board is approved by the order of the Chair-
man of the Association for the academic year not later than October 1 of the 
current year. 
16.4. Members of the Parents Board may resign from the Board of Parents at 
his/her own request. 
16.5. The tasks of the Parents Board include: 
− discussing and expressing an opinion on the adoption of local regulations of 
the Association that affect the rights and legitimate interests of juvenile 
pupils; 
− making proposals to improve the educational process; 
− informing the parents (legal representatives) of juvenile pupils about the 
decisions of the Parents Board; 
− assistance in carrying out school activities;  
− monitoring the organization of meals provision at schools;  
− assistance in organizing meetings with parents; 
− assistance in creating safe conditions for the educational process, compliance 
with sanitary and hygienic rules and regulations; 
− conducting explanatory work among the parents on compliance with the 
internal regulations at schools; 
− coordination of the choice of disciplinary punishment/inducement of 
students; 
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− election of representatives of the parental community to the commission for 
the settlement of disputes between participants in educational relations; 
− participation in the planning, preparation, conduct and analysis of extra-
curricular activities for the schools included in the Association. 
− Participation in the Supervisory Board of the Association. 
16.6. The Chairman the Parents Board shall be elected by a simple majority of 
votes at the first meeting. 
16.7. The Chairman of the Parents Board may attend meetings of management 
bodies of the Association about the issues within the competence of the Parents 
Board. 
16.8. During the school year at least 3 (three) meetings of the Parents Board are 
held. 
16.9. Decisions of the Parents Board are taken by a simple majority of votes. If 
the number of votes is equal, the Chairman of the Parents Board has the 
decisive vote.   
16.10. The meeting is considered to be valid if at least 2/3 of the members of the 
Parents Board are present at the meeting. 
16.11. Decisions of the Parents Board taken within its competence and in 
accordance with the law are of a recommendatory nature for the Bodies of the 
Association.  
16.12. Decisions of the Parents Board shall be brought to the attention of the 
Chairman of the Association by the Chairman of the Parents Board. If a 
decision of the Parents Board is rejected, the explanation must be given to the 
Parents Board in a written form. 
 
§ 17. Budget 
17.1. The Chairman of the Association shall notify the members of the 
Association of the draft Budget early enough, but at least one month before the 
adoption of the Budget. 
 
§ 18. Annual financial report and audit 
18.1. The Chairman of the Association shall present the annual financial report 
to the Assembly of the Association and the Supervisory Board, which shall 
verify them (local audit) and then approve them. The audit may be carried out 
by an Audit Committee appointed from among its members by a decision of the 
Association Assembly or another public auditing institution.  
18.2. After approval of the annual financial report, the Association Assembly 
shall also decide on business performance of the Association and the realisa-
tions of plan according to § 10.3.  
18.3. The obligation of the Chairman of the Association to arrange a higher-
rank audit according to the legal regulations remains unaffected. 
 
§ 19. Cash management 
19.1. For the management of the cash transactions, the Association sets up its 
own cash register, which has to be at the location of the Association Chairman.  
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19.2. The Chairman of the Association is responsible for organising the fulfil-
ment of accounting. 
 
§ 20. Subsidiaries and Representative offices 
20.1. The Association has the right to establish subsidiaries and open represen-
tative offices. 
20.2. A subsidiary of the Association is a separate subdivision of the Associa-
tion located outside the location of the Association and performing all or part of 
its functions, including the functions of a representative office. 
20.3. A representative office of the Association is a separate subdivision which 
is located outside the Association's location, represents the interests of the Asso-
ciation and protects them.  
20.4. Subsidiaries and representative offices of the Association are not legal 
entities, they are provided with the property of the Association and act on the 
basis of the approved regulations. The property of a subsidiary or representative 
office shall be accounted for on a separate balance sheet and on the balance 
sheet of the Association.  
20.5. The Association appoints the head of the subsidiaries and representative 
office, who acts on the basis of a power of attorney issued by the Chairman of 
the Association. The subsidiary and representative office shall operate on behalf 
of the Association that established them. 
20.6. The Association is responsible for the activities of its subsidiaries.  
 
§ 21. Reorganisation and liquidation of the Association 
21.1. The Association may be voluntarily reorganised84.  
21.2. Reorganization of the Association is carried out by the decision of the 
General Assembly of the Association, adopted by a qualified majority of two-
thirds of the votes present at the meeting. Reorganization of the Association is 
carried out in accordance with the Civil Code of the Russian Federation. 
21.3. The Association can be reorganized into a public organization, autono-
mous non-commercial organization or fund by the decision of its members85. 
The decision to reorganise the Association should be taken by all members who 
have concluded an agreement on its establishment86. 
21.4. The Association can be voluntarily liquidated87.  
21.5. Liquidation of the Association shall be carried out by the decision of the 
General Assembly of the Association Members, adopted by a qualified two-
thirds majority of votes present at the meeting. Liquidation of the Association 
shall be carried out in accordance with the Civil Code of Russia.  
 
                                                            
84  In the manner provided by Federal Act No. 7 “On Non-commercial Organisations”, 
Article 16 and Civil Code of the Russian Federation, Articles 57-60. 
85  Based on Civil Code of the RF, Article 123.8, § 4. 
86  Federal Act No. 7 “On Non-commercial Organisations”, Article 17, § 5. 
87  In the manner provided by Civil Code of the Russian Federation, Articles 61-64 and 
Federal Act No. 7 “On Non-commercial Organisations”, Articles 18-21. 
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21.6. The Association can be liquidated by court decision88.  
21.7. The members (participants) of Association or the body that decide on 
liquidation of the Association shall appoint a liquidation commission (liqui-
dator) and establish the procedure and terms of liquidation of the Association89. 
From the moment of appointment of the liquidation commission, the authority 
to manage the affairs of the Association shall be transferred to the commission. 
The liquidation commission shall act in court on behalf of the Association.  
21.8. The property which has remained after satisfaction of requirements of 
creditors is directed to the purposes it has been created for, and (or) to the muni-
cipal purposes. In case property of the liquidated Association cannot be used 
according to its stated purposes, it addresses in the income of the municipalities-
members in the proportional share of their participation90.  
21.9. Liquidation of the Association is considered to be completed after 
making an entry about it in the Unified State Register of Legal Entities91. 
 
§ 22. Amendments to the Statute of the Association 
22.1. Amendments to the Statute of the Association shall be made by decision 
of the General Assembly of the Association. The decision to amend the Statute 
shall be made by a qualified two-thirds majority of the Association members 
present at the meeting. 
 Amendments to the Statute are subject to state registration and become 
effective for third parties from the moment of state registration of the Statute. 
  
The third chapter has applied FOCJ concept and microeconomic theory for 
FOCJs of type II to the Russian school services. By matching together FOCJ of 
type II characteristic features and requirements of the Russian legal forms of 
companies, an appropriate legal form of association (union) has been discovered 
as the most suitable for school FOCJs of type II. Furthermore, municipal areas 
and urban districts are detected as adequate levels of municipalities, which can 
cooperate in the form of FOCJs of type II in Russia. FOCJ of type II appli-
cability to the Russian school services has been estimated based on the results 
of microeconomic modelling, document analysis and interviews with Russian 
school municipal and regional authorities, school directors and parents. Practi-
cal recommendations in the form of exemplary Memorandum and Statute for 
school FOCJs of type II in Russia conclude the third chapter. 
 
  
                                                            
88  Based on Civil Code of the RF, Article 61, § 3. 
89  In accordance with Civil Code of the Russian Federation and Federal Act No. 7 “On 
Non-commercial Organisations”, Article 18, § 3.  
90  Federal Act No. 7 “On Non-commercial Organisations”, Article 20. 
91  Federal Act No. 7 “On Non-commercial Organisations”, Article 21. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The author has investigated the concept of Functional Overlapping Competing 
Jurisdiction (FOCJs) and its applicability to enhance inter-municipal coopera-
tion in the provision of Russian school services. In answer to the main research 
question, it can be concluded that an FOCJ of type II is an applicable tool for 
inter-municipal cooperation and the provision of school services in Russia. The 
applicability of functional jurisdictions to Russian school services has been 
verified based on the outcome of FOCJ of type II microeconomic modelling, a 
document analysis of Russian legislation and the results of interviews with pub-
lic officials in Russian municipalities. The analysis of these three aspects has 
not revealed obstacles to the establishment of school FOCJs of type II in Russia. 
The FOCJ concept combines four components. FOCJs perform different 
functions, such as school education. They overlap in the same territory, compete 
for members and clients and are assumed to be jurisdictions that levy fees and 
possess internal democratic structures (e.g. management).  
We may distinguish between four types of FOCJs. They differ by members, 
which means that FOCJs of type I include only citizens as members who decide 
to establish an FOCJ for the provision of a particular service. The members of 
FOCJs of type II are governmental units, among them are municipalities, re-
gions, counties, states, etc. FOCJs of type III combine public and private legal 
entities, whereas type IV can be called a ‘mixed’ type, with all possible mem-
bers from first three types. This thesis investigates Functional Overlapping 
Competing Jurisdictions as a tool for enhancing inter-municipal cooperation 
between Russian municipalities; therefore, it concentrates on FOCJs of type II 
with municipalities as members. 
After analysing the entire scope of literature devoted to the FOCJ concept, 
the author has gained an understanding that the literature mainly discusses 
FOCJs of type I, which can also be explained by the fact that, initially, this ap-
proach was introduced by Swiss scientists Frey and Eichenberger as a new form 
of federalism and democratic initiative in Europe. Thus, this type of FOCJ can 
successfully function in Switzerland, where citizens with respect to municipal 
service production may belong to different jurisdictions at the same time but is 
only questionably applicable to other federal countries, such as Russia, where 
the density of the population is not equal among regions. At the same time, 
FOCJs of type II with municipalities as members seems to be appropriate for 
IMC in Russia as a good alternative to the amalgamation of municipalities un-
der the conditions of depopulation.  
Among all FOCJ classification types, especially type II with municipalities 
as members, the features of inter-municipal cooperation align. For example, 
FOCJ member municipalities cooperate when they decide to jointly fulfil one or 
several tasks included in the scope of their competence in order to mutually 
benefit. Cooperation should be voluntary and involve the dedication of re-
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sources from municipalities. Municipalities keep indirect control over the ser-
vices provided through the FOCJ Assembly of Members.   
In the general classification of IMC forms (IMC Toolkit Manual 2010), 
FOCJs of type II belong to formalised economic units with the appropriate legal 
status. Other forms of inter-municipal cooperation, such as informal cooperation 
of municipalities, municipal contracts and agreements, sub-contracting, public-
private partnership, are less advantageous for Russia and school services since 
they do not have a permanent nature and therefore cannot provide long-term 
solutions to social-economic and demographic problems. On the other hand, 
formalised economic long-term IMC in the form of functional enterprises pos-
sesses undeniable advantages. For example, municipal control over the services 
provided (Citroni et al. 2013), following of publicly oriented purposes by mu-
nicipalities (De Peuter, Wayenberg 2007), faster decision-making of manage-
ment without additional coordination with municipal authorities (Haveri, Airak-
sinen 2007), etc.  
However, the literature on IMC typologies still does not consider FOCJs as a 
form of formalised economic long-term inter-municipal cooperation, nor does it 
apply mathematical modelling to develop a microeconomic theory for estab-
lishing inter-municipal cooperation. Therefore, the author suggests including 
the classification of FOCJs in line with other IMC typologies, in particular con-
sidering microeconomic tools of analysis developed for FOCJs of type II.     
Since FOCJs of type II are economic units with their management and other 
internal administrative bodies, such an Assembly of Members, modelling of 
FOCJ activity comprises three sequential phases: establishment, current opera-
tion and competition for members. The second phase of FOCJ establishment, 
current operation, is essential for the analysis since, after FOCJs are established, 
all managerial functions are fulfilled mainly by the executive bodies responsible 
for FOCJ procurement. Therefore, in order to analyse the possible reactions of 
FOCJ management and members if external and internal political and economic 
factors change, an FOCJ of type II microeconomic theory has been developed in 
this thesis. For example, to detect how management and members are going to 
react if the volume of labour and materials, factor prices, tax rates, financial 
support from higher rank jurisdictions, demand, etc. change. In order to fulfil 
this aim of the thesis, the author applies methods of microeconomic theory and 
mathematical modelling. In each phase, an algebraic formula for the optimisa-
tion problem maximising the utility function of members, management or 
higher rank authorities has been formulated. 
In the basic model of FOCJ of type II establishment, the utility function of 
members is maximised. In order to establish an FOCJ of type II, municipalities 
have to dedicate financial and resources in kind to FOCJ of type II equity capi-
tal. The model determines the optimal share municipalities should contribute to 
the equity capital and the optimal number of FOCJ of type II participants that 
should form an equity capital based on the comparison of their costs and bene-
fits. If the benefits outweigh the costs, municipalities are eager to increase their 
FOCJ of type II share. First, the solution is found only under the condition that 
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municipalities contribute with only one kind of financing (e.g. real estate, mu-
nicipal land, credit, municipal budget resources). Second, an optimal solution is 
found in the case that municipalities participate with different financial and in-
kind resources.  
A lump-sum grant from a higher ranking authority, which can be, for exam-
ple, a regional educational department, as discovered via interviews, can be 
considered in the FOCJ of type II establishment model. If municipalities receive 
a grant for the establishment of an FOCJ, an optimal share of their participation 
in the FOCJ of type II equity capital increases, not because they have to invest 
more, but because their participation is partly compensated by the grant. At the 
same time, since the shares become larger, they can involve less municipalities 
in this cooperation. 
How management react to grants received from higher ranking jurisdictions, 
special financial means under monopolistic and oligopolistic market conditions, 
considering different types of management behaviour during the FOCJ of type 
II current operation phase, shows the model of FOCJ current operation. This 
model determines the internal combination of factor-input relations and an op-
timal fee level for municipalities. It implies that municipalities should cover the 
current costs of the FOCJ of type II by themselves via participation fee pay-
ment. The model assumes a cost coverage rule, which means that an FOCJ has 
no profit. The result of this model is an optimal fee tariff from the management 
point of view, which is characterised by two optimality conditions. The first one 
stipulates that the relations between marginal utility received from marginal 
factor input equal the proportion of marginal profit caused by the respective 
factor contribution. The second condition shows that the contribution fee, which 
municipalities regularly pay, should equal the average costs. The model is ap-
plicable in analysing how an optimal solution is changing if the utility function 
of management is different or output, factor prices, labour and materials are 
changing and what happens if an FOCJ of type II receives a non-negotiable 
grant. The latter case shows that if a grant is a lump-sum, the first optimality 
condition does not change. However, the contribution fee for municipalities gets 
lower and output grows.    
Moreover, FOCJs of type II can also receive grants through negotiations 
with higher level jurisdictions during the current operation phase. The result of 
the model is a negotiation solution determined according to Nash for a coopera-
tive non-zero-sum game. In this model, not only an FOCJ of type II but also a 
higher rank authority maximises its utility function depending on output and the 
size of the grant. Since output depends on the amount of the grant, there is a 
solution where output volume, resulting from negotiation, depends on the eval-
uation of the grant, the evaluation of additional output allowed by the grant and 
the evaluation of the negotiating partners of the output. The amount of the grant 
resulting from negotiation is determined by this output, the minimum utilities of 
the negotiators and the parameters of the evaluation functions. With the higher 
grant induced, evaluation of the additional output by the FOCJ management, the 
volume of output and the size of the grant will increase. 
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Different means of financing influence the optimal solution of the model of 
the FOCJ of type II current operation as well. In this model, special financial 
costs are included in total costs and considered a part of factor prices. The solu-
tion of the model provides special financial guidelines. One concerns the input 
of production factors: the relation between marginal utilities from changing 
finance and material marginally equals the relation of the marginal profits con-
nected to finance and materials, and the relation between marginal utilities from 
changing finance and labour marginally equals the relation of the marginal 
profits connected to finance and labour. The other solution stipulates that the 
amount of the contribution municipalities have to pay equals average costs. If 
the size of finance-related factor prices depends on factor inputs, the optimal 
conditions are changing, which affects the input, output and fee. 
How the utility function of management and different market forms influ-
ence management decision-making is shown in subchapter 2.2. The author pro-
vides analytical solutions for labour, material, output, utility and participation 
fee with respect to four cases of management behaviour both in monopoly and 
oligopoly markets. The analytical solution for the fees is rather complicated; 
therefore, only numerical examples have been included in this thesis under an 
assumed combination of parameters. The author has found Launhardt-Hotelling 
solutions and Krelle-Ott spaces for two FOCJs of type II under the assumption 
that the management of both of them have the same behaviour of management. 
Moreover, the analytical solutions for labour and materials make it possible to 
derive demand functions for labour and material production factors for each of 
the four cases in monopoly and oligopoly. The optimal solutions for output 
provide a basis for the FOCJ of type II supply functions with respect to each 
case of management behaviour and market forms. 
By turning to the basic model of current operation, an optimal contribution 
fee has been found for monopoly. However, the author makes extensions and 
tackles oligopoly in the thesis as well. The costs are fully covered by the FOCJ 
of type II in oligopoly as well as in monopoly. In literature, it is mainly assumed 
that the management’s main goal is profit, sales or turnover maximisation. Fol-
lowing the idea of Williamson (1964) that management in corporations maxim-
ises utility, which depends on their own objectives and not the utility of stake-
holders, this thesis focuses on an FOCJ of type II as a company where manage-
ment maximises their utility. Their utility may depend on many factors, such as 
financial remuneration, social prestige, self-realisation, realisation of public 
goals, etc. However, this thesis, similar to Friedrich, Ukrainski, Timpmann 
(2014), focuses on four separate cases where management utility function de-
pends on both public and private goals:  
• Case I: volume of labour involved in the production and output received  
• Case II: output singularly  
• Case III: labour singularly 
• Case IV: labour positively and output negatively. 
The author formulates these four cases of management behaviour algebraically.  
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In the Launhardt-Hotelling model, the autonomous behaviour of two FOCJs 
of type II, where contribution fees are the parameters of action, is assumed. 
Launhardt-Hotelling behaviour is combined with Krelle behaviour under the 
specifications of Ott. Implementation of the Launhardt-Hotelling model in the 
condition of FOCJs of type II allows the identification of a combination of fees 
p1 and p2 where the oligopolistic market with two firms reaches its equilibrium. 
Moreover, the combination of these fees varies depending on the management 
case each FOCJ of type II possesses. The equilibrium points are found for four 
cases of management behaviour algebraically. The solution according to the 
Krelle-Ott model is a fee stability region. If two FOCJs end up by adaptation or 
external influences in this area, they do not change their fees anymore. These 
Krelle-Ott areas have also been calculated algebraically for four cases of man-
agement behaviour. The Krelle-Ott space can also move depending on changes 
in market parameters.  
FOCJs of type II might not reach the Launhardt-Hotelling solution, for 
example, for external reasons or owner interventions. If they do, they do not 
realise cost coverage. Hence, they might realise a profit, which contradicts the 
assumed cost coverage rule. If such situations occur, FOCJ management may 
try to hide the profit using an appropriate cost accounting approach, by con-
sidering the municipality’s costs as FOCJ of type II costs or by referring costs 
of one service to another if the FOCJ of type II provides different services in 
order to equalise turnover and costs artificially. To avoid this situation, special 
restrictions in the institutional environment must be introduced, e.g. by the rules 
stated in laws and statutes. With the Launhardt-Hotelling model, the author 
discovers how the management acts on factor markets and what happens if the 
employment level changes. Moreover, with this model, the way restrictions on 
factors and output, and also subsidies and taxes, can change the solution can be 
analysed. 
The highest monopoly fee has been identified by the author for FOCJs of 
type II maximising labour (Case III). The same is true for oligopoly at the 
Launhardt-Hotelling equilibrium point. FOCJs of type II with Case II of 
management behaviour maximising output show the highest output in mo-
nopoly. FOCJs of type II with Case I of management maximising output and 
labour obtain the highest total output and utility value in duopoly (neglecting 
the less productive Case III of management behaviour). In terms of fee level, 
management maximising output (Case II) shows the lowest fee both in mo-
nopoly and duopoly. Therefore, Cases I and II of management behaviour are 
more favourable for members of FOCJs of type II. The generally expected and 
confirmed result is that fees are higher in monopoly than in the oligopolistic 
market and output is bigger in oligopoly than in monopoly.  
For the Krelle-Ott area, numerical examples have shown that the smallest 
area in which competitors do not change their fees is in Case IV, with manage-
ment evaluating labour positively and output negatively. The biggest fee sta-
bility area is in Case I of management behaviour where management evaluates 
both labour and output positively. Cases II and IV have comparable Krelle-Ott 
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areas. Case III of management behaviour has three points where the Stackelberg 
equilibrium is reached. Therefore, the shape of the Krelle-Ott space is not 
smooth in this case.   
In the basic model of FOCJ current operation, it is assumed that FOCJ mem-
bers (municipalities) intervene only by formulating the cost coverage rule, 
which FOCJ management must follow. This means that management is free to 
choose the output they produce. However, according to stipulations fixed in the 
Statute of an FOCJ of type II, its Assembly of Members might directly in-
fluence the output, for example, by setting a minimum output requirement, and 
management must fulfil some of the members’ orders. Another situation is pos-
sible where members and management negotiate an output volume to produce. 
In this case, management has requirements with respect to minimum utility that 
they would like to receive, and members require a minimum output to be pro-
duced. 
With respect to the competition for members, the author graphically shapes a 
corresponding model. It shows the distribution of members between two es-
tablished and competing FOCJs of type II. The solution of the basic model is an 
optimal size for two competing FOCJs of type II and, if the size grows, it leads 
to congestion of the FOCJ of type II and a decrease in the quality of services 
provided. This is comparable to the solution of Buchanan.  
The effects of a lump-sum grant are demonstrated in the competition for 
members model as well. These grants can be received from higher-level autho-
rities. They increase the net-benefit of the members of two competing FOCJs of 
type II. If both FOCJs of type II get an equal volume of grants, the new alloca-
tion point does not change the distribution of members among FOCJs of type II. 
The members of both FOCJs of type II will just have a higher net-benefit than 
they did before receiving the grant; they still choose the FOCJ of type II which 
allows the highest net-benefit. However, if one of the competing FOCJs of type 
II receives a bigger grant, the allocation of members changes in favour of the 
FOCJ of type II with a higher grant, which gives a higher net-benefit for its 
members. Hence, the distribution of members between the two FOCJs of type II 
has changed.  
In the model of FOCJ competition for members, net-benefit curves may also 
reflect the consequences of different means of financing. The model shows that 
a change in financing conditions will change the net-benefit curves of FOCJs’ 
members. There are two situations under observation here. If only one financial 
policy is possible for the FOCJ of type II, the optimal distribution of members 
will vary depending on the availability of a more advantageous policy for mem-
bers. Advantageous is used in the sense of the net-benefit members receive 
when applying this policy. The net-benefit curves for one FOCJ of type II do 
not cross here. If many financial policies are available and the net-benefit 
curves cross with respect to one FOCJ of type II, then the curves between the 
crossing points must be compared. The curves of the highest net benefit 
between the crossing points show the most favourable financial policy for one 
FOCJ of type II, similar to the other one. The crossing point of the two optimal 
237 
curves reflects the resulting allocation of members to the two FOCJs of type II 
and the related optimal financial policy. 
The empirical analysis has been undertaken applying the document analysis 
of Russian legal acts and the interview method. Interviews in Russia were espe-
cially valuable in obtaining information which cannot be received via literature 
and document analysis. They provided valuable insights into the legal possibili-
ties for municipal cooperation, the involvement of municipalities and regions in 
decision-making, sector-specific conditions, the fiscal opportunities of the 
municipalities and regions, the relations between municipalities of different 
levels and the region with respect to schools. The aim of the interview with Bo-
densee water provision association was to gather information about how inter-
municipal cooperation in the form of an FOCJ of type II is organised in prac-
tice: what financial, organisational and juridical aspects are important to con-
sider in its establishment documents?  
Beforehand, in order to gain a preliminary understanding, the author studied 
legal acts on education and local self-governance in the Russian Federation as 
well as the Russian Civil Code. This information, the main characteristics of 
FOCJs of type II obtained from the literature analysis and the results of micro-
economic modelling were used to design the interview questions. In turn, the 
findings from the interview have been used to answer the question of whether it 
is possible to establish FOCJs of type II in Russia, to verify whether all reality 
factors of the Russian school system are considered by the FOCJ microeco-
nomic models and to develop a Statute and Memorandum. Therefore, the 
methodology developed assists in contributing to the literature devoted to the 
FOCJ concept.      
As a special sphere of activity, educational organisations can be established 
only in one of the non-commercial legal forms in Russia. Considering this as-
pect, the author has mainly focused on them. A document analysis follows an 
FOCJ literature analysis, which provided a list of characteristic features of 
FOCJs of type II. To find an appropriate legal form for FOCJs of type II in Rus-
sian legislation, these features should find reflection in the description of non-
commercial legal forms of companies according to the Civil Code and other 
laws. The main difficulty here was finding legal forms that match all FOCJ of 
type II features simultaneously. 
As the analysis of legal forms suitable for inter-municipal cooperation has 
revealed, school FOCJs of type II in Russia can be established only in the form 
of an association (union). Current legislation provides two non-commercial 
forms – autonomous non-commercial organisations and funds – which are sug-
gested for the cooperation of municipalities in Russia. However, autonomous 
non-commercial organisations and funds are not suitable for FOCJs of type II 
because they do not assume membership of their founders and therefore no par-
ticipation fees can be collected for the current operation activity. Since the the-
sis focuses on FOCJs of type II, there is only one non-commercial legal form of 
association (union) where municipalities can be members and founders, can 
voluntarily enter and quit, overlap and compete for members, have democratic 
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procedures and structures and a published statute and levy fees and contribu-
tions.  
Russian legislation devoted to relationships between municipalities requires 
better clarification and structuring. For example, the possibility to organise IMC 
in a legal form of association (union) should be explicitly included in Article 69 
of Federal Act No. 131 “On the general principles of organisation of local self-
governance in the Russian Federation” in one line with autonomous non-com-
mercial organisations and funds. Furthermore, as an additional recommenda-
tion, the author finds that a special public law regime would be useful for 
Russia, which would regulate the activities of state and municipal authorities 
and public enterprises, including FOCJs of type II. This special public law re-
gime is necessary to emphasise the exceptional role of public enterprises and 
show their unique rights and obligations because the Russian Civil Code does 
not distinguish between public and private legal forms so far. 
Russia is a federal state with a federal structure, including the level of Fede-
ration, the regional level of administration (subjects of the Russian Federation) 
and the municipal level. The latter consists of two types of municipality: mu-
nicipal areas and urban districts are upper-level municipalities; urban and rural 
settlements are lower-level municipalities. The right to establish, reorganise, 
liquidate and found schools belongs to the authorities at the municipal level. 
However, only upper-level municipalities, such as municipal areas, municipal 
and urban districts and urban districts with intra-city division may organise the 
provision of school services in Russian municipalities. The other types of muni-
cipalities, such as rural and urban settlements, are not competent to make deci-
sions concerning school service provision. Upper-level municipalities are autho-
rised to decide on the establishment, reorganisation and liquidation of school 
educational organisations, the maintenance of the buildings and structures of 
schools, the arrangement of adjacent territories, etc.  
FOCJ of type II managerial bodies make decisions regarding a number of 
factor inputs, the size of the output produced, the preferred factor prices, the 
fulfilment of the cost coverage rule, the qualification of teachers, the quality of 
teaching materials, etc. on a regular basis. Their decisions are not always made 
in accordance with the priorities of FOCJ of type II member municipalities and 
FOCJ statutory purposes. At the same time, FOCJ management should possess 
enough freedom to fulfil its tasks to make an FOCJ of type II attractive so that 
current municipalities stay in the FOCJ of type II and new member municipali-
ties join it. Therefore, to avoid unfavourable decisions and actions of FOCJ 
management and clarify its spectrum of responsibilities, there are different ways 
to coordinate management actions. By introducing a special legal framework, 
unfavourable management decisions can be reduced in the long run. For this 
purpose, the author has developed an exemplary school FOCJ of type II Statute 
and Memorandum. As a basis for these establishment documents, an association 
has been identified as an appropriate legal form for inter-municipal cooperation 
in Russia. Associations are required to have two establishment documents: 
Statute and Memorandum. The Statute is more detailed and contains guidelines 
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on how the Association should work, while the Memorandum expresses an ini-
tiative of parties to establish a joint company. The provisions of the Statute and 
Memorandum may overlap. This thesis complements the standard provisions of 
these documents with information important for FOCJs of type II, such as the 
results of theoretical models and the empirical insights obtained from the inter-
views with the representatives of school education authorities in the munici-
palities and region and the FOCJ-like form of inter-municipal cooperation in 
Germany (Bodensee Zweckverband).  
Among the most important provisions of the Statute are the FOCJ of type II 
members; the goals and subject of activity; the competencies of executive 
bodies; the rights and obligations of members; the entrance and annual member-
ship fee payment; the procedure of decision-making; the liquidation and re-
organisation procedure; the tasks of the supreme body; the FOCJ of type II in-
ternal organisational structure; etc. 
 Stipulations regarding who is allowed to attend school FOCJs of type II af-
fect the size of output; therefore, it should be marked in the FOCJ of type II 
Statute. Moreover, clarification of consumers in the Statute defines the market 
structure and the demand function and influences solutions for an FOCJ of type 
II optimal plan. FOCJ members can be divided into groups with respect to the 
quality of school services provided to them or the diversity of the services they 
consume from the FOCJ of type II. The question of whether children from other 
non-member municipalities can attend school FOCJs of type II affects the size 
of output. Thus, this information is crucial to define in the FOCJ of type II 
Statute. 
The goals of an FOCJ of type II fixed in the Statute determine the case of 
management behaviour desired by FOCJ members so that unfavourable Cases 
III and IV of FOCJ management are simply excluded by the goals of the FOCJ 
of type II stipulated in the Statute. The tasks and fields of activity should be 
emphasised in the Statute as well. Whether an FOCJ of type II provides only 
primary educational services or basic or secondary (complete) education affects 
the demand size.  
The paragraphs of the Statute devoted to members and the Assembly of 
Members show how powerful they are in relation to the executive bodies, the 
kinds of decisions they transfer to be made by the FOCJ of type II executive 
bodies and the responsibilities of the Assembly itself. Additionally, the compe-
tencies of management bodies included in the Statute are necessary because 
they steer management activities towards Cases I and II of management be-
haviour, avoiding Cases III and IV. 
When municipalities become members of school FOCJs of type II, they 
transfer their responsibilities concerning school administration to FOCJs of type 
II as well as all kinds of financial support they receive for schools at the federal 
or regional level. Schools may also partly transfer their management bodies to 
the FOCJ of type II level, but they may still have some personnel that tackle 
everyday issues. For example, school directors and maintenance administrators. 
However, general decision-making and management of schools is moved to 
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FOCJs of type II as well as the responsibility to cover schools’ costs. A school 
FOCJ of type II may include one or several schools under its administration. 
FOCJs of type II form their own budget to cover costs via regional and federal 
subventions and grants, municipal regular fees and other sources that should be 
set out by the FOCJ of type II Statute. 
Provisions concerning membership and entrance fees are linked to the results 
of theoretical modelling and interviews. According to the information received 
from the analysis of interviews and legal acts, regional educational authorities 
finance labour costs and the costs of materials related to educational processes, 
such as textbooks and teachers’ salaries. At the same time, municipalities are 
responsible for the maintenance of the buildings and structures of schools. 
Therefore, a mathematical solution for two-part tariffs has been adopted from 
the models of establishment and current operation of FOCJs of type II to be set 
out in the FOCJ of type II Statute. Other rules of entrance and regular fee pay-
ment as well as other sources can be imposed as well depending on the decision 
of the FOCJ of type II Assembly of Members. 
The Statute should also contain the procedure for decision-making for FOCJ 
of type II bodies. The basis for the distribution of votes (such as the statistical 
number of school-age children in municipalities) and voting rules must be 
marked. The number of votes may be directly linked to output (number of 
pupils) or the share of a municipality in the FOCJ of type II equity capital. This 
shapes the results of voting and gives more way to some FOCJ of type II mem-
ber municipalities.  
FOCJs of type II might have subsidiaries and representative offices. In this 
case, information about them must be provided in the establishment documents. 
Usually such subsidiaries are created due to the special teaching or technologi-
cal approach that can be adopted by schools not included in the FOCJ of type II.  
The provision of the Statute related to the liquidation procedure emphasises 
the priority of the non-commercial goals of the Association because the proper-
ty contribution of members must be returned to them in the share of their par-
ticipation and used by municipalities for educational, cultural, social and other 
statutory purposes. However, if this is not possible, municipalities may use it for 
other purposes not prohibited by law. 
How to organise permanent long-term inter-municipal cooperation with the 
primary aim of reducing municipal expenses for public services under the con-
ditions of decreasing population is a topical issue in many countries. It is espe-
cially topical for Eastern European and developing countries, such as Russia, 
where practices of IMC are very few. This thesis provides theoretical and em-
pirical recommendations regarding aspects that should be considered when es-
tablishing cooperation of municipalities in the form of Functional Overlapping 
Competing Jurisdictions of type II. 
In particular, this thesis is of practical interest to the Russian policy-makers 
who are responsible for territorial development and municipal planning. For 
heads of municipal areas and urban districts initiating inter-municipal coopera-
tion in municipalities, this thesis contains detailed guidelines on what should be 
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considered in school FOCJ of type II establishment documents. The FOCJ of 
type II Statute and Memorandum include solutions on how the shares of mu-
nicipalities must be calculated and how to decide on the level of the regular 
participation fee, etc. In addition, municipalities might gain insights regarding 
the management type that should be employed for performing the current ac-
tivity of an FOCJ of type II. If the aims of management cannot be revealed be-
fore they are employed, decisions can be regulated by the provisions stated in 
the FOCJ of type II Statute. This is useful for excluding management decisions 
that deviate from the statutory purposes of FOCJs of type II. 
Since regional authorities provide subventions for schools to municipalities, 
which partially cover the municipal costs related to educational processes, re-
gional school educational authorities might also be interested in school optimi-
sation and cost reduction via the FOCJ of type II network.  
School FOCJs of type II may focus on a particular educational level (e.g. 
primary or secondary general education), develop unique educational ap-
proaches and open access to technical and human resources (teachers) that 
single municipalities could not have done previously (Friedrich, Reiljan 2011). 
Basically, FOCJ of type II municipalities create a shared pool of material re-
sources. Service receivers might gain most of this since the quality of school 
services is not equal everywhere in Russia. The situation is especially difficult 




FOCJs of type II are economic units with municipalities that are founders and 
members. This means that the economic long-term cooperation of municipali-
ties is under investigation in this thesis, which assumes FOCJs of types II. Other 
FOCJ types, such as I, III and IV, should be analysed in a similar way. 
This thesis points to a broader overview of alternative forms of inter-munici-
pal cooperation, such as joint projects, cooperation contracts, joint public enter-
prises, public-private partnerships, etc. in Chapter 1. Following the strengths of 
the long-term, formalised cooperation of municipalities suggested by the litera-
ture analysis, this thesis focuses on Functional Overlapping Competing Juris-
dictions of type II as one of the more advantageous forms. However, a deeper 
comparative analysis of the alternative forms of inter-municipal cooperation in 
application to the Russian context can be a matter for further investigations. 
Another possible extension would be to consider the municipal reform of school 
centralisation as an alternative approach in dealing with depopulated munici-
palities.  
The general advantages of FOCJs of type II are summarised in subchapter 
1.2. However, a more complex approach, imbedding cost-benefit analysis or 
utility analysis, can be applied to uncover the advantages and disadvantages of 
FOCJs of type II and other types for Russia.   
Investigations shown in the theoretical chapter for the FOCJ of type II can 
also be developed further. The author cannot conduct an ex-post evaluation of 
an FOCJ policy implementation to Russian regions because FOCJs of type II 
have not yet been introduced in Russia. Therefore, it is a matter of future re-
search. This should be followed by determining the location and number of all 
FOCJs of type II in Russia. An equilibrium model for the FOCJs of type II 
using Tiebout’s approach, gravity models, cluster analysis (Isard 1956), etc. can 
be developed as well.  
It has been revealed via interviews that the Russian public officials respon-
sible for school administration in municipalities and the management of 
schools, in general, positively evaluate the idea of the establishment of school 
FOCJs of type II. To analyse whether FOCJs of type II is an attractive concept 
for politicians as well, more interviews should be arranged. For example, at the 
regional level with representatives of Voronezh Regional Duma (Voronezh 
Regional Parliament). 
It is not possible to include stochastic models in the thesis so far since there 
are no data on FOCJs of type II in Russia. However, this direction of research 
should not be excluded in future. In order to test the microeconomic models 
developed in this thesis, the first step could be to collect statistical data on 
FOCJs of type II in Austria, Germany, Switzerland and the United States, where 
FOCJs of types I and II exist. The effect of introducing FOCJs of type II on 
educational success can also be statistically checked for these countries.  
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Considering the main features of FOCJs of type II, it might be possible to 
identify, applying a regression analysis, which regions of Russia have more 
favourable conditions for inter-municipal cooperation in the form of FOCJs of 
type II. 
Additionally, FOCJ management behaviour can be modelled assuming dif-
ferent types of market structure in comparison, such as monopoly, oligopoly, 
monopolistic competition, etc. In the oligopolistic model of current operation, 
the author found Launhardt-Hotelling solutions and Krelle-Ott spaces assuming 
that the management of two FOCJs of type II have the same case of behaviour.  
However, cases of FOCJ competition with different managerial behaviour can 
be investigated in future research.  
Game-theoretical approaches and principal-agent problems, which are only 
partly involved in the thesis, can be developed further as well. 
The empirical chapter focuses on the school level because municipalities are 
responsible for school educational organisations. However, other levels of edu-
cation can be tackled similarly, considering the fact that regional and federal 
authorities are in charge of vocational and higher educational institutions, 
respectively. Whether FOCJ of type II inter-municipal cooperation is possible 
for other educational levels can also be questioned. 
The applicability of FOCJs of type II to other publicly provided services 
(e.g. water supply, waste collection) in Russia can be checked as well. Other 
sectors of economy might have their own specificities, such as different pro-
duction factors, different levels of governance (e.g. regional, federal authori-
ties), other legislation and standards that regulate this sphere, etc. Additionally, 
a comparison of the conditions in Russia and, for example, Germany, where 
FOCJ of type II-like inter-municipal cooperation in the form of Zweckverband 
has existed for a long time could be conducted. 
Interviews have only been conducted in one region of Russia, but a case 
study of other regions can similarly be tackled. The Voronezh region has been 
selected for the analysis because it is an illustrative example of the declining 
birth rate with a reduction in the number of schools and pupils. However, there 
are other regions experiencing a better demographic situation. An investigation 
of the potential for IMC in these regions could be useful for a comparison be-
tween regions. Whether rural or urban areas are more promising for the es-
tablishment of FOCJs of type II is also an open question.  
The institutional part of the thesis can be developed further. For each type of 
FOCJ, the suitable legal forms of a company can be identified, which is partly 
fulfilled by this thesis. It is also necessary to check with respect to Russian 
legislation whether schools included in the FOCJ of type II may be legal per-
sons or only subsidiaries with no legal personality.  
As an institutional framework for the regulation of relationships between 
FOCJ management and members, this thesis offers an exemplary FOCJ of type 
II Statute and Memorandum in subchapter 3.4. These documents are applicable 
to Russia, but their suitability for FOCJs of type II in other countries should be 
investigated. There are other ways to coordinate management behaviour, such 
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as a special regional policy, regional subsidisation, direct orders, etc., which can 
be discussed as alternatives to the legal framework. Additionally, in order to 
avoid unfavourable decisions of FOCJ management, which can happen ac-
cording to the results of Chapter 2, and to determine the rights and obligations 
of FOCJ of type II bodies, a Public Corporate Governance Code can be de-
veloped for school FOCJs of type II in Russia.   
General adaptation measures after the establishment of an FOCJ of type II 
with respect to how FOCJs of type II should be financed: from federal, regional 
or municipal budgets, how schools should be located, whether transportation of 
pupils and teachers is necessary and whether a special education system should 
be introduced for FOCJ of type II staff and teachers could also be matters of 
future research. A detailed investigation into whether all of the requirements of 
the Russian Federal State Education Standards are considered by the FOCJ of 














Acocella, N. (2005). Economic Policy in the Age of Globalisation. Cambridge, New 
York, Madrid: Cambridge University Press.  
Adams, W. (2015). Conducting Semi-Structured Interviews. In: Handbook of Practical 
Program Evaluation (pp. 492–506), J. S. Wholey, H. P. Hatry, K. E. Newcomer 
(Eds.): John Wiley & Sons. 
Albach, H. (1980). Average and Best-Practice Production Functions in German In-
dustry. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 29(1), 55–70. 
Aldag, A. M., Warner, M. (2018). Cooperation, not cost savings: explaining duration of 
shared service agreements. Local Government Studies, 44(3), 350–370. 
Allen, R. G. D. (1967). Macro-economic Theory: A Mathematical Treatment. New 
York: St Martin’s Press. 
Allers, M. A., De Greef, J. A. (2018). Intermunicipal cooperation, public spending and 
service levels. Local Government Studies, 44(1), 127–150. 
Andreev, A. L. (2013). On the Modernization of Education in Russia. Russian Social 
Science Review, 54 (5), 4–21. 
Anishenko, A. G., Sergunin, A. (2012) Twin cities: a new form of cross-border coopera-
tion in the Baltic Sea Region? Baltic Region, 1(1), 19–27. 
Arntsen, B., Torjesen, D. O., Karlsen, T.-I. (2018). Drivers and barriers of inter-munici-
pal cooperation in health services – the Norwegian case. Local Government Studies, 
44(3), 371–390. 
Baba, H., Asami, Y. (2020). Municipal population size and the benefits of inter-munici-
pal cooperation: panel data evidence from Japan. Local Government Studies, 46(3), 
371–393. 
Bailey, S. J. (1999). Local Government Economics: Principles and Practice. London: 
Macmillan. 
Bartholomae, F. W., Popescu, A. M. (2007). The Role of Regional Competition for 
Demography and Regional Disparities in Germany. Romanian Journal of Regional 
Science, 1(1), 45–70. 
Bartholomae, F., Wiens, M. (2016). Spieltheorie: Ein anwendungsorientiertes Lehr-
buch. Wiesbaden: Springer. 
Baumol, W. J. (1959). Business Behavior, Value and Growth. New York: Macmillan. 
Bel, G., Fageda, X. (2006). Between Privatization and Intermunicipal Cooperation: 
Small Municipalities, Scale Economies and Transaction Costs. Urban Public Eco-
nomics Review, 6, 13–31. 
Bel, G., Fageda, X., Mur, M. (2013). Why Do Municipalities Cooperate to Provide 
Local Public Services? An Empirical Analysis. Local Government Studies, 39(3), 
435–454. 
Bel, G., Gradus, R. (2018). Privatisation, contracting-out and inter-municipal coopera-
tion: new developments in local public service delivery. Local Government Studies, 
44(1), 11–21. 
Bel, G., Warner, M. E. (2015). Inter-Municipal Cooperation and Costs: Expectations 
and Evidence. Public Administration, 93(1), 52–67. 
Bel, G., Warner, M. E. (2016). Factors explaining inter-municipal cooperation in servi-
ce delivery: a meta-regression analysis. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 19(2), 
91–115. 
246 
Bel, G., Sebő, M. (2019). Does Inter-Municipal Cooperation Really Reduce Delivery 
Costs? An Empirical Evaluation of the Role of Scale Economies, Transaction Costs, 
and Governance Arrangements. Urban Affairs Review, 57(1), 153–188. 
Benz, M., Frey, B. S. (2007). Corporate Governance: What can we Learn from Public 
Governance? The Academy of Management Review, 32(1), 92–104. 
Bertrand, J. (1883). Revue de la Theorie Mathematique de la Richesse Sociale et des 
Recherches sur les Principles Mathematiques de la Theorie des Richesses. Journal 
des Savants, 67, 499–508. 
Björn, F. (l998). Haben Unternehmen eine Nutzenfunktion? Manager auch nicht. Zeits-
chrft fur Planung, 9, 285–292. 
Bischoff, I., Wolfschütz, E. (2020). Inter-municipal cooperation in administrative tasks – 
the role of population dynamics and elections. Local Government Studies, 1–25. 
Bishop, R. L. (1964). A Zeuthen-Hicks Theory of Bargaining. Econometrica, 32(3), 
410–417. 
Bisson, L. (2014). Cooperation between Russia and the EU in the Sphere of Migration. 
Russian Politics & Law, 52(6), 76–93. 
Blankart, Ch. B. (1980). Ökonomie der öffentlichen Unternehmen. München: Vahlen. 
Bolgherini, S. (2011). Local Government and Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Italy and 
Germany. PIFO Politische Italien-Forschung, 12, 1–64. 
Bondarenko, N. Borodina, D. et al. (2020). Indicators of Education in the Russian 
Federation: Data Book. Moscow: National Research University Higher School of 
Economics. 
Bondarenko, N., Gokhberg, L. et al. (2017). Indicators of Education in the Russian 
Federation: Data Book. Moscow: National Research University Higher School of 
Economics. 
Bondarenko, N., Gokhberg, L. et al. (2018). Indicators of Education in the Russian 
Federation: Data Book. Moscow: National Research University Higher School of 
Economics.   
Bönisch, P., Haug P., Illy, A., Schreier, L. (2011). Municipality Size and Efficiency of 
Local Public Services: Does Size Matter? IWH Discussion Papers, 18, 3–39. 
Bös, D. (1981). Economic Theory of Public Enterprise. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. 
Bös, D. (1986). Public Enterprise Economics: Theory and Application. Amsterdam, 
New York: North Holland. 
Bozeman, B. (2007). Public values and public interest: Counterbalancing economic 
individualism. Georgetown: Georgetown University press.  
Bozeman, B., Johnson, J. (2015). The Political Economy of Public Values: A Case for 
the Public Sphere and Progressive Opportunity. American Review of Public Admi-
nistration, 45(1), 61–85. 
Bowley, A. L. (1924). The Mathematical Groundwork of Economics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Brecher, Ch. et al. (2012). Integrative Production Technology for High-Wage Countries. 
In: Integrative Production Technology for High-Wage Countries, Ch. Brecher (Ed.): 
Springer.  
Branzei, R., Dimitrov, D., Tijs, S. (2005). Models in Cooperative Game Theory. Crisp, 
Fuzzy, and Multi-Choice Games. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. 
Buchanan, J. (1965). An Economic Theory of Clubs. Economica, 32(125), 1–14. 
Calabrò, A., Torchia, M. (2011). Conflicts of Interest and Governance Mechanisms in 
Italian Local Public Utilities. International Journal of Public Administration, 34(7), 
447–460. 
247 
Cellini, S. R., Kee, J. E. (2015). Cost‐Effectiveness and Cost‐Benefit Analysis. In: 
Handbook of Practical Program Evaluation (pp. 636–673), J. S. Wholey, H. P. 
Hatry, K. E. Newcomer (Eds.): John Wiley & Sons.  
Chamberlin, E. (1933). Theory of Monopolistic Competition. Cambridge:  Harvard Uni-
versity Press. 
Chebotareva, M. (2018). Application of Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdic-
tions concept to inter-municipal cooperation in the Russian school sector. Совре-
менная экономика: проблемы и решения, 7, 114–131. 
Chebotareva, M., Friedrich, P. (2017). Microeconomic Models of Functional Over-
lapping Jurisdiction (FOCJs). Estonian Discussions on Economic Policies, 25(1), 
27–52.  
Chebotareva, M., Friedrich, P. (2020). Tax Shifting Decisions of Functional Over-
lapping Competing Jurisdictions’ Management. In: Decision Making in the Public 
Sector (pp. 15–27), P. Eichhorn, D. Klein, J. Merk, A. Rahmel (Eds.): Jacobs-Ver-
lag. 
Citroni, G., Lippi, A., Profeti, S. (2013). Remapping the State: Inter-Municipal Co-
operation through Corporatisation and Public-Private Governance Structures. Local 
Government Studies, 39(2), 208–234. 
Civil Code of the Russian Federation. Available at: http://www.consultant.ru (Accessed 
in June 2019). 
Cobb, Ch. W., Douglas, P. H. (1928). A Theory of Production. The American Economic 
Review, 18(1), 139–165. 
Cournot, A. (1838). Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of 
Wealth. New York: Kelley. 
Creswell, J. W. (2014). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods 
Approaches (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE. 
Cross, J. G. (1965). A Theory of the Bargaining Process. The American Economic Re-
view, 55, 67–94. 
Debela, K. W. (2020). Local governance in Switzerland: Adequate municipal autonomy 
cumintergovernmental cooperation? Cogent Social Sciences, 6(1), 1–17. 
De Peuter, B., Wayenberg, E. (2007). Belgium: Flemish Inter-municipal Cooperation 
under Reform. In: Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Europe (pp. 23–38), R. Hulst, A. 
van Montfort (Eds.): Springer. 
Dehne, A., Friedrich, P., Nam, Ch.  (2009). Determination of Fees for Local Services 
under the Consideration of Public and Management Objectives. Zeitschrift für 
öffentliche und gemeinützige Unternehmen, 32, 1–18. 
Diggs, B. J. (1973). The Common Good as Reason for Political Action. Ethics, 83(4), 
283–293. 
Dollinger, P. (1976). Die Hanse. Stuttgart: Kröner. 
Dos Santos Ferreira, R. (1998). Launhardt and Hotelling. Louvain Economic Review, 
64(1), 97–109.  
Drakopoulos, S. (1992). A Behavioural Approach to Kinked Demand Curves. The 
Cyprus Journal of Economics, 5(1), 1–14.  
Duncombe, W., Yinger, J. (2007). Does School District Consolidation Cut Costs? Edu-
cation Finance and Policy, 2 (4), 341–375. 
Eckardt, M., Friedrich, P. (2014). European grouping of territorial cooperation (EGTC) 
as a legal form to realize cross border FOCJ. In: Public Sector in Transition (pp. 
106–141), P. Friedrich, D. Greiling, T. Haldma (Eds.): University of Tartu Press. 
248 
Eckardt, M., Gritsch, M. (2016). Governance of cross-border regional cooperation by 
the EGTC – An explorative analysis with a focus on Hungarian EGTCs. Journal for 
Public and Non-Profit Services, 39(1/2), 200–215. 
Edgeworth, F. Y. (1925). The pure theory of monopoly. In: Papers relating to Political 
Economy (pp. 111–142), F. Y. Edgeworth (Ed.): Macmillan.  
Eerma, D. (2014). A bookkeeping approach to social accounting for a university facul-
ty: the case of the University of Tartu. Tartu: University of Tartu Press. 
Eichenberger, R., Frey, B. S. (2006). Functional, Overlapping and Competing Jurisdic-
tions (FOCJ): A Complement and Alternative to Today’s Federalism. In: Handbook 
of Fiscal Federalism (pp. 154–181), E. Ahmad, G. Brosio (Eds.): Edward Elgar. 
Eichhorn, P., Friedrich, P. (1976). Verwaltungsökonomie I. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Eichhorn, P., Friedrich, P., Jann, W. (2003). Verwaltungslexikon. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Ellwood, S., Garcia-Lacalle, J. (2016). Examining Audit Committees in the Corporate 
Governance of Public Bodies. Public Management Review, 18(8), 1138–1162. 
Expert Commission of the German Public Corporate Governance-Modelcode (2020). 
German Public Corporate Governance-Modelcode (G-PCGM). Available at: 
https://pcg-musterkodex.de (Accessed in January 2020).  
Fandel G. (1991). Theory of production and Cost. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. 
Fedele, M., Moini, G. (2007). Italy: The Changing Boundaries of Inter-Municipal Co-
operation. In: Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Europe (pp. 117–138), R. Hulst, A. 
van Montfort (Eds.): Springer.   
Federal Act No. 7 “On Non-commercial Organisations”. Available at: 
http://www.consultant.ru (Accessed in May 2017).  
Federal Act No. 41 “On Production Cooperatives”. Available at: 
http://www.consultant.ru (Accessed in May 2017). 
Federal Act No. 131 “On the general principles of organisation of local self-governance 
in the Russian Federation”. Available at: http://www.consultant.ru (Accessed in 
May 2017). 
Federal Act No. 161 “On the State and Municipal Unitary Enterprises”. Available at: 
http://www.consultant.ru (Accessed in May 2017). 
Federal Act No. 273 “On Education in the Russian Federation”. Available at: 
http://www.consultant.ru (Accessed in May 2017). 
Federal State Statistics Service (2020). Russian Statistical Yearbook 2020. Мoscow: 
Rosstat. Available at: https://eng.rosstat.gov.ru (Accessed in May 2020). 
Fedorov, G. M. (2013). Innovations in the Baltic Sea region and network cooperation 
between Russia and the EU. Baltic Region, 1, 4–18. 
Feng, C., Friedrich, P. (2013). Basic Approaches to a Location Theory of One Public 
Firm. Discussions on Estonian Economic Policy, 21(1), 51–72. 
Fershtman, Ch., Judd, K. L. (1987). Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly. The American 
Economic Review, 77(5), 927–940.  
Fink, A. (2012). The Hanseatic League and the Concept of Functional Overlapping 
Competing Jurisdictions. Kyklos, 65(2), 194–217. 
Fladung, L., Friedrich, P. (2008). Finanzierung eines Wirtschaftsförderungs - FOCJ. In: 
FOCJ als Mittel regionaler Kooperation (pp. 23–47), P. Friedrich, F. Bartholomae 
(Eds.): Universität der Bundeswehr München. 
Fontana, A., Frey, J. H. (2000). The interview: From structured questions to negotiated 
text. In: Handbook of qualitative research (pp. 645–672), N. K. Denzin, Y. S. Lin-
coln (Eds.): SAGE. 
249 
Frère, Q., Leprince, M., Paty, S. (2014). The Impact of Intermunicipal Cooperation on 
Local Public Spending. Urban Studies, 51(8), 1741–1760. 
Frey, B. S. (1999). The New Democratic Federalism for Europe. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
Frey, B. S. (2001). A Utopia? Government without Territorial Monopoly. The Indepen-
dent Review, 6(1), 99–112. 
Frey, B. S. (2005). Functional, Overlapping, Competing Jurisdictions: Redrawing the 
Geographic Borders of Administration. European Journal of Law Reform, 5(3/4), 
543–555. 
Frey, B. S. (2009). A New Concept of European Federalism. LSE ‘Europe in Question’ 
Discussion Paper Series, 3, 1–24.  
Frey, B. S., Eichenberger, R. (1995). Competition among Jurisdictions: The Idea of 
FOCJ. In: Competition among Institutions (pp. 209–229), L. Gerken (Ed.): Palgrave 
Macmillan.   
Frey, B. S., Eichenberger, R. (1996). FOCJ: Competitive Governments for Europe. 
International Review of Law and Economics, 16(3), 315–327. 
Frey, B. S., Eichenberger, R. (1997). FOCJ: Creating a Single European Market for 
Governments. In: Constitutional Law and Economics of the European Union (pp. 
195–215), D. Schmidtchen, R. Cooter (Eds.): Edward Elgar. 
Frey, B. S., Eichenberger, R. (1999). The New Democratic Federalism for Europe: 
Functional Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions. Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar. 
Frey, B. S., Eichenberger, R. (2001a). Federalism with Overlapping Jurisdictions and 
Variable Levels of Integration: The Concept of FOCJ. In: Regionalism in Europe: 
Geometries and Strategies after 2000 (pp. 3–21), J. Von Hagen, M. Widgren (Eds.): 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Frey, B. S., Eichenberger, R. (2001b). A Proposal for Dynamic European Federalism: 
FOCJ. In: Rules and Reasons: Perspectives on Constitutional Political Economy 
(pp. 207–257), R. Mudambi, P. Navarra, G. Sobbrio (Eds.): Camridge University 
Press.  
Frey, B. S., Eichenberger, R. (2002). Democratic Governance for a Globalized World. 
Kyklos, 55(2), 265–287. 
Friedman, J. (1983). Oligopoly Theory. Cambridge, New York, London, New Rochelle, 
Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press. 
Friedrich, P. (1978). Ausrichtung der Preisbildung öffentlicher Unternehmen am Grenz-
kostenpreisprinzip bei differiernden Marktformen. Schriftenreihe der Gesellschaft 
für öffentliche Wirtschaft und Gemeinwirtschaft, 16, 90–129.  
Friedrich, P. (2006). FOCJ: A New Type of Special Public Organization to Provide 
Health Services? In: Liberalisierung im Gesundheitswesen, Schriftenreihe der 
Gesellschaft für öffentliche Wirtschaft (pp. 133–154), G. Braun, E. Schultz-
Nieswandt (Eds.): Nomos. 
Friedrich P., Chebotareva, M. (2017). Options for Applying Functional Overlapping 
Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJs) for Municipal Cooperation in Russia. In: Public 
Sector Entrepreneurship and the Integration of Innovative Business Models (pp. 73–
107), M. Lewandowski, B. Kozuch (Eds.): IGI Global.  
Friedrich, P., Feng, X.  (2000). The Role of Public Enterprises in Regional Competition. 
In: Regional Competition (pp. 186–201), P. W. J. Batey, P. Friedrich (Eds.): 
Springer. 
250 
Friedrich, P., Gwiazda, J., Nam, C. W. (2004). Strengthening Municipal Fiscal Auto-
nomy Through Intergovernmental Transfers. In: Urban Dynamics and Growth (pp. 
691–728), R. Capello, P. Nijkamp (Eds.): Elsevier. 
Friedrich, P., Kaltschütz, A., Nam, C. W. (2004). Significance and determination of fees 
for municipal finance. CESinfo Working Paper Series, 1357, 1–35. 
Friedrich, P., Popescu, A. M. (2006). FOCJ as Institution for Population Policy. In: New 
members – new challenges for the European regional development policy (pp. 228–
242), T. Markowski, M. Turala (Eds.): Polish Academy of Sciences. 
Friedrich, P., Reiljan, J. (2011). FOCJ as model for financing the Estonian general 
Education. Estonian Discussions on Economic Policy, 19(2), 37–57. 
Friedrich, P., Ukrainski, K. (2013). Quangos as a tool of public management to promote 
public sector entrepreneurship. Zeitschrift für öffentliche und gemeinwirtschaftliche 
Unternehmen, 43, 37–51. 
Friedrich, P., Ukrainski, K., Timpmann, K. (2014). Teaching Public Management: 
Between Academic Disciplines. A Teaching Methodology for Students in Economics 
and Business Administration. Tartu: Sihtasutus Archimedes. 
Frisch, R. (1933). Monopole-polypole-la notion de force dans l’économie. Nationalø-
konomisk Tidsskrift, 71, 241–259.  
Frisch, R. (1964). Theory of production. Netherlands: Springer.  
Frolova, N., Danilova, S., Vasilkova, E. (2017). Public-Private Partnership as Means of 
State & Business Cooperation. The European Proceedings of Social and Beha-
vioural Sciences, 699–704. 
Gabbe, J. (2008). Legal Status of Cross-border Co-operation Structures – Past, Present 
and Prospects. Gronau: Associations of European border regions (AEBR). 
Galletta, A. M. (2013). Mastering the Semi-Structured Interview and Beyond: From 
Research Design to Analysis and Publication. New York: NYU Press. 
Garrido, E. N. (2007). Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Spain: Dealing with Microscopic 
Local Government. In: Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Europe (pp. 169–192), R. 
Hulst, A. van Montfort (Eds.): Springer. 
Gillard, D. (2018). Education in England: a history. Available at: 
www.educationengland.org.uk/history (Accessed in June 2020).  
Glewwe, P., Lambert, S. (2010). Education production functions: evidence from 
developing countries. In: International Encyclopedia of Education (pp. 412–422), P. 
Peterson, E. Baker and B. McGaw (Eds.): Elsevier.  
Goodman, Ch. B., Leland, S. M. (2019). Do Cities and Counties Attempt to Circumvent 
Changes in Their Autonomy by Creating Special Districts? American Review of 
Public Administration, 49(2), 203–217. 
Götze, U., Northcott, D., Schuster, P. (2008). Investment Appraisal: Methods and 
Models. Berlin: Springer. 
Graaff, J. de V. (1963). Theoretical Welfare Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
Gradus, R., Schoute, M., Dijkgraaf, E. (2018). The effects of market concentration on 
costs of local public services: empirical evidence from Dutch waste collection. Local 
Government Studies, 44(1), 86–104. 
Gravelle, H., Rees, R. (2004). Microeconomics. London, New York, Boston, Toronto, 
Sydney: Pearson Education. 
Grossi, G., Reichard, Ch. (2008). Municipal corporatization in Germany and Italy. 
Public Management Review, 10 (5), 597–617. 
251 
Grunwald, W., Bernthal, W. F. (1983). Controversy in German Management: The 
Harzburg Model Experience. The Academy of Management Review, 8(2), 233–241. 
Gutnikova Y. A. (2012). Inter-municipal cooperation as a factor promoting the econo-
mic and social development. Economic and social changes: facts, trends, forecast, 
6(24), 198–208.  
Hanushek, E. A. (1979). Conceptual and Empirical Issues in the Estimation of Edu-
cational Production Functions. The Journal of Human Resources, 14(3), 351–388. 
Harris, D. N. (2010). Education Production Functions: Concepts. In: International 
Encyclopedia of Education (pp. 402–406), P. Peterson, E. Baker and B. McGaw 
(Eds.): Elsevier.  
Harsanyi, J. C. (1956). Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the 
Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen’s, Hicks’, and Nash’s Theories. 
Econometrica, 24(2), 144–157. 
Hart, D. M. (1982). Gustave de Molinari and the Anti-statist Liberal Tradition, Part III. 
The Journal of Libertarian Studies, 6(1), 83–104. 
Haveri, A., Airaksinen, J. (2007). Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Finland: Old Tradi-
tions and New Promises. In: Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Europe (pp. 39–66), R. 
Hulst, A. van Montfort (Eds.): Springer. 
Heinen, E. (1966). Das Zielsystem der Unternehmung. Grundlagen betriebswirt-
schaftlicher Entscheidungen. Wiesbaden: Gabler Verlag. 
Heinz, W. (2007). Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Germany: The Mismatch Between 
Existing Necessities and Suboptimal Solutions. In: Inter-Municipal Cooperation in 
Europe (pp. 91–115), R. Hulst, A. van Montfort (Eds.): Springer. 
Henderson, J. M., Quandt, R. E. (1980). Microeconomic theory: A mathematical 
approach. Singapore: McGraw-Hill. 
Hicks, J. R. (1942). Consumers’ Surplus and Index-Numbers. Review of Economic 
Studies, 9(2), 126–137. 
Hicks, J. R. (1963). The Theory of Wages (2nd Edition). London: Macmillan.  
Hill, Ch. W. L., Jones, G. R., Schilling, M. A. (2014). Strategic Management Theory: 
An Integrated Approach (11th Edition). South-Western: Cengage Learning. 
Hillman, A. L. (2009). Public Finance and Public Policy: Responsibilities and Limi-
tations of Government (2nd Edition). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hophmayer-Tokich, S., Kliot, N. (2008). Inter-municipal cooperation for wastewater 
treatment: case studies from Israel. Journal of Environmental Management, 86(3), 
554–565. 
Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in Competition. The Economic Journal, 39(153), 41–57.  
Hsieh, H.-F., Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis. 
Qualitative health research, 15(9), 1277–1288.  
Huber, S. G. (2011). School Governance in Switzerland: Tensions between New Roles 
and Old Traditions. Educational Management Administration & Leadership, 39(4), 
469–485.  
Hulst, R., Montfort, A. van (2007). The Netherlands: Cooperation as the only Viable 
Strategy. In: Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Europe (pp. 139–168), R. Hulst, A. 
van Montfort (Eds.): Springer. 
Hulst, R., Montfort, A. van (2011). Institutional Features of Inter-Municipal Coopera-
tion: Cooperative Arrangements and their National Contexts. Public Policy and 
Administration, 27(2), 121–144. 
Humphrey, T. M. (1997). Algebraic Production Functions and their Uses before Cobb-
Douglas. Economic Quarterly, 83(1), 51–83. 
252 
IMC Toolkit Manual (2010). Inter-municipal cooperation. Available at: 
http://www.municipal-cooperation.org (Accessed in June 2016). 
Isard, W. (1956). Location and space economy: A General Theory Relating to Industrial 
Location, Market Areas, Land Use, Trade, and Urban Structure. New York: The 
M.I.T. Press and Wiley.  
Jehle, G. A., Reny, P. J. (2011). Advanced Microeconomic Theory (3rd Edition). 
London, New York: Pearson. 
Jensen, M. C., Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–
360.  
Kelly, A. (2003). Decision Making using Game Theory: An introduction for managers. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kelly, J. (2007). The Missing Ingredient: Inter-municipal Cooperation and Central-
Local Relations in the UK. In: Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Europe (pp. 193–
210), R. Hulst, A. van Montfort (Eds.): Springer. 
Klijn, E.-H., Koppenjan, J., Termeer, K. (1995). Managing Networks in the Public 
Sector: A Theoretical Study of Management Strategies in Policy Networks. Public 
Administration, 73(3), 437–454. 
Klimovský, D., Mejere, O., Mikolaityte, J., Pinterič, U., Saparniene, D. (2014). Inter-
Municipal Cooperation in Lithuania and Slovakia: Does Size Structure Matter? Lex 
localis, 12(3), 643–658. 
Kozlova, O. A., Makarova, M. N. (2018). Inter-municipal cooperation as an institution 
of strategic development of territories. Economic and Social Changes: Facts, 
Trends, Forecast, 11(3), 132–144. 
Krelle, W. (1961). Preistheorie. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 
Krueger, A. (1999). Experimental estimates of education production functions. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(2), 497–532. 
Kuhlmann, S. (2010). Between the State and the Market: Assessing Impacts of Local 
Government Reforms in Western Europe. Lex Localis, 8(1), 1–21. 
Lanzillotti, R. F. (1958). Pricing Objectives in Large Companies. The American 
Economic Review, 48(5), 921–940.  
Launhardt, W. (1885). Mathematisch Begrundung der Volkswirtschaftslehre. Leipzig: 
B.G. Teubner Verlag.   
Leibenstein, H. (1966). Allocative Efficiency vs. “X-Efficiency”. The American Eco-
nomic Review, 56(3), 392–415. 
Linder, W. (2010). Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to the conflict in Multicultural 
Societies (3rd Edition). London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lingnau, V., Härtel, I. (2014). Zum Verhältnis von Unternehmenszielen und Stake-
holderzielen. Beiträge zur Controlling-Forschung, 26, 1–33. 
Lloyd, P. J. (1969). Elementary Geometric/Arithmetic Series and Early Production 
Theory. Journal of Political Economy, 77(1), 21–34. 
Longley, C. H., Sneed, J. (2009). Effects of Federal Legislation on Wellness Policy 
Formation in School Districts in the United States. Journal of the American Dietetic 
Association, 109(1), 95–101.  
Luce, R. D., Raiffa, H. (1957). Games and Decisions. New York: Wiley & Sons. 
Machina, M. J. (1987). Choice Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1(1), 121–154. 
253 
Mann, D., Briller, V. (2005). School Administration in Russia: Centralization Versus 
Decentralization. In: Fundamental Change. International Handbook of Educational 
Change (pp. 120–134), M. Fullan (Ed.): Springer. 
Marris, R. (1964). The economic theory of managerial capitalism. London: Macmillan. 
Matzembacher, D. E., Raudsaar, M., Mets, T. (2019). Sustainable Entrepreneurial 
Process: From Idea Generation to Impact Measurement. Sustainability, 11(21), 1–
27. 
Mayring, Ph. (2014). Qualitative content analysis: theoretical foundation, basic pro-
cedures and software solution. Klagenfurt. Available at: https://www.psychopen.eu 
(Accessed in June 2020). 
McGregor, D. (1960). The human side of enterprise. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Mert, M. (2018). What does a firm maximize? A simple explanation with regard to eco-
nomic growth. International Journal of Engineering Business Management, 10, 1–
13. 
Metis (2014). EGTC Monitoring Report 2013. Towards the New Cohesion Policy. 
Available at: https://cor.europa.eu (Accessed in June 2020). 
Meynhardt, T. (2015). Public Value – Turning a Conceptual Framework into a 
Scorecard. In: Public Value and Public Administration (pp. 147–169), L. Bloom-
berg, J. M. Bryson, B. Crasby (Eds.): Georgetown University Press. 
Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M., Saldaña, J. (2014). Qualitative Data Analysis. A 
methods sourcebook (3rd ed.). London: SAGE. 
Mizany, K., Manatt, A. (2002). What’s So Special About Special Districts? A Citizen’s 
Guide to Special Districts in California. Available at: https://www.napa.lafco.ca.gov 
(Accessed in May 2020). 
Moore, M. H. (1995). Creating Public Value: Strategic management in government. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Moore, M. H. (2013). Recognizing Public Value. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Muller, D. C. (2003). Public Choice III. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Musgrave, R. A., Musgrave, P. (1989). Public Finance in Theory and Practice. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
Myerson, R. (1982). Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-Agent 
Problems. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10, 67–81. 
Nash, J. (1953). Two-Person Cooperative Games. Econometrica, 21(1), 128–140. 
Niaounakis, T., Blank, J. (2017). Inter-municipal cooperation, economies of scale and 
cost efficiency: an application of stochastic frontier analysis to Dutch municipal tax 
departments. Local Government Studies, 43(4), 533–554. 
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Odiorne, G. S. (1965). Management by Objectives: A System of Managerial Leadership. 
New York: Fearon-Pitman Publishing. 
OECD (2014). OECD Territorial Reviews: Netherlands 2014. Paris: OECD Publishing  
OECD (2018). Ownership and Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A Com-
pendium of National Practices. Available at: https://www.oecd.org (Accessed in 
January 2020). 
OECD (2019). OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2019. Available at: 
https://www.oecd.org (Accessed in January 2020).   
Olson, M. (1969). The principle of fiscal equivalence. The division of responsibilities 
among different levels of government. American Economic Review, 59(2), 479–487. 
254 
Oltmann, S. M. (2016). Qualitative Interviews: A Methodological Discussion of the 
Interviewer and Respondent Contexts. Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 17(2), 
15. 
Osborne, M. J., Rubinstein, A. (1994). A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts: MIT Press.  
Osterrieder, H., Bahloul, H., Wright, G., Shaffner, K., Mozur, M. (2006). Joining Forces 
and Resources for Sustainable Development. Cooperation among Municipalities - A 
Guide for Practitioners. Bratislava: UNDP Bratislava Regional Centre. 
Ott, A. E. (1970). Grundzüge der Preistheorie. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Rupprecht 
Verlag.  
Ouchi, W. G. (1981). Theory Z. New York: Avon Books. 
Pakhalov, A. M., Saks D. G. (2020). Networking of Small Tourist Destinations: Evi-
dence from Russia. In: Cultural and Tourism Innovation in the Digital Era (pp. 381–
391), V. Katsoni, T. Spyriadis (Eds.): Springer. 
Papenfuß, U., Schaefer, Ch. (2017). Beteiligungsmanagement und Public Corporate 
Governance: Grundsachverhalte und Reformperspektiven. ZögU - Zeitschrift für 
öffentliche und gemeinwirtschaftliche Unternehmen, 40(2–3), 131–151. 
Parts, E. (2010). Social capital, its determinants and relations with economic growth: 
Comparison of the Western European and Central and Eastern European countries. 
Saarbrücken, Germany: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing. 
Peltzman, S. (1971). Pricing in Public and Private Enterprises: Electric Utilities in the 
United States. Journal of Law and Economics, 14, 109–147. 
Pen, J. (1952). A General Theory of Bargaining. The American Economic Review, 
42(1), 24–42. 
Persson, T., Tabellini, G. (2002). Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. 
Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Ploom, K., Haldma, T. (2013). Balanced performance management in the public edu-
cation system: An empirical study of Estonian general education schools. Baltic 
Journal of Management, 8(2), 183–207. 
Rainey, H. G. (1989). Public management: Recent research on the political context and 
Managerial roles, structures and behaviours. Journal of Management, 15(2), 229–
250. 
Rees, R. (2006). The Economics of Public Utilities. Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward 
Elgar. 
Reichard, C. (2002). Marketization of public services in Germany. International Public 
Management Review, 3(2), 63–79. 
Ross, S. (1973). The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem. American 
Economic Review, 63(2), 134–139.  
Rubinstein, A. (1982). Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica, 50(1), 
97–109. 
Ruester, S., Zschille, M. (2010). The impact of governance structure on firm perfor-
mance: An application to the German water distribution sector. Utilities Policy, 
18(3), 154–162. 
Samuelson, P. A. (1979). Paul Douglas’s Measurement of Production Functions and 
Marginal Productivities. Journal of Political Economy, 87(5), 923–939. 
Saraydar, E. (1971). A Certainty-Equivalent Model of Bargaining. The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 15(3), 281–297. 
Sato, K. (1967). A Two-Level Constant-Elasticity-of-Substitution Production Function. 
The Review of Economic Studies, 34(2), 201–218. 
255 
Scholich, D. (Ed.). (2007). German Annual of Spatial Research and Policy. Territorial 
Cohesion. Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer. 
Shaw, S. (2012). History of education. In: Professional studies in primary education 
(pp. 3–18), H. Cooper (Ed.): SAGE. 
Sen, D. (2004). The kinked demand curve revisited. Economics Letters, 84, 99–105. 
Silvestre, H. C., Marques, R. C., Dollery, B., Correia, A. M. (2020). Is cooperation cost 
reducing? An analysis of public-public partnerships and inter-municipal cooperation 
in Brazilian local government. Local Government Studies, 46(1), 68–90. 
Skidmore, P. (2006). Public Value and Policing. London: Work Foundation. 
Sklivas, S. D. (1987). The strategic choice of managerial incentives. RAND Journal of 
Economics, 18(3), 452–458.  
Slack, N. E. (1997). Inter-Municipal Cooperation: Sharing of Expenditures and Reve-
nues. Toronto: ICURR Press. 
Slack, N. E., Bird, R. (2013). Merging Municipalities: Is Bigger Better? IMFG Papers 
on Municipal Finance and Governance, 14, 1–34. 
Smith, D. (2011). Functional, Overlapping, Competing Jurisdictions among Fractio-
nalized Agents: Medieval Spain. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com (Accessed in 
January 2017).  
Soto, M. (2002). Rediscovering Education in Growth Regressions. OECD Development 
Centre Working Papers, 202. Paris: OECD Publishing.  
Spennlingwimmer, T. (2017). Der Public Corporate Governance Kodex in öffentlichen 
Unternehmen. Wiesbaden: Springer. 
Spremann, K. (1987). Agent and Principal. In: Agency Theory, Information, and In-
centives (pp. 3–38), G. Bamberg, K. Spremann (Eds.): Springer. 
Stackelberg, H. (2011). Market structure and equilibrium, translated by D. Bazin, L. 
Urch and R. Hill. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. 
Steiner, R. (2003). The causes, spread and effects of inter-municipal cooperation and 
municipal mergers in Switzerland. Public Management Review, 5(4), 551–571. 
Steinhaus, H. (1948). The Problem of Fair Division. Econometrica, 16(1), 101–104. 
Sweezy, P. M. (1939). Demand Under conditions of oligopoly. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 47(4), 568–573.  
Swianiewicz, P., Teles, F. (2019). The institutionalization of inter-municipal arrange-
ments in Europe: findings from the unusual suspects. Transylvanian Review of 
Administrative Sciences, 57, 119–136. 
Teles, F.  (2016).  Local governance and inter-municipal cooperation.  New York: Pal-
grave Macmillan. 
Texas Senate Research Center (2008). Invisible Government: Special Purpose Districts 
in Texas. Available at: https://texashistory.unt.edu (Accessed in January 2016). 
Thiemeyer, T. (1975). Wirtschaftslehre öffentlicher Betriebe. Reinbek bei Hamburg: 
Rowohlt. 
Tiebout, Ch. (1956). A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. Journal of Political Eco-
nomy, 64, 416–424. 
Tijs, S. (1981). Bounds for the core and the r-value. In: Game Theory and Mathematical 
Economics (pp. 123–132), O. Moeschlin, D. Pallaschke (Eds.): North-Holland 
Publishing Company. 
Tirole, J. (2006). The theory of corporate finance. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press. 
Tucker, A., de Bellis, G. P. (Eds.) (2016). Panarchy: Political Theories of Non-Terri-
torial States. New York: Routledge. 
256 
Tynkkynen, N. (2008). Experiences of environmental cooperation between the Nordic 
countries and Russia: Lessons learned and the way forward. In: The new northern 
dimension of the European neighbourhood (pp. 71–91), P. Aalto, H. Blakkisrud, H. 
Smith (Eds): CEPS.  
Walliman, N. (2001). Your Research Project: A Step-by-Step Guide for the First time 
Researcher. London: SAGE. 
Walters, A. A. (1963). Production and Cost Functions: An Econometric Survey. Eco-
nometrica, 31(1/2), 1–66. 
Warner, M. E. (2006). Inter-municipal Cooperation in the U.S.: A Regional Governance 
Solution? Urban Public Economics Review, 6, 221–239. 
West, K. (2007). Inter-Municipal Cooperation in France: Incentives, Instrumentality and 
Empty Shells. In: Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Europe (pp. 67–90), R. Hulst, A. 
van Montfort (Eds.): Springer. 
Williamson, O. E. (1964). The Economics of Discretionary Behaviour: Managerial 
Objectives in a Theory of the Firm. Hoboken, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
Van de Walle, S., Groeneveld, S. M. (2011). New steering instruments: Trends in public 
sector practice and scholarship. In: New steering concepts in public management 
(pp. 205–214), S. Groeneveld, S. Van de Walle (Eds): Emerald. 
Varian, H. R. (1992). Microeconomic analysis (3rd Edition). New York, London: W.W. 
Norton & Company.  
Varian, H. R. (2010). Intermediate Microeconomics. A Modern Approach. (8th Edition). 
New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company. 
Zabojnik, J. (1998). Sales maximization and specific human capital. Rand Journal of 
Economics, 29(4), 790–802. 
Zaitseva, Korneevets, Semenova (2016). Prospects for the Cross-Border Cooperation 
Between Russia and Poland in the Field of Tourism. International journal of 
environmental & science education, 11(14), 7166–7175. 
Zeuthen, F. (1930). Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare. London: Routledge. 
United Nations (2017). World Population Prospects. The 2017 Revision: Key Findings 
and Advance Tables. Available at: https://population.un.org (Accessed in January 
2020). 
Uzawa, H. (1962). Production Functions with Constant Elasticities of Substitution. The 
Review of Economic Studies, 29(4), 291–299. 
Антонов, Е. В. (2020). Городские агломерации: подходы к выделению и делими-
тации. Контуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, право, 
13(1), 180–202. 
Арумова, Е. С. (2012). Организационные схемы и механизмы межмуниципального 
сотрудничества. Краснодар: Кубанский государственный университет. 
Бабун, Р. В. (2012). Агломерация городов как объект управления. Регион: эконо-
мика и социология, 2(74), 239–252. 
Бутова, Т. В., Пухова, М. М., Щукин, И. А. (2013). Проблемы и перспективы ста-
новления института межмуниципального сотрудничества в России. Управлен-
ческие науки, 3(8), 4–15.  
Бутова, Т. В., Смирнова, А. А., Миловидова, Н. А. (2014). Межмуниципальное 
сотрудничество как основа обеспечения устойчивости региона. Управлен-
ческие науки, 3(12), 4–15. 
Винницкий, А. В. (2010). Участие публичных образований в имущественных 
отношениях: проблемы сбалансированности административно-правового и 
257 
гражданско-правового регулирования. Административное и муниципальное 
право, 11, 83–91.  
Винницкий, А. В. (2013). Публичная собственность. Москва: Статут.  
Власова, Н. Ю., Джек, Л. Н. (2009). Перспективы развития межмуниципального 
сотрудничества в субъектах РФ. Вопросы управления, 2(9), 13–17. 
Гайнанов, Д. А., Тажитдинов, И. А., Атаева, А. Г. (2017). Межмуниципальное 
сотрудничество в Российской Федерации: теоретические и практические 
аспекты. Экономика и предпринимательство, 8–2 (85), 295–300. 
Госкомстат РФ (2004). Постановление от 05.01.2004 №1 “Об утверждении 
унифицированных форм первичной учетной документации по учету труда и 
его оплаты”. Available at: http://www.consultant.ru (Accessed in May 2020).  
Гохберг, Л. М., Озерова, О. К., Саутина, Е. В., Шугаль, Н. Б. (2020). Образование в 
цифрах: краткий статистический сборник. Москва: НИУ ВШЭ. 
Гриценко, Е. В. (2001). Местное самоуправление в системе публичного управле-
ния федеративного государства. Значение опыта ФРГ для России. Иркутск: 
ИГЭА. 
Даутов, Р. М. (2018). Mуниципальная кооперация: цели, стимулирование, резуль-
таты, дифференциация проектов. Научные труды центра перспективных 
экономических исследований, 14, 46–56. 
Ирискина, О. В. (2010). Современные формы управления межмуниципальным    
сотрудничеством в Российской Федерации. Известия Саратовского универси-
тета, 2(10), 60–65.  
Ладыгин, В. В. (2011). Возможности создания муниципального бизнес-инкубатора 
с использованием механизмов межмуниципальной кооперации. Вопросы 
государственного и муниципального управления, 2, 25–38. 
Лякишева, В. Г., Шлегель, А. А. (2017). Роль межмуниципального сотрудничества 
в социально-экономическом развитии территории. Экономика, профессия, 
бизнес, 1(3), 41–46. 
Малков, П. В., Баранов, Э. Ф. et al. (Eds.) (2019). Россия в цифрах 2019. Краткий 
статистический сборник. Москва: Росстат. Available at: https://www.gks.ru 
(Accessed in June 2020).  
Маркварт, Э. (2010). Межмуниципальная хозяйственная кооперация как инстру-
мент повышения эффективности предоставления муниципальных услуг. 
Федерализм, 3(59), 47–56. 
Маркварт, Э. (2016). Депопуляция – один из вызовов государственному и муници-
пальному управлению в современном мире. Экономика и жизнь, 39, 59–64. 
Маркварт, Э., Францке, Й. (2017). Территориальное реформирование местного 
самоуправления в Германии и России на современном этапе. Пространст-
венная экономика, 3, 40–61. 
Матершева, В. В., Клинова С. П., Соловьев Б. А. (2008). Микроэкономика – 2: 
учебное пособие. Воронеж: Воронежский государственный университет. 
Меркулов, А. В. (2020). Стратегия межмуниципальной кооперации как инстру-
мент управления локальными территориями. Вестник Академии знаний, 37(2), 
173–178. 
Миронова, О. В. (2014). История и опыт формирования современной модели 
межмуниципального сотрудничества. Вестник Астраханского государст-
венного технического университета, 1, 44–51. 
258 
Миронова, О. В. (2017). Организационно-управленческие формы сотрудничества 
российских муниципалитетов. Государственная власть и местное самоуправ-
ление, 5, 17–22. 
Михайлова, М. А. (2010). Городская агломерация как новая форма межмуни-
ципального сотрудничества. Проблемы теории и практики управления, 6(74), 
114–117. 
Москаленко, A. Ф. (2016). Становление и развитие правовой доктрины межмуни-
ципального сотрудничества в Pоссии. Вестник Томского государственного 
университета. Право, 1(19), 30–38. 
Мэнкью, Н. Г. (1999). Принципы Экономикс. СПб: Питер Ком. 
Негодуйко, А. В. (2008). Управление межмуниципальным экономическим со-
трудничеством в регионе. Иркутск: ИПО БГУЭП. 
Нейман, фон Дж., Моргенштерн, О. (1970). Теория игр и экономическое поведение. 
Москва: Наука. 
Остапец, О. Г. (2017). Система правового регулирования межмуниципального 
сотрудничества в России. Вестник Поволжского института управления, 
17(1), 56–61. 
Петроградская, А. А. (2010). Виды и формы межмуниципального сотрудничества 
в Российской федерации. Вестник Самарского государственного универси-
тета, 5(79), 256–262.  
Петроградская, А. А. (2011). Правовое регулирование межмуниципального сот-
рудничества в Российской Федерации. Саратов: Саратовский юридический 
институт МВД России.  
Петросян, Л. А., Зенкевич, Н. А., Шевкопляс, Е. В. (2012). Теория игр: учебник (2-
е издание). Санкт-Петербург: БХВ-Петербург.   
Пивоваров, A. (2015). Школьный образовательный округ как способ организации 
сетевого взаимодействия муниципальной системы образования. Муниципаль-
ное образование: инновации и эксперимент, 2, 14–33. 
Победин, А. А. (2013). Перспективы межмуниципального сотрудничества при раз-
витии городских агломераций: опыт зарубежных стран и России. Вестник 
Омского университета, 4, 43–48. 
Рагозина, Л. Г. (2009). Правовое обеспечение и практика осуществления раз-
личных форм межмуниципальной кооперации в России и за рубежом. Инсти-
тут экономики города. Available at: https://urbaneconomics.ru (Accessed in Ja-
nuary 2020). 
Рамазанов, М. А. (2019). Правовые основы, возможности и институциональные 
ограничения межмуниципального сотрудничества в России. Научный форум: 
Экономика и менеджмент. Сборник статей по материалам XXVI междуна-
родной научно-практической конференции, 3(26), 9–13. 
Рождественская, И. А., Кабалинский, А. И. (2016). Межмуниципальное сотрудни-
чество в регионах России и его роль в развитии городских агломераций. 
Экономика и предпринимательство, 1(66), 387–390. 
Росстат (2017). Регионы России. Социально-экономические показатели 2017. 
Available at: https://rosstat.gov.ru (Accessed in May 2021). 
Росстат (2018). Регионы России. Социально-экономические показатели 2018. 
Available at: https://rosstat.gov.ru (Accessed in May 2021). 
Росстат (2019). Регионы России. Социально-экономические показатели 2019. 
Available at: https://rosstat.gov.ru (Accessed in May 2021). 
259 
Росстат (2020). Регионы России. Социально-экономические показатели 2020. 
Available at: https://rosstat.gov.ru (Accessed in May 2021). 
Советов, Б. Я., Яковлев, С. А. (2001). Моделирование систем. Учебник для вузов 
(3-е издание). Москва: Высшая школа. 
Суринов, А. Е., Баранов, Э. Ф. et al. (Eds.) (2016). Россия в цифрах 2016. Краткий 
статистический сборник. Москва: Росстат. Available at: https://www.gks.ru 
(Accessed in June 2020).  
Суринов, А. Е., Баранов, Э. Ф. et al. (Eds.) (2017). Россия в цифрах 2017. Краткий 
статистический сборник. Москва: Росстат. Available at: https://www.gks.ru 
(Accessed in June 2020). 
Тургель, И. Д. (2015). Mежмуниципальное сотрудничество в РФ: пространст-
венная специфика развития и управления. Вопросы управления, 3(34), 196–203. 
Урманов, Д. В. (2013). Институциональные барьеры формирования и развития 
механизмов межмуниципального сотрудничества в России. Pегиональные 
исследования, 1(39), 114–121. 
Федеральная служба государственной статистики (2018). База данных показа-
телей муниципальных образований. Available at: https://www.gks.ru (Accessed in 
May 2020).  
Филатова, Т. В., Воробьева, Е. С., Тарасов, И. В., Шаповаленко, Е. В. (2014). 
Объединение муниципальных образований: проблемы и перспективы. Вест-
ник университета, 3, 100–105. 
Цветкова, О. В. (2017). Роль местного самоуправления и межмуниципального 
сотрудничества в развитии приграничных территорий Российской Федерации 
(на примере Псковской области). Политическая экспертиза, 13(2), 65–76. 
Шипачев, В. С. (1985). Высшая математика. Учебник для нематематических 












































Annex 1. Terms and Definitions 
Term Definition (in accordance with current thesis) 
Amalgamation 
 
The merger of two or more geographically contiguous 
municipalities (Slack, Bird 2013: 4). 
Association A non-commercial legal company form with legal entities 
and/or citizens as members who are not less than two, can 
exit at any time and have to pay membership fees and 
form equity capital. Association has its Statute and 
internal self-administrated structures (Civil Code of the 
Russian Federation, Articles 123.8-123.11). 
Autonomous behaviour Autonomous behaviour means that if one FOCJ decides to 
change its service fee, it does not consider the reaction of 
the rival (another FOCJ). 
Cross-border cooperation Joint activity in public service provision of municipalities 
which belong to different countries.  
Equilibrium When two FOCJs reach such a combination of fees p1 and 
p2 which maximize management utility and they have no 
initiative to change their fees anymore. “At any fee other 
than an equilibrium fee, some agents’ behaviours would 
be infeasible, and there would therefore be a reason for 
their behaviour to change” (Varian 1992: 283).  
Equity capital A minimum size of the property of the legal entity which 
guarantees the interests of its creditors. It can be in a 
monetary and in-kind form. 
Federal state educational 
standard (FSES) 
A set of obligatory requirements to the educational 
programmes of primary (начальное), basic (основное) 
and secondary (среднее) general education, vocational 
education and higher education institutions, which have 
state accreditation (Federal Act No. 273 “On education in 




1) Public organizations which are jointly established by 
municipalities to provide one or several public services, 
overlapping and competing with other public and private 
units on the same territory (The definition of FOCJs in the 
context of the thesis is different from the one meant by 
Frey, Eichenberger 1999 in their initial concept).  
2) Form of inter-municipal cooperation. 
FOCJ management FOCJ executive bodies who administrate and organise 
daily procurement. For example, a sole executive body 
(chairman, president, etc.) and collective executive bodies 
(council, board, presidium, committee etc.) 
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Term Definition (in accordance with current thesis) 
General education General education in Russia includes 4 stages:  
– pre-school education that children usually receive in 
kindergartens; 
– primary general education; 
– basic general education; 
– secondary general education.  
The last three stages of general education pupils usually 
receive in schools. Therefore, the last three stages are 
called “school education” in this thesis. 
Institutions Formal and informal rules which shape interactions 
between individuals and “reduce uncertainty by providing 
structure” (North1990). The thesis focuses on formal 
institutions (e.g. legal acts of Russia, internal normative 
documents for FOCJs, etc.)   
Inter-municipal 
cooperation (IMC) 
“Inter-Municipal cooperation is when two or more 
municipalities agree to work together on any of the tasks 
assigned to them in order to gain mutual benefits. The 
term ‘inter-municipal cooperation’ is a relationship 
between two or several local authorities (i.e. entities at the 
first level of territorial administration) having a status of 
legal persons, endowed with competences, powers, and 
resources in accordance with the European Charter of 
Local Self-Government” (IMC Toolkit Manual 2010: 7). 
Isoutility curves (or equal 
utility curves) 
Show the combination of FOCJ fees (p1, p2) that guarantee 
to a duopolist (e.g. FOCJ1) the same (equal) utility level.  
Krelle behaviour  The competitor reacts to the action of his rival if only the 
rival tries to force him in a situation where he loses profit 
(or utility). If a competitor is not pushed to a situation 
with lower profit, he does not react.  
Krelle-Ott space Such combinations of fees p1 and p2 where duopolists 
have no initiative to change their fees. This space (or area) 
results when non-fee-change regions of two FOCJs of 
type II intersect. For each of them this area is formed by 
the reaction line of one FOCJ of type II and the highest 
possible isoutily curve which touches the reaction function 
of another FOCJ of type II. 
Kuhn-Tucker condition Assumes that the constraints imposed on variables are not 
equations, but inequalities. Hence, one can set limitations 
on parameters, such as a1 + d1*p2 ≤ w1, so that the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions can be applied for a maximization 
problem if an objective function and restrictions are both 
assumed concave (Henderson, Quandt 1980: 386). 
Increase in price p2, and consequently, an increase in 
demand continues until parameter combination a1 + d1*p2 
reaches its limit w1. 
Lagrange function The method to find a local maximum of the goal function 
(utility function) under the particular constraints (the 
Lagrange multiplier λ) (Шипачев 1985). 
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Term Definition (in accordance with current thesis) 
Legal person (entity) An organization that has separate property and is liable for 
its obligations with its property, may acquire and exercise 
civil rights and bear civil obligations, and may be a 
plaintiff and defendant in court (Civil Code of the Russian 
Federation, Article 48, § 1).  
1. The Russian Federation, subjects of the Russian 
Federation: republics, krais, oblasts, cities of federal 
significance, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrugs, as 
well as urban and rural settlements and other municipal 
units shall act in relations regulated by civil legislation on 
an equal basis with other participants of these relations - 
individuals and legal entities. 
2. The rules, regulating participation of legal entities in 
civil law relations, should be applied to the subjects of 
civil law referred to in paragraph 1, unless otherwise 
provided by law or the specifics of these subjects (Civil 
Code of the Russian Federation, Article 124). 
Lump-sum (grant, fee, 
payment, etc.) 
A fixed sum which does not depend on output, labour or 
other variables. 
Management behaviour The reaction of FOCJ of type II management to changing 
internal and external factors, such as decisions of FOCJ 
members and competitors, volume of labour and 
materials, factor prices, changing utility function, 
production function, demand, etc.  
Management concept Shows the relations between managers and employees on 
different levels in a company relying on different leading 
ideas as a key element (Friedrich, Ukrainski, Timpmann 
2014). It reflects a possibility to delegate decision-making 
rights to managers of lower level inside economic units, 
such as, for example, an FOCJ. In FOCJ sense, 
management concepts can shape relations between FOCJ 
management and school directors, for example. 
Memorandum One of the establishment documents for associacions 
where members express their readiness to establish an 
association, determine the procedure for joint activities, 
conditions for transfer of their property and withdrawal 
procedure (Federal Act No. 7 “On Non-commercial 
organisations”, Article 14, § 1).   
Monopoly A market structure which is characterized by only one 
firm (one public economic unit) in the industry (Varian 
2010: 439). 
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Term Definition (in accordance with current thesis) 
Municipalities Entities of the first level of territorial administration where 
a local self-governance takes place (IMC Toolkit Manual 
2010: 7). In Russia, local self-governance is carried out in 
municipal areas (муниципальные районы), municipal and 
urban districts (муниципальные и городские округа), 
urban districts with intra-city division (городской округ с 
внутригородским делением), urban settlements 
(городские поселения), rural settlements (сельские 
поселения), intra-city areas of federal cities 
(внутригородские территории городов федерального 
значения) (Federal Act No. 131 “On the general 
principles of organisation of local self-governance in the 
Russian Federation”, Article 10).   
Natural person (physical 
person) 
A person who has his/her legal rights and obligations. 
Unlike the natural person, the legal person is often used 
synonymously for companies of different legal forms. 
Network form The network form for implementing educational programs 
(hereinafter - the network form) provides opportunities for 
students (pupils) to learn using resources of several 
organizations that carry out educational activities, 
including foreign organisations (Federal Act No. 273 “On 
Education in the Russian Federation”, Article 15, § 1).  
Oligopoly A market structure which is characterized by a small 
number of firms which have a strategical dependence with 
competitors (Varian 2010: 497, 519). 
Principal-agent problem The situation between two unequally informed actors 
(asymmetric information). Usually, the one who orders 
(principal) is less informed than the one who is supposed 
to implement the order (agent), therefore, the agent may 
use the information, which the principal does not possess, 
in their own interest.  
Productivity Relations between output and factor inputs. Here, the 
productivity of all factors is meant: labour, materials and 
fixed capital. In relation to one factor, productivity can be 
measured as well. Increase of one factor influences the 
growth in productivity of the others. 
Public choice The theoretical approach which attempts to apply 
economic methodology to the process of forming and 
implementing policy decisions, in particular introducing 
the assumption that all agents including politicians and 
bureaucrats act in their own interests. As a consequence of 
this behavioural assumption, this school underscores the 
inefficiency and injustice that can accompany government 
actions (Acocella 2005: 128). 
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Term Definition (in accordance with current thesis) 
Quality of education A complex characteristic of the educational activity and 
training of students, expressing the degree of their 
compliance with federal state educational standards, 
requirements and (or) needs of the individual or legal 
entity in whose interest educational activities are carried 
out, including the degree of achievement of planned 
results within the educational program. 
Quangos Quasi-governmental organizations that are “appointed 
public agencies holding executive powers and discharging 
a small number of functions previously under control of 
democratically-elected politicians” (Bailey, 1999: 69). 
Reaction curve (line) FOCJ1’s reaction curve depicts utility maximizing fee of 
FOCJ1 (p1) given various believes FOCJ1 might have 
about FOCJ2’s choice of fee (p2) (Varian 1992: 286; 
Varian 2010: 500). 
Regions Subjects of the Russian Federation – upper level territorial 
units of Russia which include republics (республики), 
krays (края), oblasts (области), autonomous oblasts 
(автономные области), autonomous okrugs 
(автономные округа), cities of federal significance 
(города федерального значения). Subjects have their 
legislation system and Parliaments, constitutions 
(конституции) or charters (уставы). 
School services  The thesis includes 3 levels of school education that is 
provided by general education schools, gymnasiums, and 
lyceums in Russia: 
1) primary general education – age 7-10; 
2) basic general education – age 11-15; 
3) secondary (complete) general education – age 16-17. 
Small-sized schools Educational organizations which realise main educational 
programs and situated distantly from other educational 
organizations, they may also have no transport access 
and/or small number of pupils (Federal Act No. 273 “On 
Education in the Russian Federation”, Article 99, § 4).  
Statute A legal document that regulate FOCJs of type II’s 
activities and should be approved by FOCJ founders. It 
should include a set of provisions and rules concerning the 
legal status, organizational form, structure of an FOCJ, 
forms of activities, the order of relations with legal 
entities, individuals and state bodies, as well as determine 
the rights and responsibilities of FOCJ members. 
Stackelberg equilibrium Occurs when the reaction curve of one FOCJ touches the 
isoutility curve of the other FOCJ. 
Subsidiary liability Additional liability imposed, for example, on the members 
of association in conditions when the main defendant (the 
association) is unable to pay the debt.  
Generally, subsidiary liability is regulated by the Civil 
Code of the Russian Federation, Article 399. 
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Term Definition (in accordance with current thesis) 
The European Grouping 
of Territorial Cooperation 
(EGTC) 
A European Union legal instrument designed to promote 
cooperation at local level. It was established on 5 July 
2006 on the basis of EU Regulation 1082/2006. 
Tool FOCJ of type II is suggested by the thesis as an instrument 
which enhances inter-municipal cooperation in Russia. 
Unfavourable 
management decisions 
Decisions of FOCJ management can be unfavourable from 
the members (municipalities) point of view. Management 
by their decisions may create such undesirable situations 
which can lead to bankruptcy of FOCJs and non-
fulfilment of public goals. Management can act not in 
interests of members, but, for example, in their own 
interests (see Williamson 1964; Heinen 1966; Lingnau, 
Härtel 2014; etc.) 
Utility function of 
management 




Programming package which belongs to ‘Wolfram 
Research’ company and is used for mathematical, 
engineering, technical purposes, computer simulation and 
visualization.   
Zweckverband A legal form of special purpose associations for local 
authorities in Germany and German-speaking countries. It 
is frequently used for inter-municipal cooperation.  







Annex 2. Guidelines for the interviews in Russia 
Introduction: explaining research aims and asking for consent.   
 
Questions for school directors 
General issues: 
1. How is the number of pupils changing in your school? What are the trends? 
2. What is the process of enrolment? Is it related to place of residence? 
3. Is there competition between schools in the municipal area? Can parents 
choose between different schools for their children, e.g. located in neigh-
bouring municipalities?  
4. What is your teaching program? 
5. Is a kindergarten related to your school?  
6. Is it possible to receive teaching services from other schools, private firms, 
etc.?  
7. How far can children and teachers be transported? 
Legal issues: 
8. What are the most important legal acts for school organisation? Are there 
some regional and municipal peculiarities, e.g. special rules and regulations 
of the region, the statutes of municipalities? 
9. In which legal forms can schools be established? Is it possible to change the 
legal form of a school? 
Financial issues: 
10. How is your school financed? Where do the main resources come from?  
11. What is the role of the school in making of budget plan? 
12. Are there special problems related to financing?  
13. Do parents contribute to school financing? 
Issues related to teachers: 
14. What are the requirements for teachers’ qualification and education?  
15. What are the criteria for good teaching results? 
16. How is teachers’ income related to their positions (ranks)? How can teachers 
improve their income?  
17. Is it difficult to attract teachers to your school (staffing problem)? 
18. Is there a Codex of Professional Ethics for teachers?  
Issues related to school management: 
19. How is the director appointed to his/her position? 
20. Are there hierarchical relationships between a school director and municipal 
or regional authorities? 
21. How do parents influence the election of the director? The election of 
members of other school administrative bodies? 
22. What are the decision-making bodies at your school? Who appoints or elects 
them? What decisions do they make? 
23. What is the role of a parent committee in management of your school (e.g. 
Parents council, etc.)? 
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24. What happens to the director of a liquidated school if schools merge? 
25. Do local authorities consider the opinions of parents regarding school 
policies, school liquidation or reorganization? 
Concluding questions requiring FOCJ explanation:  
26. Do you think schools should merge if there are not enough children in each 
school? How and who does decide on this? 
27. Could an FOCJ, in your opinion, be a solution? Would you be interested in 
this kind of cooperation? Which role would school directors and munici-
palities play in such a cooperation? 
28. Do you know similar attempts of school cooperation in Russia? 
29. Do you want to add anything?  
 
 
Questions for the Heads of Education Departments of the 
municipal areas of the Voronezh region 
General issues: 
1. Which achievements of schools in your municipal area are you proud of?  
2. Could you tell me about difficulties related to general education and schools 
in your municipal area? 
3. What do you aim to achieve by providing school services? (e.g., better 
quality of education, higher budgets, increased number of pupils, higher 
income of teachers, etc.) 
4. What are your relations with the province (regional authorities) regarding 
school education? What is the role of the province? 
5. Are there many small-sized schools (i.e., with a small number of pupils) in 
your municipality? How do you work with such schools? 
6. Which powers does a municipality have with respect to location, finance, 
educational content and transportation of pupils? 
7. Do municipal authorities influence school managers and school management 
bodies? What is the legal framework to do so? 
8. Do local authorities consider opinion of parents when create municipal 
policies, open or close schools?  
9. Is there school competition within your municipal area and with other 
municipalities? For what do they compete? 
10. Does a political situation in municipality influence school management? 
11. Why have school educational districts been created? What is the role of 
these districts? 
Issues related to teachers: 
12. What are the requirements for qualification and education of teachers?  
13. What are the criteria for good teaching results (their productivity)? 
14. How is the income of teachers related to their positions (ranks/categories)? 
How can teachers influence their income?  
15. Is there a Codex of Professional Ethics for teachers?  
Issues related to school management: 
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16. How is a director appointed to his/her position? 
17. Are the hierarchical relationships between school directors and municipal or 
regional authorities? 
18. How do parents influence the election of a director? The election of other 
school administrative bodies? 
19. What are the decision-making bodies at your school? Who appoints or elects 
members of these bodies? Which decisions do they make? 
20. What is the role of the committee of parents in school management (e.g. 
Parents’ council, etc.)? 
21. What happens to the director of a liquidated school if schools merge?  
Legal issues:  
22. What are the normative acts that you consider to organise school services 
provision in your municipal area? 
23. Is it possible to change legal form of a school, e.g. from municipal to non-
commercial form of company? 
Financial issues: 
24. How do you finance your schools? Which expenses does the municipality 
cover and which are covered by other jurisdictions?  
25. Does the municipality pay for transportation of pupils or teachers? Should 
these expenses be covered by parents, rural settlement or the municipal area?  
26. Do municipal settlements in your municipal area compete with each other 
for school money/grants? 
27. Is a municipality responsible for financing, maintaining and repairing school 
buildings? Is it possible that municipalities sell school buildings which are 
not used?  
28. Can you increase investments and expenses related to schools? 
Inter-municipal cooperation issues: 
29. Do you cooperate with other municipalities in your area? Regarding what? 
What are the legal normative acts that you use to regulate this cooperation? 
30. Are municipalities authorised to close schools in order to establish inter-
municipal cooperation concerning school services provision? 
Concluding questions requiring FOCJ explanation: 
31. Do you feel that optimization of school system in your municipal area is 
necessary? 
32. Would you appreciate an FOCJ solution because of possible cost savings or 
other advantages? Are you interested in school FOCJs in your municipal 
area? 
33. What are the effects of school budget reallocation to FOCJ? Would the 
municipality lose financial means, e.g. grants, which an FOCJ might not get? 
Can funds from other jurisdictions (e.g. regions) be paid to FOCJs under 
private law?  
34. Would your municipality be able to transfer budgetary funds or property to 
an FOCJ? Is it legally possible? 
35. Would an FOCJ be taxed? 
36. Should an FOCJ be responsible for one school or several schools?  
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37. Do you know about similar attempts of inter-municipal cooperation in 
Russia? 
38. Do you know about special grants that support cooperation in the school 
services provision in Russia? 
 
Questions for the Heads of rural settlements 
General issues: 
1. Which achievements of schools in your settlement are you proud of?  
2. Could you tell me about difficulties related to general education and schools 
in your settlement? 
3. What are your relations with the municipal area and province (regional 
authorities) regarding school education? What are their roles in school 
education?  
4. Which powers do settlement authorities have with respect to location, 
finance, teaching program and transportation of pupils? 
5. Do municipal authorities influence school managers and school management 
bodies? What is the legal framework for this? 
6. Do you have small-sized schools (i.e., with a small number of children) in 
your settlement? How do you organise the work of such schools? 
7. Do local authorities consider opinion of parents when create municipal 
policies, open or close schools?  
8. Is there school competition within your municipal area and with other 
municipalities? For what do they compete? 
9. Does a political situation in municipality influence school management? 
Legal issues:  
10. What are the normative acts that you consider to organise school services 
provision in your settlement?  
11. Is it possible to change legal form of a school, e.g. from municipal to non-
commercial form of company?  
Financial issues: 
12. How do you finance your schools? Which expenses does the municipality 
cover and which are covered by other jurisdictions?   
13. Are there expenses for transportation of pupils or teachers? Are these 
expenses covered by parents, rural settlement or municipal area?  
14. Do rural settlements compete with each other for school money/grants? 
15. Is a municipality responsible for financing, maintaining and repairing school 
buildings? Is it possible that municipalities sell school buildings which are 
not used?   
16. Can you increase investments and expenses related to schools?  
Inter-municipal cooperation issues: 
17. Do you cooperate with other municipalities in your area? Regarding what? 
What are the legal normative acts that you use to regulate this cooperation? 
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18. Would you try to improve the financial situation of municipality through 
cooperation with other municipalities regarding school management? What 
is the legal framework for this? 
19. Are municipalities authorised to close schools in order to establish inter-
municipal cooperation concerning school services provision?  
Concluding questions requiring FOCJ explanation: 
20. Do you feel that optimization of school system in your settlement is 
necessary? 
21. Would you appreciate an FOCJ solution because of possible cost savings or 
other advantages? Are you interested in school FOCJs in your municipal 
area?   
22. What are the effects of school budget reallocation to FOCJ? Would the 
municipality lose financial means, e.g. grants, which an FOCJ might not get? 
Can funds from other jurisdictions (e.g. regions) be paid to FOCJs under 
private law?   
23. Would your municipality be able to transfer budgetary funds or property to 
an FOCJ? Is it legally possible?  
24. Would an FOCJ be taxed? 
25. Should an FOCJ be responsible for one school or several schools? 
26. Do you know about similar attempts of inter-municipal cooperation in 
Russia? 
27. Do you want to add something? Did I cover everything which might have 
influence? 
 
Questions for the representatives of parents’ committees 
1. What is the role of parents in school management? 
2. Can parents influence the decision of school management?  
3. Do you know how parents can influence the election of a school director? 
Election of other school management bodies? 
4. Do local authorities consider the opinion of parents when they develop 
school policies or in case of school liquidation or reorganisation? 
5. Can parents choose a school where their child will go, e.g. the school which 
is located in neighbouring municipalities? Are there any normative acts 
regulating this question? 
6. Do you have an opportunity to drive your child to another school? Would 
you agree that your child will be transported to school by bus?    
7. How do parents financially support schools? What kind of expenses must 
parents cover?  
8. Are there schools in your municipal area where you would like your child 
study? Why? What are the criteria of your ideal school? 
9. Would you support cooperation of municipalities regarding school services 




Questions for the advisor of the General Education Provision 
Office of the Department of Education, Science and Youth Policy 
of the Voronezh region  
1. What are the achievements in school education you are proud of in the 
Voronezh region? 
2. What do you aim to achieve by providing school services? (e.g. better 
quality of education, higher budgets, higher number of educated pupils, 
higher teacher incomes, etc.)  
3. What kind of difficulties related to school education do you have in your 
region? What are the difficulties in rural areas?  
4. Are there many small-sized schools (i.e. with small numbers of pupils) in the 
region? How do you work with such schools? 
5. What are the most important legal acts for organisation of school services 
provision? Are there some regional and municipal peculiarities, e.g. special 
rules and regulations of the region, the statutes of municipalities, etc.? 
6. In which legal forms schools are established? Can they be established in one 
of the private non-commercial forms? 
7. What is the situation with school financing in your region? 
8. How schools are financed in your region? Which expenses are covered by 
municipalities and other jurisdictions?  
9. Are there differences in financing public and private schools? 
10. Is there a principle of allocation of school subsidies to municipalities?  
11. Are there opportunities to increase school financing? 
12. Who is responsible for the management of school budgets? 
13. Is there competition between schools in the region? What are they competing 
for? 
14. Are municipalities independent in decision-making regarding school educa-
tion? What is the role of the region in relations to municipalities?  
15. What is the role of federal government with respect to schools, educational 
policy and school education financing? 
16. Do regional authorities influence school management? What is the legal 
framework for this? 
17. Do regional authorities consider parents’ opinion when they create regional 
policies, for example, to establish or liquidate a school? How? 
18. Does political situation in the region influence school management? 
19. Who makes decisions regarding school abolishment? Can municipalities 
independently decide on school liquidation in order to participate inter-
municipal cooperation? 
20. Is it possible to receive teaching services from other schools, private firms, 
etc.?  
21. Are kindergartens related to schools? Is it a separate educational level? 
22. What is the longest distance where children and teachers can be transported?  
23. How is a school director appointed to his/her position? 
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24. What are the hierarchical relations between school director and municipal 
and regional authorities? 
25. How do parents influence the election of directors?  
26. In your opinion, should schools merge if there are not enough children there? 
How and who decides regarding this question?  
Questions requiring FOCJ explanation: 
27. Is school optimization necessary in your region and with rural settlements? 
Are the locations for school FOCJs available?  
28. Would you appreciate FOCJ solution because of possible cost savings or 
other advantages? 
29. Is it possible to redistribute financial means from other jurisdictions to FOCJ 
institutions of private law? 
30. Would the region transfer budget means or property to FOCJs? Is it legally 
possible? 
31. What are the effects of budget reallocation on FOCJ? Does a municipality 
lose financial means when establish an FOCJ, e.g. grants which an FOCJ 
might not get? 
32. Should an FOCJ be taxed? 
33. Are there special grants to enhance cooperation of municipalities with 
respect to schools? 
34. Do you know similar attempts of school inter-municipal cooperation in the 
Voronezh region or Russia? 
 
Questions for the Deputy Head of the Department of Education, 
Science and Youth Policy of the Voronezh region  
1. Could you, please, tell about the dynamics and plans of school development 
in the region? 
2. What is the situation with school financing in the Voronezh region? 
3. How schools are financed in your region? Which expenses are covered by 
municipalities and other jurisdictions? 
4. In which legal forms schools are established? Can they be established in one 
of the private non-commercial forms?  
5. Is it possible to increase financing of school education in the region?  
6. Is there any principle of how school subsidies are allocated to munici-
palities? 
7. What is the role of the region in planning of school location?  
8. How should schools be located in municipalities with respect to school stage 
(primary, secondary, etc.) and education content?  
9. Do the regional educational authorities influence school management 
bodies? 
10. How does political situation in the region influence school management? 
11. Could you tell about the budgeting process of schools? Who manages the 
school budget? 
276 
12. What kind of difficulties related to school education do you have in your 
region? What are the difficulties in rural areas? 
13. Does a school reform should be linked to territorial reform?  
14. Could you tell what the region is going to plan if a fertility rate grows next 
10 years? 
15. In your opinion, should schools merge if there are not enough children there? 
How and who decides regarding this question?  
16. How should municipalities be compensated if schools are abolished? 
17. What instruments the region possesses to influence municipalities? 
18. Is a school optimization necessary in your region? In which municipalities 
inter-municipal cooperation potentially can be used for school services 
provision? 
Questions requiring FOCJ explanation: 
19. Would you appreciate FOCJ solution because of possible cost savings or 
other advantages? Are you interested in school FOCJs in the region? 
20. Is it possible to redirect financial means from other jurisdictions to FOCJ 
institutions of private law?  
21. Would the region allocate budget means or property to an FOCJ? Is it legally 
possible? 
22. What are the effects of budget reallocation on FOCJs? Does a municipality 
lose financial means when establishes an FOCJ, e.g. grants which an FOCJ 
might not get? 
23. Should an FOCJ be taxed? 
24. In your opinion, can functional cooperation of municipalities be a potential 
solution to the difficulties which exist in school services provision? Are you 
interested in this form of cooperation? What would be the role of school 
directors and municipalities? 
25. Are there special grants to enhance cooperation of municipalities with 
respect to schools? 
26. Do you know similar attempts of school inter-municipal cooperation in the 
Voronezh region or Russia?  
 
Questions for the Head of the Office for Interaction with 
Municipalities of the Department for the Development of 
Municipalities of the Voronezh region   
1. Is there cooperation between municipalities or rural/urban settlements in the 
region? Regarding which services do they cooperate?  
2. What are the legal normative acts to regulate this cooperation? Should muni-
cipal cooperation be approved by the regional/federal authorities?  
3. Are there special grants to enhance school inter-municipal cooperation? 
4. Would you try to improve the financial situation of the region through sup-
porting cooperation of municipalities regarding school services provision? 
What is the legal framework to do so?  
 
277 
Questions requiring FOCJ explanation: 
5. What do you think about establishing school FOCJs in the Voronezh region?  
6. Should school FOCJs be responsible for several or for only one school? 
7. Do you know similar attempts of inter-municipal cooperation in Russia? 
8. Do you implement any regulations regarding participation of municipal areas 
of the Voronezh region in inter-municipal cooperation? What legal charac-
teristics these regulations possess? Are they mandatory or advisory?  
9. Does the region have a right legally influence municipalities to sign a coope-




Annex 3. Overview of interviews with experts in  
the provision of Russian school services92 
№ Position Date and 
duration 
Comments 
1 Director of municipal budgetary 
general education establishment, 




2 Consultant of the Department 
for Licensing, Supervision and 
Confirmation of Documents of 
the Department of Education of 




3 Specialist of the pre-university 
education department of 




4 Head of Novogremyachenskoe 





5 Director of municipal (kazen-
nyi) general education 
establishment 
“Novogremyachenskaya general 
education school”  
23.10.2017 
41 min. 
Interview transcription  





Interview transcription  
7 Director of municipal 







8 Chief specialist of the Voronezh 





9 Advisor of the General 
Education Provision Office of 
the Department of Education, 




Interview transcription  
10 Member of a parents’ 
committee in 









Interview transcription  
                                                            
92  The interview transcriptions and notes can be received on request.  
279 
№ Position Date and 
duration 
Comments 
12 Head of Education Department 





13 Deputy Head of the Department 
of Education, Science and 





14 Head of Education Departments 
of the Liskinsky municipal areas 
13.11.2017 
70 min. 
Interview transcription  
15 Head of the Office for 
Interaction with Municipalities 
of the Department for the 
Development of Municipalities 




16 Director of municipal budgetary 




Interview transcription  
17 Member of a parents’ 
committee in Khokholsky 




18 Director of municipal budgetary 
general education establishment 























































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
    
   
   
   
   
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Annex 5. Guidelines for the interview with Bodensee water 
provision association  
Introduction: explaining research aims and asking for consent.   
 
The list of questions: 
1. How did the idea to establish Bodensee Zweckerband come up? What was 
the reason for that? Warum und wie wurde der Bodensee Zweckverband 
gegründet? What is the legal form of water provision association Boden-
see? Welche Rechtsform besitzt der Bodenseewasserverband? 
2. What are the most important legal acts that Bodensee Zweckverband is 
relying on?  Are there some regional (Land level), municipal regulations 
and legal peculiarities in the Statutes of municipalities? Welche sind die 
wichtigsten Gesetze für den Bodensseewasserverband? Welche Gesetze des 
Landes und welche Satzungen der Gemeinden sind relevant? Which 
special, sector-related laws are relevant? Welche Spezialgesetze und 
Landes sowie Gemeindeplanungen sind relevant? 
3. Are there any alternatives for the legal form of Zweckverband? Welche 
anderen Rechtsformen wären ebenfalls vorteilhaft?  
4. How is Bodensee Zweckverband financed? Does it have profit? Wie wird 
der Bodenseewasserverband finanziert? Ist er profitabel? 
5. Could you tell about the budgeting process of Bodensee Zweckverband, 
e.g. with respect to investments, production costs? Who manages the 
budget? Wie wird der Budgetierungs- und Finanzierungsprozess des 
Bodenseewasserverbandes gestaltet? (z.B. Investitionen, Kosten der 
laufenden Produktion)? 
6. How was the equity capital formed? Are the shares of all municipalities 
equal? Where is this issue regulated, e.g. in the Statues? Which organs of 
the Bodenseewasserverband make decisions? Wie wurde das Eigenkapital 
aufgebracht? Sind die Eigenkapitalanteile für alle Gemeinden gleich? Wie 
wird der Eigenkapitalanteil bestimmt? Wo ist diese Frage geregelt, z.B. in 
der Satzung? Welche Organe des Bodenseewasserverbandes entscheiden? 
7. How is cooperation of municipalities realised apart from financial partici-
pation? Do they participate only financially? Wie gestaltet sich die Zusam-
menarbeit mit den Gemeinden außerhalb der Finanzierungsbeteiligung?  
8. How do you control costs in order not to make them too high? Wie erfolgt 
die Kostenkontrolle, um übermässige Kosten zu vermeiden. 
9. How is the management of Bodensee Zweckverband appointed to their 
positions? Wie wird das Management des Bodenseewasserverbandes be-
stimmt, ausgewählt und eingestellt? 
10. What are the relations between Bodensee management, municipalities and 
Land authorities? Wie gestalten sich die Beziehungen zu den Gemeinden? 
11. What is the role of municipalities in the association? What are their main 
economic and political objectives? Welchen Einfluss nehmen die Ge-
300 
meinden auf den Zweckverband. Was sind deren wichtigsten ökonomischen 
und politischen Ziele? 
12. What is the role of Land in inter-municipal cooperation with Bodensee and 
how is it coordinated by the Land authorities? What is the legal framework 
for that? Welche Rolle spielt das Land in der kommunalen Zusammenarbeit 
mit dem Zwechverband und welche Kooerdination erfolgt über Landesbe-
hörden? 
13. What is the role of the Federal government and the EU?  Welche Rolle 
spielen Eingiffe und Vorgaben des Bundes und der EU?  
14. How do municipalities influence election of Bodensee administrative 
bodies? Wie beeinflussen die Gemeinden die Besetzung der Organe und 
der Organisationseinheiten des Zweckverbandes? 
15. What are, in your opinion, advantages and disadvantages of public services 
provision through inter-municipal cooperation in the form of Zweckver-
band? Are there any difficulties? Welche Vorteile und Nachteile entstehen 
für Gemeinden bei der Bereitstellung von öffentlichen Leistungen mittels 
eines Zweckverbandes? Treten Schwierigkeiten auf? 
16. Could you, please, share Bodensee Zweckverband establishment docu-
ments with me (Statute, for example)? Darf ich Einsicht in die Gründungs-
dokumente, in die Satzung und grundlegende Abmachungen mit den Ge-
meinden nehmen? 
17. Does Bodensee Zweckverband have competitors in water services pro-
vision, e.g. through own activities of municipalities? Besitzt der Bodensee-
wasserverband Konkurrenten bei der Wasserversorgung, z.B. durch kom-
munale Eigenversorgung? 
18. Does Bodensee Zweckverband receive any grants from the Land, Fede-
ration or EU? Erhält der Bodensee Zweckverband Zuweisungen, Zuschüsse 
vom Land, Bund und von der EU? 
19. What are advantages and disadvantages of Zweckverband in terms of 
financial conditions which can be achieved on financial markets? Welche 
Vor- und Nachteile besitzt der Zeckverband hinsichtlich seiner Finan-
zierungsbedingungen an Kapitalmärkten?  
20. Is Bodensee Zweckverband taxed as a regular private company (as Betrieb 
gewerblicher Art) or has it a special taxation regime concerning tax exemp-
tions, tax rates, etc.? Wie wird der Bodensseezweckverband besteuert als 
privates Unternehmen, als Betrieb gewerblicher Art oder bestehen eigene 
steuerliche Regelungen, z..B. Steuerfreiheiten, spezielle Steuersätze usw. 
21. Are the employees of water provision association Bodensee public officials 
or do they have usual contracts like in private enterprises? Sind Ihre 
Mitarbeiter Beamte oder Angestellte wie in privaten Unternehmen?  
22. For what kind of public services should Zweckverband legal form be used? 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
    
   
   
   
   





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN  
Funktsionaalsed, kattuvad ja konkureerivad 
jurisdiktsioonid (FKKJ-id) võimaliku vahendina Venemaa 
omavalitsustevaheliseks koostööks kooliteenuste 
pakkumisel 
Uurimuse motivatsioon ja aktuaalsus 
Demograafilised probleemid ja sündimuse langus mõjutavad Venemaa oma-
valitsusi ja regioone. ÜRO andmeil väheneb Venemaa rahvaarv 143,9 miljonilt 
2017. aastal 132,7 miljonini 2050. aastal (World population prospects 2017: 
26). Selle tagajärjel kahaneb ka omavalitsuste arv. Selle probleemi lahendami-
sega seotud debatid Venemaal on suunatud peamiselt territoriaalsetele reformi-
dele: maa- ja linnaasulate kaotamine, ümbernimetamine ja väikeste maa-asulate 
liitmine suuremateks (Макварт, Францке 2017). Arutelus kerkib paljudes 
valdkondades esile tsentraliseerimisküsimus, muuhulgas näiteks koolihariduses, 
mille jaoks on osa eksperte pakkunud välja idee viia koolide haldamine regio-
naalsele tasandile (Mann, Briller 2005, Andreev 2013). Teised kinnitavad aga, 
et omavalitsuste suurendamine pole tingimata ainuke ega parim lahendus ning 
avalike teenuste tsentraliseerimist saab vältida (Макварт, Францке 2017; 
Филатова et al. 2014; Маркварт 2010). Seega pakutakse siinses lõputöös 
välja alternatiivne lähenemine Venemaa rahvaarvu vähenemise tagajärgede 
lahendamisele omavalitsustevahelise koostöö abil. Üks nimetatud tagajärgedest 
on tarbijate nõudluse vähenemine munitsipaalteenuste – vee ja elektri, ühis-
transpordi ja kooliteenuste – järele (Маркварт 2016). 
Samuti viib sündimuse vähenemine kooliealiste laste arvu kahanemiseni, 
mida on seni kompenseerinud eelnevate aastate väike sündimuse kasv. Samas 
on aga ilmselge kalduvus iga-aastasele koolide sulgemisele ja seda kinnitab 
statistika: koolide arv on kahanenud aastatel 2010 kuni 2018 umbes 10 000 
võrra. Samal ajal on kooliealiste laste arvu vähenemise tõttu üha raskem pak-
kuda kvaliteetset haridust (iseäranis maapiirkondades), sest koolide rahastamine 
sõltub otseselt registreeritud õpilaste arvust. Hästi rahastatud koolid saavad 
palgata paremate kutseoskustega õpetajaid ning neil on piisavalt õppematerjale 
ja tehnilisi vahendeid. Vaatamata üleüldisele positiivsele dünaamikale Venemaa 
hariduse rahastamisel jooksevhindades vähenevad riigi kulud reaalhindades. 
Säärastes oludes võimaldaks Venemaa omavalitsustevaheline koostöö vähen-
dada koolide tegevusega seotud kulusid ja saavutada mastaabisäästu (Bel, Sebő 
2019; Baba, Asami 2020 jne.). 
Omavalitsustevahelist koostööd reguleeritakse enamjaolt föderaalseadusega 
nr 131 „Venemaa Föderatsiooni kohalike omavalitsuste töö korraldamise üld-
põhimõtted“. Toetudes nimetatud seadusele ja kirjandusele, võib esile tõsta 
kolm võimalikku õiguslikku vormi omavalitsustevaheliseks koostööks Vene-
maal: 
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− assotsiatiivsed vormid (ühingud, liidud); 
− lepingulised vormid (lühi- ja pikaajalised lepingud); 
− majanduslikud vormid (aktsiaseltsid, mittekaubanduslikud organisatsioonid 
jne) (Ирискина 2010; Петроградская 2010; Миронова 2014). 
Assotsiatiivsed ja lepingulised vormid arenevad kiiresti, samas kui Venemaa 
omavalitsuste majanduslikud koostöövormid on arengus maha jäänud (Бутова, 
Пухова, Щукин 2013; Бутова, Смирнова, Миловидова 2014). Üks võimalik 
pikaajalise majandusliku koostöö vorm on funktsionaalsed, kattuvad ja konku-
reerivad jurisdiktsioonid (nn FOCJ-mudel, edaspidi FKKJ-id). Autor pakub 
FKKJ-id välja alternatiivina omavalitsuste liitmisele ja koolide tsentraliseeritud 
haldamisele ning võimalusena, mille abil vältida Venemaa koolihariduse kvali-
teedi langust. 
Siinne lõputöö põhineb funktsionaalsete, kattuvate ja konkureerivate juris-
diktsioonide (FKKJ-ide) mõistel, mille pakkusid algselt välja Bruno S. Frey ja 
Reiner Eichenberger (Frey, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005; Frey, Eichenberger 1995, 
1996, 1997, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2002, 2006). Lõputöös määratleb autor FKKJ-
e kui majanduslikke üksusi, mitte poliitilisi institutsioone, millena Frey ja 
Eichenberger need algselt välja töötasid. 
Kirjanduses eristatakse FKKJ-ide neli tüüpi (nt Eckardt, Friedrich 2014). 
Neid liigitatakse liikmesusega seotud kriteeriumide alusel (kes on FKKJ-ide 
liikmed). Kui liikmed on füüsilised isikud, on tegemist I tüüpi FKKJ-iga. Kui 
liikmed on valitsusüksused (nt omavalitsused), moodustuvad II tüübi FKKJ-id. 
III tüübi FKKJ-id hõlmavad riiklikke ja eraõiguslikke üksusi ning IV tüübi alla 
kuuluvad kõik ülejäänud tüüpide juures nimetatud liikmed. Siinses lõputöös 
keskendutakse II tüübi FKKJ-idele, mille liikmed on omavalitsused, mis tähen-
dab, et tähelepanu keskmes on FKKJ-id omavalitsustevahelise koostöö vormina. 
Käesolev doktoritöö on interdistsiplinaarse lähenemisega toetudes peamiselt 
majandusteadusele, kuid annab oma panuse ka õigusteadusesse, pakkudes jurii-
dilisi soovitusi FKKJ-ide rakendamiseks Venemaal.  
Siinse lõputöö teema on väga oluline, sest see aitab vastata küsimusele, kas 
FKKJ-idel põhinev koostöö on Venemaal võimalik sealhulgas millistel institut-
sioonilistel tingimustel või mitte. Kirjanduses ei käsitleta FKKJ-i eraldi juriidi-
lise isikuna, millel on oma juhtkond, kõrgeimad organid ning tootmis- ja nõud-
lusfunktsioonid kooliteenuste pakkumisel (ainult osaliselt allikas: Friedrich, 
Reiljan 2011). Samas on aga ülioluline töötada FKKJ-ide jaoks välja mikroma-
janduslik teooria, mis on seni puudulik, et analüüsida võimalikke muutusi 
FKKJ-i juhtkonna käitumises väliste ja sisemiste, poliitiliste ja majanduslike 
tegurite varieerumisel. 
Siinse lõputöö raames määratletakse FKKJ-i juhtkonda kui täitevorganit, mis 
haldab ja korraldab jurisdiktsiooni igapäevaseid hanketoiminguid. Näiteks võib 
see olla üksik täitevorgan (esimees, president jne) või kollektiivne täitevorgan 
(nõukogu, juhatus, presiidium, komisjon jne). FKKJ-i täitevorganid langetavad 
iga päev otsuseid, mis on seotud liikmemaksu ning sisendtegurite koguse ja 
kvaliteediga jne. Seega kujutab FKKJ-i juhtkonna käitumine endast haldusor-
ganite reaktsiooni muutuvatele sisemistele ja välistele teguritele, näiteks FKKJ-i 
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asutajate (omavalitsuste) ja konkurentide otsustele, töötajate ja materjalide hul-
gale, ressursihindadele, maksumääradele, kõrgema astme jurisdiktsioonide raha-
lisele abile, muutuvale kasulikkusfunktsioonile, tootmisfunktsioonile, nõudluse-
le jne. Juhtide reaktsioonide arvestamine on äärmiselt oluline, sest pärast FKKJ-
i asutamist delegeeritakse igapäevased hanketoimingud jurisdiktsiooni palgatud 
juhtkonnale. FKKJ-i juhtkonna käitumisega seotud oletusi väljendatakse mate-
maatiliselt nelja FKKJ-i juhtkonna kasulikkusfunktsioonide näitel lõputöö 
alapeatükis 2.2. 
Uurimisobjektina võtab autor vaatluse alla Venemaa kooliteenused. Valitud 
uurimisobjekti aktuaalsust on põhjendatud eespool. Siinses lõputöös välja töö-
tatud mikromajandusliku teooria kohaldatavus teistele majandussektoritele 
(mitte üksnes Venemaal) tuleb välja selgitada edaspidises uurimistöös. 
 
 
Eesmärk, peamine uurimisküsimus ja -ülesanded 
Siinses lõputöös vastab autor peamisele uurimisküsimusele: kas FKKJ-id on 
Venemaal kooliteenuste pakkumisel sobiv omavalitsustevahelise koostöö va-
hend, kui võtta arvesse FKKJ-i juhtkonna käitumist? 
Et teha järeldus II tüübi funktsionaalsete, kattuvate ja konkureerivate juris-
diktsioonide kohaldatavuse kohta Venemaa omavalitsustevahelise koostöö 
osas kooliteenuste pakkumisel, võtab autor arvesse järgmist: 
• mikromajandusliku modelleerimise tulemusi, millega tuvastatakse juhtkonna 
soositud käitumine, et vältida kooli II tüübi FKKJ-ide väära juhtimist. See 
tähendab juhtkonna otsuseid, mis ei vasta omavalitsuste ehk liikmete soovi-
dele, ei täida eesmärke, milleks FKKJ tuleks luua. Seega pole võimalik rää-
kida FKKJ-i kohaldatavusest kooliteenuste pakkumisele Venemaal, kui 
FKKJ-i juhtkond kaldub oma tegevuses FKKJ-i põhikirjas esile tõstetud ees-
märkidest kõrvale; 
• juriidiliste dokumentide analüüsi, mille abil otsida kõige sobivamat õiguslik-
ku vormi, mis peaks olema kooskõlas FKKJ-i tunnusjoonte ja haridustege-
vuse mittekaubanduslike nõuetega; 
• intervjuusid Venemaa riigiametnikega, kes vastutavad koolide haldamise 
eest omavalitsuste ja regioonide tasemel, ning koolidirektorite ja lapsevane-
matega. 
Doktoritöö eesmärk on töötada välja teoreetilised mikromajanduslikud mudelid 
FKKJ-i juhtkonna otsustamisprotsessi jaoks ning põhikiri kooli II tüübi FKKJ-
idele Venemaal. Teoreetilised mudelid hõlmavad FKKJ-i asutamisfaasi, hetke-
tegevuse faasi ja konkureerimist liikmete nimel ning FKKJ-i juhtkonna ja liik-
mete käitumise analüüsi monopoli ja oligopoli korral. Välja pakutud mudelid 
saab võtta aluseks II tüübi FKKJ-idel põhinevale omavalitsustevahelisele koos-
tööle, võttes arvesse teatud riigi institutsioonilisi eriomadusi. 




UÜ 1: määratleda FKKJ-ide peamised tunnused ja tüübid;  
UÜ 2: analüüsida ja süstematiseerida FKKJ-e ja omavalitsustevahelise koostöö 
alternatiivseid vorme teaduskirjanduse põhjal; 
UÜ 3: koostada mikromajanduslik põhimudel II tüübi FKKJ-i asutamise koh-
ta, võttes arvesse kõrgema astme jurisdiktsioonide toetusi ja erilisi raha-
lisi vahendeid; 
UÜ 4: formuleerida mikromajanduslik põhimudel II tüübi FKKJ-i hetketege-
vuse kohta, võttes arvesse kõrgema astme jurisdiktsioonide toetusi, eri-
lisi rahalisi vahendeid ja eri tüüpi juhtimiskäitumist monopolistlikes ja 
oligopolistlikes turutingimustes; 
UÜ 5: formuleerida mikromajanduslik põhimudel II tüübi FKKJ-i liikmete ni-
mel konkureerimise kohta, võttes arvesse kõrgema astme jurisdiktsioo-
nide toetusi ja erilisi rahalisi vahendeid; 
UÜ 6: teha kindlaks õiguslikud vormid, millena II tüübi FKKJ-id võivad 
Venemaal esineda ja mida saaks kasutada omavalitsustevahelises koos-
töös kooliteenuste pakkumisel; 
UÜ 7: selgitada, millist tüüpi omavalitsused saavad Venemaal teha vabalt ja 
sõltumatult otsuseid seoses II tüübi FKKJ-idel põhineva koostööga; 
UÜ 8: töötada välja koolide II tüübi FKKJ-ide põhikiri ja memorandum, võttes 




Siinne lõputöö täiendab olemasolevat teaduskirjandust ja täidab vähemalt neli 
lünka teemavaldkonna senises käsitluses. Esiteks pole II tüübi FKKJ-i kui 
majanduslikku üksust põhjalikult uuritud. Kõik varasemad analüüsid keskendu-
vad FKKJ-idele kui peamiselt poliitilistele vahenditele ning kirjeldavad seega I 
tüübi FKKJ-i. Vaid vähestes lähenemisviisides võetakse tähelepanu alla II tüübi 
FKKJ-id majanduslike üksustena ning nende juhtkonna käitumist analüüsitakse 
majandusteooria põhjal (Friedrich, Kaltschütz, Nam 2004; Gabbe 2008; Fried-
rich, Eckardt 2014; Friedrich, Chebotareva 2017; Chebotareva, Friedrich 2017; 
Chebotareva, Friedrich 2020). Käesolevas doktoritöös töötatakse välja mikro-
majanduslik teooria II tüübi FKKJ-ide kohta, mis on aluseks omavalitsuste, 
FKKJ-i juhtkonna ja kõrgema astme jurisdiktsioonide otsustusprotsessis.  
Teiseks tehakse siinses lõputöös esimene katse kohaldada FKKJ-i kontsept-
siooni Ida-Euroopa riikidele ja arenguriikidele, näiteks Venemaale. Varasemad 
autorid on võtnud vaatluse alla peamiselt Ameerika Ühendriikide ja Lääne-
Euroopa (Šveits, Saksamaa jne) näited ning FKKJ-idele sarnased omavalitsuste-
vahelise koostöö vormid nendes riikides (Steiner 2003; Huber 2011; Dun-
combe, Yinger 2007; Longley, Sneed 2009). 
Kolmandaks pole seni uuritud omavalitsustevahelist koostööd Venemaa 
koolihariduses. Mõned autorid (Ирискина 2010; Бутова, Смирнова, Милови-
дова 2014; Гриценко 2001; Власова, Джек 2009; Рагозина 2009) on uurinud 
pikaajalist majanduslikku koostööd omavalitsuste vahel, kes on asutanud äri-
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ühingu õiguslikud vormid, kuid mitte FKKJ-id. Need uuringud on enamjaolt 
kirjeldavad ja neil puudub teoreetiline mikromajanduslik alus II tüübi FKKJ-ide 
väljatöötamiseks Venemaal. 
Neljandaks pole FKKJ-ide koostöövormi varem analüüsitud konkreetse riigi 
institutsioonilises õigusraamistikus, mille puhul on FKKJ-e soovitatud. Seega 
on analüüsist välja jäetud hulk väga olulisi tegureid ja neid ei ole arvestatud 
FKKJ-ide asjakohasusega seotud soovitustes. 
Kuna II tüübi FKKJ-i käsitatakse riikliku majandusüksusena, täiendab siinne 
lõputöö ka avaliku sektori äriühingute juhtimisega seotud kirjandust (nt Papen-
fuß, Schaefer 2017; Ellwood, Garcia-Lacalle 2016; OECD 2018; Bozeman, 
Johnson 2015; Benz, Frey 2007; Calabrò, Torchia. 2011 jne). Avaliku sektori 
äriühingute juhtimise eesmärk on ühest küljest avaliku sektori organisatsioonide 
tõhususe, tootlikkuse ja jätkusuutlikkuse parandamine riiklike ülesannete täit-
misel ning teisest küljest üldsuse heaolu suurendamine ja avalikkuse huvide 
teenimise tagamine (Expert Commission of the German Public Corporate 
Governance-Modelcode 2020). Esimest osa sellest eesmärgist täidab palgatud 
juhtkond, teist järelevalvet teostavad omavalitsusasutused. Munitsipaalettevõte-
te vastutustundlikuks haldamiseks ja järelevalveks saab välja töötada spetsiaalse 
reguleeriva raamistiku avaliku sektori äriühingute juhtimise eeskirjade kujul 
(OECD 2019; Spennlingwimmer 2017). Seda soovitatakse ka kooli II tüübi 
FKKJ-ide puhul. 
Käesolev doktoritöö on ainulaadne ka omavalitsustevahelise koostöö uurimi-
seks kasutatavate meetodite kombinatsiooni poolest. Kvalitatiivsed (dokumen-
dianalüüs ja intervjuud kohalike ametnikega) ja kvantitatiivsed lähenemisviisid 
(mikromajanduslik ja matemaatiline modelleerimine) täiendavad teineteist. 
Omavalitsustevahelise koostöö uurimisel kasutatud meetodite seas pole mate-
maatiline modelleerimine saanud tähelepanu, mida see meetodina väärib ja 
mida saab kaasata mikromajandusliku teooria väljatöötamiseks omavalitsuste-
vahelise koostöö algatamisel. Siinne lõputöö täidab ka selle lünga.  
 
 
Metodoloogia ja analüüsietapid 
Töö interdistsiplinaarsuse tagavad erinevad rakendatud analüüsimeetodid, alates 
matemaatilisest modelleerimisest ja kirjandusanalüüsist kuni õigusaktide ja 
intervjuude analüüsini. Täpsemalt on uurimismetodoloogia töötatud välja uuri-
misülesannete ja lõputöö eesmärgi järgi, võttes aluseks kirjandusanalüüsi. 
Esiteks uuris autor kirjandust, kus käsitletakse FKKJ-i ja II tüübi FKKJ-
idega sarnaseid omavalitsustevahelise koostöö vorme peamiselt seoses kooli-
haridusega eri riikides. FKKJ-e käsitlevas kirjanduses on esitatud FKKJ-i mää-
ratlus ja tunnusjooned, mis peaks olema põhikirja ja memorandumi aluseks (1. 
peatükk). Joonisel 1 on näha metodoloogia empiirilise osa arendamiseks. 
Teiseks rakendatakse tulenevalt uurimislüngast mikromajandusliku teooria 
ja matemaatilise modelleerimise meetodit ja kasutatakse tarkvara Wolfram 
Mathematica, et analüüsida FKKJ-ide juhtkonna käitumist, võttes arvesse kõr-
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gema astme jurisdiktsioonide (föderaalsed või piirkondlikud ametiasutused) 
tähtsust seoses toetuste ja muu finantsabi, ressursihindade ja maksumääradega 
ning muutustega nõudluses, juhtimislaadi kasulikkusfunktsioonis jne. Teoreeti-
lise mikromajandusliku modelleerimise tulemuste ja järelduste põhjal on või-
malik välistada FKKJ-i juhtkonna ebasoodsat käitumist ja rakendada optimaal-
seid lahendusi FKKJ-i liikmete ja juhtkonna otsustusprotsessis (2. peatükk).  
Mikromajanduslike mudelite väljatöötamiseks on teises peatükis analüüsitud 
oligopolistlikku turu mudeleid (Stackelberg 2011; Krelle 1961; Gravelle, Rees 
2004). Arvesse on võetud ka riigirahandusega seotud kirjandust (Musgrave, 
Musgrave 1989; Olson 1969), sest FKKJ-id on riiklikud üksused ning nende 
asutamisel ja hetketegevuses tuleks rakendada riigirahanduse põhimõtteid. 
FKKJ-i käsitlevat kirjandust on analüüsitud, võttes eelduseks, et FKKJ-id on 
avalik-õiguslikud majanduslikud üksused, mis toimivad omavalitsustevahelise 
koostöö vahendina. Venemaa omavalitsustevahelist koostööd käsitlev kirjandus 
on lisaks võetud vaatluse alla kolmandas peatükis. 
 
 
Joonis 1. Metodoloogia empiirilise osa arendamiseks  
Allikas: autori koostatud 
 
 
Kolmandaks on kasutatud dokumendianalüüsi, et töötada välja II tüübi FKKJ-
ide põhikiri ja memorandum ning anda soovitusi, kuidas asutada Venemaal 
FKKJ-e ühingu (liidu) vormis, kusjuures Venemaa teatud tüüpi omavalitsusi 
vaadatakse kui võimalikke liikmeid (alapeatükk 3.2). Uurimise alla võeti föde-
raalseadus nr 131 „Venemaa Föderatsiooni kohalike omavalitsuste töö korral-
damise üldpõhimõtted“, Venemaa Föderatsiooni tsiviilseadustik ja äriühingute 


































FKKJ-i abil, ilma et võetaks arvesse Venemaa Föderatsiooni föderaalseadust nr 
273 „Haridus Venemaa Föderatsioonis”, eelarvekoodi, regionaal- ja munitsi-
paaltasandi hariduseeskirju ning sarnaseid dokumente. Dokumendianalüüsi abil 
on kindlaks määratud sobivad õiguslikud vormid ja see, kuidas need sobivad 
FKKJ-i peamiste tunnustega. FKKJ-ide koostööks sobivaid Venemaa oma-
valitsusi analüüsiti samuti õigusaktide uurimise põhjal. 
Neljandaks tehti intervjuud Venemaa ametnikega, kes vastutavad koolide 
haldamise eest munitsipaal- ja regionaaltasandil, koolidirektorite ja lapsevane-
matega ning Bodensee veevarustuse ühinguga Saksamaal (alapeatükk 3.3). Neid 
on vaja, et koguda II tüübi FKKJ-i põhikirja ja memorandumi jaoks praktilise 
tähtsusega teavet, mida pole võimalik teiste meetoditega saada. 
Venemaal Voroneži piirkonnas tehtud intervjuud on vajalikud, et saada tea-
vet koolide rahastamise, haldamise vms olukorra kohta ning mõista, kas II tüübi 
FKKJ-ide tunnusjooned on Venemaa koolisüsteemi jaoks sobilikud. Saksamaa 
Bodensee veevarustuse ühinguga (Bodensee-Wasserversorgung) tehti intervjuu, 
et mõista, kuidas hallatakse praktikas ühingut, mis teeb omavalitsustevahelist 
koostööd. Autori eesmärk on selgitada välja, millega arvestamine on Bodensee 
veevarustuse ühingu juhtkonna jaoks nende tööprotsessis ja asutamisdokumen-
tides oluline. 
Intervjuude jaoks koostas autor küsimused kirjandusanalüüsi, mikromajan-
dusliku teoreetilise modelleerimise tulemuste ja esialgse dokumendianalüüsi 
põhjal. Intervjuude tulemuste alusel on muudetud teises peatükis välja töötatud 




Lõputöö koosneb kolmest peatükist. Esimeses peatükis esitatakse kirjanduse 
ülevaade, milles keskendutakse FKKJ-i mõistele alates selle esialgsest määrat-
lusest föderalistliku poliitilise vormina kuni hiljutiste määratlusteni: II tüübi 
FKKJ kui majanduslik üksus. Alapeatükis 1.1 võetakse vaatluse alla ka see, 
millistes sektorites ja valdkondades saab kohaldada funktsionaalseid jurisdikt-
sioone ning milliseid FKKJ-idele sarnaseid omavalitsustevahelise koostöö vor-
me leidub eri riikides. Alapeatükis 1.2 on toodud termini „omavalitsustevahe-
line koostöö“ määratlus siinse lõputöö raames. Siinkohal esitatakse üldised mär-
kused omavalitsustevahelise koostöö eri vormide kohta. Alapeatükis 1.2 tõste-
takse esile ka seosed II tüübi FKKJ-ide ja omavalitsustevahelise koostöö mää-
ratluste vahel. 
Teine peatükk aitab kaasa mikromajandusliku teooria väljatöötamisele II 
tüübi FKKJ-ide juhtkonna ja liikmete otsustusprotsessi jaoks. Autor töötab välja 
II tüübi FKKJ-i majandustegevuse kolme faasi mudelid mikroökonoomika teoo-
riat ja matemaatilise modelleerimise meetodeid kasutades. Alapeatükis 1.2 aru-
tatakse optimaalseid lahendusi mudelite loomiseks II tüübi FKKJ-i asutamise, 
hetketegevuse ja liikmete nimel konkureerimise kohta, võttes arvesse rahalisi 
vahendeid ja kõrgema astme jurisdiktsioonide toetusi. Alapeatükis 2.2 näida-
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takse, kuidas II tüübi FKKJ-i hetketegevuse mudeli optimaalne lahendus sõltub 
juhtkonna kasulikkusfunktsioonist ja turuvormidest. See, kuidas muutused 
sisendtegurites, tootmisfunktsioonis, juhtkonna kasulikkusfunktsioonis, nõud-
lusfunktsioonis ning juhtkonna ja liikmete läbirääkimisprotsessis määravad 
juhtkonna otsuseid ning kuidas vältida juhtkonna ebasoodsaid otsuseid, on võe-
tud vaatluse alla vastavalt alapeatükkides 2.3 ja 3.4. 
Kolmas peatükk on empiiriline ning seal kohaldatakse II tüübi FKKJ-i kui 
omavalitsustevahelise koostöö vormi Venemaa kooliharidusele. Alg-, põhi- ja 
keskharidust (täielikku üldharidust) uuritakse seoses rahastusallikate, halduse ja 
peamiste otsuseid tegevate organitega (alapeatükk 3.1). Alapeatükis 3.2 otsib 
autor dokumendianalüüsi abil II tüübi FKKJ-ide koostööle sobivat õiguslikku 
vormi ja vastavat omavalitsuste tüüpi, võttes arvesse sektori eriomadusi Vene-
maal (kooliteenuste mittekaubanduslikku olemust ja kooliteenuste pakkumise 
eest vastutajaid). 
 Alapeatükis 3.3 esitatud intervjueerimismeetod on ülioluline teabe kogu-
misel tingimuste kohta, mida on vaja II tüübi FKKJ-ide asutamiseks Venemaa 
kooliteenuste jaoks, ning annab kasulikke vihjeid selle kohta, kuidas II tüübi 
FKKJ-id toimivad Saksamaal õigusliku vormina, mida nimetatakse Zweckver-
band´iks. Lisaks on alapeatükkide 3.1 kuni 3.3 ja teise peatüki tulemuste abil 
töötatud välja soovitused Venemaa II tüübi FKKJ-i koolijurisdiktsioonide me-
morandumi ja põhikirja kujul. Näidissätted on esitatud alapeatükis 3.4. Töö 
lõpus on toodud üldised järeldused II tüübi FKKJ-i kohaldatavuse kohta Vene-
maa kooliteenustes ja võimalikud suunad edaspidiseks uurimistööks. 
 
 
Teoreetilised ja empiirilised tulemused 
Autor uuris funktsionaalsete, kattuvate ja konkureerivate jurisdiktsioonide 
(FKKJ-ide) mõistet ja selle kohaldatavust omavalitsustevahelise koostöö eden-
damisele kooliteenuste pakkumise valdkonnas Venemaal. Vastusena peamisele 
uurimisküsimusele võib öelda, et II tüübi FKKJ on sobiv vahend omavalitsuste-
vahelise koostöö ja kooliteenuste pakkumise jaoks Venemaal. Funktsionaalsete 
jurisdiktsioonide kohaldatavust Venemaa kooliteenustele kinnitati II tüübi 
FKKJ-i mikromajandusliku modelleerimise, Venemaa õigusaktide analüüsi ja 
Venemaa omavalitsuste ametnikega tehtud intervjuude tulemustega. Kõigi kol-
me nimetatud aspekti analüüsist ei ilmnenud takistusi II tüübi FKKJ-ide asuta-
miseks Venemaal. 
FKKJ-i mõiste hõlmab nelja komponenti. FKKJ-id täidavad mitmeid funkt-
sioone, näiteks koolihariduse vallas. Nad kattuvad ühel territooriumil, võist-
levad liikmete ja klientide nimel ning eeldatakse, et FKKJ-ides nõutakse tasusid 
ja neis on demokraatlikud sisestruktuurid (nt juhtkond). 
Võib eristada nelja tüüpi FKKJ-e. Need erinevad liikmete poolest, mis 
tähendab, et I tüübi FKKJ-i kuuluvad liikmetena vaid kodanikud, kes otsustavad 
asutada FKKJ-i teatud teenuse pakkumiseks. II tüübi FKKJ-ide liikmed on 
valitsusüksused, sealhulgas omavalitsused, regioonid, maakonnad, osariigid jne. 
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III tüübi FKKJ-id hõlmavad riiklikke ja eraõiguslikke üksusi, samas kui IV 
tüüpi võib nimetada segatüübiks, kuhu võivad kuuluda kõigi kolme esimese 
tüübi võimalikud liikmed. Lõputöös uuritakse funktsionaalseid, kattuvaid ja 
konkureerivaid jurisdiktsioone kui vahendit, mille abil edendada Venemaa oma-
valitsustevahelist koostööd, mistõttu keskendutakse II tüübi FKKJ-idele, kelle 
liikmed on omavalitsused. 
Omavalitsustevahelise koostöö üldklassifikatsioonis (IMC Toolkit Manual 
2010) kuuluvad II tüübi FKKJ-id asjakohase õigusliku staatusega ametlike 
majandusüksuste alla. Muud omavalitsustevahelise koostöö vormid, nagu oma-
valistustevaheline mitteametlik koostöö, munitsipaallepingud, allhanked ning 
avaliku ja erasektori partnerlus, ei ole Venemaa kooliteenuste puhul niivõrd 
kasulikud, sest need pole oma olemuselt püsivad ega paku seega pikaajalisi 
lahendusi sotsiaalmajanduslikele ja demograafilistele probleemidele. 
Kuna II tüübi FKKJ-id on majandusüksused, millel on oma juhtkond ja 
muud sisemised haldusorganid, nagu liikmete kogu, koosneb FKKJ-i tegevuse 
modelleerimine kolmest järjestikusest faasist: asutamine, hetketegevus ja kon-
kureerimine liikmete nimel. Teine faas ehk FKKJ-i hetketegevus on analüüsi 
jaoks ülioluline, sest pärast FKKJ-ide asutamist täidavad kõiki juhtimisüles-
andeid peamiselt täitevorganid, kes vastutavad FKKJ-i hanketoimingute eest. Et 
analüüsida FKKJ-i juhtkonna ja liikmete võimalikke reaktsioone, kui välised ja 
sisemised poliitilised ja majanduslikud tegurid muutuvad, on lõputöös töötatud 
välja II tüübi FKKJ-i mikromajanduslik teooria. 
II tüübi FKKJ-i asutamise baasmudelil maksimeeritakse liikmete kasulikkus-
funktsioon. II tüübi FKKJ-i asutamiseks peavad omavalitsused suunama rahalisi 
ja mitterahalisi vahendeid II tüübi FKKJ-i omakapitali. Mudelis määratakse 
kindlaks optimaalne osa, mille omavalitsused peaksid panustama omakapitali, 
ja II tüübi FKKJ-i omakapitali moodustavate osaliste optimaalne arv, võttes 
aluseks nende kulude ja tulude võrdluse. Kui tulud ületavad kulusid, soovivad 
omavalitsused innukalt suurendada oma osa II tüübi FKKJ-is. Esiteks leitakse 
lahendus vaid tingimusel, et omavalitsused panustavad vaid üht liiki rahastamis-
vahendiga (nt kinnisvara, munitsipaalmaa, laen, omavalitsuse eelarvevahendid 
jne). Teiseks leitakse optimaalne lahendus juhuks, kui omavalitsused osalevad 
erinevate rahaliste ja mitterahaliste ressurssidega. 
II tüübi FKKJ-i asutamismudelis võib arvesse võtta ühekordset toetust kõr-
gema astme ametiasutuselt, milleks võib olla näiteks piirkondlik haridusosa-
kond, nagu on selgunud intervjuudest. Kui omavalitsused saavad FKKJ-i asu-
tamiseks toetuse, suureneb nende omakapitali panustatav optimaalne osa, mitte 
seetõttu, et nad peavad rohkem investeerima, vaid tänu sellele, et nende osaluse 
kompenseerib osaliselt toetus. Samas võivad nad omavalitsusi vähemal määral 
koostöösse kaasata, kuna nende osa on muutunud suuremaks. 
FKKJ-i hetketegevuse mudelilt on näha, kuidas juhtkond reageerib kõrgema 
astme jurisdiktsioonidelt saadud toetustele ning erilistele rahalistele vahenditele 
monopolistlikes ja oligopolistlikes turutingimustes, ning arvesse on võetud juht-
konna erinevat käitumist II tüübi FKKJ-i hetketegevuse faasis. Selles mudelis 
määratakse kindlaks sisendtegurite suhete kombinatsioon ja omavalitsustelt 
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nõutava tasu optimaalne määr. Osutatud on sellele, et omavalitsused peaksid 
katma II tüübi FKKJ-i kulud makstes osalustasu. Mudelis on võetud aluseks 
kulude katmise reegel, mis tähendab, et FKKJ-il ei ole kasumit. Nimetatud mu-
deli tulemuseks on optimaalne tasumäär juhtkonna vaatepunktist, mida iseloo-
mustab kaks optimaalsuse tingimust. Esimese kohaselt on marginaalse sisend-
teguri põhjal saadud marginaalsete kasude suhe võrdne osaga marginaalsest 
kasumist, mille on tekitanud vastava teguri panus. Teiseks tingimuseks on see, 
et tasu, mida omavalitsused maksavad regulaarselt, peaks olema võrdne kesk-
miste kuludega. Mudeli abil saab analüüsida, kuidas optimaalne lahendus muu-
tub, kui juhtkonna kasulikkusfunktsioon on erinev ning väljund, ressursihinnad, 
tööjõud ja materjalid muutuvad, ja mis juhtub, kui II tüübi FKKJ saab mittekau-
beldava toetuse. Viimasel juhul on näha, et kui toetus on ühekordne, ei muutu 
esimene optimaalsuse tingimus. Omavalitsuste osalustasu aga väheneb ja väl-
jund suureneb. 
II tüübi FKKJ-id võivad saada hetketegevuse faasis toetusi ka kõrgema 
astme jurisdiktsioonidega läbirääkimiste teel. Mudeli tulemuseks on läbirääki-
miste lahendus, mille määrab Nashi järgi kindlaks kooperatiivne nullsumma-
mäng. Sõltuvalt väljundist ja toetuse suurusest maksimeerib selle mudeli puhul 
oma kasulikkusfunktsiooni nii II tüübi FKKJ kui ka kõrgema astme ameti-
asutus. Kuna väljund sõltub toetuse suurusest, on üheks lahenduseks see, kui 
väljundmaht, mis tuleneb läbirääkimistest, sõltub hinnangust, mis antakse toetu-
sele – lisaväljundile, mis saab võimalikuks tänu toetusele, ning väljundiga 
seoses läbi rääkivatele partneritele. Nimetatud väljund määrab läbirääkimiste 
tulemusel saadud toetuse suuruse läbirääkijate minimaalsete kasude ja hin-
damisfunktsioonide parameetrite abil. Suurema toetuse korral tõuseb FKKJ-i 
juhtkonna hinnang lisaväljundile ning kasvab väljundmaht ja toetuse suurus. 
Ka erinevad rahastamisvahendid mõjutavad II tüübi FKKJ-i hetketegevuse 
mudeli optimaalset lahendust. Selles mudelis lisatakse erilised kulud kogukulu-
dele ja loetakse osaks ressursihindadest. Mudeli lahendus pakub spetsiaalseid 
finantssuuniseid. Üks on seotud tootmistegurite sisendiga: rahastuse ja materjali 
muudatustega seotud marginaalsete kasude suhe on marginaalselt võrdne rahas-
tuse ja materjaliga seotud marginaalsete kasumite suhtega ning rahastuse ja 
tööjõu muudatustega seotud marginaalsete kasude suhe on marginaalselt võrdne 
rahastuse ja tööjõuga seotud marginaalsete kasumite suhtega. Teise lahenduse 
kohaselt on tasu, mida omavalitsused peavad maksma, võrdne keskmiste kulu-
dega. Kui rahastusega seotud ressursihindade suurus sõltub sisendteguritest, 
muutuvad optimaalsed tingimused, mis mõjutab sisendeid, väljundeid ja tasu. 
Alapeatükis 2.2 on näidatud, kuidas juhtkonna kasulikkusfunktsioon ja eri-
nevad turuvormid mõjutavad juhtkonna otsustusprotsessi. Autor pakub ana-
lüütilisi lahendusi tööjõu, materjali, väljundi, kasulikkuse ja osalustasu jaoks 
seoses nelja juhtumiga, mis käsitlevad juhtkonna käitumist monopolistlikel ja 
oligopolistlikel turgudel. Analüütiline lahendus tasude jaoks on küllaltki keeru-
line, mistõttu on lõputöösse lisatud vaid arvulised näited, mis tulenevad para-
meetrite eeldatavast kombinatsioonist. Autor leidis Launhardti-Hotellingi ja 
Krelle-Otti mudeli põhjal lahendused kahele II tüübi FKKJ-ile, võttes eeldu-
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seks, et nende juhtkondade juhtimiskäitumine on ühesugune. Lisaks võimal-
davad tööjõu ja materjaliga seotud analüütilised lahendused tuletada tööjõu ja 
materjali tootmistegurite nõudlusfunktsioone kõigi nelja juhtumi puhul mono-
poli ja oligopoli tingimustes. Väljundi optimaalsed lahendused on aluseks II 
tüübi FKKJ-i tarnefunktsioonidele, mis on seotud iga juhtimiskäitumise avaldu-
misvormi ja turuvormidega. 
Võttes aluseks hetketegevuse baasmudeli, leiti monopoli jaoks optimaalne 
osalustasu. Autor laiendab aga teemavaldkonda ja käsitleb siinses lõputöös ka 
oligopoli. Nii oligopoli kui ka monopoli puhul katab II tüübi FKKJ kulud täieli-
kult. Kirjanduses eeldatakse peamiselt, et juhtkonna peaeesmärk on kasumi, 
müügi või käibe maksimeerimine. Järgides Williamsoni (1964) ideed, mille 
kohaselt maksimeerivad äriühingute juhtkonnad kasulikkust, mis lähtub nende 
enda eesmärkidest, mitte kasulikkusest sidusrühmade jaoks, keskendutakse siin-
ses lõputöös II tüübi FKKJ-ile kui äriühingule, mille juhtkond maksimeerib oma 
kasulikkust. Nagu Friedrich et al. (2014), keskendub lõputöö neljale eri juhtu-
mile, mille puhul juhtkonna kasulikkusfunktsioon sõltub avalikest ja isiklikest 
eesmärkidest: 
• juhtum I: tootmisse kaasatud tööjõu maht ja saadud väljund; 
• juhtum II: väljund eraldi; 
• juhtum III: tööjõud eraldi; 
• juhtum IV: tööjõud positiivselt ja väljund negatiivselt. 
Autor formuleerib nimetatud nelja juhtimiskäitumise juhtumi algebra abil. 
Launhardti-Hotellingi mudelis võetakse eelduseks kahe II tüübi FKKJ-i auto-
noomne käitumine, mille puhul on osalustasud tegevuse parameetrid. Launhardti-
Hotellingi mudelil põhinev käitumine kombineeritakse Krelle omaga, mida on 
täpsustanud Ott. Launhardti-Hotellingi mudeli rakendamine II tüübi FKKJ-i 
tingimuste puhul võimaldab tuvastada sellise tasude kombinatsooni p1 ja p2, 
mille puhul kahe äriühinguga oligopolistlik turg saavutab tasakaalu. Lisaks 
varieerub nimetatud tasude kombinatsioon olenevalt iga II tüübi FKKJ-i 
juhtkonna tüübist. Nelja juhtumi puhul leitakse tasakaalupunktid algebra abil. 
Krelle-Otti mudeli järgi on lahendus tasude stabiilsuspiirkond. Kui kaks FKKJ-i 
satuvad kohandamise või välismõjude tõttu sellesse piirkonda, ei muuda nad 
enam oma tasusid. Need Krelle-Otti piirkonnad on samuti arvutatud algebra abil 
kõigi nelja juhtimiskäitumise juhtumi puhul. Krelle ruum võib sõltuvalt turu-
parameetrite muutustest ka liikuda. 
Autor tegi kindlaks suurima monopoolse tasu II tüübi FKKJ-i tööjõu maksi-
meerimise eest (juhtum III). Sama kehtib oligopoli puhul Launhardti-Hotellingi 
tasakaalupunkti kohta. II tüübi FKKJ-id, kes kuuluvad juhtimiskäitumise II juh-
tumi alla ja maksimeerivad väljundit, saavutavad monopolis suurima väljundi. 
II tüübi FKKJ-id, kes kuuluvad I juhtumi alla ning maksimeerivad väljundit ja 
tööjõudu, saavutavad duopoli korral suurima koguväljundi ja kasulikkuse väär-
tuse (jättes vähem tootliku III juhtimiskäitumise juhtumi tähelepanuta). Väljun-
dit maksimeeriva juhtkonna (juhtum II) puhul on nii monopolis kui ka duopolis 
madalaim tasu. Seega on II tüübi FKKJ-i liikmete jaoks juhtimiskäitumise 
juhtumid I ja II soodsamad. Üldistele ootustele vastav ja kinnitatud tulemus on 
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see, et tasud on monopolis suuremad kui oligopolistlikul turul ning väljund on 
oligopolis suurem kui monopolis. 
Krelle-Otti piirkonna puhul on arvuliste näitajate põhjal näha, et väikseim 
piirkond, kus konkurendid ei muuda tasusid, on IV juhtumi korral, kus juhtkond 
annab tööjõule positiivse ja väljundile negatiivse hinnangu. Suurim tasu stabiil-
suspiirkond on I juhtimiskäitumise juhtumi korral, kus juhtkond annab nii töö-
jõule kui ka väljundile positiivse hinnangu. Juhtumitel II ja IV on võrreldavad 
Krelle-Otti piirkonnad. Juhtimiskäitumise III juhtumi korral saavutatakse kol-
mes punktis Stackelbergi tasakaal. Seega pole sel juhul Krelle-Otti ruum ühe-
tasase kujuga. 
Autor on graafiliselt kujutanud liikmete nimel konkureerimise mudelit. Sel-
lel on näha liikmete jaotumine kahe asutatud ja konkureeriva II tüübi FKKJ-i 
vahel. Baasmudeli lahendus on kahe konkureeriva II tüübi FKKJ-i optimaalne 
suurus ning kui see suurus kasvab, põhjustab see II tüübi FKKJ-i ülekoormatust 
ja langetab pakutavate teenuste kvaliteeti. See on võrreldav Buchanani lahen-
dusega. 
Ühekordse toetuse mõju on näha ka liikmete nimel konkureerimise mudelilt. 
Neid toetusi võib saada kõrgema astme ametiasutustelt. Need suurendavad kahe 
konkureeriva II tüübi FKKJ-i liikmete puhastulu. Kui mõlemad II tüübi FKKJ-
id saavad toetusi ühesugusel määral, ei muuda uus jagamiskoht liikmete jaotu-
mist II tüübi FKKJ-ide vahel. Mõlema II tüübi FKKJ-i liikmed saavad lihtsalt 
suuremat puhastulu kui enne toetuse saamist ning valivad ikka II tüübi FKKJ-i, 
mis võimaldab suurimat puhastulu. Kui üks konkureerivatest II tüübi FKKJ-
idest saab aga suurema toetuse, muutub liikmete jaotus suurema toetuse saanud 
FKKJ-i kasuks, mis annab selle liikmetele suurema puhastulu. Seega on liik-
mete jaotumine kahe II tüübi FKKJ-i vahel muutunud. 
Puhastulu kõverad FKKJ-i liikmete nimel konkureerimise mudelis võivad 
osutada ka eri rahastamisvahendite mõjudele. Mudelilt on näha, et muutus 
rahastamistingimustes muudab FKKJ-ide liikmete puhastulu kõveraid. Siin-
kohal on vaatluse all kaks olukorda. Kui II tüübi FKKJ-i puhul on võimalik vaid 
üks rahastusstrateegia, varieerub liikmete jaotus olenevalt sellest, kuivõrd kätte-
saadav on soodsam strateegia liikmete jaoks. Soodsama all on mõeldud puhas-
tulu, mille liikmed saavad seda strateegiat rakendades. Ühe II tüübi FKKJ-i 
puhastulu kõverad siin ei ristu. Kui saadaval on hulk rahastusstrateegiaid ja 
puhastulu kõverad ristuvad ühe II tüübi FKKJ-i puhul, tuleb võrrelda ristumis-
kohtadevahelisi kõveraid. Kõrgeima puhastulu kõverad, mis asuvad ristumis-
kohtade vahel, näitavad kõige eelistatumat rahastamisstrateegiat nii ühe kui ka 
teise II tüübi FKKJ-i puhul. Kahe optimaalse kõvera ristumiskoht viitab sellest 
tulenevale liikmete jaotumisele kahe II tüübi FKKJ-i vahel ja sellega seotud 
optimaalsele rahastusstrateegiale. 
Empiiriline analüüs viidi läbi Venemaa õigusaktide analüüsimise ja interv-
juude abil. Venemaal tehtud intervjuud olid iseäranis väärtuslikud sellise teabe 
hankimisel, mida kirjanduse ja dokumendianalüüsi abil ei saa. Need aitasid 
paremini mõista omavalitsustevahelise koostöö õiguslikke võimalusi, oma-
valitsuste ja regioonide kaasamist otsustusprotsessi, sektoritele omaseid tingi-
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musi, omavalitsuste ja regioonide eelarvepoliitilisi võimalusi ning regiooni ja 
eri tasandi omavalitsuste vahelisi suhteid seoses koolidega. Bodensee veevarus-
tuse ühinguga tehtud intervjuu eesmärk oli koguda teavet selle kohta, kuidas 
omavalitsustevahelist koostööd II tüübi FKKJ-ide kujul praktikas korraldatakse 
ning milliste rahaliste, korralduslike ja juriidiliste aspektidega arvestamine on 
asutamisdokumentides oluline. 
Enne seda uuris autor esialgse ülevaate saamiseks Venemaa Föderatsiooni 
hariduse ja kohaliku omavalitsemisega seotud õigusakte ning tsiviilseadustikku. 
Seda teavet, II tüübi FKKJ-ide tunnusjooni, mis selgitati välja kirjandusanalüüsi 
abil, ja mikromajandusliku modelleerimise tulemusi kasutati intervjuuküsimuste 
koostamiseks. Intervjuude tulemusi kasutati omakorda selleks, et vastata küsi-
musele, kas Venemaal on võimalik II tüübi FKKJ-i asutada, et kontrollida, kas 
Venemaa koolisüsteemi kõiki tegelikke tegureid on FKKJ-i mikromajanduslikes 
mudelites arvesse võetud; ning töötada välja põhikiri ja memorandum. Seega 
täiendab väljatöötatud metodoloogia FKKJ-i mõistet käsitlevat kirjandust. 
Nagu selgus omavalitsustevahelise koostöö jaoks sobilike õiguslike vormide 
analüüsist, saab Venemaal asutada II tüübi FKKJ-i koolijurisdiktsioone vaid 
ühingu (liidu) kujul. Kehtivates õigusaktides on kaks mittekaubanduslikku vor-
mi – autonoomsed mittekaubanduslikud organisatsioonid ja fondid –, mida soo-
vitatakse omavalitsustevaheliseks koostööks Venemaal. Autonoomsed mitte-
kaubanduslikud organisatsioonid ja fondid pole aga II tüübi FKKJ-ide jaoks 
sobilikud, sest nad ei eelda asutajate liikmesust, mistõttu ei saa hetketegevuse 
jaoks osalustasu koguda. Kuna siinses lõputöös keskendutakse II tüübi FKKJ-
idele, leidub vaid üks mittekaubandusliku ühingu (liidu) õiguslik vorm, mille 
puhul omavalitsused saavad olla liikmed ja asutajad, vabatahtlikult liituda ja 
lahkuda, kattuda ja liikmete nimel konkureerida, seada sisse demokraatlikud 
toimingud ja struktuurid, avaldada põhikirja ning nõuda tasusid ja panuseid. 
Omavalitsuste tasandi ametiasutustel on õigus koole asutada, ümber kor-
raldada ja sulgeda. Venemaal tohivad aga kooliteenuste pakkumist korraldada 
ainult kõrgema astme omavalitsused, nagu munitsipaal- ja linnapiirkonnad ning 
linnasisese jaotusega linnaringkonnad. Omavalitsuste teised tasandid, nagu 
maa- ja linnaasulad, ei ole kooliteenuste pakkumisega seotud otsuste tegemiseks 
pädevad. Kõrgema taseme omavalitsused on volitatud langetama otsuseid seo-
ses haridusasutuste asutamise, ümberkorralduse ja sulgemisega ning kooli-
hoonete ja -rajatiste hooldamise, külgnevate territooriumide korrastamisega jne. 
FKKJ-i juhtkonna tegevust saab kooskõlastada mitmel moel, et vältida nen-
de ebasoodsaid otsuseid ja tegevusi ning selgitada nende kohustusi. Ebasood-
said otsuseid saab pikas perspektiivis vähendada, kui seada sisse eriline õigus-
raamistik. Sel eesmärgil on autor välja töötanud II tüübi FKKJ-i näidispõhikirja 
ja -memorandumi. Asutamisdokumentide jaoks on kindlaks tehtud, et ühing on 
sobilik õiguslik vorm omavalitsustevahelise koostöö jaoks Venemaal. Ühingutel 
peab olema kaks asutamisdokumenti: põhikiri ja memorandum. Põhikiri on 
üksikasjalikum ja sisaldab suuniseid selle kohta, kuidas ühing peaks toimima, 
samas kui memorandumis väljendatakse poolte initsiatiivi ühisettevõtte asuta-
miseks. Põhikirja ja memorandumi sätted võivad kattuda. Siinses lõputöös 
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täiendatakse nimetatud dokumentide standardsätteid teabega, mis on II tüübi 
FKKJ-ide jaoks oluline, näiteks teoreetiliste mudelite tulemused, omavalitsuste 
ja regioonide haridusasutuste esindajatega tehtud intervjuudest saadud empiiri-
lised teadmised ning FKKJ-iga sarnane omavalitsustevahelise koostöö vorm 
Saksamaal (Bodensee Zweckverband). 
Põhikirja kõige olulisemate sätete seas on II tüübi FKKJ-i liikmed, eesmär-
gid ja tegevusala, täitevorganite pädevus, liikmete õigused ja kohustused, liitu-
mine ja iga-aastane liikmemaks, otsustamisprotsess, likvideerimise ja ümber-
korralduste kord, kõrgeima organi ülesanded, II tüübi FKKJ-i organisatsiooni-
line struktuur jne. 
 Eritingimused selle kohta, kellel on lubatud II tüübi FKKJ-i koolides käia, 
mõjutavad väljundi suurust ning tuleks seega põhikirja lisada. Samuti määrab 
tarbijate väljaselgitamine põhikirjas turu struktuuri ja nõudlusfunktsiooni ning 
mõjutab II tüübi FKKJ-i optimaalse planeerimise lahendusi. FKKJ-i liikmed 
saab jagada rühmadesse neile pakutava kooliteenuste kvaliteedi või nende tar-
bitavate teenuste mitmekesisuse alusel. See, kas lapsed, kes on pärit omavalit-
sustest, kes pole liikmed, tohivad II tüübi FKKJ-i koolides käia, mõjutab väl-
jundi suurust. Seega on äärmiselt oluline nimetatud teave II tüübi FKKJ-i põhi-
kirja lisada. 
II tüübi FKKJ-i põhikirjaga ettenähtud eesmärgid määravad liikmete soovi-
tud juhtimiskäitumise tüübi, mistõttu nimetatud eesmärgid välistavad ebasood-
sad juhtumid III ja IV. Põhikirjas tuleks rõhutada ka ülesandeid ja tegevusvald-
kondi. See, kas II tüübi FKKJ pakub üksnes alg-, põhi-, või keskharidust, mõ-
jutab nõudluse suurust. 
Põhikirja lõigetest, mis käsitlevad liikmeid ja liikmete kogu, on näha, kui 
võimukad nad on võrreldes täitevorganitega, milliste otsuste tegemise nad anna-
vad II tüübi FKKJ-i täitevorganitele üle ja mille eest vastutab liikmete kogu. 
Samuti on vajalik juhtorganite pädevuse lisamine põhikirja, sest nii piiritletakse 
juhtkonna tegevus juhtimiskäitumise juhtumitega I ja II ning välditakse juh-
tumeid III ja IV. 
Liikmesust ja liitumistasu käsitlevad sätted on seotud teoreetilise model-
leerimise ja intervjuude tulemustega. Intervjuude ja õigusaktide analüüsi käigus 
saadud teabe kohaselt katavad piirkondlikud haridusasutused haridusvaldkonna 
tööjõu ja materjalide kulud, näiteks õpikud ja õpetajate palgad. Samas vastu-
tavad omavalitsused koolihoonete ja -rajatiste hooldamise eest. Seega võeti II 
tüübi FKKJ-i asutamise ja hetketegevuse mudelitest kasutusele matemaatiline 
lahendus kaheosalistele tariifidele, et need põhikirjas kindlaks määrata. Liik-
mete kogu otsusega saab kehtestada ka muid liitumise ja regulaarsete tasudega 
seotud eeskirju ning nende muid allikaid. 
Põhikiri peaks hõlmama ka II tüübi FKKJ-ide organite otsustusprotsessi. 
Häälte jaotumise alus (näiteks omavalitsuste kooliealiste laste statistiline arv) ja 
hääletamiseeskirjad tuleb ära kirjeldada. Häälte arv võib olla otseselt seotud 
väljundiga (õpilaste arv) või omavalitsuse osaga II tüübi FKKJ-i omakapitalis. 
See kujundab hääletuste tulemusi ja annab osale liikmetest rohkem mõjuvõimu. 
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Põhikirja sättes, mis on seotud likvideerimiskorraga, rõhutatakse ühingu mitte-
kaubanduslikke eesmärke, sest liikmete varaline panus tuleb neile tagastada 
vastavalt nende osalusele ning omavalitsused peavad seda kasutama haridus-
likel, kultuurilistel, sotsiaalsetel ja muudel põhikirjajärgsetel eesmärkidel. Kui 
see pole aga võimalik, võivad omavalitsused kasutada seda teistel eesmärkidel, 
mis pole seadusega keelatud. 
Siinne lõputöö võib pakkuda praktilist huvi Venemaa poliitikakujundajatele, 
kes vastutavad territoriaalse arengu ja munitsipaalplaneerimise eest. Omavalit-
sustevahelist koostööd algatavate omavalitsuste ja linnapiirkondade juhtide 
jaoks on siinses lõputöös üksikasjalikud juhised, mida II tüübi FKKJ-i kooli-
jurisdiktsioonide asutamisdokumentides arvesse võtta. II tüübi FKKJ-i põhi-
kirjas ja memorandumis on juba esitatud lahendused sellele, kuidas arvestada 
omavalitsuste osa, kuidas määrata regulaarse osaluse tasu jne. Lisaks võib see 
aidata omavalitsustel mõista, millist juhtimisviisi tuleks II tüübi FKKJ-i tege-
vuses kasutada. Kui juhtkonna eesmärke ei saa avalikustada enne nende tööle-
võtmist, võib nende otsuseid reguleerida II tüübi FKKJ-i põhikirja sätetega. 
Selle abil saab välistada juhtkonna otsused, mis kalduvad kõrvale II tüübi 
FKKJ-i põhikirjajärgsetest eesmärkidest.  
Kuna piirkondlikud ametiasutused pakuvad omavalitsuste koolidele toetusi, 
mis katavad osaliselt omavalitsuste haridustegevusega seotud kulud, võib 
piirkondlikele haridusasutustele huvi pakkuda ka koolisüsteemi optimeerimine 
ja kulude vähendamine II tüübi FKKJ-võrgustiku abil. 
Kooli II tüübi FKKJ-id saavad keskenduda teatud haridustasemele (nt alg- 
või keskharidusele), töötada välja ainulaadseid lähenemisviise haridusele ning 
tagada juurdepääsu tehnilistele ja inimressurssidele (õpetajad), mis polnud 
varem mõnede omavalitsuste jaoks võimalik. Sisuliselt loovad II tüübi FKKJ-i 
omavalitsused ühise ressursireservi. Nii võivad teenuse kasutajad sellest kõige 
rohkem kasu saada, sest kooliteenuste kvaliteet pole Venemaal ühtlane. Olukord 
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